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A bstract
I present a new analysis of the  problem, situation  in  Artificial Intelligence (AI), 
grounded in a Popperian epistemology.
I first review argum ents purporting to  establish th a t no purely “com puta­
tional” system can realise genuine m entality. I conclude th a t the  question is still 
open; bu t th a t the more pressing question is w hether such a system  can even 
exhibit intelligent behaviour. A ttention is thus directed a t the  com putational em­
bodim ent of knowledge, and its growth. I suggest th a t m uch of the  work in this 
area incorporates a flawed, naïve em piricist, epistemology. I adopt Popper’s view 
th a t the growth of knowledge is possible only through a process of unjustified 
variation and selective retention. In particular, the  inate  knowledge of biological 
organisms has arisen by such a  process, in the  form of Darwinian evolution.
I review previous work on the  realisation of Darw inian processes in compu­
tational systems. In particular, I present a critical re in terpretation  of von Neu­
m ann’s pioneering work in this area. I conclude th a t no system  to  date has 
exhibited substantive growth of artificial knowledge via a process of Darwinian 
evolution. More im portantly, I argue th a t this problem  is deeper th an  is generally 
recognised, requiring the  effective integration of autopoiesis w ith  evolvability. To 
achieve this it m ay ultim ately  be necessary to  realise something analogous to  the 
genesis o f life. I review one proposal for such a phenomenon: Holland’s so-called 
a-Universes. I present an implementation  of a  specific a-Universe and review the 
(largely negative) results of em pirical tests carried out on it.
I conclude w ith the  claim th a t the  problem  of realising the  spontaneous genesis 
of “artificial life” is of great difficulty, bu t th a t its solution m ay yet prove to  be 
an essential prerequisite for the  realisation of anything deserving to  be called 
“artificial intelligence” .
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Prologue
All this happened in a small town in Ireland, some time ago.
There was a man who went to live in the woods, thereby greatly 
surprising his neighbours. He was a well set-up man with a good job 
and a fine house, and so was well thought of, but he sold the fine house 
and gave away the money fo r  it, and he gave up the good job. Now  
this was a time when a good job was hard to come by and a man didn’t 
give one up unless he had a better one to go to, or he was an eejit. 
The man who went to live in the woods had never been thought o f as 
an eejit, but now his neighbours wondered. They asked him  why he 
was doing this thing.
“I  don’t  know,” said the man who went to live in the woods. This 
was thought to be an unsatisfactory answer, so they concluded that he 
was an eejit after all, and left him  to his fo lly ...
Brendan McNamee 
The Man W ho Lived In Sorcy Wood
C hapter 1 
Setting Out
1.1 In tro d u ctio n
The journey which this Thesis involves is a somewhat in tricate  one. W hile each 
separate chapter is reasonably self-contained, and m ight be read in isolation, the 
essential th rust of the  work relies on the  interconnections between them . The 
purpose of this introductory chapter is therefore to  preview the m ajor landm arks 
which will appear along the way, and especially how they are related to  each 
other. Equipped w ith this outline the  reader will then  hopefully be in a  position 
to  examine the  details w ithout losing sight of the  overall view.
1.2 O n C ritic ism
The point I want to make here is that Popper’s work itself contains a 
feature, unavoidable when properly understood, which has got between 
him and potential readers—who, being only potential, are not yet in a 
position to understand it. He believes, in a sense which will be made fully 
clear later, that only through criticism can knowledge advance. This leads 
him to put forward most of his important ideas in the course of criticizing 
other peoples’ . . .
Magee (1973, p. 14)
I am  very far indeed from supposing th a t anything I present here would bear 
favourable comparison w ith the achievements of Karl Popper. B ut M agee’s com­
m ent is relevant in at least this one respect: this Thesis is quite deliberately and 
self-consciously a work of criticism. I believe th a t I have some new things to  say, 
bu t th a t the  only way to say them  is to  place them  securely in the  context of the
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problems they a ttem pt to solve. These are not new, so to  present the  problems 
means to revisit the  work of their originators; and to  offer new solutions means to 
criticise previous solutions, and to  show where, in m y view, they  are deficient and 
can be improved. I emphasise this a t the  outset, for otherwise the  reader may 
quickly find herself wondering when I am going to  stop m erely “reviewing” the 
work of earlier w riters, and start w ith m y own substantive contribution; Gentle 
Reader, do not look for this boundary for it is nowhere to  be found. My “sub­
stantive contribution” is precisely this critical review, and cannot be conveniently 
distinguished from it.
1.3 P o p p e r ’s P ro b lem
I, however, believe that there is at least one philosophical problem in which 
all thinking men are interested. It is the problem of cosmology: the problem 
of understanding the world—including ourselves, and our knowledge, as 
part of the world. All science is cosmology, I believe, and for me the interest 
of philosophy, no less than of science, lies solely in the contributions which 
it has made to it. For me, at any rate, both philosophy and science would 
lose all attraction if they were to give up that pursuit.
Popper (1980, p. 15, original emphasis)
I shall call this problem of cosmology Popper’s Problem. I do not, of course, 
propose to  solve it. Indeed, I have very little  to  say directly about it. Nonetheless, 
I think it worthwhile to make explicit, this once, the fact th a t it  is the  original 
m otivating problem  which will be lying behind the  various more specific problems 
w ith which I shall be visibly concerned in  this work.
My approach to this problem of Popper’s is inevitably conditioned by my 
training as an Engineer. The first instinct of the Engineer is to  take things 
apart, and the  second is to  pu t them  together again—only differently. T hat is, 
as an Engineer I try  to  understand by re-creating. I don’t  expect to  re-create the 
world, and, in tru th , I don’t really expect to understand it. B ut I m ight succeed in 
understanding some bits of it; the trick is to select those bits which are interesting, 
and for which there is some realistic chance of success in understanding, which 
is to  say in re-creating.
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1.4 M ak in g  a M in d
The bits of the  world w ith which I shall s ta rt are minds.
It is an obvious, if ra ther foolhardy, starting  point. Popper’s Problem  is 
thus exchanged for something which is not noticeably any easier: the  problem  of 
Artificial M entality—building or re-creating minds. It is the  subject of C hapter 2.
I consider only one relatively narrow aspect of th is m ore specific problem: 
w hether we can establish valid a priori grounds for rejecting one particular 
approach—nam ely the  a ttem pt to  realise an artificial m ind simply by executing 
an appropriate program on a digital computer. The la tte r, which I shall call the 
hypothesis of computationalism, m ay be taken to  be the  prem ise underlying the 
research program m e of Artificial Intelligence (AI) a t least in its so-called “strong” 
form (Searle 1980).
I have two points to  m ake about this.
The first is th a t the  idea th a t com putationalism  is true  is an affront to  hum an 
dignity. However this does not m ake com putationalism  false. More im portantly, 
even if I “believed” th a t it is true, th is would be a t best a fallible belief—I would 
not use it, in itself, to  underm ine a hum anist ethics.
My second point is th a t I do not accept the  argum ents p u t forward either 
by Searle (1980) or Popper & Eccles (1977) for rejecting com putationalism  on 
strictly a priori grounds. This, of course, does not m ake com putationalism  true.
I finally wash my hands of this problem , by saying th a t I am  a m etaphysi­
cal dualist (I really and tru ly  believe th a t com putationalism  is false); bu t th a t I 
am  simultaneously a methodological com putational m onist (I am  going to pre­
tend th a t com putationalism  is true, because th a t seems, currently, like the  most 
promising avenue for m aking any progress).
1.5 K n o w led g e  and I ts  G row th
W ith the really difficult problems thus held in abeyance, I address myself to  some­
thing which is at least superficially m uch more tractable. Let us not aim  to  realise 
a com putational m ind ; instead, we will settle for com putational knowledge. This 
amounts to  asking for a com puter to  exhibit behaviours which we characteristi­
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cally associate w ith m entality, while we w ithhold judgem ent as to  w hether this 
could ever be the  “real” thing. The problem  of realising artificial, particularly  
com putational, knowledge is therefore tackled in  C hapter 3; this is the  problem  
of Artificial Intelligence in the “weak” form (Searle 1980).
I take up a num ber of current issues in  AI, which, though they  are quite 
distinct, are not independent: there is a single objective m otivating m y entire 
discussion, which is the  a ttem pt to  strip  away the  considerable c lu tter and ver­
biage th a t has accum ulated in the vicinity of the  m odern AI research program m e, 
and to  thus lay bare what I consider to  be its bedrock: the  problem  of the  growth 
of artificial knowledge. I suspect th a t m any workers in the  field are not even 
clearly aware of the  existence or true  nature  of th is problem; and are certainly 
not aware of its depth  and difficulty.
My first sally here is concerned w ith the  so-called Turing Test (Turing 1950). 
This is an operational, or behavioural, “test” for intelligence, based deliberately 
and exclusively on linguistic performance; it has provided an im portan t focus for 
AI research. I have two comments to m ake about it. F irst, the  Test has recently 
been criticised by French (1990) for being too stringent; I a ttem p t to  clarify the 
nature of the Test, and to  show, in  this way, th a t French’s criticism  is unfounded, 
and th a t the  Test can still serve as a valid goal in  AI research. However, secondly, 
and m ore im portantly, I suggest th a t it is, a t best, a  very long range goal; no 
computers have come close to  passing this test, and there is little  im m ediate 
prospect th a t any will. It seems to  m e wildly prem ature to  actively pursue this 
specific goal in the current state  of the  art. In my view, effective linguistic 
performance relies on very substantial pre-linguistic knowledge; I suggest th a t, for 
the  tim e being at least, a ttem pts to achieve linguistic behaviours are a  distraction 
from the  real problem s confronting AI.
I tu rn  next to  the  vexed question of “cognitive architecture” : roughly, what 
“kind” of com puter is “best” for realising AI? This is a question which im plicitly 
underlies m uch of the  tension between the  two m ajor contem porary groups w ithin 
AI: those advocating the  “symbol processing” or “Good Old Fashioned AI” (GO- 
FAI) approach, and the  “connectionists” . I will not preview th a t discussion in 
detail here: suffice it to  say th a t I consider th is debate to  be futile. There is, of 
course, no “best” kind of com puter for realising AI; and discussion in those term s
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is, again, a distraction from the  real problems.
At this point, I digress to  a ttem p t to  clarify w hat it is I m ean by “artificial 
knowledge” . Briefly, I equate knowledge w ith the  generation of predictions about 
the  world, which are at least “approxim ately” true , and the  exploitation of these 
predictions to  effectively m ediate an agent’s in teraction w ith the  world. Knowl­
edge thus consists in  anticipatory models or expectations, and is relative to  the 
world in  which the  agent is embedded. There is, perhaps, nothing shockingly new 
in this view, bu t it contrasts w ith some of the  ideas typically en tertained  w ithin 
AI, and it is w orth spelling out for th a t reason.
W ith  this m ore precise concept of “knowledge” in  hand, I consider the  problem  
of embodying such knowledge in a com puter system . I argue th a t doing so w ith 
a b ru te  force, so-called knowledge engineering, approach is unsatisfactory for two 
reasons. The first is pragm atic: the experience has been th a t th is is an extrem ely 
difficult thing to  so. In itself this is not decisive— perhaps we sim ply have not 
yet tried hard  enough. The second reason for rejecting knowledge engineering 
is, on the  other hand, fundam ental and compelling: we should rightly  consider 
any system  which relies on this form of spoon feeding—which is incapable of 
“learning” for itself—as a peculiarly impoverished and unsatisfactory kind of 
“intelligence” . Thus finally do we expose w hat I have already called the  bedrock 
problem of AI: the  growth of artificial knowledge.
How one progresses beyond this point depends critically on a philosophical 
issue: the  problem  of induction. Strangely, this need for a definite epistemological 
foundation rarely seems to be m ade explicit in  AI; th a t is to  say, m any workers 
in AI seem not to  recognise th a t there is any “problem ” of induction (e.g. Lenat 
1983). Be th a t as it may. I adopt the  Popperian view, which is simply th a t 
there is no such thing as a “logic” of induction; bu t th a t, notw ithstanding this, 
knowledge can and does grow by a kind of generalised Darw inian process of 
unjustified variation and selective retention  (UVSR).
I review this theory of evolutionary epistemology, and point specifically a t the 
distinction between “unjustified” variation (a strictly  logical notion) and “unbi­
ased” variation (which is a quite different notion concerned w ith  verisimilitude). I 
argue th a t several apparent criticisms of the  UVSR approach to  knowledge growth 
rest on a confusion between these two notions, and are therefore unfounded.
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At this stage the  problem at hand has resolved itself into the  following form: 
can we build a com putational system  which can support an open-ended growth 
of knowledge, based on the principles of Popperian evolutionary epistemology?
I m ay note th a t Popper himself has been less th an  sanguine about the 
prospects for such a development:
We learn by mistakes; and this means that when we arrive at inconsistencies 
we turn back, and reframe our assumptions. In applying this method 
we go so far as to re-examine assumptions even of a logical nature, if 
necessary. (This happened in the case of the logical paradoxes.) It is hardly 
conceivable that a machine could do the same. If its creators, incautiously, 
equip it with inconsistencies, then it will derive, in time, every statement 
that it can form (and its negation). We may perhaps equip it with a gadget 
which will warn it, in case it derives ‘0=1’, and make it abandon some of its 
assumptions. But we shall hardly be able to construct a machine which can 
criticize and readjust its own methods o f derivation, or its own methods of 
criticism.
Popper (1988, p. 109, emphasis added)
This comment originally dates from about 1957, and could perhaps be crit­
icised for being over-simplistic in  the  light of developments in au tom ated  logic 
since th a t tim e. Nonetheless, I th ink the  crucial point, contained in  the  final sen­
tence which I have italicised above, still stands: it raises the  problem  of m aking 
the  system  self-referential in  a  very deep and fundam ental way. This rem ains 
a very difficult and intractable problem , and lies behind m uch of w hat is to  be 
discussed in this Thesis. In my own earliest analysis, I described such systems as 
being reflexive, and summ arised the  difficulty like this:
We have now exchanged an abstract philosophical problem for a (mere?) 
engineering one: how to actually design and build such reflexive systems.
More carefully: it is easy to design a system which is reflexive—the prob­
lem is that it will tend to immediately self-destruct. This phenomenon is 
familiar to all who have had programs “accidentaHy” treat their own in­
structions as data, and overwrite themselves—a “crash” is the inevitable 
result. Thus we need to identify what properties or constraints a reflexive 
system should have so that it will spontaneously evolve toward greater in­
ternal organisation, and correspondingly sophisticated external behaviour.
In short, a system which, even if not initially intelligent, can become intel­
ligent.
McMullin (1990, p. 214)
In any case, at this stage in the  discussion the  problem  of the  growth of 
knowledge has been recognised as continuous w ith, and in a certain  deep sense,
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identical with, the problem of the growth of organismic complexity through D ar­
winian evolution. Given th a t Darwinian evolution is the best concrete example of 
evolutionary epistemology in action, I now reform ulate the problem  in  the  follow­
ing way, finally taking it altogether out of the  conventional dom ain of “artificial 
intelligence” : can we abstract the  processes of Darwinian evolution from their 
biological source, and embody them  in a com putational system?
1.6 O n D arw in ism
It seems to me th a t any serious a ttem p t to realise an artificial, com putational, 
Darwinism, should best be preceded by a  serious analysis of the  nature  of D ar­
winian theory w ithin its original, biological, domain. However, I have presented 
such an analysis in detail elsewhere (McMullin 1992a; 1992b; 1992c), and I will 
not repeat th a t m aterial here. Instead, I proceed directly to  the  question of em­
bodying Darwinian evolution in a com putational system , and this is the subject 
for C hapter 4.
W hile there has been a recent resurgence of interest in  this issue (particularly 
under the  rubric of Artificial Life—e.g. Langton 1989a; Langton et al. 1992; 
Varela h  Bourgine 1992), the seminal work was carried out by John von Neum ann 
in the period 1948-1953 (von Neum ann 1951; Burks 1966d). I present a detailed 
re-evaluation and critique of von N eum ann’s work.
My first, and perhaps m ost im portan t, point is th a t von Neum ann was in­
deed concerned w ith the  realisation of an artificial Darwinism in a com puta­
tional m edium . This requires emphasis, and detailed argum ent, because there  has 
emerged what I shall call a von Neum ann myth  in this area, which suggests some­
thing quite different. The m yth  holds th a t von Neum ann was working on some 
problem of autom aton “self-reproduction” per se; and because this would adm it 
of trivial “solution” , the  m yth further holds th a t von Neum ann introduced, as a 
criterion of autom aton “com plexity” (and thus of “non-trivial” self-reproduction), 
a requirem ent th a t a universal com puter (or, perhaps a “universal constructor” ) 
should be em bedded within it.
Like all m yths, there is a core of tru th  in this; bu t the  m yth  is now very 
garbled, and the tru th  is extrem ely hard  to uncover.
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Briefly, I argue th a t von Neum ann was interested in  the  question of autom a­
ton self-reproduction only insofar as th a t is an elem ent of the  problem  of realising 
artificial Darwinism; and th a t, insofar as he proposed a criterion for “non-trivial” 
self-reproduction, this was simply th a t it should be such th a t it can potentially 
support the growth of autom aton complexity by Darw inian processes. Von Neu­
m ann’s genius was firstly to recognise th a t this is problem atic a t all (he pointed 
out th a t it seems paradoxical th a t any autom aton could construct another which 
is more complex than  itself) and secondly th a t th is very particu lar problem  can 
be overcome by using a kind of programmable constructing autom aton  (what I 
shall call a Genetic M achine).
These points, once they are distilled, are, it seems to  me, fairly clear and 
uncontroversial. However, the  detailed argum ents are ra th e r involved and will 
take up the  bulk of Chapter 4.
The balance of th a t chapter is concerned w ith going beyond von N eum ann’s 
work: he had solved one im portant aspect of the  problem  of realising artificial 
Darwinism, bu t this by no means represents a complete solution. Von Neum ann 
showed how one could design an autom aton such th a t it could, in principle, con­
struct other au tom ata more complex than  itself (and so on). In practice, however, 
von N eum ann’s design can work only if his autom aton is protected  from virtually 
all m anner of interference or perturbation  of its operation— conditions which ef­
fectively rule out any possibility of Darwinian na tu ra l selection taking place. In 
this way, the outstanding problem, not addressed by von Neum ann, is identified 
as the  problem  of autonomy—how can an autom aton establish, m aintain, and 
protect its own unity  and integrity in the  face of environm ental perturbations. It 
is, in its way, a prior problem, and perhaps a deeper and m ore difficult one.
I examine a range of work which m ay be said to  have been inspired, directly 
or otherwise, by von Neum ann’s investigations.
I suggest th a t a  significant portion of this work is contam inated by the 
von Neum ann m yth—for if one has adopted th a t m istaken view of von Neu­
m ann’s original problem, it becomes almost impossible to  see, m uch less to solve, 
the outstanding problem  of autonomy. A rather different criticism  m ay be lev­
elled a t another indirect offspring of von Neum ann’s work—the so-called Genetic 
Algorithm  (e.g. Holland 1975; Goldberg 1989). I shall argue th a t the  Genetic
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Algorithm is concerned exclusively w ith the  rival m erits of different processes of 
“unjustified variation” which m ight be overlaid on a basic von Neum ann style 
artificial Darwinism. This is, no doubt, an interesting issue in its own right, bu t 
it is, a t best, tangential to  the  problem of autonomy.
The problem of autonom y has been directly confronted by some researchers, 
m ost notably Hum berto M aturana and Francisco Varela (M aturana & Varela 
1980; Varela 1979). They have form ulated an explicit and technical notion of 
autonomy, which they call autopoiesis. Roughly, a system  is autopoietic if it 
is self-regulating or hom eostatic in respect of its own identifying organisation. 
Furtherm ore, Varela et al. (1974) have dem onstrated artificial autopoietic sys­
tem s w ithin a com putational framework which is a t least loosely inspired by 
von N eum ann’s work. However, while these workers have dem onstrated artifi­
cial autopoiesis, the  systems they exhibit are no longer self-reproducing—not, at 
least, in  the  strong sense of a von Neum ann style genetic self-reproduction.
The problem of achieving a growth of artificial, com putational, knowledge (or, 
w hat am ounts to  the  same thing at this point, a growth in autom aton complexity, 
in von N eum ann’s sense) now seems to  am ount to  this: can we embed, in a 
suitable com putational framework, au tom ata  which are autonom ous in the  sense 
of autopoiesis, and which also satisfy the von Neum ann conditions for a Darwinian 
open-ended growth in complexity?
As far as I am aware, th is problem  has not been solved; indeed, it is unclear 
whether it has been previously recognised as an im portan t problem  in its own 
right. W hile it m ay well be th a t this problem will eventually succumb to  a  direct 
attack, I choose instead to  consider the  possibility of an indirect attack. This 
suspends the  a ttem p t to  directly build or engineer systems which would satisfy 
the desiderata set out above, and asks instead w hether such phenom ena m ight 
spontaneously arise under suitable conditions? In biological term s, we redirect 
our a tten tion  away from the  evolution of life, and take up, instead, the question 
of its genesis.
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1 .7  T h e G en esis  o f  A rtific ia l Life?
I take up the question of Artificial Genesis in C hapter 5, b u t I do so in a  ra ther 
narrow and specific way.
Recall th a t we are interested in  the spontaneous emergence of entities which 
are bo th  autonomous (autopoietic) and satisfy the von N eum ann conditions for an 
evolutionary (Darwinian) growth of complexity—w hat I shall loosely call evolv- 
ability. The first of these seems not too difficult—it has been specifically exhibited 
by Varela et al. (1974). In fact, I believe th a t the  phenom enon has been encoun­
tered in  other systems also, though not generally recognised as such; this, for 
example, is the sense in which I would interpret R ay’s otherwise fantastic re­
m ark th a t “It would appear th a t it is ra ther easy to  create [artificial] life” (Ray 
1992, p. 393). In any case, combining the  spontaneous emergence of autopoiesis 
w ith von N eum ann’s conditions for evolvability is another, and altogether m ore 
difficult, problem.
As it happens, there has been at least one specific a ttem p t to  form ulate 
systems which would specifically support the  spontaneous emergence of self- 
reproducing entities using a  von N eum ann style genetic mechanism: these are the 
a-Universes introduced by John Holland (1976). It should be emphasised th a t 
Holland’s proposal was m ade in a ra ther different context from th a t in which I 
a ttem p t to apply his work. In particular, even if the  or-Universes did everything 
which Holland thought they m ight, this would not represent a solution to  the 
problem  which I  have form ulated. Firstly, although the  self-reproducing entities 
envisaged by Holland use a  kind of genetic m echanism, they  still fall far short 
of satisfying the von Neum ann conditions for evolvability (they do not span a 
significant range of “complexity” ). Secondly, Holland did not address the  issue 
of whether these entities would be autonomous at all—not, a t least, in the  tech­
nical, autopoietic, sense. However, having said th a t, the  im plication of Holland’s 
analysis was th a t these entities would be at least “viable” in face of a range of 
“perturbations” , and thus it  seems th a t the a-Universes could provide a  useful 
stepping stone toward solving the problems a t hand.
Holland provided a description of one specific a-Universe, which I denote ao, 
and his detailed theoretical analyses were based specifically on this. His results
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were concerned w ith estim ating the  expected spontaneous emergence tim e for 
prim itive genetically self-reproducing entities; specifically he proposed th a t this 
could occur in a  somewhat increm ental fashion, and th a t th is could m ake the 
difference between a feasible and a  to tally  infeasible emergence tim e.
Holland did not carry out any em pirical testing of his results, though he 
noted th a t it should be possible to  do so. The bulk of m y C hapter 5 is there­
fore concerned w ith presenting ju s t such a  program m e of em pirical testing. This 
involves firstly re-defining «o in considerably m ore detail, and w ith  greater for­
mality, th an  H olland’s original presentation; the  la tte r left m any details open, 
which was satisfactory for Holland’s purely theoretical purposes, bu t such details 
m ust be specified in any practical im plem entation. I then  review the  results of a 
series of tests of Holland’s predictions.
The outcome of this is, in effect, a report on failure. It tu rns out th a t Holland’s 
analysis was flawed, insofar as it neglected several significant effects which he had 
not anticipated. a 0 cannot, in fact, support the  predicted spontaneous emergence 
of genetic self-reproduction, not even in Holland’s relatively impoverished sense 
of tha t.
Failure however, is not necessarily a negative outcome. W hile a 0 does not 
behave as expected, the precise modes of failure are interesting, and m ay provide 
a useful basis for further work. In particu lar, having investigated c*o in detail, it 
becomes clear th a t, a t best, it could only ever have realised autopoietic entities in 
essentially the same, ra ther lim ited, sense as had already been im plicitly exhibited 
by, say, Rasmussen et al. (1990) or Ray (1992). T hat is, the  entities which would 
be autopoietic would not be the putatively  genetically self-reproducing entities. 
Once th is is recognised, it suggests some possible avenues for fu rther exploration, 
which would a ttem p t to combine relevant aspects from these several different 
systems, and also from the somewhat different systems of Varela et al. (1974) 
and Zelany P ierre (1976).
However: such further investigations would finally take us beyond the  scope 
of w hat can be addressed in this one Thesis, and m ust therefore be left simply as 
aspirations for the  future.
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1.8 C on clu sion
To conclude this introductory chapter I shall sum m arise once more.
I have been inspired by Popper’s great cosmological problem  of understanding 
the world and our place w ithin it; bu t I know th a t th a t problem  is too demanding, 
and so I im m ediately simplify by focusing atten tion  on understanding ourselves, 
and w hat kinds of things we might be—which is to  say the  problem  of mentality. 
Here, and throughout, I seek an engineer’s solution—by re-creating we might 
understand. I examine some of the argum ents against the  very possibility of a 
com putational re-creation of m entality, b u t conclude th a t they  are not compelling. 
Now I simplify again, leaving aside m entality  proper (th a t ineffable notion of self- 
conscious experience) and ask w hether we can re-create intelligent behaviours, 
which is to  say artificial knowledge. I a ttem pt to  strip  away various ancillary 
issues which have come to  obscure this problem, and argue th a t the  substantive 
issue is then  the  growth of artificial knowledge. Further progress dem ands certain 
philosophical commitments, and I com m it myself to  a Popperian evolutionary 
epistemology. I thus simplify again, and now ask w hether we can re-create a 
form of artificial Darwinism. I show how von Neum ann solved one im portant 
aspect of this problem; and how this leaves exposed another, perhaps more basic 
and m ore difficult aspect, namely the  re-creation of artificial autonomy. My final 
simplification is to  ask not for artificial Darwinism, bu t for artificial genesis. I 
describe one detailed a ttem pt to  achieve this; and conclude by examining, and 
trying to  learn from, its failure.
T hat is the  journey ahead. We can do no more planning; we m ust simply set 
out.
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C hapter 2 
Artificial M entality
2.1 In tro d u ctio n
Many psychologists and brain scientists are embarrassed by the philosophi­
cal questions, and wish no one would ask them, but of course their students 
persist in asking them, because in the end these are the questions that mo­
tivate the enterprise.
Dennett (1978b, Introduction, p. xiii)
In coming to grips with the idea of a natural system, we must necessarily 
touch on some basic philosophical questions . . .  This is unavoidable in any 
case, and must be confronted squarely at the outset of a work like the 
present one, because one’s tacit presuppositions in these areas determine 
the character of one’s science.
Rosen (1985a, p. 45)
This chapter is concerned w ith the  philosophical milieu in which the rest of 
the Thesis will be unfolded. More particularly, it is concerned w ith the  question 
of whether the  research program m e which goes under the title  of Artificial In­
telligence, or A I, is capable (even in principle) of solving any of the  substantive 
problems posed by the  existence of minds.
This is no idle concern. As we shall see, a variety of critics, most notably 
Searle and Popper, have suggested th a t the  answer to  the  question is a m ore or 
less simple No—th a t AI cannot illum inate the  problems of m entality. If they 
were correct in this assessment it would represent a lim itation, a t the  very least, 
on the applicability of subsequent discussions in the  rest of the  Thesis. This 
is so because, although I eschew m any of the conventional tools and techniques 
associated w ith AI research, the  work I describe still falls w ithin the  essentially
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computational paradigm  which identifies AI as a field. It is as well to  confront 
this issue a t the  outset.
My objective then, is to  confound a t least some of the  critics of AI.
Having said th a t, let me im m ediately emphasise th a t m y conclusion will be 
the weakest possible in the circumstances: I claim  m erely th a t the  case against 
AI, or “com putationalism ” in the  broadest sense, is not (yet) proven. It is quite 
enough for m y purposes th a t the question still be open. Specifically, I do not 
propose to  argue th a t AI dem onstrably can solve any particular problem (s) of 
mentality. Or, if you wish, I accept th a t the  case fo r  AI (as an approach to 
m entality  at least—I ignore any questions concerning technological utility) is, 
equally, not (yet) proven.
I suspect th a t this agnostic position is im plicitly shared by m ost workers in 
AI; however, as Rosen points out in the  quotation above, it is best to  be explicit 
about such preconceptions.
2.2 T h ree  H y p o th ese s
I shall s ta te  three related hypotheses, which will then serve as targets for criticism.
H p (Physicalism ): All m ental states and events can, in  principle, be completely 
reduced, w ithout residue, to physical states and events.
H c (C om putationalism ): All m ental states and events can, in  principle, be 
completely reduced, w ithout residue, to  com putational states and events, 
of some universal computer.
H t (Turing Test C om putationalism ): The Turing Test (Turing 1950) can be 
passed by certain systems whose putative m ental states and events can, in 
principle, be completely reduced, w ithout residue, to  com putational states 
and events, of some universal com puter. H t is, essentially, a behaviouristic 
version of H c}
LI shall review the Turing Test in detail in the next chapter. For present purposes, the 
following formulation is adequate: a system passes the Turing Test if, based on purely linguistic 
interrogation (e.g. via teletype), but spanning arbitrary topics, a competent judge mistakes it 
for a person.
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H c implies bo th  Hp and H t. Thus the  following scenarios are logically con­
ceivable:
• A refutation of H c would be neutral w ith respect to  bo th  Hp and Ht.
•  A refutation of Hp would be neu tra l w ith respect to  H t, bu t would constitu te 
a de facto  refutation of H c.
• Similarly, a refutation of Ht would be neutral w ith respect to  Hp, b u t would 
constitu te a de facto  refutation of H c.
H c is the  hypothesis of direct interest in  this chapter; I have introduced Hp 
and Ht solely because any (alleged) refutations of these would also refute H c.
There are, of course, m any other relevant hypotheses closely related to  those 
I have introduced here, bu t w ith varying flavours and technicalities. However, in 
general, I deliberately overlook such finer distinctions in w hat follows, because 
they seem to  be unnecessary refinements for the  relatively m odest purposes I have 
in mind.
2.3 A  P erso n a l B ia s
..  .Yet machines are clearly not ends in themselves, however complicated 
they may be. They may be valuable because of their usefulness, or because 
of their rarity; and a certain specimen may be valuable because of its 
historical uniqueness. But machines become valueless if they do not have 
a rarity value: if there are too many of a kind we are prepared to pay to 
have them removed. On the other hand, we value human lives in spite of 
the problem of overpopulation, the gravest of all social problems of our 
time. We respect even the life of a murderer.
Popper & Eccles (1977, Chapter P I, p. 4)
Before proceeding to  consider criticisms of Hp and H c, I should like to  de­
clare an elem ent of personal bias: I side w ith those who hold th a t physicalism, 
whether in the plain form of Hp, or the  m ore specific form of H c, is u tterly  
and irredeem ably repugnant to hum an values. I shall therefore digress briefly to 
document just why I continue to  regard physicalism w ith such distaste.
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2.3.1 Why Physicalism  is (S till) R epugnant
Physicalism is repugnant because it denies the freedom and responsi­
bility o f man.
This is hardly a novel or original view, though it m ay have become less fash­
ionable to  speak of it (in the context of AI, a t least). Indeed, some will, no 
doubt, consider me naïve to  persist in it. However, I believe th a t this view, 
though hackneyed, is essentially correct. It has been effectively argued as such 
by, for example, Popper (Popper 1965; 1988; Popper & Eccles 1977).
Briefly, the physicalist hypothesis m ay be viewed as equivalent to  the  claim 
th a t the physical world is causally closed (which is, of course, not a t all the  same 
thing as claiming th a t the physical world is deterministic). This being so, m ental 
states and events (i.e. m inds, as such) can, in principle, be dispensed w ith  in  any 
description or analysis of physical states and events.
Minds may, of course, still be convenient devices for sum m arising certain 
(physical) phenomena. T hat is, minds m ay usefully be deployed in describing 
certain  “law-like” physical behaviours. Indeed, it seems to  me th a t it could only 
be by virtue of some such fact th a t m inds, like thunderstorm s or galaxies, would 
be real entities in good standing at all (regardless of the  tru th  or otherwise of 
physicalism). B ut, even at best, the  physicalist position is th a t any description 
of states and events, which incorporates mental states and events, will be exactly 
equivalent to some alternative (albeit vastly more com plicated) description in 
term s purely of physical states and events. Indeed we m ight expect m entalistic 
descriptions to  be mere approxim ations to  the purely physicalist descriptions 
(though this is not crucial to  the  argum ent).2
In particular, consider any episode of the  (apparent) exercise of “freedom”— 
th a t is, some kind of rational, or a t least considered, decision making. If phys­
icalism is true then, in principle, the  initial set of m ental states (and any other 
relevant factors) can be reduced to  physical states; the  tra jecto ry  of the  system
2Both Smolensky (1991) (with his plea for the “Proper Treatm ent of Connectionism” or 
PTC), and Hofstadter (1979; 1983) (with his concept of “tangled hierarchies” ), have given 
interesting discussions of such an approximate relationship between m entality  and physics. A 
detailed review would take me too far afield here, bu t I briefly consider Hofstadter’s views again 
in section 2.3.2 below.
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can be evaluated by reference only to  these physical states;3 and the  physical 
result or outcome (which, in the  general, stochastically indeterm inistic, case will 
not be unique, bu t will ra ther be represented by a probability function or dis­
tribution) can then  be encoded back into the resulting m ental states, which will 
represent the  decision (or a probability function or d istribution over potential 
decisions).
This is, of course, simply a restatem ent of Laplace’s thought experim ent which 
envisaged a  “demon” who could know the  instantaneous dynam ic s ta te  of the 
entire universe, and could therefore predict the  entire behaviour of the  universe 
for all fu ture tim e. The only additional feature I have introduced is to  allow 
for stochastic or probabilistic ra ther th an  strictly  determ inistic dynam ics—in 
deference to  the stochastic form of quantum  mechanical physical theories. This 
does not, in any way, affect the  force of the  argum ent w ith regard to  the  exercise 
(or not) of hum an “freedom” .
Note carefully th a t the  argum ent does not rely at all on the  practicality of a 
Laplacian demon. In particular, although Popper (1988) has provided a variety of 
argum ents against what he term s “ ‘scientific’ determ inism ” , this la tte r doctrine 
is m uch stronger than  the m ere causal closure of the physical world claimed by H p. 
“ ‘Scientific’ determ inism ” seems to  require th a t a Laplacian demon be physically 
realisable, a t least in principle (I take this to  be im plicit in Popper’s “principle 
of accountability” and his requirem ent for prediction from  within  the  physical 
world). W hereas, in the discussion of “freedom” above the point is not whether 
the future can, in fact, be predicted (statistically or otherwise), bu t w hether it 
can be altered (statistically or otherwise). In this respect, H v is m uch closer to 
what Popper calls “m etaphysical determ inism ” , a doctrine im plied by, bu t much 
weaker than , “ ‘scientific’ determ inism ” .
In any case, the essence of Hp is th a t no alternative analysis of the genesis 
of a hum an “decision” , using m entalistic term s or otherwise, could say any more 
about the  relationship of th a t “decision” to  the prior s ta te  of the  universe; indeed, 
we expect th a t a m entalistic analysis would yield, at best, only a  poor, and
3There m ay be some difficulty with establishing what constitutes the “system ” here; bu t, if 
needs m ust, we allow this to  include the entire physical universe (regardless of whether this is 
bounded or unbounded). Recall th a t this is only an “in principle” discussion.
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incomplete, approxim ation to  the physicalist result. In short, m ental states and 
events would have to  be considered as, in some sense, epiphenomenal.4 It is 
true th a t, under H p, the outcome of a decision m ay not be determ inistic (i.e. be a 
unique function of the  prior state), bu t it cannot be reasonably said to  be the  “free 
choice” of the  person; the possible outcomes, and the ir relative probabilities were 
already determ ined, and were not changed one io ta  by the  particu lar thoughts 
th a t the person (appeared) to  think.
The loss of freedom implied by Hp carries w ith it, of course, the  loss of re­
sponsibility or m oral obligation: since the  person’s thoughts (desires, intentions 
etc.) can be dispensed w ith in evaluating her actions, we could hardly  hold her 
responsible for those actions.
Taken to  its logical conclusion of course, this signifies th a t m y very discus­
sion of this topic is also epiphenomenal, and, in th a t sense, ridiculous (though 
perhaps not quite absurd). This result is, in essence, w hat Popper has term ed 
“the nightm are of the physical determ inist” (Popper 1965, p. 217) because it 
takes its clearest form under the  hypothesis of a determ inistic physical universe, 
in which a unique trajectory  property holds. However, the  point which Popper 
was at pains to  expose is th a t the nightmare is not in the least relieved by a 
stochastically indeterministic physics. As long as a complete reduction of m ental 
states and events to  physical states and events is possible, in  the  sense th a t the 
resulting description is causally closed (w hether the  causation is determ inistic or 
stochastic) then  the  nightm are recurs, as I have tried  to  m ake clear above. In 
Popper’s words, “indeterm inism  is not enough” (Popper 1965; 1973).
2.3.2 Som e Contrary V iew s
There exist, of course, a variety of contrary views on the  repugnant consequences 
of physicalism.
Firstly, a  common supposition is th a t stochastic indeterm inacy (typically, 
though not necessarily, involving an appeal to  quantum  mechanics) can make 
physicalism and hum an freedom com patible. Indeed, this was the  view of A rthur
4 “Epiphenomenalism” comes in more than one flavour. The kind I have in mind here is that 
of Hofstadter (1983)—which seems to be subtly different from that of Popper (Popper fc Eccles 
1977, Chapter P3, Section 20).
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Holly Compton, as noted by Popper in his C om pton m em orial lecture (Popper 
1965); however, Popper firmly rejected this view, essentially for the  reasons dis­
cussed in the  previous section. The point is th a t physical indeterm inacy of this 
sort simply does not change the nature  of the  argum ent, nor, therefore, its  con­
clusion. I shall not consider this position further.
A.F. Huxley has argued th a t the  impracticability of actually carrying out a
physicalist reduction robs it of its sting:
. . .  I used to be upset at the idea of possibly not having free will, but it now 
seems to me that even if we do not have free will, the events which govern 
our movements are so unpredictable that there is no need to be worried 
about it.
Huxley (1983, p. 15)
Penrose has recently offered a more sophisticated variation on this argum ent, 
in the  context of a discussion of free will. He argues th a t a complete physicalist 
analysis of any particular m ental event or events m ay be not m erely im practical, 
but actually impossible, in the technical sense of being uncomputable (Penrose 
1990). In this way, the  physical world could, in fact, be causally closed, b u t in 
such a way th a t this closedness could not be exploited from within.
In a sense, however, the  relatively sophisticated appeal which Penrose makes 
to  the notion of com putability is unnecessary. The following argum ent, formu­
lated by, for example, Popper (1974c, Section XXV), seems to  m e to  establish 
the same point m ore directly and decisively. Reality, in its entirety, is causally 
interconnected (by definition). Thus, any practical a ttem p t to  m ake a complete 
analysis of any aspect of reality (from within the  real world) would require a 
complete model of the  real world to  be em bedded w ithin itself; this would, of 
course, include a model of the model, and so on. This is clearly impossible (in- 
completable).
So let it be stipulated  th a t a complete reduction of m entality  to  physics will 
always be im practical; the point remains th a t the  repugnance of physicalism rests 
entirely on its in principle nature, and not any particu lar claim to  be able to  carry 
it out; the  la tte r would be a factor in any a ttem p t to  corroborate physicalism, 
but th a t is not the issue just here. Indeed, Penrose him self seems to  finally 
acknowledge th a t the  im practicality of a  physicalist reduction cannot, in  itself, 
restore hum an freedom to  the universe (Penrose 1990, pp. 558-559).
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Another possible position is to  accept the  consequences of physicalism, bu t to  
put a brave face on the  situation—claim th a t it m ay not be intrinsically repugnant 
after all.
Sperry pu t this view succinctly when he said “There m ay be worse fates than  
causal determ inism ’’ (Sperry 1965, p. 87). It should be stressed th a t Sperry 
does not m ean strict determ inism  here—he specifically accepts th a t a stochastic 
indeterminism  would add nothing m ore th an  a  degree of “unpredictable caprice” 
to  our actions. R ather, he is referring to  the  general physicalist position th a t 
m ental events are ultim ately reducible to  physical events, which is to  say Hp.
However, Sperry’s position is still a good deal m ore complex th an  th e  slogan 
m ight suggest. Hofstadter (1985, C hapter 25) has provided an extended allegory 
expanding on this paper of Sperry’s. U ltim ately, in  fact, bo th  Sperry and Hofs­
tad ter seem to  be ambivalent about the  im plications of physicalism for free will. 
T hat is, as far as I understand them , they  adopt physicalism, accept th a t this 
is incom patible w ith “free will” as it is conventionally understood, and yet they 
also seem to  qualify their physicalism, as if to  draw back again from this abyss.
Thus, Sperry claims, in effect, th a t we can have our physicalist cake and eat
. . .  you will note that the earlier basic distinction or dichotomy between 
mentalism and materialism is resolved in this interpretation, and the former 
polar differences with respect to human values . . .  become mainly errors 
of reductionism. This may be easily recognised as the old “nothing bu t” 
fallacy; that is, the tendency, in the present case, to reduce mind to nothing 
but brain mechanism, or thought to nothing but a flow of nerve impulses.
. . .  Our quarrel is not with the objective approach but with the long ac­
cepted demand for exclusion of mental forces, psychic properties, and con­
scious qualities—what the physicist might class as “higher-order effects” 
or “co-operative effects”—from the objective scientific explanation.
Sperry (1965)
Like Sperry, Hofstadter emphasises the  existence of “em ergent” behaviours, in 
the sense of levels of description having their own distinctive characteristics, even 
though these are still “compatible w ith” (but does this m ean “reducible to”?) a 
purely physical level of description. In the  case of conscious experience and free 
will, H ofstadter particularly emphasises the  Godelian im plications of self referen­
tial symbols a t different levels of description (Hofstadter 1979, C hapter XX).
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It seems to  me th a t both  Sperry and H ofstadter are here confusing two quite 
different issues: the utility of m entalistic (or other “higher-order” ) descriptions, 
versus their necessity.
It is certainly the case th a t there exist descriptions of states and events in the 
world, incorporating m entalistic term s, which are approxim ately, if not exactly, 
true—indeed, it was stipulated in the  previous section th a t this is actually  the 
defining condition (at least in a causally closed physical world) for such “higher- 
order” entities to  be recognised at all. These m entalistic descriptions, being 
“higher-order” , are more concise and tractab le  th an  the  corresponding purely 
physical descriptions. This is enough to  m ake them  useful additions to , or even 
replacem ents for, purely physical descriptions, for practical purposes of analysis 
and prediction.
B ut none of this implies th a t “higher-order” (m entalistic or otherwise) de­
scriptions are necessary. Indeed, the  point of saying th a t th e  physical world is 
causally closed is precisely to  say th a t non-physical entities are, even if only in 
principle, superfluous to a complete account of physical states and events.
To be fair to  Sperry and Hofstadter, neither explicitly claims th a t their ap­
proach does anything to  restore the  dignity of m an in a  soulless universe. At the 
end of the  day, they are m ore concerned w ith reinterpreting our attribution  of 
free will, than  in restoring or rehabilitating the  real thing. This is a perfectly 
sensible procedure upon the adoption of a  physicalist position, bu t I do not see 
th a t it can make physicalism in the  least degree m ore palatable.
There is a final possible position to  be considered, though it really brings us 
full circle. This is to  claim, despite the  argum ents m arshalled in the  previous 
section, th a t physicalism somehow is com patible w ith the  exercise of free will, 
and the a ttribu tion  of responsibility. This is a  position which D ennett forthrightly 
promised to  defend:
...c a n  psychology support a vision of ourselves as moral agents, free to 
choose what we will do and responsible for our actions? Many have thought 
that materialism or mechanism or determinism . . .  threaten this vision, but 
. . .  I  consider the most persuasive of the arguments to this effect and reveal 
their flaws.
Dennett (1978b, Introduction, p. xxii, emphasis added)
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However, virtually in the same breath , we already find a partia l re trea t from 
this bold and intriguing promise:
By uncovering the missteps in the most compelling arguments for this 
thesis I  claim not to refute it, but at least to strip it o f its influence.
Dennett (1978b, Introduction, p. xxii, emphasis added)
I shall ultim ately  find myself m ore or less in agreement w ith D ennett in  this 
second formulation; th a t is, while I continue im placably to  assert the  repugnance 
of physicalism, I agree th a t this need not “influence” our scientific investigation 
of it. However, as I shall discuss in the  next section, m y grounds even for this 
circumscribed position are somewhat different from, and m ore general than , Den­
n e tt’s.
B ut, before proceeding to th a t, I should like to  com m ent briefly on the  detailed 
arguments which D ennett actually presented (D ennett 1973).5
D ennett prim arily argues for the  validity of adopting w hat he calls the  in­
tentional stance toward certain systems, specifically including people. This is a 
necessary step in his argum ent since the intentional stance is, he says, “a  pre­
condition of any m oral stance, and hence if it is jeopardized by any trium ph  of 
mechanism, the  notion of moral responsibility is jeopardized in tu rn ” (D ennett 
1973, pp. 242-243).
This is all true, b u t is not, in my view, germane. There is no doubt th a t 
the intentional stance can usefully be adopted in m any situations, and th a t this 
possibility is a requirem ent for intentional systems, like m inds, to  be recognised 
as such at all. B ut it is not clear th a t anyone is arguing to  the contrary (i.e. to  the 
effect th a t the u ltim ate  truth of purely physical description would, in some sense, 
imply the  falsity  of m ental, or intentional, descriptions). The point is not th a t 
m entalistic or, m ore generally, intentional, descriptions are false, or even useless, 
but ra ther th a t they  m ay be causally redundant. The physical world m ight, as it 
were, go along just the same way w ithout them .
The notion th a t physicalism m ight somehow rule out the  adoption of the  inten­
tional stance, for utilitarian purposes, is a distraction—a m ere straw  m an. T hat
5 Dennett has since provided a much more extensive analysis of “free will” and related prob­
lems (Dennett 1984). Chapter 5 of th a t work addresses the issues of m ost concern for my 
purposes, bu t I have been unable to  identify anything which would deflect the criticisms which 
I present of D ennett’s earlier essay (Dennett 1973). A properly comprehensive review of (Den­
nett 1984) would take me too far afield; I shall therefore not discuss it further.
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is, as long as the  intentional stance is m erely th a t— a “stance” we m ight choose 
to take up w ith respect to  certain physical system s, for u tilitarian  purposes—it 
seems th a t it cannot be relevant to  the  issue under discussion here.
However, D ennett does offer a few further tw ists th a t m ight affect this con­
clusion. He considers the point th a t to  abandon the  intentional stance toward 
oneself would be fundam entally incoherent; th a t there is therefore an element 
of intentionality in the  world which is m ore th an  an optional stance toward an 
essentially physical system—for the  very taking up of a stance is, in  itself, an 
intentional action.
This is an in tricate  and intriguing argum ent. B ut D ennett him self im m edi­
ately adm its th a t it is really an a ttem p t to  refute physicalism, ra ther th an  a 
means of reconciling physicalism w ith free will. And, as a refutation of physical­
ism, it fails. Briefly, it is another determ inistic nightm are: if physicalism is true, 
we cannot properly be said to  “choose” to  take up any stance a t all.
Popper has discussed this kind of argum ent critically, and provides the  fol­
lowing concise version of what can, and cannot, be validly drawn from  it:
. . .  the epiphenomenalist argument leads to the recognition of its own 
irrelevance. This does not refute epiphenomenalism. It merely means 
that if epiphenomenalism is true, we cannot take seriously as a reason or 
argument whatever is said in its support.
Popper & Eccles (1977, Chapter P3, p. 75)
Indeed, I m ay say th a t this analysis provides the  rationale for the  entire orien­
tation of the  current chapter: I consider the  argum ents against physicalism, but 
not those in favour ; for, by definition, the  m ost compelling argum ents in favour 
of physicalism m ust also be the  most self defeating.
B ut to  re tu rn  to  D ennett, he next considers the  point tha t:
.. .no information system can carry a complete true representation of itself 
. . .  And so I cannot even in principle have all the data from which to 
predict (from any stance) my own future.
Dennett (1973, p. 254)
But this is simply back to the  question of the  practicality ra ther th an  the  truth 
of physicalism; indeed, D ennett explicitly acknowledges Popper’s form ulation of 
this point, as I have already described it in the discussion of Huxley and Penrose 
above; and it still does not impinge on the  issue of free will.
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It seems then  th a t D ennett does not achieve his original aim  of showing how 
free will and physicalism m ight genuinely co-exist in a single cosmology. His 
concluding rem arks are, in fact, addressed to  a different them e:
Wholesale abandonment of the intentional is in any case a less pressing con­
cern than partial erosion of the intentional domain, an eventuality against 
which there can be no conceptual guarantees at all.
Dennett (1973, p. 255)
The issue is no longer the  relationship between free will and physicalism; bu t 
ra ther the  potential for abuse of whatever physicalist understanding of m entality  
(if any) may, in practice, be achieved. This is now a discussion of the  uses of 
science, which is to  say a moral discussion. As such, it is not, itself, any longer a 
part of the  scientific discourse. This is the  point a t which I can finally agree w ith  
D ennett, and I elaborate this general position in th e  next section.
2.3.3 B ut: does it really m atter?
. . .  Thus I regard the doctrine that men are machines not only as mis­
taken, but as prone to undermine a humanist ethics. However, this very 
reason makes it all the more necessary to stress that the great defenders of 
that doctrine—the great materialist philosophers—were, nevertheless, al­
most all upholders of humanist ethics. From Democritus and Lucretius to 
Herbert Feigl and Anthony Quinton, materialist philosophers have usually 
been humanists and fighters for freedom and enlightenment; and, sad to 
say, their opponents have sometimes been the opposite.
Popper & Eccles (1977, Chapter P I, p. 5)
Does it m atte r th a t the  physicalist hypothesis has dehumanising implications? 
Well, the fear expressed above by Popper, th a t it m ight be used as an excuse for 
dehumanising actions, is not entirely w ithout foundation. Perhaps this explains, 
in part, why a proponent of physicalism m ight be loath  to  accept th a t this position 
does indeed im ply the  abandonm ent of hum an freedom and responsibility. If so, 
this would be quite understandable, perhaps even adm irable in its way; b u t I 
suggest th a t it would also be quite mistaken.
We can and should face up to  the  consequences of our theories, even when 
they are odious. We can do this because, in  fact, there  is nothing to  fear from 
even the most odious consequences of any theory—provided we remember that our 
theories are ju s t that, fallible inventions o f  the human mind. I cannot accept th a t
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any such fallible theory, no m atte r how well corroborated, could ever provide us 
w ith moral principles or, worse, justifications. “Scientific m orality” is, I suggest, 
a contradiction in term s. As Popper has said, even the  greatest defenders of 
physicalism have actually been upholders of the  hum anist ethic— and th a t, in  my 
view, is precisely as it should be.
In short, I assert th a t it is only good science to  adm it the  im plications of 
our theories, repugnant or not; but that it is then only good philosophy to admit 
that our scientific theories, in themselves, are devoid o f moral authority. Science 
absolves no sins.
In this present context, this means th a t the im plications of physicalism, re­
pugnant as they m ay be, can still be viewed w ith a certain  degree of equanim ity 
or detachm ent. We m ight almost say th a t this makes the  a ttribu tion  of repug­
nance aesthetic ra ther than  scientific; as such, it need not, and should not, deflect 
the scientific investigation.
Having said th a t, I should emphasise th a t I do not suggest th a t the  p a th  of 
science is free from m oral decisions, or from m oral culpability— th a t scientific 
“progress” might be justified as an end in itself. Q uite to the  contrary, I consider 
th a t scientific activities are no different from any other hum an activities in this 
respect; they share the  moral im perative for us to  consider (as well as possible), 
and accept responsibility for, the  likely outcomes of our activities. It is precisely 
in discharge of this m oral obligation th a t I have stipulated  my abhorrence of 
physicalism, per se, have positively argued th a t th is abhorrence is justified, but 
have then  gone on to  argue th a t this, in itself, does not have the  force of a  general, 
moral, restrain t on the  scientific investigation of physicalist theories of m entality.
This position should be distinguished from, say, a  specific advocation of sci­
entific investigation into theories of “brain-washing, sublim inal advertising, hyp­
notism  and even psychotherapy . . .  and the more direct physical tam pering w ith 
drugs and surgical intervention” (D ennett 1973, p. 255). Such activities could, 
no doubt, fall w ithin a physicalist research program m e; bu t, as D ennett im plic­
itly  draws out, they would require specific moral validation well beyond anything 
which has been discussed here.
28
2 .4  R efu tin g  C om p u ta tio n a lism ?
Having m ade clear the  unhappy implications of H p (and thus H c), bu t having also 
affirmed tha t this should not, in itself, deflect us from  the  fu rther scientific study 
of these hypotheses, I now return  to  the substantive question of this chapter: Has 
H c already, in fact, been refuted?
One avenue for the  a ttem pted  refutation of H c is the  claim, originally pro­
pounded by Lucas (1961), th a t Godel’s results on the  existence of undecidable 
propositions in consistent formal systems establish th a t m entality  is necessar­
ily irreducible to  form al processes. However, this has already received extensive 
exploration, and m any detailed criticisms (see, for example, H ofstadter 1979; 
D ennett 1970; H ofstadter &; D ennett 1981, p. 470, p. 475 give further references). 
I shall therefore m ake only one brief comment here.
The Lucas argum ent relies on the claim th a t, faced w ith any m achine which 
putatively  exhibits m entality, one can always form ulate a  proposition which the 
m achine cannot prove but which any person (Lucas himself, for exam ple) can 
see to  be “tru e” . As Dodd (1991) has pointed out, albeit in a slightly different 
context, any such perception of “tru th ” is actually dependent on an assum ption 
of consistency for the relevant formal system; bu t, precisely because of Godel’s 
results, such consistency cannot, in general, be proven. Thus, it seems to  m e th a t 
the  argum ent by Lucas fails from the  very start: while the  machine cannot prove 
its Godel sentence, neither can Lucas; the  m ost th a t Lucas can do is to  conjecture 
th a t it is true— and I can see no bar to the  m achine also doing th a t much. In any 
case, I shall not pursue the Lucas argum ent further.
I now tu rn  to  two other, quite distinct, argum ents for the  refutation of H c. 
These are Searle’s so called Chinese Room  thought experim ent, and the ra ther 
m ore general “dualist in teractionist” argum ent for the  causal openness of the 
physical world (which is to  say, for the falsity of H p, and thus, implicitly, of H c 
also) presented by Popper h  Eccles. It seems to m e th a t these are substantial and 
challenging argum ents, and I shall devote the following sections to  considering 
them  in some detail.
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2.4.1 Searle’s C hinese R oom
Searle’s [Searle 1980] ‘Chinese Room’ argument against ‘Strong AI’ has 
had considerable influence on the cognitive science community . . .  it has 
challenged the computational view of mind and inspired in many respon­
dents the conviction that they have come up with decisive, knock-down 
counterarguments . . .  Yet the challenge does not seem to  want to go away 
. . .  Indeed, some have gone so far as to define the field of cognitive science 
as the ongoing mission of demonstrating Searle’s argument to be wrong.
Harnad (1989)
John Searle’s original presentation of his Chinese Room argum ent was already 
accompanied by extensive peer com m entary (Searle 1980). In  the twelve years 
th a t have since passed, there has been a  continuing stream  of publication on the 
issue. A survey is provided by, for example, H arnad in the  paper quoted above. 
Slightly m ore recently, Scientific American  has hosted another instalm ent in the 
debate, w ith a restatem ent of his position by Searle, and an a ttem pted  reb u tta l by 
P.M. Churchland and P. Sm ith Churchland (Searle 1990; Churchland & Church- 
land 1990). It is clearly a m a tte r of some continuing interest and significance for 
AI, and I should therefore like to  comment on it.
In w hat follows, I shall take “Strong AI” , as Searle term s it, as being equivalent 
to  m y H c, and “Weak AI” as equivalent to  m y H t .
Searle’s contention is th a t H c is false, and th a t this is dem onstrable through 
a series of thought experim ents. I shall describe only the  simplest of these, and 
even th a t only very briefly.
Let there be a com puter which (when suitably program m ed) appears to  in­
stan tiate  the m entality  of a Chinese speaking person (in som ething like the  sense 
of the  Turing Test). A person, ensconced in  the  so-called Chinese Room , could, 
given appropriate, purely formal, instructions, sim ulate the  behaviour of th is com­
puter exactly. This Chinese Room would also, therefore, putatively  instan tiate  
the  m entality  of the Chinese speaking person. The “real” person carrying out 
the  sim ulation is stipulated not to  be a Chinese-speaker. If we now enquire of 
this person whether she understands any Chinese, she will say no. Therefore (?) 
there is no genuine Chinese m entality being realised by the  Chinese Room, and 
therefore m entality cannot be reduced, w ithout residue, to  com putational states 
and events. H c has been refuted.
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It is im portan t to  note th a t Searle accepts H p, or, a t least, som ething essen­
tially equivalent to  it:
Can a machine have conscious thoughts in exactly the same sense that 
you or I have? If by “machine” one means a physical system capable of 
performing certain functions (and what else can one mean?), then humans 
are machines of a special biological kind, and humans can think, and so, of 
course machines can think. And, for all we know, it might be possible to 
produce a thinking machine out of different materials altogether—say, out 
of silicon chips or vacuum tubes. Maybe it will turn out to be impossible, 
but we certainly do not know that yet.
Searle (1990, p. 20)
So, Searle’s claim  is th a t some sort of physicalist (Hp) theory is (or at least, 
m ay be) true—but th a t Hc is not th a t theory.
Searle is neutral w ith respect to H t: indeed, the  Chinese Room argum ent only 
works given the assum ption th a t H t may, in fact, be true  (if H t somehow actually 
proves to  be false, then  th a t autom atically refutes H c anyway, and the  fact th a t 
the Chinese Room argum ent could no longer even be properly form ulated would 
not m atte r—it becomes redundant w ith respect to  the  real problem , i.e. the  tru th  
or otherwise of H c).
Now m ost, if not all, com m entators on th is issue can be divided into two 
groups:
•  Those who hold th a t H c is false, w hether they  agree w ith all of Searle’s 
reasoning or not. Thus I include here, for example, Eccles (1980), who 
agrees w ith Searle’s refutation of H c, bu t disagrees strongly w ith Searle’s 
uncritical acceptance of Hp (Eccles describes himself, following Popper, as 
a  “dualist interactionist”— see Popper & Eccles 1977; I shall consider their 
views in more detail in section 2.4.2 below).
• Those who hold th a t H c is true. Their basic position is th a t, since Hc is 
true , Searle m ust be wrong. They then  go on, in the light o f this, to  try  to 
identify precisely why Searle is, in  fact, wrong. I consider th a t, if any of 
these particular com m entators are right, it is those who advocate the  so- 
called “systems reply” . Briefly, this grants th a t the  person in the  Chinese 
Room per se does not have any Chinese understanding or m entality, but 
holds th a t the  Room as a systemic whole (including the  person inside)
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understands, or at least, might understand, Chinese— i.e. have “genuine” 
Chinese m entality. However, I shall not pursue the  argum ents for and 
against th a t position here.
My purpose in m aking this classification is to  identify, by omission, a  th ird  
possible position: th a t which holds th a t Searle’s reasoning is wrong, and th a t, 
therefore, the status of H c is simply unaffected by his argum ent: it rem ains a 
tentative hypothesis. This is the  position I propose to  adopt.
It is im portant to  realise th a t this is a perfectly valid procedure, and is, if 
correct, preferable to  a position of claiming th a t H c is actually true. It is prefer­
able in the basic sense th a t a ttem pting to  argue for the  tru th  of the  converse 
of a proposition is, in general, an unnecessarily strong  way of attacking a  sup­
posed proof of the  original proposition. B ut the  procedure is doubly preferable 
in this particular case where any a ttem p t to  prove the  tru th  of H c inevitably 
undermines itself anyway (it is another variant of the  “determ inistic nightm are” 
of section 2.3.1). I suspect th a t this m ay be a t the root of H arnad’s observation 
th a t, “Many refutations [of Searle’s argument] have been attem pted , bu t none 
seem convincing” H am ad (1989, p. 5).
So, to reiterate, m y claim is th a t Searle’s reasoning is defective, and his con­
clusion (tha t H c is false) is therefore unwarranted; bu t I do not suggest th a t H c 
is, in fact true. My only claim is th a t its  status is still open.
Briefly, the  argum ent is this:
H c does not m ake the  prediction which Searle ascribes to  it (th a t the  
person in the  Chinese room should, upon enquiry, report th a t she 
understands Chinese); in fact, H c is entirely neu tra l as to  the  out­
come of the  experim ent. H c cannot, therefore, be refuted by Searle’s 
experim ent— no m atter what its outcome!
As far as I am  aware, this argum ent is due, in essence, to  Drew M cD erm ott, 
who introduced it in personal communication w ith  H arnad; I have not identified 
any published version of precisely this idea. In my view, this argum ent is not only 
concise and elegant, bu t also devastating. On the  o ther hand, as H arnad sta ted  in 
my opening quotation above, m any have previously thought they had identified 
“decisive” argum ents on this issue, but the  debate rum bles on nonetheless (indeed,
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Harnad himself rejected this view of M cD erm ott’s, bu t I have been unable to 
understand his reasons).6
In any case, I now tu rn  back to  Searle’s own argum ents. Searle has, I think, 
been somewhat puzzled by the  reception his ideas have had— at least in  the AI 
community. He believes th a t his Chinese Room A rgum ent is decisive against H c, 
and yet there are m any people who are unwilling to  accept this. So he seeks an 
explanation of this. He finds a candidate explanation in the  notion th a t some 
people m ay (mistakenly) think th a t Ht necessarily implies Hc. Therefore, anyone 
who accepts Turing’s original argum ent for H t (basically, a universal com puter 
can realise any effective procedure—can “sim ulate” anything whose behaviour is 
sufficiently well specified—and there is no m anifest a priori reason for supposing 
th a t hum an linguistic performance cannot be so specified) would in terpret this 
as an argum ent for H c also; and m ight therefore be convinced th a t Searle m ust 
be wrong in his refutation of Hc, even if they  cannot identify exactly why he is 
wrong.
Now even Searle himself is willing to  accept the  possibility th a t H t m ay be 
true. So he perceives th a t part, at least, of his task  should be to  show how it can 
be th a t H t could be true, and yet H c could be false.
He does this by citing other phenom ena (e.g. rainstorm s) which can be per­
fectly well simulated by computers, bu t which plainly cannot be so realised (a 
sim ulated rainstorm  cannot make you wet!). By analogy, he argues, there  is no 
reason to  suppose th a t the  mere sim ulation of a m ind (H t ) would actually cause 
a “real” m ind to  be called into existence (H c)— (Searle 1980, p. 423).
My comment is simply to  say th a t all this is certainly true, insofar as it goes, 
bu t it is not germane; at least, it is not germ ane to  m y  disagreement w ith Searle.
Thus, I do say th a t, in a certain special sense, H t might im ply H c; b u t this 
is not my reason for rejecting the Chinese Room Experim ent, and it is not at 
all affected by spurious meteorological analogies (ironically, Searle him self warns 
against the  dangers of wanton analogising— Searle 1990, p. 24). In fact, the 
situation is exactly opposite to  th a t apparently envisaged by Searle.
6Excerpts from this correspondence between Harnad and M cDermott were distributed by 
Harnad through his electronic discussion group on the so-called symbol grounding problem ; my 
discussion is based on a message dated Sun, 13 Hay 90 2 3 :1 1 :4 0  EDT.
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I start w ith a rejection of the Chinese Room argum ent (following M cD erm ott, 
as explained above). I therefore also, implicitly, reject Searle’s alleged distinction 
between m ere mind-like behaviour (H t ) and real m inds (Hc). I then  conjecture 
th a t, in the  absence of some alternative criterion for distinguishing Hc from  H t 
(i.e. independently of the Chinese Room Experim ent) the  two are (pro tern) 
identical (i.e. the  Turing Test is a bona fide test for m entality); and in th is very 
special, degenerate, sense, it can actually be technically correct, although not 
very illum inating, to  say th a t H t implies H c (rainstorm s notw ithstanding).
Or to  pu t it another way, Searle’s analogy only begins to  m ake sense if we 
already accept th a t minds are entities like rainstorm s, whose realisation demands 
certain specific, physical, causal powers, and are not entities like com puters (or, if 
you prefer, com putations) which can be realised by m ore or less arb itrary  physical 
systems; bu t if we already accepted that, we would have already accepted the 
falsity of Hc, and the  analogy would be unnecessary. It seems th a t, whichever 
way you look at it, Searle’s discussion of sim ulation versus realisation does not 
add anything to  the original argum ent.
Of course, on th is scenario, I should stress th a t I  take H t (and therefore, still, 
H c) to  be strictly  conjectural and unproven.
Finally, in concluding this discussion of the  Chinese Room argum ent, I should 
emphasise my adm iration for the  boldness of Searle’s idea—th a t it m ight be 
possible to  refute H c prior to  coming to  any conclusion on H t . Unfortunately, 
Searle’s particular idea for doing this does not work.
2.4.2 D ualist Inter act ionism
It seems to  me th a t, almost by definition, the  only (realist) alternative to  physical- 
ism is some kind of pluralism; th a t is, one m ust suppose th a t there  exist distinct 
classes of en tity  which interact w ith each other (they are, operationally, real) but 
which are not reducible to the  class of physical entities (supposing, for the  sake 
of the argum ent, th a t the la tte r class could be well defined in an unproblem atic 
way). As far as m entality  is concerned, th is means a dualist interactionist po­
sition: holding th a t m ental events are genuine entities, having causal effects on 
physical entities, bu t not themselves reducible to physical entities.
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There is a d istinction  to be noted here between m erely hold ing tha t physical- 
ism  is unproven (or even “un like ly” ), and holding that it  is actua lly  false— i.e. 
positively advocating a dualist position.
Such a dualist position seems, however, not to be currently  fashionable in  
the philosophy of m ind. The only substantive contem porary example cited by 
Hofstadter and Dennett, in  the ir extensive annotated b ib liography o f the fie ld 
(Hofstadter &  Dennett 1981, pp. 465-482), is that of Popper It Eccles (1977); I 
shall therefore give careful attention to a consideration o f the ir position.
2 .4 .2.1 C riticism  by D en n ett
Dennett has provided a more or less detailed c r it ic ism  of the position of Popper 
&  Eccles, in  the form  of a book review (Dennett 1979). In Dennett’s own words, 
th is is a “caustic” review (Hofstadter &  Dennett 1981, p. 477), where he finds 
very lit t le  of any sort to approve of, and appears to consider the arguments to be 
at best flawed, and at worst incoherent.
If Dennett were successful in  his critic ism , there would be nothing further for 
me to say here. However, wh ile I generally agree w ith  his conclusions, I consider 
that his route to them  is quite inadequate, so there is s t i l l some work for me to
Th is  inadequacy is presumably pa rtly  due to the constraints of the book re­
view format. However, th is cannot excuse, for example, Dennett’s parenthetica l 
summarising of Popper’s World 3 as “essentially a p la ton ic world of abstract en­
tities, such as theories, hypotheses, undiscovered m athem atica l theorems” (Den­
nett 1979, p. 94). The superfic ia lity of th is comment should be clear when it  
is noted that Popper actua lly  expends several pages of argument to distinguish 
his W orld  3 from  P la to ’s world of ideals (Popper &  Eccles 1977, Chapter P2, 
Section 13).
O r again, Dennett severely criticises the apparent incompleteness of Popper’s 
position:
What kind of interaction can this be between a thinking and a theory? We 
are not told. Popper waves his hands at how modern physics has vacated 
all the old-fashioned philosophical ideas about causation, but does not give 
a positive account of this new kind of causation...
Dennett (1979, p. 94)
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B u t, when Eccles attempts to provide some analysis precisely of the nature of 
th is causation, Dennett indulges his sarcasm from  the opposite d irection, accusing 
Eccles, in  turn, of incompleteness because he:
. . .  passes the buck to “the self-conscious mind,” about whose apparently 
wonderful powers he is conveniently silent.
Dennett (1979, p. 95)
Thus Dennett has managed to critic ise  each author for not covering issues 
dealt w ith  by the other, and a ll th is after perem ptorily  stating, in  his in troductory 
remarks, that:
These men are not really co-authors, but co-contributors to an unedited 
anthology; they have not hammered out a joint theory, nor does it appear 
that they have been tough critics of each other’s contributions.
Dennett (1979, p. 92)
It seems that Dennett’s review m ight have benefited from  some tough crit ic ism  
itself.
In sum m ary then, while I agree w ith  Dennett that the arguments propounded 
by Popper h  Eccles are flawed, I consider that he has fa iled to confront them  w ith  
the seriousness which they demand; and that, even where h is c rit ic ism  is well- 
founded, its cred ib ility  is underm ined by embellishments which are not necessary, 
nor even consistent.
2.4.2.2 E ccles N europhysiological P erspective
Eccles professes h im self a dualist interaction ist, but, as far as I have been able to 
establish, does not marshal any pa rticu la r arguments in  favour of th is position. 
In his jo in t book w ith  Popper, th is issue is p r im a rily  dealt w ith  in  Chapter E7, 
where he expressly describes his purpose, not as the establishment o f dualism  as 
such, but as “the development of a new theory re lating to the manner in  which 
the self-conscious m ind  and the bra in  in teract” (Popper &  Eccles 1977, p. 355, 
emphasis added). That is, Eccles adopts the dualist in teraction ist hypothesis, 
for whatever reasons, and goes on to explore some of the consequences of th is 
hypothesis; specifically, enquiring in to  the nature of the in teraction  between m ind  
and brain.
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I sha ll presume, though Eccles appears not to state it  exp lic itly , that he relies 
on Popper for the p rio r establishment of the dualist position: h is own ro le is then 
to consider some more specific im plications of th is general position. M y  task thus 
reduces to that of considering Popper’s arguments alone; to the extent that I 
c la im  they are flawed, the considerations raised by Eccles are at least premature, 
i f  not irre levant .7
2.4.2.3 Popper on A I
Popper is, at least, unambiguous in  his view of what I have called Hc— he holds 
that it  is false:
I have said nothing so far about a question which has been debated quite 
a lot: whether we shall one day build a machine that can think. It has 
been much discussed under the title “Can Computers Think?” . I would 
say without hesitation that they cannot, in spite of my unbounded respect 
for A .M . Turing who thought the opposite . . .  I predict that we shall not 
be able to build electronic computers with conscious subjective experience.
Popper h  Eccles (1977, Chapter P5, pp. 207-208)
Popper is less clear cut on Ht:
Turing [Turing 1950] said something like this: specify the way in which you 
believe that a man is superior to a computer and I shall build a computer 
which refutes your belief. Turing’s challenge should not be taken up; for any 
sufficiently precise specification could be used in principle to programme a 
computer. Also, the challenge was about behaviour— admittedly including 
verbal behaviour— rather than about subjective experience.
Popper & Eccles (1977, Chapter P5, p. 208)
It seems that Popper accepts Tu ring ’s argument as showing that a su itab ly 
programmed computer m ay well be able to exh ib it behaviour sufficient to pass the 
Turing Test (say); but considers therefore that there is lit t le  po int in  pursuing 
this. In particu lar, it  w ill not necessarily endow a computer w ith  “conscious 
subjective experience” .
Thus far, Popper’s position is quite comparable to that of Searle. However, 
h is arguments for this position are en tire ly  different, as we shall see.
7Eccles does make one other point that might be taken as a rationale for his dualist position— 
that he is “a believer in God and the supernatural” (Popper ¿1 Eccles 1977, p. VIII); but he 
does not expand any further on this, and thus there is no basis for substantive discussion here.
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Popper e xp lic it ly  rejects physicalism , in  a ll its  m anifestations, inc lud ing  what
1 have termed Hp. Th is is quite different from  Searle who, as we saw, seems 
w illing  to accept the general idea of physicalism , rejecting on ly the special case 
represented by Hc.
Popper describes h im se lf as a “dualist in teraction ist” w ith  respect to  the m ind- 
body problem. However, he presents th is in  the context of h is more general 
philosophy of the Open Universe, or what we m ight term  a “p lu ra lis t” (rather 
than m ere ly dualist) cosmology. Tha t is, Popper holds that there exist, in  the real 
universe, a variety of d istinct classes of entities which are m utua lly  interacting, 
but which are not reducible to each other; and that, furthermore, new irreducib le 
classes of en tity  can, and do, emerge over time.
In particu lar, Popper has identified three specific classes of entities which, he 
claims, are not reducible to each other, and which he term s Worlds.
World 1 is the conventional world o f unprob lem atic (?) physica l entities. 
World 2 is the world of subjective m ental entities such as emotions, intentions, 
sensations, ideas, thoughts etc. F in a lly , World 3 is the world  of:
. . .  products of the human mind, such as stories, explanatory myths, tools, 
scientific theories (whether true or false), scientific problems, social insti­
tutions, and works of art.
Popper & Eccles (1977, Chapter P2, p. 38)
Thus, Popper specifically cla im s that W orld  1 and W orld  2 in teract (they both 
contain real entities in  good standing), but that they are m utua lly  irreducible. 
Th is  establishes h is dualist position on the m ind-body problem.
Popper has described the general idea o f the Open Universe, and the W orlds 1,
2 and 3, in  a w ide variety of his writings. However, in  what follows I shall restrict 
myself, for the most part, to the presentation of Popper &  Eccles (1977), as this 
is where Popper exp lic it ly  relates th is idea to the problem  of a rtific ia l intelligence 
(or, at least, of a rtific ia l m entality).
Popper’s attack on physica lism  is two pronged: on the one hand, he identifies 
specific d ifficulties w ith  a purely physica list position; and on the other, he argues 
positive ly  in  favour of the dualist position. M y  rebutta l w ill therefore be s im ila r ly  
twofold.
2.4.2.4 The Open Universe
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F irstly , let me consider the specific d ifficulties alleged for physica lism . Popper 
provides a survey of varieties of physicalism , and adduces s ligh tly  different ar­
guments against them. For m y purposes, it  is sufficient to  concentrate on one 
specific variant, the identity theory (Popper &  Eccles 1977, Chapter P3, Sec­
tions 22-23). Popper considers th is the most d ifficu lt version of physica lism  to 
rebut, going as far as to grant that, viewed in  iso lation, it  may be true. However 
he claims that it  is incom patib le w ith  Darw in ism , and then argues that, since 
we must therefore choose between these two theories, we should prefer to retain 
Darw in ism  rather than physicalism .
M y  position is that Popper is m istaken in  c la im ing that the iden tity  theory 
(which is essentially equivalent to m y Hv) is incom patib le w ith  Darw in ism . Pop­
per h im self adm its that his argument here is less than in tu it iv e ly  clear. It w ill 
require some care to deal properly w ith  it— both to do justice  to it  in  the first 
place, and then to answer it  convincingly.
Popper’s argument is that, under the iden tity  theory, Darw in ism  is powerless 
to exp la in  the evolution of mental entities, per se. T h is  is so because:
• A  Darw in ian  explanation can on ly  work i f  the evolved en tity  has physical 
effects (roughly, it  must positive ly  affect the reproductive success of the 
carrier organisms).
• In the fina l analysis, under the iden tity  theory, the m enta l en tity  can be 
shown to have physical effects only by replacing it  w ith  the (putative) phys­
ica l entities w ith  which it  is identical.
• Such a pure ly physical Darw in ian  explanation, which has been shorn of a ll 
mental entities may, indeed, be valid. It w ill then properly  exp la in  why 
certain pure ly  physica l entities can evolve (i.e. because they are favoured 
by natura l selection).
• However, since th is explanatory scheme no longer contains any m ental en­
tities it  is powerless to shed any light on why the (physical) entities which 
evolve are, in  fact, identica l w ith  some mental entity.
2.4.2.5 Arguing Against Physicalism
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• To put it  another way, we would have a D arw in ian  exp lanation for the 
evolution of certain physical entities; we would separately know that these 
are identica l to some mental entity; but th is la tte r fact would have played 
no role in  the evolutionary explanation. Thus, we could not then cla im  that 
the physica l entities in  question had evolved by virtue of th is identity, nor of 
any properties of the mental entity, as such. W e would have an explanation 
for the evolution of certain physica l entities, but the fact that these are 
also correlated w ith  (are identica l to) some m ental entities would stand 
as an independent, unexplained, and inexplicable, phenomenon. Indeed, 
according to our explanation they would have evolved in  just the same way, 
even i f  they were not identica l w ith  some m ental entity.
• Tha t is, a Darw in ian  explanation for the specifica lly m ental character of 
certain evolved physical entities is impossible. W e would require some al­
ternative explanatory princip le, in addition to Darwinism, to address this.
• The in com patib ility  between the iden tity  theory and Darw in ism  resides 
precisely in  th is result: that D arw in ism  would not be effective in  explain ing 
the evolution of mental entities.
I believe I have here stated Popper’s argument in  about as strong and as 
clear a form  as is possible. I should add that Popper (Popper &  Eccles 1977, 
Chapter P3, p. 8 8 ) also refers to a s im ila r argument having been independently 
formulated by Beloff (1965).
I c la im  that the flaw in  the argument is s im p ly  this: it  goes through i f  and 
only if  the characteristics of the physica l entities which are relevant to the ir D ar­
w in ian selection are independent of (uncorrelated w ith) the characteristics which 
are relevant to the ir identification w ith  some mental entity. To put it  another 
way, an identification  between a m ental en tity  and some physica l entities w ill, 
in  the last analysis, require the physica l entities to have some specific physica l 
characteristics— otherwise the identification  would be unwarranted. These physi­
cal characteristics m ay not be sufficient for the particu la r identification , but they 
would be necessary. Once th is much is granted, it  is unprob lem atic to incor­
porate these particu la r physical characteristics, which are essential elements of 
the identification, as factors in  a D arw in ian  exp lanation of the evolution of the
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(identified) m ental entity.
To be specific, suppose that we have available to us a conjectural reduction 
of the entire m en ta lity  of some person to “unprob lem atic” physica l entities: that 
is, we have a procedure for m aking identifications between the person’s m ental 
states and events and some physica l states and events. A  necessary (though 
not sufficient) cond ition for accepting th is reduction, or system of identifications, 
is that the physica l effects that result must be more or less consistent w ith  the 
identified m ental states and events— for example, the physica l lin gu is tic  behaviour 
im p lied  by the pure ly physical model must be consistent w ith  the supposed m ental 
states which correspond to it. To m od ify  s ligh tly  an orig ina l example due to 
Fodor (1976, p. 199), one m ight postu late some particu la r identification  which 
then turns out to have the property that a m ental state of believing that it will 
rain predicts the consequent occurrence o f the physica l utterance “there aren’t 
any aardvarks any more” ; but one would then conclude that th is identification  
between beliefs and physical states is, to say the least, suspect!
U ltim ate ly , the core of Popper’s argument seems to be this: i f  W orld  1 is 
causally closed (Hp is true), then Darw in ism  can, at best, provide an explana­
tion of the evolution of certain physica l phenomena, but these, in  themselves, 
w ill have no necessary connection w ith  subjective m ental experience. Indeed, 
it  seems to be apparent from  Popper’s critic ism , already quoted, of the notion 
of Turing Testing, that he envisages that a system could we ll exh ib it extrem ely 
complex behaviours, up to and inc lud ing human level lingu istic  behaviours, and 
yet completely lack m entality; in  a phrase com m only invoked by Harnad, it  may 
be the case that, despite a ll appearances to the contrary, there could s im p ly  be 
“nobody home” . If th is is indeed possible— if  the physica l (includ ing lingu istic) 
manifestations of m enta lity  can be had in  the absence of m enta lity  proper— then 
m enta lity would, from  a Darw in ian  point of view, be redundant, and D arw in ism  
would be incapable of explain ing its evolution. B u t, i f  th is is Popper’s point, 
it  seems to beg the question at issue: the idea of Hp (and, more specifically, of 
Hc) is precisely to conjecture that m en ta lity  proper— -in the sense of “conscious 
subjective experience”— is a necessary correlate of certain physica l behaviours. 
Now th is conjecture m ay surely be m istaken, but it  can hard ly  be critic ised  by 
an argument which already assumes it  to be false.
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The essence of the problem  here for Popper, as previously for Searle, is to 
find an effective wedge to drive between Hc and Ht— for they both w ish to accept 
the la tter (tentatively, at least) but s t ill reject the former. B u t once seen in  this 
light, we can recognise that it is a very ta ll order indeed: it  requires, more or 
less, a solution to the “other m inds” problem — a basis for d iscrim inating  the mere 
“appearance” of m enta lity  from  “genuine” mentality. W h ile  Popper’s approach is 
very different from  Searle’s, I cannot see that he is u lt im a te ly  any more successful.
2.4.2.6 A rguing For D ualism
Next let us consider Popper’s positive argument in  favour of dualist interaction ism  
(Popper 1973; Popper &; Eccles 1977, Chapter P2).
The core of the argument is the c la im  that there exist at least some W orld  3 
entities which are real (i.e. which interact, a lbe it ind irectly , w ith  W orld  1) but 
such that they are demonstrably not reducib le to physica l entities, i.e. are not 
identifiable w ith  W orld  1 entities (they are “unembodied” in  Popper’s terms).
Th is  would be enough to establish that the s tr ic t ly  physica list v iew  must 
be false. It would not, in  itself, establish mind-body dualism , as such, i.e. the 
irreduc ib ility  of World 2 to W orld  1. Popper completes the argument by po inting 
out that, in  general, W orld  3 interacts w ith  W orld  1 on ly  through the m ediation 
of W orld  2; therefore (so the argument goes), since W orld  3 itse lf is irreducib le 
to W orld  1 , and W orld  2 can interact w ith  W orld  3, a capacity not exh ib ited by 
W orld  1 in  general, then W orld  2 must also be irreducib le to W orld  1.
I suggest that th is la tter argument is, in  fact, defective. To see this, note that, 
under the iden tity  theory (which Popper accepts “m ay” be true), the d istinction  
between the m ental and the physica l is s im p ly  that certain states or organisations 
of W orld  1 entities do exh ib it precisely the characteristics of W orld  2 entities, 
and, in  th is way, W orld  2 may be reduced to W orld  1. To app ly th is theory in  
Popper’s scheme, we would s im p ly  stipu late that these d istinguishing ( “m ental” ) 
characteristics of certain W orld  1 entities must include the ab ility  to “grasp” , 
as Popper puts it, W orld  3 entities. Popper has not offered any detailed theory 
of th is interaction, which m ight show that it  is beyond the ab ility  of some such 
W orld  1 entities. Therefore, Popper has fa iled to ju stify  the cla im  that interaction 
cannot happen directly between (unembodied) W orld  3 entities and (any) W orld  1
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entities, and so has failed to establish the irreduc ib ility  of W orld  2 to W orld  1, as 
required for m ind-body dualism.
Th is defect in  Popper’s argument is, indeed, pointed out by Dennett in  his 
review Dennett (1979). However, his presentation is somewhat s im p listic , i f  not 
actua lly  m istaken— as when he says:
It seems just as apt to say that when I put a Z brace on a gate to keep it from 
sagging, I bring about a causal interaction between theorems of Euclid and 
the pine boards, as it does to say that there is a causal interaction between 
my thinking and these theorems. That is, in the absence of much more 
detailed persuasions, both views appear ludicrous.
Dennett (1979, p. 94)
It seems that Dennett is presenting here, not an argument as such, but an 
example of the k ind  of th ing which he h im se lf has described (in a different context) 
as an intuition pump— i.e. a th ing which is “not, typ ica lly , an engine of discovery, 
but a persuader or pedagogical too l— a way of getting people to see things your 
way once you ’ve seen the tru th ” (Dennett 1980).
I suggest that, in  fact, the attem pted reductio ad absurdum fa ils to fu lly  
confront Popper’s argument. For the crux of Popper’s argument is not that 
W orld  3 entities, in general, can on ly interact w ith  W orld  1 v ia  W orld  2 (though 
he does, adm itted ly, c la im  this); the im portant point is the much more particu la r 
c la im  that th is is so for certain specific W orld  3 entities, nam ely those which are 
“unembodied” or demonstrably irreducib le  to W orld  1 entities. For Dennett to 
properly refute Popper’s argument, his example o f a d irect in teraction  between 
W orld  3 and W orld  1 would have had to involve some such unembodied W orld  3 
entity, rather than just any arb itra ry W orld  3 entity. H is example is not of this 
sort; or at least, is not clearly so. I sha ll return to th is below.
Thus, while I have restated Dennett’s po int— that Popper has fa iled  to estab­
lish  that unembodied W orld  3 entities cannot interact d irectly  w ith  W orld  1— I 
have not relied for th is on Dennett’s suggestion that unembodied W orld  3 entities 
can, in  fact, interact d irectly  w ith  sim ple unprob lem atic W orld  1 entities such as 
pine boards. Rather, I am w illing  to stipulate, w ith  Popper, that the interaction 
requires the m ediation of W orld  2; but then point out that th is observation, in  
itself, is neutra l w ith  respect to the reduc ib ility  of W orld  2, in some fashion, to 
W orld  1.
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The flaw in  Popper’s argument is, then, that he ( im p lic it ly )  proceeds from  the 
premise tha t certain unembodied W orld  3 entities cannot in teract d irectly  w ith  
certain W orld  1 entities (this would include, for example, D ennett’s p ine gate), 
to the conclusion that unembodied W orld  3 entities cannot interact d irectly  w ith  
any W orld  1 entities (such as m inds, or rather, under the iden tity  theory, the 
putative W orld  1 entities which are identifiab le w ith  m inds). In taking th is step 
he assumes the irreduc ib ility  of W orld  2 (i.e. the non-existence o f W orld  1 entities 
which are identifiab le w ith  m inds), which is precisely what he is purporting  to 
establish. In short, his argument fails because it  is u lt im a te ly  circu lar.
However, whether one accepts Dennett’s sim plified  analysis, or insists upon 
the more detailed refutation presented here, the outcome is actua lly  s t i l l pecu­
lia r ly  unsatisfying.
We see that Popper’s conclusion of m ind-body dualism  is unwarranted, be­
cause one particu la r step in  his argument is defective. From  both  D ennett’s point 
of view and m y own, th is is, arguably enough: we have provided a sufficient basis 
to refute Popper’s argument for m ind-body dualism , which is a ll we rea lly  sought 
to do; and, indeed, that is where Dennett does leave the issue. Bu t: it  involves 
attacking Popper on the weakest element of his argument, w h ile  s t il l leaving his 
central, substantive, point unchallenged.
Th is  central point is the c la im  that W orld  1 is causally open— that there exist 
entities which are demonstrably not reducib le to W orld  1 entities, but which are 
perfectly real in  the sense of altering the behaviours of some W orld  1 entities 
from  what would be predicted based solely on the ir interactions w ith  the rest of 
W orld  1.
It would be much more satisfactory i f  one could sustain a challenge against 
Popper’s argument for an Open Universe as such, rather than re ly ing  on a rather 
technical n icety in  how he has applied it  to the issue of m ind-body dualism . Th is 
is precisely what I shall now try  to do.
The cr it ica l step is Popper’s c la im  that certa in W orld  3 entities are “unembod- 
ied” , i.e. irreducib le to W orld  1 (or W orld  2, for that m atter), but, nonetheless, 
have defin ite causal effects on W orld  1 (via W orld  2).
The first part of th is is unobjectionable: Popper is the orig inator of the 
W orld  3 concept, so he is surely entitled to include w ith in  it  whatever he wishes.
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In particu lar, he m ay include things like  unproved theorems: that is, statements 
which are, in  fact, true (relative to some system of axioms) but for which no 
one has yet actua lly  found a proof. B y  defin ition, such things are, indeed, 
unembodied— there do not exist any W orld  1 or W orld  2 entities correlated w ith  
them.
It is the second part of Popper’s c la im  that seems to me to be potentia lly  
problematic: the assertion that such unembodied W orld  3 entities are real, in  
the sense of interacting d irectly  w ith  W orld  2, and thus ind irec tly  (at least) w ith  
W orld  1. Popper deals exp lic it ly  w ith  th is issue as follows:
. . .  Thus a not yet discovered and not yet embodied logical problem situa­
tion may prove decisive for our thought processes, and may lead to actions 
with repercussions in the physical World 1, for example to a publication.
(An example would be the search for, and the discovery of, a suspected 
new proof of a mathematical theorem.)
Popper fc Eccles (1977, Chapter P2, p. 46)
If I understand h im  correctly, Popper’s po int here is that the tru th  of a m ath­
em atica l theorem (for example) is an objective W orld  3 fact which is independent 
of any embodiment in  W orld  2; it  is, indeed, as objective as any W orld  1 fact. 
In particu lar, it  is inter subjectively testable. Such tests are always fa llib le  of 
course— but so too are tests of supposed W orld  1 “facts” . Since these W orld  3 
facts can exist and persist despite not being embodied, they ev idently  (?) cannot 
be reduced, w ithout residue, to W orld  2 or W orld  1 entities; but since they can 
interact w ith  W orld  2 (or be “grasped” ), and thus w ith  W orld  1 , they are surely 
real. Popper’s conclusion is then that W orld  1 cannot be causally closed.
Th is is a h igh ly  orig inal and bold argument. It is, in tu itive ly , quite com­
pelling. A nd  yet, when I exam ine it  critica lly , it  seems to me that it  has very 
l it t le  substance, and cannot possib ly be made to bear the burden which Popper 
attempts to place upon it.
Let us consider Popper’s own favoured example: the tru th  of a m athem atica l 
theorem. Th is  objective W orld  3 en tity  m ay be said to “in teract” w ith  a m ath­
ematician in  the sense of constraining her results; she w ill not, in  particu la r, be 
able to prove the theorem, nor any of its  corollaries, false, no m atter how hard 
she may try; the rea lity  of the theorem may be said to manifest itse lf through 
the failure of such attempts. Th is  is so, regardless of whether the m athem atician
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ever e xp lic it ly  conjectures, even, that th is theorem exists. Le t me stipu late, then, 
that th is establishes the “rea lity” of the theorem.
The irreducibility of the theorem is separately held to fo llow  from  the fact 
that, at a given time, there m ay be nobody at a ll (no W orld  2 entities) who 
have yet even conjectured that it  m ay hold, so there are not even any candidate 
W orld  2 entities as targets for a reduction (and thus, surely, there are no W orld  1 
candidates either). B u t th is c la im  is just wrong.
The theorem, if  it  is a theorem, is already im p lic it  in  the axioms of the system 
under study; it  m ay be said to exist at a ll (in  Popper’s sense) on ly  when some such 
axioms have been already adopted. Tha t being the case, there is a perfectly good 
sense in  which the theorem may be “reduced” to the axioms', and (by hypothesis) 
the axioms are already embodied, and thus are poten tia lly  reducib le to W orld  2 
(and u ltim a te ly  even W orld  1) entities.
The po int can be made more defin ite by replacing Popper’s m athem atician by 
a theorem proving machine. Such machines have indeed been bu ilt. B y  Popper’s 
own hypothesis, such machines lack m entality, so they are not W orld  2 objects. 
Yet they can interact w ith, be constrained by, or even “grasp” , the tru th  of a 
theorem in  precisely the sense outlined above for a (human) m athem atician. A nd  
they do so s im p ly  because th is W orld  3 object, th is tru th  of a theorem, is no 
more and no less than a product of the inference rules w ith  which the machine 
was o rig ina lly  equipped. B u t the system in  question here is a paradigm  example 
of a causally closed physical (W orld  1) system. W h ile  it  is true that, in it ia lly , 
the machine has no exp lic it embodiment of the theorem (even as a conjecture), 
th is p la in ly  does not establish (pace Popper) that the theorem is irreducib le  to 
W orld  1, or that the machine, qua W orld  1 entity, must be causally open to some 
influences which are not in  W orld  1.
Th is  example may be said to refine and elaborate the earlier example suggested 
by Dennett, of an interaction between theorems of E u c lid  and a Z brace. It goes 
beyond Dennett’s example just insofar as it  stipulates that, in  the in it ia l state of 
the physical system, the theorem in  question is on ly im p lic it  in  a set of axioms—  
and is thus “unembodied” in  Popper’s sense— and yet “interacts” w ith  the system 
in  just the sense w ith  which it  m ight be said to interact w ith  a m athem atician.
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However, I am  not sure that th is quite exhausts Popper’s argument yet. Pop­
per is well aware of the poss ib ility  of theorem proving machines (though I am  not 
aware of his having analysed the ir im plications in  just the way I have suggested 
above). Thus, even before he had fu lly  formulated the concept of W o rld  3, he 
made the follow ing rem ark (this o rig ina lly  dates from  c. 1957):
A  calculator may be able to turn out mathematical theorems. It may 
distinguish proofs from non-proofs— and thereby certain theorems from 
non-theorems. But it w ill not distinguish difficult and ingenious proofs and 
interesting theorems from dull and uninteresting ones. It w ill thus ‘know’ 
too much— far too much— that is without any interest. The knowledge of 
a calculator, however systematic, is like a sea of truisms in which a few 
particles of gold— of valuable information— may be suspended. (Catching 
these particles may be as difficult, and more boring, than trying to get 
them without a calculator.) It is only man, with his problems, who can 
lend significance to the calculators’ senseless power of producing truths.
Popper(1988, pp. 107-108)
Th is  suggests to me a different, and more nebulous, in terpretation  o f Popper’s 
ideas. W h ile  I believe that the existence of theorem proving machines (even those 
proving uninteresting theorems!) adequately rebuts Popper’s later, specific, cla im  
that “unembodied” theorems are necessarily irreducib le to W orld  2 or W orld  1, 
it  seems that Popper m ight not w ish to re ly  on that argument anyway— that he 
has a much more general notion of an irreducib le  W orld  3 in  m ind. T h is  is borne 
out, to an extent, in  the follow ing comment:
There is no doubt in my mind that the worlds 2 and 3 do interact. If we 
try  to grasp or understand a theory, or to remember a symphony, then 
our minds are causally influenced; not merely by a brain-stored memory 
of noises, but at least in part by the autonomous inner structures of the 
world 3 objects which we try to grasp.
Popper (1973, p. 25)
To return again to the m athem atician, it  seems that Popper m ay w ish to 
c la im  something much stronger than anyth ing I have so far discussed. He may 
conceivably mean something like  the following: that the objective existence of a 
theorem m ay change the pattern of the m athem atic ian ’s thoughts so tha t (for ex­
ample) she moves towards its form ulation (or proof), in  a way that is not already 
im p lied  by her prio r thoughts-i.e. in  a way above and beyond the explanatory 
power of pure ly W orld  2 entities (noting o f course, that the relevant W orld  2 
entities w ill presumably be embodying certa in W orld  3 entities). Th is  should be
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contrasted sharply w ith  a c la im  m erely that the m athem atic ian ’s suspicions or 
intuitions about the theorem affected her thought processes (as they undoubt­
edly would); for suspicions and in tu itions are common or garden W orld  2 objects 
(presumably correlated w ith  W orld  3 entities—-but, by defin ition then, these are 
already embodied).
B u t it  should be clear that any such interaction  between unembodied W orld  3 
entities and W orld  2 must be, at best, conjectural— one possible in terpretation  of 
the example of the m athematician, but not at a ll a conclusion from  it. Indeed, 
i f  we apply Popper’s own crite ria  for the evaluation of scientific theories, we 
should say that the hypothesis that unembodied W orld  3 entities do not have 
such causal effects on W orld  2 has a greater content (and thus corroborability) 
than its converse, and, in  the absence of some evidence that it  has actua lly  been 
refuted (and none is offered, that I can see) should be preferred, even i f  on ly  for 
the tim e being.
B u t the ram ifications run deeper: such interactions between W orld  3 and 
W orld  2 would be completely inconsistent w ith  the rest o f Popper’s evolutionary 
epistemology. They would be tantam ount to a form  o f Lam arck ian  instruction  
by W orld  3 of W orld  2— i.e. Lam arck ism  applied to the evolutionary growth of 
an ind iv idua l’s subjective knowledge. Th is  is something that has been resolute ly 
opposed by Popper in  the case of knowledge of W orld  1 (he has dubbed it  the 
“bucket” theory of knowledge— Popper 1949; 1970b), and I see no reason why his 
arguments should have any less force in  the case of our knowledge of W orld  3. 
I therefore conclude that th is cannot, after all, be a p lausib le in terpretation  of 
Popper’s position.
It is im portant to note that none of m y discussion here attempts to deny the 
rea lity  of W orld  3 (an attack antic ipated by Popper). I c la im  on ly that Popper 
has not established the irreduc ib ility  of W orld  3 to W orld  2 (and thus, possib ly 
even to W orld  1). W orld  3 is s t il l a perfectly meaningful and useful idea; as long 
as we adm it that its reduc ib ility  is an open question, and tha t the hypothesis 
that it  is reducib le is actua lly  stronger (has greater content) than the converse, 
and is currently  a preferable basis for research.
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2.5 C on clu sion
In summary, m y claims in  th is chapter are:
1. T ha t physica lism  in  general, and com putationalism  in  particu lar, are ir ­
redeemably repugnant to human values and to the d ign ity  of mankind; it  
seems to me craven to deny this.
2. Tha t neither physica lism  nor com putationalism  have (yet) been defin itive ly 
refuted; in  particu lar, two d istinct k inds of argument, by Searle and Popper 
respectively, purporting to achieve such a refutation, are flawed.
The relationship between these two points is, I th in k , very im portant. It seems 
to me that the first po int precisely underlies the intuitive conviction of those, like 
Popper and Searle, who hold that Hc is defin ite ly false. It should be clear that 
I completely share th is in tu it ive  conviction; I w ill confess, i f  that is the correct 
word, to being a metaphysical dualist.
However: the point at issue is how we m ight proceed beyond in tu ition . Th is 
raises what is almost a refrain of Popper himself:
I regard intuition and imagination as immensely important: we need them 
to invent a theory. But intuition, just because it may persuade and con­
vince us of the truth of what we have intuited, may badly mislead us: it is 
an invaluable helper, but also a dangerous helper, for it tends to make us 
uncritical. We must always meet it with respect, with gratitude, and with 
an effort to be severely critical of it.
Popper (1988, Preface 1982, p. xxii)
B o th  Popper and Searle have attempted to proceed by supporting the ir in tu ­
itions w ith  defin ite arguments— arguments which come close to having a scientific 
rather than a metaphysical character. If these arguments were acceptable—-if 
Hc, in  particu lar, were thereby refuted— then further investigations w ith in  the 
com putationalist framework (such as, for example, attem pts to realise Turing 
Test capab ility  w ith  com putational systems) could on ly have technological signif­
icance; such investigations, though poten tia lly  valuable in  the ir own right, would 
no longer d irectly  bear on what, in  Chapter 1, I called Popper’s Problem— the 
cosmological problem  of understanding the world and our place in  it. Thus, if  one 
wished to rem ain focused on th is la tte r problem  then one would be led, instead,
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to proceed w ith  a programme of research which reflected and incorporated the 
refutation of computationalism . Such an approach m ight be typ ified  by the work 
of Eccles on the “lia ison” between m ind and brain, for example.
B u t I have claimed that the arguments put forward by Searle and Popper are 
flawed, and do not support the conclusions claimed. In particu la r, wh ile I rem ain 
in tu it ive ly  convinced of the fa ls ity  of Hc, th is remains, for me, a merely in tu it ive  
belief. So the question remains of how best to proceed. Somewhat iron ica lly , I 
th in k  Popper has already suggested at least one possible answer to this:
. . .  as a philosopher who looks at this world of ours, w ith us in  it, I in­
deed dispair of any ultimate reduction. But as a methodologist this does 
not lead me to an anti-reductionist research programme. It only leads 
to the prediction that w ith the growth of our attempted reductions, our 
knowledge, and our universe of unsolved problems, w ill expand.
Popper (1974c, p. 277)
The programme of com putationalism — of attem pting to realise or synthesise 
the “appearances” (at least) of m enta lity  by com putational means— is an essen­
t ia lly  reductionist one. L ike  Popper, I too do not expect any k ind  o f u ltim ate 
success from  th is effort. B u t our failures, and the precise mechanisms of these 
failures, m ay be extremely interesting, and perhaps even revealing. There is thus 
every reason to pursue th is programme of “methodological com putationalism ” , 
despite our pessim ism  about its potentia l for “success”— just so long as we can 
avoid dogmatism , and continue to be c r it ica l of it. For the remainder of the The­
sis then, I shall tentative ly  adopt th is com putationalist thesis, Hc, and explore at 
least some of its  detailed ram ifications.
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C hapter 3 
Artificial Knowledge
3.1 In tro d u ctio n
Th is chapter moves on from  the m etaphysical consideration of what k in d  of a 
th ing a m ind is, or m ight be, to the pragm atic consideration of bu ild ing  machines 
(especially computers) that exh ib it some or a ll of the behaviours associated w ith  
m enta lity— which is to say, a consideration of A rt if ic ia l Intelligence (A I) in  what 
Searle (1980) calls the “weak” sense. A lte rna tive ly  th is m ay be viewed as an 
investigation of the hypothesis I have previously (Chapter 2, section 2.2) called 
Turing Test Computationalism (Ht)— the cla im  that a su itab ly  programmed un i­
versal computer could pass the Turing  Test.
I start w ith  a b rie f review of the Turing Test itself, and, in  particu lar, some 
novel critic ism s of it  proposed by French (1990). I sha ll consider these critic ism s, 
but argue that the Test s t ill stands as a valuable focus for work in  AI; nonetheless, 
I shall go on to conclude that performance at this level is s t il l so far beyond our 
present theoretical understanding, that Turing Testing, as such, may of lit t le  
im m ediate or p ractica l interest.
I next consider the general issue of cognitive architecture— what, i f  anything, 
can we say about the overall structure which a (computational) system must have 
if  it  is to exh ib it behaviours ind ica tive  of intelligence. The essential po int I make 
is the negative one that universality (in  the technical sense characterised by, for 
example, Un iversa l Turing Machines), per se, does not mean tha t a com putational
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intelligence w ill adm it of explanation in  terms of a un ita ry  “sym bol leve l” , or 
“language of thought” .
I then consider the notions of “meaning” and “knowledge” in  more detail, in  
an effort to show that a computational semantics is indeed possible (despite some 
claims to the contrary), and I sketch out what it  m ight look like. In particu lar, I 
c la im  that computers can realise anticipatory systems (Rosen 1985a), and that, in  
th is case, they exh ib it intentionality (Dennett 1978b), and instantia te subjective 
knowledge in  the sense that Popper adm its for b io log ica l organisms generally 
(e.g. Popper 1961). These cla im s are made independently of any comm itment to 
the idea that computers are able to realise “genuine” m en ta lity— in the sense of 
“conscious subjective experience” .
W ith  th is particu lar philosophical perspective, I then brie fly  consider method­
ological approaches to A I, in  particu la r the notion of “Know ledge Engineering” . 
I note that th is approach has run into  serious difficulties, typ ica lly  identified w ith  
the common-sense knowledge problem. It has proven extrem ely d ifficu lt to explic­
itly formulate common-sense knowledge (and thus incorporate it  in to  computer 
systems). There is lit t le  general agreement as to the nature of th is problem; but 
it  seems that developing an exp lic it, brute force, stipulation or enumeration of 
common-sense knowledge is currently an in tractab le problem , and m ay yet prove 
to be completely impossible.
The alternative to the Knowledge Engineering approach is, of course, to de­
velop some k ind  of “adaptive” or “learning” system; which is to say, we turn  from  
the problem  of knowledge in  itself, to the rather different problem  of its growth.
I shall argue, from  several different points of view, but based pa rticu la rly  
on the evolutionary epistemology pioneered by Popper and D .T . Cam pbell, that 
a k ind  of abstract generalisation of Darwinian processes, referred to as Unjus­
tified Variation and Selective Retention (U V SR ), is an essential component in  
the growth of knowledge. I conclude from  th is that the realisation of Artificial 
Darwinism m ay a necessary, though certa in ly not sufficient, condition for the 
realisation of A rt if ic ia l Intelligence.
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3.2  T h e  T uring T est
3.2.1 D efin ition
In his in fluentia l paper, Computing Machinery and Intelligence (Turing 1950), 
A lan  Turing set out to consider the question “Can machines th in k?” (p. 433); 
u ltim ate ly, however, he concluded that, in  th is form , the question was “too mean­
ingless to deserve discussion” (p. 442). Instead, Turing  proposed an operational 
defin ition for “th ink ing ” , and restricted “machine” to designate a su itab ly  pro­
grammed digital computer. He then considered the new question of whether such 
a machine could satisfy such a definition.
Th is  operational defin ition of th ink ing  was phrased in  terms of what Turing 
called the “Im ita tion  Gam e” , and is now generally referred to as the Turing Test
Briefly, the Turing  Test involves a human interrogator, and two subjects. One 
subject is the machine to be tested, the other is a hum an control. The inter­
rogator is restricted to interacting w ith  the two subjects pure ly  lin gu is tica lly  (for 
example, v ia  teletype), and has no other way of d istingu ishing between them. One 
turn then consists of a fixed tim e— Turing suggests 5 m inutes— in  which the in ­
terrogator is allowed to question the subjects, after which tim e he must nom inate 
which subject he judges to be the human and which the machine. The machine 
is considered to have passed the Test if  the interrogator’s probability of m aking 
a successful classification is found to be below some specified threshold— Turing 
suggests 70%. Turing om itted various details here: one presumes that the success 
p robab ility  would be measured by p lay ing out as m any turns as are necessary to 
get a sta tistica lly  significant result, while varying the interrogators and control 
subjects to achieve independence between turns. Turing  does exp lic it ly  refer to 
the use of an “average” interrogator (p. 442).
3.2.2 Sufficiency?
As discussed in  Chapter 2, there is room for argument as to the sufficiency of the 
Turing Test. Tha t is, whether an en tity ’s ab ility  to pass th is Test is a sufficient 
condition for saying that it  exh ib its mentality. If the Test were not sufficient in 
th is sense then that would certa in ly  lim it  its  interest. However I have already
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stated, in  Chapter 2, m y opinion that the proposed arguments to such an effect 
are far from  compelling; and that I shall therefore proceed on the basis that, pro 
tern, Turing Testing is a sufficient operational criterion  for mentality.
3.2.3 N ecessity?
French (1990) takes the position that the Turing  Test is va lid  or sufficient for the 
a ttribu tion  of intelligence, but argues that it  is in  fact much more stringent than 
Turing anticipated or intended. Specifically, he suggests that .. the Turing  
Test could be passed on ly by things that have experienced the world as we have 
experienced i t ” (p. 53). W h ile  he believes that in principle a machine could 
indeed be bu ilt which would satisfy th is constraint, he assumes that, in practice, 
“no computer is now, or w ill in  the foreseeable future be, in  a position to do so” 
(p. 56). It follows, of course, that there is no p ractica l prospect of a computer 
passing the Turing Test. French concludes that some a lternative tests, or at least 
criteria, are therefore needed for p ractica l use in  A I  research.
I should emphasise that I agree w ith  French on certa in points which he raises. 
For example, he suggests that the Turing Test is deficient in  that it  adm its o f no 
“degrees” of intelligence, and is not applicable at a ll to non-linguistic behaviour 
that m ight, in  fact, be related to intelligence (such as exh ib ited by animals). I 
agree w ith  th is as far as it  goes: given that Turing  Test performance is currently 
an intractab le problem, it  is sensible to form ulate lesser or entire ly d istinct crite ria  
which m ight, once achieved, represent progress toward that u ltim ate  goal. In fact, 
th is is what goes on in  p ractica l A I  research a ll the time.
W here I disagree w ith  French is when he goes on to suggest that the Turing  
Test should be dispensed w ith  altogether, even as an ultimate goal against which 
intermediate goals can and should be c r it ica lly  reviewed. Even  here, I shall give 
some ground, though not, I th ink, as much as French seeks.
French’s argument is that the Test, as form ulated by Turing, adm its the use 
of so-called subcognitive probing by the interrogator, and that th is makes the 
procedure an unnecessarily harsh or severe test of general intelligence. T ha t is, 
French supposes that there could be systems (presumably inc lud ing  certa in su it­
ab ly programmed computers?) which would be unable to pass the Turing Test,
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but which should, nonetheless, be labelled in te lligen t— indeed, “as” in te lligent as 
humans, if  not more so.
The idea of subcognitive probing is to ask questions which, in  some sense, 
probe the underlying, subconscious, “structure” (the associative concept net­
work1) of the putative ly  inte lligent subject. French argues that th is is possible 
under the Turing Test conditions, and that it  would allow specifica lly or un iquely 
human aspects of intelligence to be detected— aspects which would be very d if­
ficu lt, i f  not entire ly im practica l, to duplicate in  a computer, and which are, in  
any case, inessential to general intelligence.
In fact, French concludes that the p ractica l development of some en tity  such 
that it  could pass the Turing  Test, given the use of subcognitive probing, would 
require that the en tity  be capable of experiencing the world “in  a manner in ­
distinguishable from  a human being— a machine tha t can fa ll off b icycles, be 
scratched by thorns on roses, smell sewage, and taste straw berries... ” (French 
1990, p. 56): that is, the system would have to be a more or less hum anoid robot 
or android. It is th is scenario which French regards as being im practica l (though 
not, in  princip le, impossible) for the foreseeable future. M ore to the point, he 
considers that th is renders the Turing Test unsu itab le for p ractica l use.
French further cla im s that the Turing Test cannot be modified, in  any reason­
able way, so as to e lim inate the poss ib ility  of subcognitive probing, and should 
therefore be s im p ly  discarded. He does not propose a specific, operational, a l­
ternative, but suggests that we should consider intelligence in  the “more elusive 
terms of the ab ility  to categorise, to generalize, to make analogies, to learn, and 
so on” (p. 65).
I agree w ith  French that the use of subcognitive probing, as he describes it, 
would subvert the Turing  Test; that, indeed, such probing is one of the general 
k inds of th ing Turing was try ing  to preempt in  his design of the Test; and that only 
some test which does not exp lo it such probing would be satisfactory. However, 
I disagree w ith  French that such probing cannot be elim inated from  the Turing 
Test, w ith  lit t le  or no modification. I shall argue th is on several grounds.
1French presumes that some such network necessarily underlies intelligence; I do not disagree 
as such, but it might have been better if he had made his assumption explicit, and phrased it 
as an hypothesis, rather than taking it as some kind of established fact.
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F irs t, and most obviously, French is able to introduce subcognitive probing 
in  the first place on ly by effectively changing (or, at least, augmenting) the rules 
of the orig inal Test. Specifica lly  he requires that the interrogator be allowed to 
poll humans for the answers to some questions p rio r to posing them  during the 
Test itself. Th is  is in  order to allow sta tistica l analysis of the “subcognitive” 
characteristics of responses to these questions, as exh ib ited  by people, so that 
these could then be compared w ith  the behaviours of the subjects in  the Test 
proper. French states that he feels “certain” that Turing  would have accepted 
this. I happen to disagree w ith  th is opinion, but it  is irrelevant in  any case. The 
point is that if  we disallow such po lling  (whether Turing  would have approved 
or not) the Test is effectively immunised against the use of subcognitive probing, 
by French’s own admission.
B u t quite aside from  th is, I th ink  French’s analysis is contrived and m istaken. 
W h ile  Turing d id  not specify precisely what he meant by an “average” interroga­
tor, it  seems absurd to suppose that he would have allowed interrogators who 
are fam ilia r w ith , and competent to consciously apply, the notion of subcognitive 
probing. Again , of course, the question of what Tu ring ’s own opin ion m ight have 
been is s tr ic t ly  irrelevant anyway: the im portant po int is that, in  response to 
French’s critic ism , we are quite free to add an exp lic it stipu la tion  to the Test, 
to the effect that persons having a competence in  the technique of subcognitive 
probing w ill not be allowed as interrogators— if that is deemed necessary in  or­
der to e lim inate subcognitive probing. In fact, I suggest that, for v ir tu a lly  any 
practica l purposes, it  would be adequate s im p ly  to stipulate to  interrogators, at 
the start of any Test, that they must not attem pt to use subcognitive probing in  
the ir evaluation of the subjects.
French m ight s t il l argue for the poss ib ility  of unconscious subcognitive prob­
ing having some sta tis tica lly  significant effect on the Test outcome. Th is  would 
obviously be, at best, a much weaker argument, and I don’t believe it  could be 
sustained in  any case. Remember that the Test, as Turing  specified it, is re la tive ly  
coarse (presumably deliberately?): the interrogators’ success rate only has to fa ll 
below about 70% for the computer to pass. I doubt very much that a credible 
argument could be made to the effect that subcognitive factors, alone, are lik e ly
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to consistently, and unconsciously, bias the success rate by 30 percentage points 
or more.
Bu t even if, despite its in tu itive  im p lausib ility , we suppose that French could 
marshal enough evidence to show an effect of th is  m agnitude due solely to un­
conscious subcognitive factors, I cla im  that the effect could still be nu llified  w ith  
relative ease. Th is  can be done by interposing what I shall ca ll a subcognitive 
scrambler between the interrogator and the subjects. Th is  would s im p ly  be an­
other person, who relays a ll messages between the interrogator and the subjects. 
The interrogator is now restricted to have d irect access on ly  to the scrambler, 
and not to the subjects. The scrambler takes up the previous position of the in ­
terrogator, having lingu istic  access to the subjects, v ia  teletype or otherwise, but 
otherwise having no knowledge of the identities of the subjects. The sole instruc­
tion  to the scrambler is to paraphrase the messages passed from  interrogator to 
subjects, and back, in  such a way as to m a in ta in  the ir essential semantic content, 
but to otherwise m odify  them as much as he wishes. A  pa rticu la rly  effective way 
to achieve th is m ight be to use interrogators whose native language is different 
from  that of the subjects, and thus have a translator act as the subcognitive 
scrambler .2
I freely adm it that such a scrambler would not be effective against all k inds 
of deliberate or conscious attempts at subcognitive prob ing .3 However, I th in k  
it  would greatly attenuate any possible subconscious subcognitive effects, which 
was the remain ing point at issue.
In conclusion then, I consider that the deficiency in  the Turing Test, alleged 
by French (i.e. its  supposedly excessive stringency), is e ither non-existent or easily 
corrected, and the Test can therefore survive his attack more or less unscathed.
2In allowing, or even recommending, the use of such translation, I implicitly transgress, 
to at least some extent, against another assumption which French allowed himself: that the 
human subject and the interrogator “are all from the same culture and that the computer will 
be attempting to pass as an individual from that culture” . Again, I see this as ad hoc and 
contrived on French’s part, and not sustainable.
3I have in mind specifically what French calls the Category Rating Game technique.
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3.2.4 A n Inform al Test
A nd  yet: while I disagree w ith  French’s lite ra l arguments, I cannot help but 
believe that there is some core of tru th  about his ideas.
Let me suggest then that detailed, legalistic, discussion of the Turing  Test 
is pedantic, and essentially futile— notw ithstand ing the fact that I have ju st in ­
dulged in  such a discussion above. I indulged in  it  because that is the ground on 
which French had chosen to mount his assault, so I wished to respond in  kind; 
demonstrating that, judged even in  his own terms, h is assault founders. However, 
in  many ways it  was a p ity  that Turing gave a re la tive ly  precise description of 
his proposed Test— for it  is th is spurious precision that prom pts excessive con­
centration on the details, such as exh ib ited by French.
I suggest that the Turing Test should best be considered as a b lunt (though 
moderately effective) instrument, whose details are entire ly un im portant. Its 
point lies not in  any detailed experimental set up, but in  the principle that any 
machine which can credibly, or meaningfully, partic ipate in  human conversation 
should, regardless of what other attributes it may have (especially its  physica l 
constitution), be regarded as a bona fide member of the com m unity o f sentient 
beings.
I suggest especially that indistinguishability between machine and hum an con­
versation, which is at the core of much discussion of the Test, inc lud ing  that of 
French, is actua lly  a red herring. I th in k  that th is is im p lic it  in  the rather coarse 
tolerance of 70% orig ina lly  suggested by Turing  for his Test.
The real issue is credibility: whether some putative machine intelligence can 
sustain a conversation in  such a way that we would be satisfied that it  rea lly  
means what it  says; th is remains the case, even i f  what it  is saying is obviously 
and thoroughly non-human (and thus perfectly “d istinguishable” from  human 
conversation). For example, the conversation that would be involved in  actua lly  
inv iting  a machine to act as a subject in  a form al Turing Test would certa in ly  
involve elements that would not arise in  any norm al conversation between human 
beings; but I suspect that, on the basis of just such a conversation, one could 
sensibly judge whether the machine meant what it  was saying or not.
So, i f  French ’s po int is that the Turing  Test, as stated, focuses on ind istin -
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guishab ility  from  s tr ic t ly  human intelligence, and that th is is unnecessary and 
even m isguided, then I am  inclined to agree w ith  h im . French however, sees this 
as an intrinsic defect of the Test. I th in k  he is m istaken in  this, as I have already 
argued; but even if  he were right, I th in k  th is conclusion would be contingent on a 
very lite ra l reading of the Test (which, I adm it, overemphasises the issue of com­
paring machine w ith  human intelligence), and a consequent fa ilu re to appreciate 
the central, inform al, idea being promoted by Turing.
W hat I take to be the proper view  of the Turing  Test has been previously
elaborated by Roger Penrose:
From my own point of view I should be prepared to weaken the require­
ments of the Turing test very considerably. It seems to me that asking 
the computer to imitate a human being so closely so (sic) as to be in­
distinguishable from one in the relevant ways is really asking more of the 
computer than necessary. A ll I would myself ask for would be that our 
perceptive interrogator should really feel convinced, from the nature of 
the computer’s replies, that there is a conscious presence underlying these 
replies— albeit a possibly alien one. This is something manifestly absent 
from all computer systems that have been constructed to date.
Penrose (1990, p. 11, original emphasis)
To be clear then, let me now propose what I sha ll dub the Penrose Test for 
intelligence :4
A n y  en tity  is intelligent which understands and means what it  says; 
and any en tity  understands and means what is says i f  it  can so con­
vince a competent human judge, pure ly  on the basis of her conversa­
tion  w ith  it.
B y  a “competent” judge I mean someone who, inter alia, has a reasonable 
understanding of the state of the art in  A I, and is capable thereby of probing 
past “canned” responses of the so-called ELIZA type (Weizenbaum 1984), etc. 
Indeed the judge should probably have some specific fam ilia r ity  w ith  whatever 
design princip les m ay have been used in  bu ild ing  the putative intelligence (in  this 
lim ited  respect, the test I propose here is arguably more stringent than Tu ring ’s).
4Perhaps this might equally be called the Asim ov Test for intelligence; compare it with this 
formulation: “There is no right to deny freedom to any object with a mind advanced enough to 
grasp the concept and desire the state” (Asimov 1976, p. 174). The “grasping” and “desiring” 
are apparently to be established by similar criteria to those which I have suggested: linguistic 
cross-examination of the subject. In Asimov’s case a “competent” judge is, effectively, any 
court of law having relevant jurisdiction.
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I have om itted any comment about the allowed or required domain of discourse 
in  the Penrose Test. Th is  is deliberate. I consider that the demand tha t the en tity  
convince a competent judge, pure ly through conversation, tha t it  rea lly  does 
understand and mean what it  says is already enough to guarantee a satisfactorily  
w ide ranging domain of discourse, w ithout any add itiona l stipu lation.
M y  cla im  is that the Penrose Test captures the essence o f Tu ring ’s orig i­
na l Test; and that, in  particu lar, any honest researcher can judge perfectly well 
whether h is system should be labelled inte lligent, in  th is sense, w ithout ever hav­
ing recourse to the elaborate paraphernalia actua lly  prescribed by  Turing, and 
w ithout any significant danger of being confounded by irrelevant factors, subcog- 
n itive  or otherwise.
Furthermore, I suggest that th is is in  fact the way the “Turing  Test” is em­
ployed by p ractica l researchers. I th in k  it  is generally accepted that no A I  system 
yet developed has come remotely close to meeting Turing ’s criterion, and th is is 
known w ithout any attempts at setting up the k in d  of form al test conditions 
actua lly  described by Turing. The la tte r would on ly come in to  p lay  i f  or when 
we have a system which we already know, from  the Penrose Test, to have the 
depth of understanding required to partic ipate  in  a m eaningful conversation; but 
even then the form al Turing Test would, at best, serve on ly to demonstrate the 
ob jectiv ity  of th is cla im . A nd  of course, we should remember that the rôle of the 
machine in  the Turing Test is d is tin c tly  demeaning, if  not pos itive ly  insu lting: it 
seems to me that a prima facie m ind  m ight well refuse to partic ipate  in  such a 
charade!
For a more detailed discussion of the issues arising here, see Hofstadter’s 
(1985, Chapter 22, Post Scriptum ) account of actua lly  attem pting to apply Tu r­
ing ’s ideas on testing intelligence in practice (a lbeit the “inte lligence” being tested 
turned out to be a hoax— a gentle p ractica l joke at Hofstadter’s expense). I con­
sider it  significant that, in  operation, th is turned out to be m uch closer to m y 
description of the Penrose Test than a Turing Test proper. Hofstadter also, 
incidentally, anticipates the notion of subcognitive probing, subsequently elab­
orated by French. Notw ithstanding th is, Hofstadter’s conclusion, at that tim e
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at least, was tha t he was (still) an “unabashed pusher of the Turing  Test as a 
way of operationally  defining what it  would be for a machine to genuinely th in k ” 
(p. 525).
So m y fina l answer to French is to s tr ic t ly  disagree w ith  his critic ism , and 
insist that the Turing  Test is s t ill essentially as satisfactory as when Turing first 
proposed it; but I adm it that the form al aspects o f the Test are d istracting, and 
I actua lly  propose the Penrose Test as a clarification  of Tu ring ’s central idea. 
Indeed, while I sha ll continue to refer to “Turing” testing in  what follows, this 
should now be interpreted (where th is makes any difference) as Penrose testing.
3.3  T h e  P ro b lem  S itu a tio n  in  A I
Turing ’s answer to his own reformulated version of the question of machine in te lli­
gence was that he believed that a su itab ly  programmed d ig ita l computer probably 
could pass his Test. Indeed, he went so far as to predict that “at the end of the 
century the use of words and general educated opin ion w ill have altered so much 
that one w ill be able to speak of machines th ink ing  w ithout expecting to be con­
trad icted” (Turing 1950, p. 442). Th is  was perhaps somewhat rash. It is now 
clear that the im p lied  target of programm ing a computer such that it  is capable 
of passing the Turing  Test, by the end of the century, w ill not be achieved; indeed, 
there is lit t le  consensus as to when, if ever, a Test m ight (w ith any confidence) 
be rescheduled fo r !5
To be fa ir to Turing, he was not at a ll dogmatic. He e xp lic it ly  stipu lated 
that his c la im  (that a computer could be made to pass the Test) was conjectural 
and speculative; that he had no decisive arguments to show that it  was possible 
(even in  p rinc ip le— never m ind  in  practice); and that its  tru th  could on ly be 
defin itive ly established by exh ib iting  a working example o f such an “in te lligen t” 
computer. O f course, it  was an essential part of Turing ’s paper to consider and
5Granted, the annual Loebner P rize  Com petition, launched in 1991, is derived from the idea 
of the Turing Test (Campbell & Fejer 1991). However, it is based on an extremely impoverished 
version of the Test, in that each subject can only be interrogated on a single, specified, topic, and 
the interrogators “were told to hold normal conversations, not to try aggressively to unmask 
the contestants with tricky questions” (Strok 1991). I note that the 1991 prize for the best 
performing computer subject (whose topic was “whimsical conversation”!) was presented, with 
no apparent sense of irony, not to the subject itself but to its programmer.
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discount arguments against even the poss ib ility  o f a computer passing the Test: 
for otherwise the form ulation of the Test would have been pointless. B y  way of 
conclusion, Turing adm itted that, at the tim e of w riting, it  was very unclear how 
best to go about try ing  to make a computer pass the Test, or even what the basic 
hardware requirements m ight be. Thus, Tu ring ’s achievement was in  sharply 
defining an interesting problem, rather than offering a substantive theoretical 
insight in to  its solution. It is m y view  that the prob lem  situation  in  A rt if ic ia l 
Intelligence can s t ill be quite well characterised in  the way outlined by Turing. 
Specifically, I suggest that:
• The Turing  Test has not been shown to be invalid (i.e. not a sufficient test 
for intelligence). Indeed, I would argue that th is question w ill not actua lly  
become pressing u n til (or unless) some system other than a human being 
(whether a programmed computer, or something else, as yet unimagined) 
actua lly  passes it.
• Turing  Test performance has not been shown to be impossib le, or inher­
en tly  im practica l, for a computer (not even i f  we restrict attention to  those 
computers which are already techn ica lly  feasible).
• Conversely, no essentially new argument has been forthcom ing to suggest 
that Turing  Test performance defin ite ly is possible (even in  princ ip le) for a 
computer (either now or in  the future).
• We s t il l lack any comprehensive understanding (theory) o f what, specifi­
cally, would be required to make a computer pass the test. There has, of 
course, been a m ajor research effort over the 40 years since Tu ring ’s orig ina l 
assessment of the situation. Th is  has yie lded considerable insights in to  the 
problem . I review some of th is work in  subsequent sections. There is no 
doubt that our understanding o f the difficulties in  achieving Turing  Test 
performance from  a computer is now much more acute than when Turing 
first formulated the problem; but it  is ce rta in ly  not the case that we now 
know “in  p rincip le” how to achieve th is performance, but on ly  lack (say) 
adequate hardware, or a sufficient software development effort, to bring  it 
about.
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3 .4  O n C o g n itiv e  A rch itec tu re
Turing, through the notion of the Un iversa l Com puter, provided an existential 
argument for A rt if ic ia l Intelligence: it  seems that some (universal) computer, 
running some program, should “surely” be able to pass the Turing  Test. Th is  is 
the hypothesis of Turing Test Computationalism (Ht).
Turing  Test performance would mean (by defin ition) that we im pute “m ental” 
states and events to such a machine. Th is  can be done even w ithout a com m it­
ment to the view that the machine “rea lly ” has any m entality: Dennett (1971) 
refers to th is process as the adoption of the intentional stance. M ore generally, 
even for a machine which does not achieve fu ll Turing  Test performance, the be­
haviour may s t ill be such as to ju s tify  a lim ited  adoption of the in ten tiona l stance, 
i.e. the im putation  of mentality, a lbe it in  some im poverished form . In th is way 
we sidestep, even if  on ly pro tern, the m etaphysical debate as what “genuine” 
(human) m enta lity  actua lly  consists in .6
Since the un-programmed computer m anifestly lacks m entality, we thus effec­
tive ly  im pute m enta lity  to the computer program(s): that is, the general notion 
that there can exist programmed computers which are intentional, or the more 
particu la r notion that there can exist programmed computers which can pass the 
Turing Test (Ht), im p lic it ly  asserts that the m ental states and events o f (or im ­
puted to) such machines are, in  princip le, reducible to, or identifiab le w ith , states 
and events of the ir programs, which is to say of pure ly “com putational” entities.
The point is that, whenever we adopt the intentional stance toward a pro­
grammed computer, we im p lic it ly  identify  some reduction of m ental entities to 
com putational entities.
It is the nature of these reductions that is actua lly  of central interest—  
particu larly , though not exclusively, for whatever light th is m ight u lt im a te ly  cast 
on human m entality. Adm itted ly , we would need to do a good deal more work 
to ju stify  any step from  “machine” m enta lity  to human m entality: we would, for 
example, have to appeal to some convergence princip le, to suggest that sim ilar
6This is the distinction (insofar as there really is one) between H i  and the stronger doctrine 
of (unqualified) Com putationalism  (H c): H e claims that a computer which passes the Turing 
Test really does exhibit genuine mentality—that mentality just is some particular kind of 
computational activity.
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reductions m ight be expected to apply to any systems, inc lud ing  hum an beings, 
exh ib iting  the relevant behaviour (Harnad 1989). However, since the level of m a­
chine “m enta lity” which has been achieved to date is extrem ely lim ited  (fa lling 
far short of Turing Test performance) it  seems a lit t le  premature to worry un­
du ly  about the u ltim ate  scope of any such putative  “machine psychology” at th is 
stage.
Now, com putational universality (e.g. Lew is &  Papad im itr iou  1981) guaran­
tees that i f  a realisation of any abstract universal computer can pass the Turing 
Test (exhib it intelligence) when su itab ly  programmed then, in  p rinc ip le , some 
(sufficiently “large” and/or “fast” ) realisation of every abstract universal com­
puter can. W h ich  is to say that the underly ing program m ing form alism  (which 
defines the abstract computer), once it  is universal, does not constrain the in te l­
ligence of the machine. However, it  will rad ica lly  affect the reduction of m ental 
to com putational entities; th is reduction w ill, at best, be unique on ly re la tive to 
a particu la r programm ing formalism .
Furthermore, we must at least recognise the poss ib ility  that the reduction 
m ay therefore be much simpler re lative to some form alism s compared to others; 
and that which form alism  is most illum ina ting  m ay even be different depending 
on the particu la r aspects of m enta lity  under consideration at any given time.
M y  point here is to distinguish between the existential and the pragmatic as­
pects of the A r t if ic ia l Intelligence research programme. From  an existentia l point 
of view, a ll (abstract) universal computers are equally powerful; i f  one can be 
made inte lligent, they a ll can. Bu t, from  the pragm atic point of view, in  terms 
of understanding or exp la in ing intelligence (reducing the m ental to the com puta­
tional), there m ay be very substantial differences between universal computers, 
and, indeed, the most pragm atica lly  useful computer m ay be different in  different 
contexts.
To put it  another way, consider the case of a reasonably good com puter chess 
player— Dennett’s (1978b, passim) p roto typ ica l example of a machine to which 
we can effectively adopt the intentional stance. One possible exp lanatory schema 
would be to attem pt a direct reduction of the in tentional a ttribu tions to charac­
teristics of the program as expressed in the native instruction set of its processor. 
A t best th is w ill be uninte llig ib le; at worst it  w il l be hopelessly im practica l. In­
64
stead, any effective explanation would certa in ly  make use o f a hierarchy o f “levels” 
which progressively reduces (or explains) the in ten tiona l attributes. It is quite 
p lausible that explanations at some of the different levels, or even w ith in  certain 
levels, may be effectively expressed in  different form alism s (i.e. in  terms of d if­
ferent virtual machines). It would be quite sterile to then argue about which of 
these formalisms is the “correct” one.
Compare also Dennett’s (1978a) own discussion o f a s im ila r mode of expla­
nation, which he describes in  terms of progressively discharging homunculi, and 
Daw kins’ (1986, p. 13) notion of hierarchical reductionism. W h ile  D ennett’s dis­
cussion is most na tu ra lly  applied to the decomposition of a program  w ith in  a 
single programming formalism , s im ila r princip les would apply to transitions be­
tween different formalisms. M ore generally, wh ile I have ta lked loosely about 
d istinct programm ing “form alism s” and “v ir tu a l machines” , the transitions need 
not always be clear cut or precise. There are hierarchies and hierarchies (compare 
also, the “Strange Loops” and “Tangled H ierarch ies” of Hofstadter 1979).7
Converse arguments apply, of course, to the synthesis of in tentional systems. 
W h ile , “in  p rinc ip le” , any abstract universal computer is as powerful as any other, 
in  practice (i.e. in  terms of the ease of designing the required functiona lity) some 
m ay be better than others, and a variety m ay be much better than any single 
one. The la tte r point s t ill holds even if, u ltim ate ly, a system is implemented by 
sim ulating the required diverse computers on a single host. Note carefu lly that 
the d istinction  I am drawing here has nothing to do w ith  the re lative speed or per­
formance of d istinct, physical, computers: it  is concerned pure ly  w ith  differences 
between programm ing formalisms, or abstract computers.
I am arguing here against a tendency to adopt an extrem ely over-simplified 
view  of the com putationalist thesis. G iven  Turing ’s (1950) results on universal 
computation, and the general notion of com putationalism , there seems to be an 
almost overwhelm ing tem ptation  to interpret Hc as positing the existence of some 
specific and unique (v irtua l) machine, or “language of thought” , which, im p lic it ly ,
7Note incidentally that, even when one has full access to the design of an artefact such as a 
chess computer—i.e. when one can, in principle at least, adopt Dennett’s “design” stance—the 
reduction of the intentional to the computational may still be a very difficult problem. For 
example, consider Dennett’s comment on “innocently” emergent phenomena (Dennett 1977a, 
p. 107), or Hofstadter’s discussion of “epiphenomena” (Hofstadter 1979, Chapter X).
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is realised in  (all) human brains, and which is a sufficient form alism  for the direct 
explanation (reduction) of a ll cognitive phenomena. Tha t is, that the architecture 
of cognition consists of a single significant v ir tu a l m achine level, and even that 
th is machine is of some particu la r class (such as, say, a L ISP -like  machine).
Th is k ind  of v iew  can easily lead to essentia lly sterile argumentation about the 
“absolute” cla im s of particu lar abstract machines— say procedural versus declar­
ative programming, or serial versus para lle l programm ing, or “passive” versus 
“active” symbols.
More recently, th is k ind  of argument has become an element o f the on-going 
debate between “classical A I ” and “connectionism ” . Consider, for example, the 
review of th is debate presented by Fodor &  Py lyshyn  (1988). T he ir conclusion is 
that a connectionist “architecture” , insofar as such a th ing is well defined, is not 
a viab le candidate as the “architecture of cognition” . Now the ir arguments based 
on “com binatoria l syntax and semantics” seem to me conclusive in  th is regard. In 
other words, contrary to some of the connectionist rhetoric, connectionism  is not 
(or, at least, not necessarily) an alternative to  classical ideas on cognitive architec­
ture:, but is, rather, complementary to it , pa rticu la r ly  insofar as it  m ay offer insight 
into  ways to effectively implement certain aspects of classical arch itecture .8 B u t 
even here there is a risk  that Fodor and Py lyshyn  could be (m is-?)interpreted as 
proposing that there does, in  fact, exist some unique (though non-connectionist) 
programm ing form alism  (abstract universal computer) which is the “architecture 
of cognition” . Such an interpretation (which, I stress, m ay not be intended by 
Fodor and Py lyshyn) would be almost as bad as the position they attack: the 
proposal of connectionist networks as the “architecture of cognition” .
Th is  whole discussion is fraught w ith  difficulty, and the poss ib ility  of m is in ter­
pretation. Thus, consider, for example, the Physical Symbol System  hypothesis 
of Newell &  Simon (which I w ill denote Hpti):
A  physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general 
intelligent action.
Newell & Simon (1976, p. 41)
8Compare also Boden’s slightly earlier review of this debate, where she considered, and 
ultimately rejected, the idea that connectionism might represent a Kuhnian “paradigm shift” 
relative to “Good Old Fashioned AI” (Boden 1988, Chapter 8).
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Now Newell &; Simon exp lic it ly  stipu late tha t a key element in  the ir form u­
lation of Hpaa was the invention of L IS P  by John M cCarthy , which became the 
prototyp ica l example of a “symbol system” , and the demonstration tha t such a 
system was “equivalent to the other universal schemes of com putation” . B u t i f  a 
symbol system  is s im p ly  a particu la r class of (abstract) universal computer, and 
a physical sym bol system is s im ply a realisation of a member of th is class, then 
exactly how does Hpts go beyond the general com putationalist hypothesis, HC1 
A lternative ly, i f  we accept the lite ra l in terpretation  that Hpsa posits that only a 
particu la r class of universal computers can exh ib it general inte lligence (i.e. the 
cla im  that a member of th is class is necessary) then the hypothesis is s im p ly  
false: by the defin ition of com putational universality, as already discussed, i f  any 
(abstract) universal computer can exh ib it intelligence then they a ll can.
Now, as a m atter of fact, I believe that what Newell &  S im on mean to  c la im  by 
Hpss is (at least) that any intelligence system must have a “v irtu a l m achine” level 
which is an im plem entation of a sym bol system (of a more or less L ISP -like  sort). 
Th is would a perfectly good qualification of Hc, i.e. a perfectly good add itiona l 
hypothesis about the nature of “cognitive arch itecture” , though it  would need 
considerable clarification. B u t there again, Newell &  S im on ’s c la im  may, in  fact, 
be even stronger than this: it  is s im p ly  very d ifficu lt to establish, unambiguously, 
what exactly they intend.
As evidence that th is confusion is not m ere ly an ind iv idua l fa iling  on m y own 
part, consider Hofstadter’s attem pt at a c r it ica l evaluation of Newell &  S im on ’s 
position (Hofstadter 1983); Newell dissented from  th is sharply in  h is accompany­
ing commentary (Newell 1983), stating inter alia that Hofstadter was “m istaken, 
absolutely and unequivocally” (p. 293) in  at least some of his interpretation; 
but Hofstadter has since repeated and reinforced his critic ism , a lbe it w ith  some 
c larification (Hofstadter 1985, Chapter 26, Post Scriptum ).
There the d irect argument currently rests, to  the best of m y knowledge. How­
ever, ind irect reverberations continue. Thus, Fodor &  Py lyshyn  (1988, p. 59) 
are dism issive (verging on the sarcastic) in  re lation  to the follow ing particu la r 
passage from  Hofstadter’s orig inal paper:
The brain itself does not manipulate symbols; the brain is the medium 
in which the symbols are floating and in which they trigger each other.
There is no central manipulator, no central program. There is simply a
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vast collection of “teams”— patterns of neural firings that, like teams of 
ants, trigger other patterns of neural firings. The symbols are not “down 
there” at the level of the individual firings; they are “up here” where we 
do our verbalization. We feel those symbols churning within ourselves in 
somewhat the same way we feel our stomach churning.
Hofstadter (1983, p. 279)
Yet: precisely the same passage has been quoted, apparently favourably, by 
Boden (1988, p. 247).
As another example of ambivalence about the notion of an arch itecture o f cog­
n ition , consider Fodor’s book The Language of Thought (Fodor 1976). Reflecting 
the definite artic le  used in  the title , the book is dom inated first by the attem pt 
to establish that “the” language of thought exists, and then by the exam ination 
of what some of “its ” properties must be.
Fodor starts off his argument w ith  the statement that “representation presup­
poses a m edium  of representation, and there is no sym bolisation w ithout symbols 
. . .  In particu lar, there is no representation w ithout an (sic) in terna l language” 
(p. 55). Th is  could be interpreted s im p ly  as a variation  on Hc, and, as such, is 
hard ly objectionable; it  is equivalent to the c la im  that a computer (generally) 
has a single native instruction  set (language), in  which every aspect o f its  be­
haviour can (in princip le) be explicated. But: Fodor also cla im s that “a lit t le  
prodding w ill show that the representational system  . . .  must share a number 
of the characteristic features of real languages” (p. 31), and la ter he speculates 
specifically that “the language of thought m ay be very like  a natura l language 
. . .  It may be that the resources of the inner code are rather d irectly  represented 
in  the resources of the codes we use for com m unication” (p. 156). T h is  k in d  of 
discussion strongly suggests that Fodor has in  m ind  a single, unitary, language, 
d istinct from  any natura l language, but not a ll that different, which is sufficient 
for the more or less d irect reduction of m ental phenomena. Now I emphasise that 
th is s im p listic  view is on ly  suggested by Fodor’s treatment. Nowhere does he ex­
p lic it ly  state anyth ing to th is effect; and there are at least some occasions when 
he appears to exp lic it ly  reject any such interpretation, such as the following:
It is probably a mistake to speak of the system of internal representations 
that the organism has available for the analysis of environmental events or 
behavioral options. Rather, in the general case, organisms have access to a 
wide variety of types and levels of representation, and which one— or ones—  
they assign in the course of a given computation is determined by a variety
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of variables, including factors of motivation and attention and the general 
character of the organism’s appreciation of the demand characteristics of 
its task.
Fodor (1976, p. 157)
.. .  we can see that ‘the’ representation that gets assigned to an utterance 
in a speech exchange must be a very heterogenous sort of an object. It 
is, in effect, the logical sum of representations drawn from a number of 
different sublanguages of the internal language. It is an empirical question 
what, if anything, these sublanguages have in common . ..
Fodor (1976, p. 159, emphasis added)
Now I agree wholeheartedly w ith  th is position; but I confess that I find it 
d ifficu lt to interpret the rest of the book in  th is light. G iven  such a view, i t  would 
seem that a sensible first step would be to emphasise distinctions between different 
systems of representation, rather than doing as Fodor does— which is to  ta lk  of 
a single system of representation (the language o f thought) which encompasses 
everything.
In conclusion, I suggest that the app lication  o f the notion of universal com­
putation  in  A rt if ic ia l Intelligence could usefully be reversed from  its usual formu­
lation. It is usual to th in k  of com putational un iversa lity  as ind icating  tha t arb i­
tra ry  intentional phenomena can be “explained” in  terms o f a single mechanism—  
im p lic it ly , that there is some theoretical gain ( “parsim ony” ?) in  doing so. B y  con­
trast, m y view is that com putational un iversa lity  leg itim ises explanations which 
invoke a rb itra rily  complex combinations of different (computational) mechanisms, 
because we are guaranteed that, provided these are a ll effectively defined, they can 
a ll u ltim ate ly  be “reduced” to a single mechanism (should there be any benefit 
in  doing so).
That is, in  considering the architecture of cognition, we need not conceive 
of that architecture as fundam entally identified w ith  a particu la r computer (i.e. 
a particu la r “system” of representation, or homogenous “language o f thought” ); 
rather we m ay th in k  in  terms of an heterogenous network of (abstract) machines 
(homunculi) specialised for different tasks, which, in  aggregation, m ight y ie ld  
something approaching human intelligence.
Th is is not, of course, an orig ina l idea. For example, it  is very s im ila r to 
M in sky ’s Society of Mind (M insky  1986), or Hofstadter’s “soup cognition” (Hof-
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stadter 1983). S im ilarly , Boden has recently emphasised the need to take a p lu ­
ra lis tic  view of computationalism , and to avoid over-sim plification (Boden 1988, 
p. 232). Dennett has also ventured to provide a schematic design of computer 
“consciousness” which exemplifies these ideas (Dennett 1978c). Perhaps then I 
have laboured the issue unduly; and yet, I th in k  it  is clear from  the lite rature 
I have reviewed above that th is central po in t— the potentia l for a programmed 
universal computer to simultaneously adm it descriptions both of t r iv ia l s im p lic ­
ity, and almost inconceivable com plexity— has not been consistently recognised, 
or clearly enunciated.
The point is, in  any case, crucia l for m y purposes here. Specifically, the work 
to be presented in  subsequent chapters m ay seem, by comparison w ith  A I  research 
generally, to be of a re la tive ly  p rim itive  sort; but m y c la im  is that the problem  of 
build ing, and understanding, an artific ia l intelligence is of unknown, but certa in ly 
vast, proportions, and that it  is on ly w ith  an appreciation of th is that the need 
for the k ind  of fundamental research described here can be properly understood. 
To underline this, I close th is discussion of cognitive arch itecture w ith  a final 
quotation from  Fodor:
On the one hand, internal representations are labile and the effectiveness 
with which they are deployed may, in given cases, significantly determine 
the efficiency of mental processing. On the other hand, we know of no 
general constraints on how information flows in the course of the computa­
tions which determine such deployments: To say that we are dealing with 
a feedback system is simply to admit that factors other than the proper­
ties of the input may affect the representation that the input receives. In 
particular, what internal representations get assigned is sensitive to the 
cognitive state—for all we know, to the w hole  cognitive state—of the stim­
ulated organism. Perhaps there are bounds to the options that organisms 
enjoy in this respect, but if there are no one now knows where to set them. 
Psychology is very hard.
Fodor (1976, p. 166)
3.5 O n C o m p u ta tio n a l S em an tics
The essence of the Turing  Test, as already discussed, is to judge whether a system 
means what it  says, or knows what is being ta lked about— in  a comparable sense 
to the way we use these terms for human beings. Th is  is considered to be diag­
nostic of intelligence, subsuming other aspects, such as consciousness, creativ ity,
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imagination, etc.— presumably because these la tte r things would, im p lic it ly , be 
tested anyway: they are so central to our granting tha t the system understands 
our conversation at a ll that we would surely, inter alia, insist on testing whether 
it  understands these particu la r concepts themselves.
So, the key question which arises in  re lation  to a programmed computer which 
passes the Test, is: what is the relationsh ip between its  knowledge and the form al 
entities (tokens) m aking up its program ? 9 O r, equally: which of these tokens 
mean anything at all, and, of those which do mean something, just what do they 
mean? Or, in  the terms of the discussion of the previous section, we are asking: 
how are the m enta l entities meaning or knowledge to  be reduced to the tokens 
constituting the com puter’s program?
Note again that any answer to these questions must be contingent on the 
defin ition of the computer itself: on its being the pa rticu la r universal computer 
postulated by the program. To th is extent, the reduction of meaning or knowledge 
to aspects of the program would not represent the complete reduction to physica l 
terms: however, I take it  that the reduction o f the computer itse lf to physica l 
terms w ill not be problematic.
We should feel much happier in  attem pting to answer these questions if  we 
already had available to us a detailed specification of a programmed computer 
which can pass the Turing Test. Unfortunately, of course, we do not. Indeed, 
the fact is that the very design or construction of such a system presupposes, to 
some extent, that we already know what the answer to these questions is. More 
precisely, we must hypothesise answers to these questions as a prerequisite to 
bu ild ing  a computer system which could pass the Turing  Test.
So, we need a theory of meaning or semantics, applicable to com putational 
systems in  general.
On the face of it, there is no shortage of competing theories for th is purpose. I 
shall certa in ly not attem pt a comprehensive review here. However, I shall suggest
91 use “program” without prejudice to the programming formalism, and eschewing any 
distinction between “instructions” and “data”; to put it another way, to the extent that any 
practical digital computer has finite storage, “program” can conveniently be interpreted as 
synonymous with the siaie (of this finite state machine). I use “token” to denote any arbitrary 
component of a program. It need not, and generally does not, imply any kind of “atomic” or 
“primitive” component of a program: indeed the entire program will be considered to constitute 
one particular token.
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that, despite differences in  vocabulary and emphasis, there is a common core to 
several of the theories of meaning which are in  p ractica l use w ith in  A I. I shall try  
to identify, and make more exp lic it, this common core, and to then use it  as a 
foundation for subsequent developments.
I must consider first the view that there cannot be a “com putational seman­
tics” at a ll— that computers (and/or the ir programs) s im p ly  are not the k inds 
of things to which, in  whole or in  part, meaning can be ascribed. Th is  position 
has been put forward by a number of writers. The basic idea is that a com­
puter program is no more and no less than a form al, or syntactic object, and, as 
such, cannot in tr in s ica lly  refer to  anything. It m ay (or m ay not) be possible to 
system atica lly interpret it  as referring to something, but th is meaning, or under­
standing, is entire ly in  the m ind  of the person doing the interpretation— it  is not, 
and cannot be, a property of the program “itse lf” .
There is, of course, a grain of tru th  in  th is view. Thus, we m ay compare a 
computer program to a book; the book has meaning only insofar as people read 
and understand it. The book does not understand itse lf .10 O r we m ay identify  
a program w ith  its  information content— in  the sense of the form al theory of in ­
formation; such inform ation  content would be independent o f the meaning of the 
program (if any). Indeed, one m ight underline th is by  arguing that any pa rtic ­
u la r arbitrary sequence of characters, of the same length as the program, would 
lite ra lly  have the same in form ation content (relative to an im p lic it, equiprobable, 
ensemble of a ll such sequences).
I said that there was a gra in of tru th  in  th is view, and it  is this: a program 
cannot be given meaning s im p ly  by w ishing it  so. In particu la r, one cannot cause 
a program token to mean something m erely by g iv ing it  a particu la r labe l— i.e. 
the use of what M cD erm ott (1976) calls “w ishful m nem onics” . Th is  also applies 
of course mutatis mutandis to the tokens output by a program— as artfu lly, if  
accidentally, demonstrated by W eizenbaum w ith  h is infamous ELIZA program(s) 
(Weizenbaum 1984; see also Dreyfus &; Dreyfus 1986, Chapter 3).
10Popper diverges somewhat from this common-sense view, with his idea of the World of 
objective knowledge (World 3). However, I do not think this is critical for the issue at hand 
here: while Popper would challenge the view that the only kind of knowledge is (subjective) 
knowledge of organisms, especially people, he certainly would not claim that a book literally 
understands itself.
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Equa lly  of course, the fact that a token of a program  has a particu la r labe l does 
not necessarily mean that it  is devoid of meaning: it  m ere ly says that whatever 
( if  any) meaning it  has is not by virtue of the label.
The formalist idea— that a computer program, being a pure ly  form al object, 
cannot rea lly  mean anything— has been reviewed in  deta il, and rejected, by Boden 
(1988, Chapter 8 ). I consider tha t her analysis is correct, and I do not propose to 
repeat her detailed arguments here. The essential po in t is that, although a com­
puter program per se m ay be viewed as a pure ly form al object, one cannot say 
the same for a programmed computer. The com puter does actua lly  do something 
(as a consequence of its  program— but also depending on its  inputs). Th is  is just 
to repeat the point made earlier that, when one ascribes m en ta lity  to a program, 
th is is always shorthand for referring to the system consisting of a (compatible) 
computer which is actua lly  running the program. The shorthand is reasonable 
because we assume that the computer itse lf can be “easily” reduced to  a lower 
(physical) level, should one w ish to do so: the rea lly  com plicated or interest­
ing phenomena are ev idently related to the pa rticu la r program, rather than the 
computer. B u t while the shorthand is reasonable, it  is open to m isinterpretation: 
specifica lly as being a c la im  that a program has intrinsic meaning, of and in  itself, 
independently of any particular computer. Th is  la tte r idea is certa in ly  m istaken, 
and, insofar as th is is the object of the fo rm a list’s attack, the attack is justified. 
B u t the point remains that th is cannot be turned in to  a general attack on the 
idea that programmed computers can have “genuine” semantics.
To return now to th is m ain theme: follow ing Boden, I discount the suggestion 
that the formal tokens m aking up a computer program (embedded in  a suitable 
computer) cannot have “in trin s ic” meaning. So far so good, but I have not yet 
made any positive suggestion as to what it  could or should mean (!) to say that 
a program token does mean something in  th is in tr in s ic  sense.
To progress this, let me first consider a term ino log ica l point. I have gener­
a lly  used the word token to refer to the constituents o f programs (regardless of 
what the programm ing form alism  m ight be), rather than the word symbol (except 
where I was citing  other authors who have, or at least seemed to  have, adopted 
the la tte r usage). M y  reason is, of course, that token doesn’t prejudice the issue 
of semantic content, whereas once we describe something as a symbol we are im ­
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p ly ing  that it  has meaning, that it  refers to something, that it  serves to symbolise, 
as least w ith  respect to some interpreter.
Now the conventional notion of a symbol places some emphasis on its  arbitrary 
or conventional character: a sym bol is viewed as a vehicle of com m unication (or, 
perhaps, of memory), and, as long as the com m unicating parties are agreed as to 
its meaning (even i f  on ly approxim ately), then the exact nature o f the sym bol is 
largely irrelevant. O f course, it  is adm itted  that a sym bol may, in  some sense, 
“resemble” the th ing  symbolised, but th is is not considered necessary or crite ria l 
for its being a symbol. Th is  is a ll true and valid, but I th in k  it  m ay be m isleading. 
It puts the emphasis entire ly in  the wrong place. W h ile  it  is true that the symbol, 
viewed in  isolation can be entire ly unrelated to  its referent (which is m erely to 
reiterate yet again that the symbol, in  isolation, is meaningless), the symbol, 
viewed in  context, must be related to the referent. T ha t is, a sym bol is a symbol 
because it  is related (somehow) to the referent.
Informally, m y general c la im  is that what makes a token a sym bol is that it  
interacts w ith  some system(s) in  a manner which is related, in  some more or less 
definite (though perhaps very complex) way, to the manner in  which the referent 
interacts w ith  the same system(s). M ore concisely, a token is a sym bol when it  
is used by some system to model something.
There is, of course, nothing novel or orig ina l in  this; it  is m ere ly an attem pt to 
spell out the im p lica tion  of ca lling  something a symbol— nam ely that a token is 
on ly  ever a sym bol in relation to some system, and that, further, its  referent must 
bear, in  some (identifiable) sense, a s im ila r re lationsh ip to the system. Dennett 
puts it  thus:
. . .  nothing is intrinsically a representation of anything; something is a 
representation only for or to someone; any representation or system of 
representations thus requires at least one user or interpreter of the repre­
sentation who is external to it.
Dennett (1978b, Chapter 7, p. 122)
Th is is worth spelling out in  deta il because, in  dealing w ith  computer pro­
grams, i t  is a ll too easy to confound two senses in  which a token can symbolise: 
it  can symbolise something to the programmer and it  can symbolise something 
to the (rest of) the computer. The form er sense of sym bolisation is, of course, the
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basis for the form alist argument that program tokens have no “in tr in s ic ” mean­
ing. The argument is wrong, but it  is a very natu ra l m isunderstanding. Consider, 
as a more or less random example, the follow ing quotation from  Boden:
No one with any sense would embody list-structures in a computer without 
providing it also with a list-processing facility, nor give it frames without 
a slot-filling mechanism, logical formulae without rules of inference, or 
English sentences without parsing procedures.
Boden (1988, p. 249, original emphasis)
W h ile  Boden is here arguing for exactly  the same point as I am  attem pting to 
make, it  seems to me that she can easily be m isunderstood. M y  po in t is that list- 
structures (say), in  the absence of a list-processing facility , are on ly  list-structures 
by courtesy; that is they are on ly lis t structures relative to a human interpreter 
(the programmer or otherwise). B u t, in  the presence of a list-processing facility , 
then they become list-structures relative to that facility. To avoid confusion one 
should idea lly  always consistently refer to the meanings of the tokens on ly  re lative 
either to  the computer o r to a human interpreter; but, in  any case, one should not 
sw itch between these two viewpoints w ithout warning or comment, as Boden does 
here. The situation  is not, as Boden puts it, that no one “w ith  any sense” would 
embody list-structures w ithout a corresponding list-processing fac ility ; rather, in  
the sense in  which Boden evidently means (i.e. re lative to the computer) no one, 
sensible or otherwise, could do it— it  is absolutely not a m atter of choice. The 
idea of “embodying” list-structures in  a computer w ithout a corresponding list- 
processing fa c ility  is lite ra lly  a contrad iction in  terms. The tokens in  question, 
whatever they m ight symbolise to the programmer, cannot be said to symbolise 
(or to be) list-structures relative to the computer except in  the case that it treats 
them so: i.e. that it  has corresponding list-processing facilities.
Boden ’s version seems to be in te llig ib le  on ly  i f  we interpret her to mean that, 
in  the absence of a list-processing facility , the meaning of the relevant tokens 
(i.e. that they are inter alia lis t structures) should be interpreted re lative to a 
human interpreter; but that, in  the presence of a list-processing fa c ility  we can 
(and should?) change our viewpoint and interpret the ir meaning re lative to the 
computer instead. B u t, i f  th is is the interpretation Boden intends, it  is poorly 
expressed.
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Again , let me stress that th is example was p icked v ir tu a lly  at random , and 
I do not intend any particu la r or ind iv idua l crit ic ism  of Boden. The problem  
is in trin s ic  to the nature of software engineering, and is very d ifficu lt to avoid. 
M cD erm o tt’s idea of the “w ishful m nem onic” , already discussed, is obviously 
closely related to this.
I doubt that th is point can be overemphasised. In any discussion of the 
“meaning” of the tokens associated w ith  a computer program it  seems that the 
only way to stay properly honest is to consistently ask “meaning re lative to 
whom?” ; and to then absolutely restrict our a ttribu tions of meaning to  those 
which are va lid  or demonstrable relative to the (programmed) computer (or some 
subsystem thereof— such as some (other) specified tokens of the program). That 
is, we must constantly resist the tem ptation  to, as it  were, anthropomorphize 
meaning into  a token.
I m ay add that I consider that th is d iscip line, p roperly applied, seems to y ie ld  a 
un ita ry  basis for a com putational semantics, which resolves, or at least neutralises, 
the so-called dual-calculus view of computer programming. Th is  v iew  posits a 
sharp d iv is ion  of a program into active “instructions” and passive “data” . Such 
a view  leads to entire ly m isguided attem pts to more or less exclusive ly  or inde­
pendently a ttribu te  meaning to specific aspects of instructions or data separately. 
B u t in  fact, th is d istinction, while o f considerable p ractica l value in  conventional 
software engineering (i.e. the development o f software to exh ib it particu la r, effec­
tively specified, behaviours), lacks any in trin s ic  theoretical foundation .11 Tha t is, 
whether a human observer chooses to describe a particu la r token as “instruction ” 
or “data” , or as being “active” or “passive” , or “declarative” or “procedural” , is 
s tr ic t ly  irrelevant to its meaning ( if  any) to the computer. The la tte r meaning 
(which is the on ly meaning of interest in  the A I  context) can only be established
11 As discussed by Hodges, in his biography of Turing, this point was already implicit in 
Turing’s invention of the Universal Turing Machine, though it was not explicitly recognised by 
Turing until he set about designing his first practical digital computer (Hodges 1983, Chapter 6, 
pp. 324-327). It was documented in Turing’s report on the A u to m atic  Computing Engine, or 
ACE (c. 1945). As Hodges put it: “It was . . .  a small step to regard instructions . . .  as grist 
to the ACE’s own mill. Indeed, since so much of his [Turing’s] war work had depended upon 
indicator systems, in which instructions were deliberately disguised as data, there was no step 
for him to make at all. He saw as obvious what to others was a jump into confusion and 
illegality.” Hodges also notes that this insight was not explicitly pointed out “on the American 
side” until 1947.
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by reference to the objective interactions or effects of the token on the rest of the 
system (i.e. the programmed computer) in  which it  is embedded .12
In any case, to return to the question of what a token means (as opposed 
to the question of to whom?), we m ay distinguish two cases. T r iv ia lly , we may 
identify  the meaning of the token w ith  its direct effect on its  interpreter. Thus we 
m ight say that a particu la r token “means” precisely that its  interpreter should 
do whatever it  is it  does in  response to that token. T h is  notion  o f meaning 
is possible ( if not very helpful) for very simple, determ inate, interactions. B u t 
in  more complicated cases we want to identify  the meaning of the token, to its 
interpreter, w ith  some aspect of the interpreter’s environment. T h is  is the norm al 
usage of symbol or reference: the token refers ( in  the sense of being taken by the 
interpreter to refer) to some (other) th ing in  the interpreter’s environment. A nd  
th is brings us back to the notion of the sym bolic token as a model.
Th is general notion of model based semantics is well established; but there 
is some room for debate, i f  not disagreement, as to what we should adm it as 
a “model” . For m y purposes it  is not essential to tie  th is down too precisely. 
Instead, I shall review and compare some selected ways in  which it  has previously 
been applied.
The most comprehensive, and m athem atica lly  rigorous, review  of the mod­
elling relationsh ip of which I am aware is that o f the m athem atica l b io logist 
Robert Rosen (1985a). I shall therefore base m y presentation of a com putational 
semantics on Rosen’s concept of an anticipatory system:
An  anticipatory system S? is one which contains a model of a system Si 
with which it interacts. This model is a predictive model; its present states 
provide information about future states of S i. Further, the present state 
of the model causes a change of state in other subsystems of S?] these 
subsystems are (a) involved in the interaction of S 2 with S \, and (b) they 
do not affect (i.e. are unlinked to) the model of S i. In general we can 
regard the change of state in S2 arising from the model as an adaptation, 
or pre-adaptation, of S2 relative to its interaction with Si.
Rosen (1985a, p. 344, original emphasis)
W here a re lationsh ip of th is sort exists, I shall say that the subsystem of 
¿>2 which is the pred ictive model of Si means or refers to  Si] and that, in  this
12This dual calculus issue has again been thoroughly reviewed by Boden (1988, Chapter 8, 
pp. 248-250), though not from quite the perspective suggested here.
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sense, S2 understands or has knowledge of, S j. I take it  that, in  the case of 
direct interest here, i.e. where S2 is a computational system, then the relevant 
subsystem of 5 2 (the predictive model of Si) w ill be identifiab le w ith  a pa rticu la r 
token of 6 2 ’s program  (although th is need not be the only function  of th is  token, 
or a ll its  components). I repeat that such “tokens” w ill, in  general, be composite, 
dynam ic, objects. Th is  token then means or symbolises Si (to S2 ); i t  is, genuinely 
or in trinsica lly , a symbol.
I do not insist that these are absolutely necessary conditions for meaning or 
grounding; but it  seems to me that they m ay be sufficient.
Consider now Newell &  S im on ’s description o f what it  is for a form al token 
to refer to, or mean something:
A  symbol structure designates (equivalently, references or points to) an 
object if  there exist information processes that admit the symbol structure 
as input and either:
(a) affect the object; or
(b) produce, as output, symbol structures that depend on the object.
Newell fc Simon (1972, p. 21)
Cond ition  (a) here is comparable to the requirement that S2 (which encom­
passes at least the sym bol structure in  question and the specified inform ation 
processes) must be capable (potentially, at least) of interacting w ith  5 j; condi­
tion  (b) is comparable to the requirement that S2 does, in  fact, contain a model 
of Si. Now Newell &  Simon state on ly these two conditions, and state them  as 
alternatives; whereas I require both conditions, and add itiona lly  stipu late that 
the putative ly  sym bolic token ( “inform ation process” ) must be predictive. Thus 
it  is seen that m y conditions for meaning or grounding are com patib le w ith , but 
rather more severe than, those suggested by Newell and Simon.
I now tu rn  to  an early discussion by Dennett, in  h is Content and Conscious­
ness (first published in  1969), where he considers the problem  of the ascription of 
content to (physical) states and events in  brains (see Dennett 1986, Chapter IV ). 
W h ile  Dennett’s concern here is m a in ly  w ith  human psychology, or “real” m ental­
ity, rather than w ith  the putative m en ta lity  o f a su itab ly  programmed computer, 
his concepts are presented as being applicable to any “in ten tiona l” system, and
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should thus carry over more or less d irectly. D ennett’s treatm ent is quite technical 
and involved, but is roughly summarised by the follow ing extract:
The content, i f  any, of a neural state, event or structure depends on two 
factors: its normal source in stimulation, and whatever appropriate further 
efferent effects it has; and to determine these factors one must make an 
assessment that goes beyond an extensional description of stimulation and 
response locomotion. The point of the first factor in content ascription, 
dependence on stimulus conditions, is this: unless an event is somehow 
related to external conditions and their effects on the sense organs, there 
w ill be no grounds for giving it  any particular reference to objects in the 
world. A t low enough levels of afferent activity the question of reference is 
answered easily enough: an event refers to (or reports on) those stimulus 
conditions that cause it to occur. Thus the investigators working on fibres 
in the optic nerves of frogs and cats are able to report that particular 
neurons serve to report convexivity, moving edges, or small, dark, moving 
objects because these neurons fire normally only if  there is such a pattern 
on the retina. However mediated the link between receptor organ and 
higher events becomes, this link cannot be broken entirely, or reference is 
lost.
The point about the link with efferent activity and eventually w ith be­
haviour is this: what an event or state ‘means to ’ an organism also de­
pends on what it does with the event or state . . .  Where events and states 
appear inappropriately linked one cannot assign content at all, and so it  is 
possible that a great many events and states have no content, regardless 
of the eventual effect they have on the later development of the brain and 
behaviour.
Dennett (1986, Chapter IV , pp. 76-77)
I suggest that th is position of Dennett’s is closely related to the position  I have 
already described in  re lation to antic ipatory systems, although Dennett provides 
some useful complementary insights also.
Taking first Dennett’s discussion of the re lationsh ip between neural entities 
(or tokens, in  a com putational system) and “stim ulus conditions” , th is m irrors m y 
earlier requirement that the token be a model of the th ing  referred to. D ennett’s 
version is somewhat more restrictive, and I would argue that it  is unnecessarily so: 
for a subsystem m ight, conceivably, operate successfully as a m odel without any 
ongoing linkage to  the th ing modelled (i.e. w ithout any ongoing linkage to  “stim ­
ulus conditions” ). However, I would grant that some such linkage to stim ulus 
conditions m ay be a necessary factor in  the original development or establish­
ment of any m odelling relationship; m y po int is s im p ly  that, once the m odelling 
relationship is established, it  may successfully persist, even i f  the o rig ina l linkage
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to stimulus conditions is broken. It may also be that, given the context of Den­
nett’s discussion, he was p rim arily  m aking a pragmatic rather than a theoretical 
point: i.e. that on ly m odelling relationships which (still)  have extant linkages to 
stimulus conditions would be retrospectively identifiab le  in  practice. Even  th is 
would be a debatable c la im  however. A  separate po in t arises from  m y cla im  
that the model should be predictive; Dennett ce rta in ly  makes no exp lic it state­
ment of th is sort. However, his requirement that the u lt im ate  efferent effects be 
appropriate m ight, conceivably, be argued as am ounting to the same thing.
M oving on to the efferent effects, Dennett’s general requirement tha t there 
must be some such effects, and that they must be appropriate corresponds quite 
well in  m y form ulation to Rosen’s stipu lation  that the pred ictive model embedded 
in  the system S2 must actua lly  affect the interaction between 5*2 and S\. That is, 
the model must have some effect (SVs behaviour m ust depend on the model), and 
a m in im a l constraint on the appropriateness of the effect is that it  be concerned 
w ith  the interaction w ith  S\. Crudely, i f  £ 2  has a m odel of Si, but on ly  actua lly  
“uses” it  in  its  dealings w ith  some other (unrelated) system S3 , then we could 
hard ly  describe such usage as “appropriate” . Aga in , D ennett’s position may 
be somewhat more restrictive than is captured by the notion o f an tic ipatory 
system: in  particu lar, Dennett m ay well have in  m ind  some more stringent tests 
of the appropriateness of behaviour (i.e. stronger than  that the behaviour just 
be directed at the “righ t” target). I would accept that some such stronger tests 
m ight be useful in  the case of bio logical systems, but I am not convinced that 
they are necessary in  the general case.
In any case, it  should be clear that the discrepancies, such as they are, be­
tween Dennett’s v iew  of the ascription of content and m y discussion based on 
antic ipatory systems, a ll rest on rather fine d istinctions, and are not fundamen­
tal. In fact, I would suggest that the general notion of an an tic ipatory  system 
satisfactorily captures Dennett’s own idea of an in ten tiona l system, but in  rela­
tive ly  more form al terms; that is, it  seems to me that m odelling a system as being 
antic ipatory (relative to some environment in  which it  is embedded) is v ir tu a lly  
synonymous w ith  adopting the intentional stance toward it.
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Next I shall consider Boden ’s (1988) review o f the issue of com putational
semantics. She considers, in  particu lar, Montague’s (1974) model-theory:
Model-theory deals with how meaning can be assigned to an uninterpreted 
formal system. Broadly, it says that such a system can be interpreted as 
being about a given domain if  that domain can be systematically mapped 
onto it. If there are two such domains, the formal system in itself is about 
the one just as much as it is about the other.
Boden (1988, p. 131)
It is clear that the general p rincip le  here is com patib le w ith  the v iew  I have 
been describing in  re lation to antic ipatory systems. However, it  embodies on ly  
the condition that a m odelling relationsh ip must exist: it  does not stipu late a 
predictive model, and, more im portantly, does not require that the m odel must 
have effects on the interaction w ith  the th ing modelled. It is precisely th is la tte r 
om ission which introduces an unnecessary extra degree of am bigu ity in  the as­
crip tion  of meaning. Tha t is, i f  5 2 has a m odel which, in  fact, models both  S\ 
and S3 , but which affects on ly the interaction between S2 and S i (indeed, it  may 
be that S2 does not interact w ith  S3 at all), then I would argue that the model 
should on ly be said to be about S i , and is defin ite ly  not about S3— whereas M on ­
tague’s theory would appear to adm it both ascriptions equally. T h is  is not to 
suggest that the antic ipatory model elim inates a ll am bigu ity of meaning: there 
certa in ly m ay be cases in  which a model is about (affects the in teraction  w ith) 
more than one referent. Rather, I am saying that the conditions I propose for 
adm itting  such am bigu ity are significantly more restrictive than those accepted 
by Montague.
It seems to me that, although th is discrepancy is not too serious in  itself, it  
m ay actua lly  be sym ptom atic of a more fundam ental difference. The fact is that, 
despite the suggestive overlap in  vocabu lary between Montague and myself, and 
the fact that Boden introduces Montague’s work in  the context of com putational 
psychology, Montague is actua lly  dealing w ith  a different problem  from  that w ith  
which I am concerned.
M y  reading of Boden is that Montague is concerned w ith  whether, in  general, 
isolated form al systems can be said to mean anything. Th is  is the problem  to 
which his model-theory offers an answer. If I am correct in  th is interpretation, 
then I should argue that the answer is incomplete, if  not actua lly  m istaken.
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Th is comes back to the question of meaning to whom? I f we are rea lly  dealing 
w ith  a completely isolated form al system, then I assert that it  rea lly  is meaning­
less, regardless of what mappings m ay arguably exist between it  and a rb itra ry  
domains. If, on the other hand, we do not rea lly  mean that the form al system  is 
isolated, but are s im p ly  saying that it  could (potentially) be interpreted as m ap­
ping onto certain domains (although it  is not, as it  were, currently  or active ly  
being so interpreted), then the theory becomes coherent but incomplete: it  could 
on ly be completed by stipu lating  a set of (potentia l) interpreters.
The point is that, in  the former case, if  Montague is dealing w ith  tru ly  isolated 
formal systems, then his model-theory (whether right or wrong) is irre levant—  
its application in  m y context would involve a throwback to seeing a computer 
program as being purely a form al object, a perspective I have a lready rejected. 
Conversely, in  the la tte r case, if  Montague is dealing w ith  meaning re lative to sets 
of interpreters, then, for m y purposes, the theory is too general— for there is on ly 
one interpreter w ith  which I am im m ediate ly  concerned, and that is the specific 
system (the programmed computer) in  which the form al system is embedded. 
W ith  respect to that interpreter, I.argue that the more specific (and restrictive) 
theory of meaning based on antic ipatory systems, wh ich  specifically takes account 
of th is particu la r interpreter, subsumes whatever app licab ility  Montague’s theory 
m ight otherwise have had.
Boden does not pursue th is issue in  depth, but it  seems that her u ltim ate  con­
clusions are, at least, not incom patib le w ith  m y analysis. Thus, Boden u ltim a te ly  
merges th is discussion w ith  a more general discussion of whether a com putational 
semantics is possible at all. There she comments that “some writers [argue] that 
computer programs have an in trin s ic  causal-semantic aspect (to be distinguished 
from any abstract isomorphism there may be between programmed formalisms and 
actual or possible worlds)” (Boden 1988, p. 238, emphasis added). Th is  seems to 
me to be essentially the same point I have tried  to make above in  re lation  to the 
app licab ility  of Montague’s theory. Boden concludes:
In a causal semantics, the meaning of a symbol (whether simple or complex) 
is to be sought by reference to its causal links w ith other phenomena.
The central questions are “What causes the symbol to be built and/or 
activated?” and “What happens as a result of it? ”
Boden (1988, p. 250)
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A t th is point, Boden ’s review is completed, but it  should be clear tha t it  has 
more or less met up w ith  Dennett’s discussion, a lready dealt w ith  above. The 
relationship w ith  the theory based on antic ipatory  systems is therefore sim ilar, 
and I shall not deta il it  again.
I should now like  to consider Harnad (1990), who introduces what he calls the 
symbol grounding problem. T h is  is closely related to, but not identica l w ith , m y 
problem  of the conditions under which com putational tokens m ay be said to  have 
meaning or reference. H am ad ’s problem  is not identica l w ith  m ine because Har­
nad accepts Searle’s Chinese Room  argument, and concludes from  th is tha t there 
are certain re la tive ly  severe constraints on sym bol “grounding” . I, on the other 
hand, reject Searle’s argument (see Chapter 2 above, section 2.4.1), and therefore 
also reject the inferences made by Harnad from  that argument. Notw ithstand­
ing th is difference between us, I th in k  it  worthwhile to review H am ad ’s actual 
grounding proposals.
In th is discussion, it  is im portant to note tha t Harnad uses symbol in  the spe­
cia l sense of a token embedded in  a system of tokens which adm its o f “semantic 
interpret ab ility ” or systematic interpretation. T ha t is, the meaning o f any com­
posite token (symbol) can be effectively established in  terms of the meanings of 
its  atom ic components. In H am ad ’s terms then, the problem  is that w h ile  both 
people and “sym bol systems” can analyse the meaning of a composite token in  
terms of the meanings of its components, and m ay (v ia  a “d ic tionary” or other­
wise) be able to further analyse th is in  terms of the meanings o f some (smaller) 
set of primitive atom ic tokens, these p r im it ive  tokens are then, in  themselves, 
meaningful for people but not for symbol systems. For these tokens the ir mean­
ing is not (by defin ition) a consequence of some “defin ition” in  terms o f other 
tokens, so what can it  be?
Ham ad ’s outline answer is that such tokens w ill be meaningful or well 
grounded i f  they are derived from, or causally related to, “non-sym bolic” rep­
resentations of the ir referents, specifically in  the form  of what he terms iconic 
and categorical representations.
Iconic representations are “in terna l analog transforms of the projections of 
d ista l objects on our sensory surfaces” (Ham ad 1990, p .342). It is quite d ifficu lt 
to tie th is k ind  of idea down precisely— one im m ediate prob lem  is specifying
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how far into the nervous system we can s t il l speak of a “sensory surface” . B u t 
roughly speaking, Harnad means something like  an image in  the case of vision, 
and something analogous to th is for other sensory m odalities. So, an icon is 
something that more or less matches the sensory projection  which an object 
would make (whenever present in  the “im m ediate” environment) at some more 
or less well specified “level” or “locus” in  the nervous system.
Iconic, or im agistic, representations are a well established notion in  theories 
of mentality. I believe that it  is now generally accepted tha t such representations 
(and processes constrained by them) certa in ly  cannot account for a ll aspects of 
mentality, but it  seems, equally, that they do p lay some im portan t roles (however, 
see Dennett 1986, Chapter V II , and Dennett 1977b, for some crit ica l discussion 
of the issue). And , of course, that is exactly the scope o f H arnad ’s proposal— not 
that icon ic representations are the sole vehicles of m entality, but that they do 
p lay at least one cr it ica l role, namely being an essential step in  the grounding of 
(prim itive) symbols ( in  Harnad ’s sense of that word).
A  categorical representation of an object is then a derivative o f an icon, which 
has been “selectively filtered to preserve on ly some of the features of the sen­
sory projection: those that re liab ly  d istinguish members from  nonmembers o f a 
category” (Harnad 1990, p .342).
Harnad argues that icon ic representations are necessary to allow discrimina­
tion of sensory inputs; that categorical representations are necessary to  allow 
identification of objects (categorisation) in  sensory input; and that both o f these 
are necessary, though not sufficient, underly ing processes affecting a “sym bol” 
in  order for that symbol to be well grounded. The further conditions that are 
sufficient for the sym bol to be well grounded are tha t the complete system em­
bodying the symbol must be able to “m anipu late” , “describe” , 13 and “respond 
to descriptions” of the objects referred to. He does not go in to  deta il o f how th is 
m ight be achieved, but appears to suggest that general sym bol m anipu lation  ca­
pab ilities (universal com putation ab ility  operating upon the grounded symbols?)
13Harnad specifies that human beings can both “describe” and “produce descriptions of” 
objects; he clearly intends some distinction between these two, but I have been unable to 
understand what it is.
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are the on ly additional fac ilities required, together w ith  an assumption tha t “ap­
propriate” processing is realised by these fac ilit ies (i.e. they have been su itab ly  
programmed?).
In terms of m y own presentation of meaning in  the context of an tic ipatory 
systems, these ideas of H am ad ’s f it  in  reasonably well. Iconic representations cer­
ta in ly  are a k ind  of model, pa rticu la rly  suited to certa in  k inds of usage (namely 
discrim ination); categorical representations are another k in d  of model, partic­
u la r ly  suited to other k inds of usage (namely identification). To th is extent, 
H am ad ’s proposals are com patib le w ith  m ine, but are more detailed. However, 
Ham ad appears to insist that these are essential components in  the grounding of 
any symbol (whether d irectly, as in  the case of p r im it ive  symbols, or in d ire c tly  for 
a ll others). I suggest that th is condition is too strong: certain ly, some m odelling 
relationship is essential to grounding (to establish reference at a ll), bu t I don’t 
see that certain particu la r forms of such relationship, such as those singled out 
by Harnad, are uniquely necessary.
M ore generally, I would argue that iconic and categorical representations are 
a very crude and lim ited  form  of model, and I suggest that they are, at best, the 
t ip  of the iceberg of general “symbol grounding” .
To the extent that Harnad emphasises m odelling relationsh ips most closely 
related to processing of sensory input, his position is, perhaps, not d iss im ila r to 
that of Dennett. A s we have seen, Dennett emphasises the need for linkage w ith  
sensory input as a basis for ascrib ing content. So, again, the po int I w ish to make 
is that while a close re lationsh ip to sensory input is one p a rticu la r ly  p lausib le basis 
for establishing and/or recognising m odelling relationships, it  seems to me that 
it  is not generally a necessary condition for the existence of such re lationsh ips . 14 
I emphasise, of course, that I do not ru le out the involvement of sensory input in  
m odelling relationships; I s im p ly  stress that, in  general, it  m ay not be essential.
As to H am ad ’s rem ain ing crite ria  for grounding (m anipu lation, description 
etc.), I suggest that these can be viewed as specific forms of m y general require­
14Indeed, an undue reliance on sensory linkage might pose serious problems about the devel­
opment of coherent mental activity despite very limited sensory ability (see Popper’s remark 
regarding Helen Keller, quoted below). More speculatively, this is related to the persistence 
(at least for limited periods) of mental activity despite sensory deprivation (compare also the 
science fictional “brain in a vat” kind of question—e.g. Dennett 1976). However, these are 
extremely complex issues which I shall not attempt to discuss in detail here.
85
ment for the token (the predictive model) to affect the in teraction  w ith  the object 
referred to.
As a final comment here on Harnad ’s discussion of sym bol grounding, I note 
that he specifically cites Fodor (1976) as in troducing  semantic in te rp re tab ility  as 
crite ria l (or perhaps even sufficient?) for a “token” to be a “sym bol” . The sub­
sequent thrust of Harnad ’s analysis is to reject such a pure ly  “sym bolist” v iew  of 
sym bol grounding, cu lm inating  in  his in troduction  o f icon ic and categorical repre­
sentations as alternatives to th is view. Now, I have already noted, in  the previous 
section, that Fodor could be m isinterpreted in  h is book as proposing a un ita ry  
language of thought, at least on a superficial or cursory reading; and th is seems 
to be precisely what Ham ad has done. Bu t, that it  is a m isinterpretation (or, at 
least, an oversimplification) should be clear from  the fact that Fodor included, 
in  the book, an extended and positive discussion o f the use of images (icons?) 
and discursive descriptions of images (categorical representations?) (Fodor 1976, 
Chapter 4, pp. 174-194). Th is  closely paralle ls H am ad ’s discussion, yet Harnad 
makes no reference to it.
To complete th is sketchy review of com putational semantics, I tu rn  fin a lly  to 
Popper. A s discussed in  Chapter 2, Popper is no friend of physica lism , or, more 
especially, of computationalism . However, notw ithstanding this, I w ish to argue 
that Popper’s general epistemology is com patib le w ith  the theory of meaning or 
reference being propounded here (contrary perhaps, to Popper’s own wishes and 
beliefs), and can, indeed, serve to illum inate  th is theory further. Th is  is a rather 
im portant point to establish, since I shall be drawing heavily  on Popper’s work 
in  subsequent sections, pa rticu la rly  in  re lation to the growth of knowledge.
Popper’s concepts of the W orlds 1, 2, and 3 have already been introduced 
in  Chapter 2. The point argued there related to the reduc ib ility  or otherw ise of 
W orld  3 to W orld  2 (and, in  turn, of W orld  2 to W orld  1). Popper argues for 
the ir irreducib ility , and in  th is sense, he envisages tha t there exists some form  of 
“knowledge” which is not accessible to, or realisable by, computers. B y  contrast, 
I have claimed that Popper’s argument is flawed, and thus it  does not follow that 
what I ca ll “com putational semantics” is necessarily impoverished in  some sense. 
However, I do not want to reopen that particu la r debate here; m y im m ediate 
objective is more modest, and w ill be pursued separately. I w ish to establish,
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firstly, that there is some sense in  which Popper adm its that machines, such as 
computers, can realise or embody “knowledge” ; and secondly, that this k ind  of 
knowledge is essentially equivalent to the various form ulations of a com putational 
semantics which I have already discussed above.
Popper h im se lf has not, as far as I am aware, given detailed consideration to 
the question of whether, or how, his epistemology can be applied to machines in  
general, or computers in  particu lar; that is, he has not dealt very e xp lic it ly  w ith  
the application of “knowledge” or “knowing” to computers and/or the ir programs. 
However, we m ay glean a satisfactory insight in to  h is views by exam ining a variety 
of his writings.
There is first a discussion (dating o rig ina lly  from  the period c. 1951-1956) in  
which Popper introduced the idea of a “pred icting” machine, and spoke loosely 
in  terms of its  being “endowed” w ith, or being an “em bodim ent” of, knowledge 
(Popper 1988, pp. 68-77); granted, w ith in  that same discussion, Popper e xp lic it ly  
cautioned that he should not be taken as subscribing to the doctrine that “men 
are machines” ; but, to repeat, that is not the issue just here.
Popper has consistently stressed the continu ity  of the b io log ica l world— that 
his idea of subjective knowledge (at least) allows for some k in d  of continuum, 
lin k ing  a ll liv ing  things. For example, he notes that subjective knowledge “should 
better be called organism ic knowledge, since it  consists of the dispositions of 
organisms” (Popper 1970b, p. 73). Now he has not e xp lic it ly  used th is phrase 
(subjective knowledge) in  re lation to machines, but he has, in  a discussion of 
b io log ica l evolution, which relates specifica lly to the development of subjective 
knowledge, actua lly  used a machine, in place of a living organism, to  illu stra te  his 
argument (Popper 1961, pp. 274-275). Granted, Popper there emphasises that 
he leaves open the question of whether “organisms are machines” ; but it  is clear 
that, to some extent at least, he allows that h is notion of subjective knowledge 
m ay be applicable to machines.
A n  underlying issue here is the (apparent) d istin ction  between computers and 
robots. Thus, while Popper is dism issive in  general of the “intelligence” o f com­
puters per se, he seems less defin ite about robotic systems. Specifically, the 
hypothetica l machine referred to  above, which Popper actua lly  describes, inter 
alia, as a “complicated organism” , is, in  fact, a robotic aircraft. Popper even
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goes so far as to refer to th is m achine’s “ ‘m ind ’ ” (the inner scare quotes are, 
however, Popper’s own).
Th is  notion— that there is some fundamental d is tin ction  between the capab ili­
ties of computers per se and (computers embodied in) robots— is not uncommon. 
A s already mentioned in  section 3.2.3, French (1990) has viewed andro id ca­
p ab ility  as essential even to the passing of the conventional, s tr ic t ly  lingu istic , 
Turing  Test. For somewhat different reasons, re lating to Searle’s Chinese Room  
argument, Harnad (1989) has proposed what he calls the Total Turing Test which 
e xp lic it ly  calls for fu ll android im ita tion  of human ab ilities. Boden (1988, pp. 242- 
245) has also taken robotic embodiment (of a computer) as a decisive element 
in  responding to the Chinese Room  argument (though her response is somewhat 
different from  that of Harnad). A  variety of other workers have, on more general 
grounds, advocated some form  of robotic embodiment as a more or less essential 
aspect of realising A I  (e.g. Dennett 1978d; Brooks 1986; Beer 1990; C lif f  1990).
Th is  is a d ifficu lt issue, which I do not propose to discuss in  depth here. I 
shall, however, state a position. It seems to me that any given system (computer 
or otherwise) may, potentia lly, be linked or coupled w ith  its environment in  an 
indefin ite ly  large number of d istinct ways or m odalities, perhaps even w ith  a con­
tinuum  of alternatives in  between these modalities. I do not doubt that the exact 
nature of these linkages affects the potentia lities of the system. B u t I ho ld  that we 
have, as yet, very lit t le  i f  any theoretical understanding of these phenomena; and, 
in  particu lar, we have not yet got any basis for m aking a fundamental d is tinc­
tion  between systems having only, say, a pure ly “lin gu is tic” (V D U  or teletype) 
interface, and systems having more extensive “hum an-like” or “robotic” linkages.
Return ing to Popper, I m ay say that the apparently suggestive im p lica tion  
of his choice of a robotic machine rather than something closer to an isolated 
computer is, in  any case, large ly nu llified by  his constant rejection o f “sense 
data” as crit ica l for, or (worse) constitu tive of, knowledge. Thus, for example, 
we have the follow ing analysis:
According to psychological sensualism or empiricism, it is the sensory input 
of information on which our knowledge and perhaps even our intelligence 
depend. This theory is in my opinion refuted by a case like that of Helen 
Keller whose sensory input of information— she was blind and deaf—was
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certainly far below normal, but whose intellectual powers developed mar­
vellously from the moment she was offered the opportunity of acquiring a 
symbolic language.
Popper & Eccles (1977, Chapter P4, p. 124)
Incidentally, Turing made much the same po in t at an earlier date, also c iting  
the example of Helen Ke lle r, and specifically applied th is in  the context o f A I  
(Turing 1950, p. 456).
Thus far, I have s im p ly  argued that Popper should not be read as c la im ing 
that his theories of knowledge cannot be applied (at least to some extent) to 
programmed computers. It remains to actua lly  apply them  in  th is manner. I 
th in k  the follow ing quotation shows fa ir ly  c learly how th is m ay be done:
Because all our dispositions are in some sense adjustments to invariant or 
slowly changing environmental conditions, they can be described as theory 
impregnated, assuming a sufficiently wide sense of the term ‘theory’ . What 
I have in mind is that there is no observation which is not related to a set of 
typical situations— regularities— between which it tries to find a decision.
And I think we can assert even more: there is no sense organ in which 
anticipatory theories are not genetically incorporated. The eye of a cat 
reacts in distinct ways to a number of typical situations for which there are 
mechanisms prepared and built into its structure: these correspond to the 
biologically most important situations between which it has to distinguish.
Thus the disposition to distinguish between these situations is built into 
the sense organ, and with it the theory that these, and only these, are the 
relevant situations for whose distinction the eye is to be used.
Popper (1970b, pp. 71-72, original emphasis)
W h ile  th is quotation centers on subjective knowledge re lating  to sense organs, 
I take it  that the general princip les espoused here can be applied quite generally. 
G iven this, I suggest that what Popper calls an “an tic ipatory  theory” can be 
identified w ith  what I have called a “predictive m odel” . W hat he calls a “d is­
position” thus exists only in  the context of an an tic ipatory  theory (or pred ictive 
model), and can be identified w ith  the contingent interaction  of an antic ipatory 
system (S2) w ith  the system of which it  has a m odel (S i) . B u t these are pre­
cisely the conditions under which I have said that the model refers to the object 
modeled, or that the an tic ipatory system has knowledge of it. Thus, I c la im  that 
the knowledge which I propose to ascribe to (tokens of) computer programs is a 
bona fide case of subjective knowledge in  at least one sense which Popper would 
allow or recognise.
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W h ile  it  is not crucia l for m y purposes here, I m ay say that Popper seems 
to distinguish th is lim ited  or impoverished k ind  o f subjective knowledge (which, 
evidently, a computer may realise) from  the more general k ind  (which, on Pop­
per’s view, a computer cannot realise) by reference to a h ierarchy of linguistic 
functions. Specifically, Popper allows that both an im als (includ ing the human 
one) and machines can support two “lower” functions (the “expressive” and “sig­
na lling” functions), but he goes on to argue that there exist (at least) two further 
functions (the “descriptive” and “argumentative” ) which seem to be exclusive ly 
human achievements. Popper has discussed these ideas in  a number of pub lica­
tions, but the clearest and most pertinent to the question of “m achine” know l­
edge, is probably his paper on Language and the Body-Mind Problem (Popper 
1953). In any case, the arguments for th is h ierarchy of language functions, and 
for the resulting cleavage of Popperian “subjective knowledge” in to  a k ind  that 
computers can realise and a k ind  that they cannot realise, seem to me to be 
largely equivalent to Popper’s more general arguments against the causal closure 
of W orld  1. So, once again, I shall not pursue these questions further here.
Th is  covers the app lication  of subjective knowledge to com putational systems. 
It leaves open the relevance, i f  any, of what Popper has called objective knowledge. 
Popper has generally identified objective knowledge w ith  W orld  3, and I use the 
terms synonymously. A s already noted, Popper has argued that th is W orld  3 
is not completely reducib le to W orld  2. S t il l w ithout reopening tha t debate, I 
want to emphasise that Popper accepts that in  m any cases W orld  3 objects can, 
in  some sense, be identified w ith  (if not reduced to?) W orld  2 or even W orld  1 
objects. Tha t is, objective knowledge can be physically embodied.
In general, in  speaking of embodiments of W orld  3 objects, Popper has in
m ind  linguistically expressed theories (which can then be subject to discussion and
critic ism ). If th is were the on ly case of the embodiment of objective knowledge,
then it  m ight have lit t le  im m ediate relevance to A r t if ic ia l Intelligence— given the
lim ited  lingu istic  capabilities of existing computer systems. However, Popper also
considers the concept of objective knowledge in  a more general sense:
. . .  all the important things we can say about an act of knowledge consist of 
pointing out the third-world objects of the act— a theory or proposition—  
and its relation to other third-world objects . ..
Popper(1970a, p. 163)
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It seems to me that the im p lica tion  here is that subjective knowledge, as such 
(as opposed to other W orld  2 objects, such as hopes and fears and pains etc.) 
should, quite generally, be viewed s tr ic t ly  in  term s of its  re lationsh ip  to some 
W orld  3 object (the object being “grasped” , in  Popper’s terms). In terms o f m y 
discussion of An tic ip a to ry  Systems then, I suggest tha t the p red ictive m odel itself 
(separately from  the token which embodies or realises it)  can be identified as an 
example of objective knowledge. Tha t is, any systems (includ ing com putational 
ones) which can be ascribed subjective knowledge can also be said to grasp, even 
i f  on ly in  a rud im entary fashion, some objective knowledge. They  have, as it  were, 
a toehold (at least) into  W orld  3. Th is  is a significant point, to the extent that 
Popper has stressed that, as a methodological guide line for scientific research, one 
should concentrate on the W orld  3, objective knowledge of a system, rather than 
its subjective W orld  2 realisation. He makes th is k in d  of argument e xp lic it ly  for 
non-linguistic (biological) organisms in  (Popper 1968, p. 112-114).
In the present case, the significance of th is is s im p ly  that, i f  we w ish to  ascribe 
meaning to a token (of a program) we can on ly do so by reference to the model 
which (we cla im ) it  embodies. That is, the (tentative) identification  of the W orld  3 
object which a token embodies would be a crucia l m ethodological step in  any 
p ractica l application  o f the com putational semantics presented here.
That completes m y review of com putational semantics, or of the idea of ar­
t ific ia l, computational, knowledge. In conclusion, then, let me just reiterate the 
central theme, which I have tried  to view  from  a number of different perspectives. 
Th is  is, firstly, that a programmed computer is a dynamic system, which must not 
be confused w ith  the static, formal, object, which is its  program; and secondly 
that such programmed computers can and should be said to be knowledgable 
precisely to the extent that they embody pred ictive model(s) o f the rea lity  in  
which they are embedded and that they use these predictions to condition the ir 
confrontation w ith  that reality.
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3.6  O n th e  “E n g in eer in g ” o f  K n o w led g e
A t  this point I have more or less identified the prob lem  of A r t if ic ia l Intelligence 
w ith  the problem  of artificial knowledge, and I have elaborated what I intend 
by that la tte r phrase in  some detail. To be sure, for our computer to (say) 
pass the Turing  Test, it  must not on ly  know about the world, but also be able 
to communicate (lingu istica lly) about it; and to be sure, the specific problems 
associated w ith  re lating its knowledge to lingu istic  expression are far from  triv ia l; 
but I suggest that the p rim ary  problem, in  the current state of the A I  art, is not 
that computers cannot ta lk, but rather that they have noth ing worthwhile to say.
For example, as far as computer lingu istic  performance goes, we m ay consider 
W inograd ’s SHRDLU system to be a c lim ax of sorts (W inograd 1973; Hofstadter 
1979, pp. 627-632). The emphasis in  the development of SHRDLU was on language 
“interpretation” or “understanding” , rather than on language “production” , but 
perhaps th is is the harder of the two. In any case, viewed pure ly in  terms of its 
ab ility  to use language, SHRDLU was a considerable achievement— it could indeed 
m ainta in  quite a creditable and coherent conversation.
Unfortunately, the conversation turns out to be extrem ely monotonous, or 
even boring. SHRDLU’s “knowledge” of the world is lim ited  to an extrem ely narrow 
and restricted domain, or a microworld. SHRDLU’s pa rticu la r m icroworld  m ay be 
thought of its a table top w ith  various k inds o f toy-like blocks on it— cubes, 
pyram ids, etc. in  various colours. There is also an arm  (belonging to, or operated 
by, SHRDLU) which can be used to move these objects around. I say that the 
m icroworld m ay be thought of in  th is manner, but, as always, one must be careful 
about who (or what) is doing the th ink ing  here. SHRDLU’s knowledge certa in ly  
encompasses some of the most salient aspects o f the m icroworld  I have described; 
but it  also lacks a ll of the background ram ifications tha t the description I have 
given would have for a human. Thus, not on ly is the scope of SHRDLU’s knowledge 
very lim ited , but so also is the depth. It m ight be more accurate to describe 
SHRDLU’s m icroworld as consisting of a ‘table top ’ , w ith  ‘b locks’ ‘on’ it , of various 
‘shapes’ and ‘ colors’ etc.— using the scare quotes to emphasise that, although 
SHRDLU may use these terms in  conversation, its  understanding of them  is, at 
best, a pale shadow of the norm al human understanding of them.
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So, it  seems that the central problem  is knowledge. It may, or m ay not, be a 
d ifficu lt problem  to “hook up” an already knowledgable subject, so that i t  could 
communicate lingu istica lly ; but th is problem  hard ly  even arises u n t il the system 
is quite knowledgable to start with: u n til it  shares enough knowledge of the world 
w ith  us that it  m ight conceivably have something substantive to communicate. 
I emphasise th is d istinction  between knowledge and the a b ility  to lingu is tica lly  
communicate it, because there is sometimes a danger of confusing language and 
its content. Th is  is closely related to the issue dealt w ith  in  the previous sec­
tion, o f the difference between a program  per se (which knows nothing) and a 
programmed computer (which m ay or m ay not know something).
Now, the simplest conceptual approach to the prob lem  of a rtific ia l knowledge 
is to engineer it. That is, one attempts to e xp lic it ly  form ulate model(s) of reality, 
and then instantiate them  in  a computer program; in  other words, one bu ilds an 
antic ipatory system by actua lly  designing and bu ild ing  the requisite pred ictive 
model(s) and using the output of these models in  some (more or less) rationa l 
or appropriate way to cond ition the behaviour o f the system— in  particu lar, to 
cond ition its interaction w ith  the object(s) modelled.
Knowledge Engineering is thus a brute force, or stipu lative, approach to re­
alising A I. It is the approach which has dom inated A I  research u n til re la tive ly  
recently. It is (in  effect) the way SHRDLU’s knowledge was created, and is charac­
teristic  of A I ’s p rinc ip le  commercial success, the notion of the Expert System.
The question which now arises is: what is the scale of th is (knowledge engi­
neering) task? How much knowledge15 does a typ ica l hum an being have? O r, 
perhaps s ligh tly  less demandingly, how much knowledge would be required to 
pass (or even come close to passing) the Turing Test?
Turing h im se lf attempted th is k ind  of analysis. He first estimated the “storage
capacity” of the bra in  at about 1 0 9 b its, and then comments:
A t my present rate of working I produce about a thousand digits of pro­
gramme a day, so that about sixty workers, working steadily through the 
fifty years might accomplish the job, if  nothing went into the waste-paper 
basket. Some more expeditious method seems desirable.
Turing (1950, p. 455)
15I pretend, for the sake of the discussion, that there could be some meaningful quantitative 
measure of knowledge—say something like “person-years of development effort” to realise the 
corresponding artificial predictive model(s).
93
W ith  the benefit of forty  years experience of the problems of large scale soft­
ware engineering, we m ight be perm itted  some w ry  amusement at Tu ring ’s even 
contemplating the idea of developing roughly 100 M B y te  of software, w ithout 
anything going in  the “waste-paper basket” ; furthermore, Turing  adm its that 109 
b its is a low estimate for the storage capacity of the brain. However, the po int is 
that these factors only serve to further strengthen Turing ’s conclusion that, even 
supposing the knowledge engineering approach to be theoretically tractab le, it  is 
not practical.
W h ile  we m ight now be more reticent about doing th is  k in d  o f calcu lation, 
nothing in  the past forty  years has served to suggest that Turing  m ay have se­
riously  under-estimated the effort required. Tha t is, the knowledge engineering 
approach has proved more or less successful in  narrow domains of knowledge, 
but it  has remained lim ited  to such domains. In terms o f the o rig ina l objec­
tive of general intelligence, at the Turing  Test level, the approach has largely 
stagnated . 16
The apparent lim ita tions of knowledge engineering have been recently docu­
mented by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (Dreyfus &  Dreyfus 1986). They identify  
two related difficulties: the common sense knowledge problem , and the frame 
problem.
The common sense knowledge problem  refers to the extreme d ifficu lty  which 
has been encountered in  attempts to systematise common sense knowledge. Th is 
is generally agreed to be a very severe problem , though there is room  for debate 
as to its  exact nature— specifically, whether it  is “m erely” a m atter of scale, of 
the sheer quantity  of knowledge involved, or whether there are more fundamental 
problems not yet properly recognised. Thus, for example, Hayes (1979) proposed 
a research programme to systematise or formalise “a large part of o rd inary ev­
eryday knowledge of the physica l world”— what he dubbed naive physics. Drew 
M cD erm ott was o rig ina lly  an enthusiastic advocate of Hayes’ approach, but sub­
sequently (M cD erm ott 1987) reported that very lit t le  progress had been made, 
and concluded that the programme faced very fundam ental and substantia l d if­
ficulties.
16 One major exception is Lenat’s Cyc project (Lenat & Guha 1990). However, substantive 
results (one way or the other) are not expected from this project before about 1994.
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The frame problem  refers to the fact that, even if  a system has been provided
w ith  a great deal of knowledge (w ithout, for the moment, try in g  to quantify this),
it  is very d ifficu lt to integrate th is successfully— especially to ensure that the most
relevant knowledge is available and applied at any given time; and, of course, the
more knowledge is provided, the worse th is problem  becomes. Dreyfus &  Dreyfus
describe the frame problem  as follows:
In general skilled human beings have in the areas of their expertise an 
understanding that enables them, as events unfold, to distinguish what 
is relevant from what is not. However, during the first three phases of 
A I  research, from cognitive simulation up through work on micro-worlds, 
computers, like beginners, advanced beginners, and competent performers, 
were programmed to confront all facts as isolated from each other and 
goals as just further facts. Thus whenever a change occurred the whole 
set of facts that made up the computer’s representation of the current 
state of affairs had to be recalculated to update what had changed and 
what had remained the same. The attempt to capture human, temporal, 
situated, continuously changing know-how in a computer as static, de­
situated, discrete, knowing that has become known as the frame problem.
Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986, p. 82)
It is interesting to compare th is w ith  Popper:
A t every instant of our pre-scientific or scientific development we are living 
in the centre of what I usually call a ‘horizon of expectations’. By this I 
mean the sum total of our expectations, whether these are subconscious or 
conscious, or perhaps even explicitly stated in some language. Animals and 
babies have also their various and different horizons of expectations though 
no doubt on a lower level of consciousness than, say, a scientist whose 
horizon of expectations consists to a considerable extent of linguistically 
formulated theories or hypotheses.
Popper(1949, p. 345)
M y  point here is that wh ile Popper has never e xp lic it ly  addressed the frame 
problem, it  is clear that his theory of knowledge encompasses the issues it  raises. 
To the extent that I have argued in  the previous section tha t computers can, 
in  p rinc ip le  at least, realise knowledge in  Popper’s sense, th is can be taken as a 
cla im  that computers can, in  princip le, be programmed to overcome the frame 
problem. Th is  is worth stating exp lic it ly  because Dreyfus h  Dreyfus are frank ly  
skeptical about it.
However, the point remains that, to date, the brute force m ethod of knowledge 
engineering has proven to be extrem ely lim ited  as an avenue toward the realisation 
of a rtific ia l intelligence. It seems that some alternative should be sought.
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3.7 B uild ing a Baby
Turing h im se lf had, of course, antic ipated that what I now ca ll the knowledge 
engineering approach m ight prove im practica l. H is proposed alternative was to 
develop a machine which would be capable of learning. In th is way, he hoped, the 
initial programm ing requirement could be reduced to manageable proportions:
Presumably the child-brain is something like a note-book as one buys it 
from the stationers. Rather little  mechanism and lots of blank sheets. 
(Mechanism and writing are from our point of view almost synonymous.)
Our hope is that there is so little  mechanism in the child-brain that some­
thing like it can be easily programmed. The amount of work in the educa­
tion we assume, as a first approximation, to be much the same as for the 
human child.
Turing (1950, p. 456)
Th is poss ib ility  has certa in ly  not been ignored in  the intervening years. How­
ever, Turing ’s “hope” that it  m ight prove sign ificantly easier to program  a “child- 
b ra in” compared to an adult has, so far at least, proved forlorn. A s Charn iak 
and M cD erm ott put it:
One idea that has fascinated the Western mind is that there is a general 
purpose learning mechanism that accounts for almost all of the state of 
an adult human being. According to this idea, people are born knowing 
very little, and absorb almost everything by way of this general learner.
(Even a concept like “physical object,” it has been proposed, is acquired by 
noticing that certain visual and tactile sensations come in stable bundles.)
This idea is still powerfully attractive. It underlies much of behavioristic 
psychology. A I  students often rediscover it, and propose to dispense with 
the study of reasoning and problem solving, and instead build a baby and 
let it just learn these things.
We believe this idea is dead, killed off by research in A I  (and linguistics, 
and other branches of “cognitive science” ). W hat this research has re­
vealed is that for an organism to learn anything, it must already know a 
lot. Learning begins with organized knowledge, which grows and becomes 
better organized. W ithout strong clues to what is to be learned, nothing 
w ill get learned.
Charniak & McDermott (1985, pp. 609-610)
Popper has made related cla im s in  a different context:
. . .  to every man who has any feeling for biology it must be clear that 
most of our dispositions are inborn, either in the sense that we are born 
with them (for example, the dispositions to breathe, to swallow, and so on)
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or in the sense that in the process of maturation, the development of the 
disposition is elicited by the environment (for example, the disposition to 
learn a language).
Popper (1970b, p. 66)
If it were not absurd to make any estimate, I should say tha t 999 units out 
of 1,000 of the knowledge of an organism are inherited or inborn, and that 
one unit only consists of the modifications of this inborn knowledge...
Popper(1970b, p. 71)
Boden (1988, p. 187-188) also discounts Tu ring ’s o rig ina l programme for sim ­
ila r reasons. Somewhat more caustically, but m aking an essentia lly s im ila r point, 
the biologists Reeke &  Edelm an have said:
In fact, consideration of the magnitude of the problem with due modesty 
suggests that perception alone is hard enough to understand, without at­
tempting to jump directly from perception to learning, through learning 
to social transmission and language, and from there to all the richness of 
ethology. At present, it is still a large challenge to understand how an 
animal can even move, and it would be well for AI to look first to such 
fundamental issues.
Reeke & Edelman (1988, p. 144)
I note that th is critic ism  by Reeke ¿z Edelm an is d irected ju st as much at the 
recent rev iva l of research in  the fie ld of a rtific ia l neural networks (“connection- 
ism ” ) as at the approaches of conventional (so called “sym bolic” ) A I.
Th is  result— that the realisation of an a rtific ia l “in fant” intelligence seems 
not to be sign ificantly easier than the realisation of an “adu lt” intelligence— is 
certa in ly disappointing, but it  is by no means com plete ly fa ta l to the A I  enter­
prise. W ith  m y rejection, in  the previous section, of the knowledge engineering 
approach the problem  had already changed from  that o f a rtific ia l knowledge in  
itself, to  the problem  of the growth of (artific ia l) knowledge. T ha t s t i l l remains 
our problem , but now we recognise that th is cannot be solved by restricting  our 
attention to the somatic tim e growth of human intelligence. W e must take a more 
comprehensive view, in  which human knowledge is seen as being continuous w ith  
anim al or b io log ica l knowledge. In short, we must understand not on ly  “learning” 
but also “evolution” .
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3.8 The G rowth o f K now ledge
The development so far has indicatéd that, in  a ttem pting to realise a rt if ic ia l in te l­
ligence, we must realise the growth of a rtific ia l knowledge; and that, furthermore, 
we must be concerned not just w ith  the som atic tim e  “learn ing” o f an ind iv idua l, 
but also w ith  the evolutionary tim e growth o f “inate” knowledge. T ha t is, we 
must u lt im a te ly  seek to realise the growth of a rt if ic ia l knowledge in  something 
comparable to both of these bio logical senses.
I now w ish to go beyond th is result, and review a stronger, perhaps even a 
radical, claim: th is is that the growth of knowledge by learn ing and by  evolution 
are not fundam entally d istinct processes in  any case— rather, they are both forms 
of a k ind  of abstract or generalised Darw in ian  process. Th is  being so, i t  w ill follow 
that the A I  research programme m ay be identified w ith , or even replaced by, a 
programme aimed at the realisation of Artificial Darwinism.
3.8.1 E volutionary E pistem ology
The doctrine that the processes underly ing all growth of knowledge are of an 
essentially D arw in ian  k ind  is now called evolutionary epistemology; the concept 
was pioneered by Popper, and it  is fundam ental to his overall philosophy, but 
it  has also been sign ificantly expanded and developed by others— R adn itzky  &; 
Ba rtley  (1987) provide a comprehensive survey. I have very lit t le  to add to th is 
existing literature, so I shall restrict m yself here to  a re la tive ly  b rie f review.
Evo lu tionary  epistemology derives, u ltim ate ly, from  Popper’s analysis of the 
problem  of induction, and the im plications he draws from  th is for the growth 
of knowledge (e.g. Popper 1971). Popper denies tha t there can be such a th ing 
as certain knowledge (except in  the t r iv ia l sense o f a tautology); and, more im ­
portantly, denies that there can be such a th ing as a logic of induction. That 
is: nothing that we know is necessarily true (includ ing “observation statements” , 
since these are, themselves, theory impregnated); and even to the extent that 
what we know is, in  fact, true, we cannot logically infer from  it  (consciously or 
otherwise) any more general, or s tr ic t ly  new, knowledge.
To take a favoured example of Popper’s (e.g. Popper 1970b, p. 97) we know 
that the Sun rises each day; but th is is not certain knowledge (there are any
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number o f reasons why the Sun m ay not in  fact rise tomorrow); and our (tentative 
or conjectural) knowledge that the Sun w ill, in  fact, rise tomorrow, is not, and 
cannot be, a consequence of, nor justified by, our experiences of the Sun rising 
on previous days— no m atter (for example) how m any times th is experience m ay 
have been repeated.
It is im portant to  emphasise here that, in  th is Popperian view, deduction as 
such can never result in  new knowledge or in  the growth of knowledge. Deduction 
is a too l which can be used (and most notab ly is used in  science) to  draw out 
consequences o f our existing knowledge; but th is is (just) m aking exp lic it what 
was already im p lic it , and, in  itself, cannot increase our knowledge. Processes 
weaker than log ica l deduction (e.g. so called fuzzy logic) cannot, of course, re liab ly  
do any better in  th is particu lar respect.
Popper has called the naïve em piric ist idea that knowledge is “derived” or 
“extracted” or “d is tilled ” from  some accum ulation of “experience” the bucket 
theory of knowledge (Popper 1949). H is central po int is that, as long as knowledge 
is interpreted in  the sense of effective p red ictive models, the bucket theory is 
untenable on purely logical grounds.
B u t i f  knowledge cannot grow through the analysis of experience, then how 
does it  grow? 17
Popper’s answer is that knowledge grows, and can on ly  grow, by a process 
of conjecture and refutation. B y  “conjecture” he means the form ulation, by any 
means, o f new models or assertions or theories, which make predictions about the 
environment in  which the knowledge agent is embedded. The on ly constraint is 
that the predictions of these new models must poten tia lly  go beyond (or conflict 
w ith) predictions made by the p rio r knowledge o f the agent.
In effect, we must d iv ide knowledge processes in to  two kinds. In the first, 
tru th  conditions (or more strictly* belief conditions) are preserved. Such pro­
cesses clearly do not involve any growth of knowledge, but rather represent an 
elaboration of existing knowledge; they include, for example, the operation or ex­
ecution o f “pred ictive models” , as I have used the term  (follow ing Rosen 1985a)
17I discount here the relativist (non-)answer that the growth of knowledge is an illusion; what­
ever about the growth of human knowledge, the idea that the growth of biological knowledge, 
in the evolutionary sense, is imaginary, seems to me to be quite unsustainable.
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in  section 3.5 above. These processes correspond to  the application of knowledge 
which has been accepted or adopted (at least ten tative ly) by an agent. In the 
second k ind  of knowledge process, tru th  (belief) conditions are not s tr ic t ly  pre­
served. Since these processes are not tru th  preserving, the ir output is inherently 
conjectural (i.e. even re lative to premisses which are assumed to  be true). Regard­
less of the nature of these processes, we m ay say tha t they represent unjustified 
variation. Such unjustified variation is c learly d is tin ct from  elaboration of al­
ready accepted knowledge— for it  poten tia lly  produces conjectures transcending, 
and especially contradicting, the previously (presumed) known. B u t unjustified 
variation  does not yet represent growth of knowledge, for these new conjectures 
m ay be un ifo rm ly  m istaken.
Knowledge can grow i f  and on ly i f  the agent’s predictions ( “deductions” ) 
are frustrated; that is, i f  the world does not behave in  the way the model (the 
knowledge) predicts; whenever expectations are defied in  th is  way, there is an 
opportunity for growth. B u t th is opportun ity  can be exp lo ited on ly i f  the fa ilure 
has the effect of selecting between competing models which were not a ll equally 
bad at predicting the behaviour of the world.
In short, there must be some mechanism for generating new candidate models 
of reality, which m ay compete w ith , and im prove upon, the o ld  ones; these may, 
or m ay not, be derived in  some sense from  existing models; but the ir v a lid ity  or 
u tility , is independent of the ir genesis. Knowledge can thus continue to grow only 
to the extent that new models of aspects of the world, not log ica lly  (deductively) 
entailed by prio r knowledge, can be generated and tested. There can be no definite 
method (or logic of induction) for the generation of such new models which would 
guarantee the ir truth . For that m atter, there cannot even be a definite method 
for testing of competing conjectures .18
W h ile  Popper orig ina lly  formulated this theory of the growth of knowledge 
by conjecture and refutation in  the context of scientific knowledge, the schema
18I may say that I fully accept that there is a concept being used implicitly here, of relative 
“closeness” to the truth, or “verisimilitude”, which is a difficult and problematic one; but I 
think it has, nonetheless, a clear and useful intuitive meaning—in this, I follow Newton-Smith 
(1981), at least partially (compare also Popper 1974b, pp. 1011-1012). In any case, it must be 
emphasised that the notion in question is always a relative one: we are always talking about a 
comparison between competing conjectures rather than between an isolated conjecture and the 
“naked” truth (the latter being strictly inaccessible—to us just as much as to our machines).
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clearly represents a k ind  of generalised or abstract Darwinian process. Cam pbe ll 
(1974a, p. 49) points out that th is Darw in ian  undertone can be found even in  
Popper’s earliest discussions of the subject; in  any case, Popper h im se lf has since 
(e.g. Popper 1961) e xp lic it ly  emphasised the essential u n ity  of a ll processes of 
knowledge growth in  both evolutionary and som atic tim e (and also, indeed, in  
what we m ight ca ll “cu ltu ra l tim e” , in  the case of lin gu is t ica lly  form ulated W orld  3 
knowledge; but that further extension is not relevant to m y purposes here).
Thus, under the doctrine of evolutionary epistemology, a ll knowledge (sub­
jective or objective, conscious or unconscious) consists in  tentative hypotheses or 
theories about the world (includ ing theories about theories, and how to apply 
them  etc.). G row th of knowledge is possible (indeed, is only possible) through 
the unjustified form ulation of new, tentative, theories, and some form  of testing 
and selection between competing theories. In the special case that the theories 
are lingu istica lly  formulated, are falsifiable, and selection is based on rational 
analysis and cr it ica l testing, then Popper identifies th is as scientific knowledge. 
In the special case that the theories are inate or inborn, and selection is based on 
differential reproduction arising through com petition for lim ited  resources, then 
the process is conventional Darw in ian  evolution. B u t, in  a ll cases, the growth of 
knowledge involves an in it ia l unjustified generation o f new conjectures— i.e. con­
jectures whose tru th  is not log ica lly  entailed by the (tentative ly  accepted) tru th  of 
previous knowledge— followed by a confrontation between these new conjectures 
and the objective world, a confrontation in  which the (more) false are rejected.
Cam pbell (1974b) has referred to th is unified theory of knowledge growth as 
Unjustified Variation and Selective Retention, or, as I shall say, UVSR.
3.8.2 On “R andom ” V ariation
The variation which underlies Darw in ian  (U V S R ) evolutionary processes is com­
m only referred to as being “random” , but it  turns out that th is has connotations 
which can be deeply m isleading. Cam pbe ll (1974a; 1974b) has previously re­
viewed th is question quite comprehensively; I sha ll s im p ly  extract some details 
which w ill be pa rticu la rly  relevant to m y own objectives here.
Unjustified variation is an essentially logical notion. W h ile  it  perhaps con­
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forms to one of the common-sense ideas of “randomness” , it  is ce rta in ly  not ran­
dom in  the sense of the p robab ility  calculus. Th is  should be clear, for example, 
from  the fact that the p robab ility  calculus relies on the poss ib ility  o f a defined 
event space, whereas to classify a variation as “unjustified” does not require any 
reference to a “space” of “possible” variation. Lack  of ju stifica tion  is, rather, a 
log ica l relationship between new (tentative) knowledge and p rio r knowledge.
M ore generally, “randomness” im plies the absence o f predictability, (except, 
perhaps, in  a sta tistica l sense) whereas “unjustified” varia tion  m ay be a rb itra r ily  
systematic and predictable. Note that th is does not im p ly  that the growth of 
knowledge is predictable. A s Popper (1988, pp. 62-67), for example, has pointed 
out, any c la im  to be able to predict the future growth of knowledge is fundamen­
ta lly  flawed; in  the case at hand, such a c la im  must fa il because the growth of 
knowledge requires both  the generation of unjustified variations (and we stipu­
late that th is may be predictable, in  isolation) but also the testing, and selective 
retention, of some of the generated variations. T h is  second step, o f selective 
retention, is not predictable.
Th is  establishes that unjustified variation is not (necessarily) a “random ” 
process in  the sense of the p robab ility  calculus, and tha t it  need not even be 
unpredictable. B u t the crucia l d is tinction  between the notions of “unjustified” 
and “random” variation is rather more subtle than this. A  key connotation of 
“random” variation, in  the context of knowledge processes at least, is tha t it  is 
“unbiased” w ith  respect to the truth, or, more generally, the verisimilitude, of the 
generated conjectures. Tha t is, a “random” varia tion  should be “just as lik e ly ” 
to be false as to be true.
I should point out that, wh ile th is notion of randomness, in  the sense of 
a lack of bias between tru th  and falsity, seems to have a fa ir ly  clear intuitive 
meaning, it  can hard ly  be made form ally  respectable at all. To say that a process 
of generating conjectures is “random” in  this sense requires that we be able to 
categorise a ll possible conjectures which it  can generate as true or false in advance; 
and if  we could do that then we would already have a ll the accessible knowledge 
in  our possession, and there could be no growth. Granted, we could possib ly 
apply th is notion to our machines, or perhaps even to anim als— if  the dom ain 
of the ir knowledge is s tr ic t ly  circum scribed to lie  w ith in  some domain o f which
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we already have “perfect” knowledge. B u t of course, we never have “perfect” 
knowledge of any domain, so even th is is a contrived case; furthermore, machines 
whose knowledge cannot, in  principle, transcend our own would s t il l represent a 
c r it ica lly  impoverished k ind  of a rtific ia l intelligence.
In any case, the im portant point is that the idea o f “unjustified” variation  
does not require or im p ly  “randomness” in  th is last sense either. A  pa rticu la r 
process for generating new conjectures may, in  fact, be strong ly “biased” (either 
towards tru th  or fa ls ity), insofar as th is idea o f bias can be given a clear meaning 
at all; but we can never know th is to be the case. O u r labe lling  of a generation 
process as unjustified does not re ly  one way or the other on such bias, or its 
absence.19
In fact, it  seems that, i f  anything, “successful” U V S R  processes typ ica lly  in ­
volve generators which are strongly biased in  favour o f true (or “approxim ate ly 
true” ) conjectures. The crucia l point here is that, wh ile the possibility o f know l­
edge growth does not rest on such bias, the rate of growth w ill be strongly affected 
by it.
In saying th is it  m ay appear that I am now begging the question at issue: it 
seems that I now expla in  or solve the problem  of the growth of knowledge (at least 
insofar as it  occurs at “speed” ) by calling upon some mysterious inbu ilt bias in  the 
generation of new conjectures. B u t th is is actua lly  a flawed critic ism — because 
the U V S R  p rinc ip le  can be applied recursively. I f I should say (or conjecture) that 
a generator of (unjustified) conjectures is favourably biased, I would be im p ly ing  
that it  already incorporates knowledge; wh ile th is would raise the question of 
where this knowledge came from, I have a sim ple answer ready— nam ely that 
it  came from  a p rio r process of (unjustified) generation of different generators, 
w ith  selective retention of the “best” . The im p lied  regress is not vicious: it  can 
bottom  out w ith  generators which are unbiased (or even unfavourably biased)—  
or, more to the po int, generators whose operation can be explained w ithout any
19I should caution that I myself have previously made the terminological blunder of using 
“unjustified variation” to refer not just to the relatively weak logical concept for which I use 
the term here, but also to refer to the stronger concept which I here call “unbiased variation” 
(McMullin 1992a; 1992b); this was a blunder insofar as I acquired the phrase “unjustified 
variation” from Campbell (1974b), and it has become clear to me that Campbell meant the 
term to imply only the weak, strictly logical, notion. I have therefore now reverted to using it 
only in this original sense of Campbell’s.
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assumption of bias (i.e. non-teleologically) one way or another.
So the “unjustified” in  U V S R  does not equal “unbiased” (or “ignorant” ); but 
a complete evolutionary epistemology does demand that, to  whatever extent an 
unjustified generator is held to already incorporate significant knowledge, that 
the genesis of this knowledge must be explained by a p rio r U V S R  process. Th is 
recursion must u lt im ate ly  term inate in  “p rim ord ia l” generators whose genesis is 
not problematic. We can hold that such a te rm ination  is possible, even i f  we have 
lit t le  or no idea of its  detailed nature, because U V S R  can operate even in  the 
face of a strongly tm-favourable bias (provided enough tim e is allowed).
Th is  is an im portant result. The previous section established, on s tr ic t ly  logi­
cal grounds, that unjustified variation  was necessary to the growth of knowledge—  
but said nothing about the rate of such growth. I am  now suggesting tha t the 
rate of growth w ill depend on an ab ility  to exp lo it p rev iously gained knowledge in  
a loosely h ierarch ica l fashion: that, in  other words, for “fast” knowledge growth, 
we need an architecture which is not tied  in to  a fixed, predefined, generator of 
unjustified variation, but which instead supports the emergence o f new generators 
of unjustified variation, and selection between such generators.
There is a further separate, but complementary, result, regarding the “open­
ness” of knowledge growth, but it  w il l require some discussion to  develop it  prop­
erly.
Note f irs t ly  that, while it  seems that an organisation supporting such a h i­
erarchic knowledge structure m ay be a necessary cond ition for “fast” knowledge 
growth, i t  cannot, of course, be a sufficient condition. W e m ay say that the 
fundamental p rinc ip le  of evolutionary epistemology is that there are no sufficient 
conditions for the growth of knowledge.
In p ractica l terms, th is means that i f  we happen to find  a “good” generator of 
new (tentative) knowledge, then that can allow a burst of re la tive ly  rap id  know l­
edge growth, but th is w ill inev itab ly  be exhausted; further growth of knowledge 
w ill then re ly  on generating an a lternative generator. T ha t is to say, a “good” 
generator is a double-edged sword: to the extent that it  does generate good con­
jectures, it  accelerates the growth of knowledge; but buried among a ll the “bad” 
conjectures which it  does not generate, there m ay be some jewels, better even 
than the “best” conjectures which it  does generate.
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Thus, once it  is accepted that all knowledge is conjectural— inc lud ing  that 
incorporated in  our best “generators”— we see that the growth o f knowledge m ay 
u ltim ate ly  cease altogether i f  we cling dogm atica lly  to any knowledge. Conversely, 
i f  we w ish the growth of knowledge to be (as far as possible) open-ended, we need 
a knowledge structure which is not a sim ple hierarchy, but is rather more like  a 
heterarchy, in  which all knowledge (includ ing a ll generators) is po ten tia lly  subject 
to com petition and displacement.20 There is th is inherent tension between the 
two aspects of the U V S R  process— between varia tion  and retention— and it  is 
precisely the maintenance of th is tension which perm its (but cannot compel) 
continued, open-ended, growth of knowledge.
O ur problem  then is to find  a way to design our putative m achine or computer 
“intelligence” in  just such a way that it  can successfully balance on th is  same 
knife-edge which separates dogmatism  from  ignorance. Th is  is not a t r iv ia l task.
3.8.3 U V S R  and A I
The notion of realising some k ind  of more or less D arw in ian  process, in  a com­
putationa l system, is not at a ll orig inal. Turing  (1950) e xp lic it ly  drew paralle ls 
between processes of learning and of b io log ica l evolution, in  h is sem inal discussion 
of the prospects for realising A I. The earliest p ractica l research was p robably that 
of Friedberg and his colleagues in  the fie ld  of “autom atic program m ing” (Fried- 
berg 1958; Friedberg et al. 1959). However, the problems they tackled were 
extrem ely sim ple (e.g. 1 -b it b inary  addition), and the results mediocre. A  form  
of a rtific ia l Darw in ian  evolution was proposed by Selfridge (1959), but was not 
pursued to an implementation. S im on (1969) provided an early, and perceptive, 
analysis of some of the general factors involved in  applying any k in d  of Darw in ian  
process in  a rtific ia l systems.
The idea of a rtific ia l evolution was taken up again by Fogel et al. (1966), now 
specifica lly in  the context of A I, but s t il l applied to very sim ple problems and 
w ith  very lit t le  tangible success. The scathing review of th is pa rticu la r work by 
L indsay (1968) was, perhaps, instrum enta l in  discouraging further investigation
20In its most abstract form this becomes, in effect, the principle of pancritica l rationalism  
advocated by Bartley (1987). Compare also what I have previously called the “reflexive hy­
pothesis” (McMullin 1990).
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along these lines for some time. Ho lland has since rehab ilita ted the evo lutionary 
approach somewhat w ith  the so-called Genetic Algorithm or G A  (H o lland  1975), 
and th is has generated a significant level of interest, pa rticu la r ly  in  the U S A  
(Schaffer &  Greffenstette 1988). I shall discuss the philosophical background to 
Ho lland ’s work in  more deta il below, and w ill also consider the Genetic A lgo rithm  
again in  Chapter 4, section 4.3.2. There has been a somewhat para lle l European 
development in  the form  of Evolution Strategies (Schwefel 1979; 1988). Several of 
these h istorica l developments have been recently reviewed by Goldberg (1989).
I shall not attem pt a comprehensive discussion of these p rio r efforts here. 
They have met, at best, w ith  lim ited  success, and then on ly in  re la tive ly  narrow 
domains. I suggest that th is fa ilu re can be traced, to a large extent, to the 
fact that these approaches have not been inform ed by the detailed ph ilosoph ica l 
arguments and analyses which have been elaborated by Popper and others under 
the rubric  of evolutionary epistemology. I shall develop th is c la im  by considering 
a number of attempts to probe the philosoph ica l foundations o f evo lutionary 
or Darw in ian growth of knowledge which have previously appeared in  the A I  
literature.
I start w ith  the analysis contained in  D an ie l Dennett’s paper Why the Law 
of Effect Will Not Go Away (Dennett 1975). Th is  is a remarkable paper in  
that Dennett succeeds in  (re-)developing m any o f the im portant ideas present in  
evolutionary epistemology, but appears to have done so almost independently of, 
and concurrently w ith , the “m ainstream” work in  the field. There is on ly  fleeting 
mention of Popper, w ith  no detailed citation; and there is no m ention at a ll of 
D .T . Cam pbell, or other workers associated w ith  the development of evolutionary 
epistemology.
I note that Dennett’s paper is c learly a development of ideas previously 
mooted in  his Content and Consciousness (Dennett 1986), which was o rig ina lly  
published in  1969. Thus th is work by Dennett either predated or overlapped 
w ith  the orig ina l pub lication  of Popper’s co llection of essays Objective Knowledge 
in  1972 (Popper 1979), and the pub lica tion  of the Schilpp volum e on Popper’s 
philosophy (Sch ilpp 1974), which also contained Cam pbe ll’s most comprehensive 
expression of evolutionary epistemology (Cam pbe ll 1974a). So, notw ithstanding 
the fact that the essential ideas of evolutionary epistemology were available in
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much earlier pub lications21 it  is perhaps not too surprising that D ennett’s de­
velopment of these ideas was quite independent. W h ile  Dennett has mentioned 
Cam pbe ll’s work more recently (Dennett 1981, p. 59), th is was in  a quite different 
context, and does not bear d irectly  on the issues to be discussed here. A s far 
as I am aware, neither Dennett himself, nor any other commentator, has previ­
ously drawn attention to the close connections between D ennett’s analysis and 
evolutionary epistemology per se.
A lthough D ennett’s treatment does not, in  m y view, go sign ificantly beyond 
the analyses o f Popper and Cam pbell, it  is p a rticu la r ly  relevant here because 
Dennett e xp lic it ly  relates these ideas to AI.
Dennett expresses his discussion in  terms of the thesis known, in  behaviourist 
psychology, as the Law of Effect; very roughly, th is states that actions followed 
by reward are lik e ly  to be repeated, or, more specifically, that rewards act to 
reinforce or select the “successful” behaviours from  a diverse reperto ire of possible 
behaviours. W h ile  Dennett is no friend of behaviourism , h is c la im  is tha t there 
is a core of tru th  in  the Law  of Effect, and, in  particu lar, that something like  it 
w ill be “not just part of a possible exp lanation o f behavior, but of any possible 
explanation of behavior” (Dennett 1975, p. 72, o rig ina l emphasis).
Dennett develops th is c la im  by first noting that Darw in ian  evolution provides 
an explanation of the growth of what I have called “inate knowledge” (and which 
Dennett refers to as pure ly  “trop istic” or “in stin ctua l” contro l of behavior); and 
that, for the tim e being at least, D arw in ism  is the only account we have of th is 
growth which is not “question-begging” . In Dennett’s view, the Law  of Effect 
provides a s im ila r ly  unavoidable basis for any satisfactory account of the growth 
of knowledge in  somatic tim e (i.e. what I termed “learn ing” above, as opposed to 
“evolution” )— indeed he now reformulates the Law  of Effect in  a generalised form  
of what he calls “generate-and-test” procedures. These are hard ly  d istingu ish­
able from  Cam pbe ll’s U V S R  processes— except that Dennett does not exp lic it ly
21 As already noted, there were clear anticipations of evolutionary epistemology in Popper’s 
Logik der Forschvng, first published in 1934, of which the English translation, The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery, first appeared in 1959 (Popper 1980); there were also substantive specific 
discussions of the problem of induction in Popper’s Conjectures and Refutations (Popper 1989), 
first published in 1963; and Campbell published two seminal papers in the field at an early date 
(Campbell 1960a; 1960b).
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formulate the notion of log ica lly  unjustified varia tion  as a essential element of 
these processes.
Dennett’s analysis closely m irrors that of Cam pbe ll in  other respects also. In 
particu lar, he introduces the notion of an “inner” environm ent which can allow  a 
selection process to proceed in terna lly  to an organism, apart from  overt external 
behaviour. Th is  is very s im ila r to Cam pbe ll’s idea o f “v icarious” or “substitu te” 
selectors (Cam pbell 1974a), and, like  Dennett, Cam pbe ll has e xp lic it ly  viewed 
th is as a necessary generalisation of earlier learn ing theories, behaviourist and 
otherwise (Cam pbell 1960a). Follow ing Simon (1969, Chapter 4, pp. 95-97), 
Dennett’s discussion of the role of generate-and-test procedures in  A I  focuses 
on the requirement ( if  the growth of knowledge is to be “efficient” ) for genera­
tion  processes to be “endowed w ith  a h igh degree o f se lectiv ity” (Dennett 1975, 
p. 8 6 )— which I take to be equivalent to what I have earlier called “favourable 
bias” . However, un like Simon, but exactly  m atch ing Cam pbe ll’s various descrip­
tions, Dennett e xp lic it ly  recognises that any such “se lectiv ity” in  a generation 
process itse lf demands an explanation in  turn, and tha t th is can on ly be satisfied 
by a recursive appeal to some earlier (perhaps p roperly  D arw in ian  or evolution­
ary) generate-and-test process; and, further, that th is recursion can on ly  bottom  
out w ith  an appeal to  some “u ltim ate” generators which “contain an element of 
randomness or arb itrariness” (Dennett 1975, pp. 86-87).
So: it  seems clear that Dennett’s ideas, so far at least, are essentia lly at one 
w ith  the ideas of evolutionary epistemology. B u t I have not yet dealt w ith  Den­
ne tt’s substantive claim : that his generalised Darw in ism , in  the form  of generate- 
and-test, is a necessary component of any satisfactory psychology (or, indeed, 
A I). Frankly, I find  Dennett’s argument here obscure, and I shall not attem pt to 
reproduce it. B u t I note that, in  introducing h is argument, Dennett says:
I suspect this argument could be made to appear more rigorous (while also, 
perhaps, being revealed to be entirely unoriginal) by recasting it into the 
technical vocabulary of some version of “information theory” or “theory of 
self-organizing systems”. I would be interested to learn that this was so, 
but am content to let the argument, which is as intuitive as it is sketchy, 
rest on its own merits in the meantime.
Dennett (1975, p. 84)
Now I adm it that I m ay not have grasped D ennett’s argument correctly; but 
insofar as I th in k  I do understand it, it  seems to me tha t it  is, indeed, “entire ly
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unorig inal” (as Dennett anticipated) and tha t it  already had been made more 
“rigorous” . However, far from  being related to “in form ation  theory” , I th in k  
it  is actually, in  essence, a specialised form  of Popper’s argument in  re la tion  to 
the im possib ility  of a logic of induction. It differs p r im a rily  in  that Dennett has 
failed to locate the problem  as precisely or c learly  as Popper, as being that of 
the growth of knowledge (in the face of the im poss ib ility  of induction), and his 
solution is, as a result, much less clearcut than Popper’s; but i t  is essentia lly the 
same result, nam ely that there is no log ica l a lternative to seeing knowledge as 
irredeemably hypothetica l, and that knowledge grows, i f  at a ll, by  (unjustified) 
variation and selective retention.
Having accepted that Dennett’s analysis of the growth of knowledge is es­
sentia lly equivalent to the doctrine of evolutionary epistemology, the rem ain ing 
question is the relevance of th is to A I.
Dennett notes that generate-and-test, in  the most general sense, is a “ub iqu i­
tous” strategy w ith in  A I  programs (and actua lly  uses th is fact to bolster some­
what h is argument for the necessity of such processes). Tha t is fa ir enough, as far 
as it  goes, but it  does not go very far. The im portan t po int for m y purposes is that 
the use of generate-and-test is not, in itself, any k in d  o f panacea. Dennett argues 
(and I agree) tha t such processes w ill be necessary in  the realisation o f A I— but 
they are not sufficient by any means. I have argued earlier that the effective 
and open-ended growth of knowledge actua lly  requires that the arch itecture of 
the knowledge agent must support the growth and elaboration of a heterarchical 
structure in  which no knowledge (includ ing knowledge generators, and vicarious 
selectors) is sacrosanct, or dogm atica lly held. T h is  is a much stronger require­
ment than sim p ly  insisting  on having “some” form  of U V S R ; as far as I am aware, 
such an architecture is unknown in  any function ing A I  system.
In particu lar, Dennett h im se lf (who is, of course, p r im a rily  a philosopher) has 
not attempted to actua lly  apply the abstract ideas reviewed here in  the design of 
any real A I  system, and I shall therefore not discuss his analysis any further.
I now tu rn  to some writers who, at first sight at least, m ight seem to oppose 
the central c la im  that U V S R  processes are essential to the growth o f knowledge, 
and thus to the realisation of AI.
Consider first the crit ic ism  by Boden (1984). Boden is p r im a rily  concerned
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w ith  the relevance of Darw in ian  processes to problems o f mentality, specifica lly  
includ ing A I, but she is also prepared to carry her attack to  the home ground of 
Darw in ian theory, b io log ica l evolution itself:
Perhaps similar considerations concerning creative exploration might illu­
minate various biological phenomena which, on a neo-Darwinist account 
of evolution, are very puzzling. These include the facts that the fraction 
of DNA that does not code for the synthesis of specific proteins increases 
phylogenetically; that species have evolved remarkably quickly, and that 
the more complex species have if anything evolved at a greater rate than 
their predecessors; and that the speed with which a species evolves mor­
phologically seems quite unrelated to the rate at which its individual pro­
teins evolve (so frogs have protein-synthesizing mechanisms of comparable 
complexity to those of man). Such facts are not explicable in terms of 
“Random-Generate-and-Test,” the mutational strategy favoured by neo- 
Darwinism. This is because (as was discovered by the early workers in 
automatic programming), the combinatorics of such a process are horren­
dous (cf. [Arbib 1969a22]). Switching to a higher-level biological language 
(cf. “consolidation”), might be effected by random processes of gene dupli­
cation and recombination; but this merely reduces the exponent without 
preventing an exponential explosion.
Instead, some strategy of “Plausible-Generate-and-Test” is needed, where­
by mutations of a type likely to be adaptive become increasingly probable.
Boden (1984, p. 312, emphasis added)
B u t although Boden represents herself here as being opposed to “neo- 
Darw in ism ” , it  should be clear that there is, in  fact, very lit t le  difference between 
the position she describes and the general position  envisaged w ith in  the scope 
of evolutionary epistemology. Specifically, Boden seems to be assuming that 
neo-Darw inism  must re ly  exclusive ly on generators of variation  which are unbi­
ased; but as I have already explained, that is a m istaken v iew . 23 The structure 
of Darw in ian  exp lanation (or, more generally, of evolutionary epistemology) de­
mands on ly that, to whatever extent a generator of variation  exh ib its significant 
favourable bias, th is w ill require a further, recursive, invocation of the U V S R  
principle; and th is can bottom  out on ly  w ith  generators whose exp lanation or 
genesis is, we m ay say, unproblematic.
22I have been unable to identify the relevance of Boden’s citation here: (Arbib 1969a) makes 
no reference, that I can see, to automatic programming; it seems possible that the intended 
reference was actually to (Lenat 1983).
23While I believe that Boden is mistaken in her interpretation of neo-Darwinism, I also 
consider that she can hardly be blamed for this. Evolutionary biologists have not always been 
very clear on the issue, though there have been some useful recent discussions (e.g. Dawkins 
1989a; Wills 1991). I review this in more detail in (McMullin 1992b).
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Boden evidently accepts a ll this: thus she says, variously that “the in it ia l 
heuristics must evolve by random m utation (since there is no suggestion o f teleol­
ogy here)” (p. 312), and that “a structura l theory can even allow that contingency 
is sometimes essential to creative intelligence” (p. 314).
Nonetheless, a lite ra l reading of the fu ll passage quoted above m ight s t ill 
suggest that Boden has something stronger than th is result in  m ind: the last 
sentence, in  particu lar, w ith  its reference to favourable m utations becom ing “in ­
creasingly probable” , could be read as im p ly ing  some k in d  of inevitable progres­
sion, or even acceleration, in  the growth of “adaptation” (or, in  m y terms, in  the 
growth of knowledge). Tha t would obviously be deeply contrary to the princip les 
of evolutionary epistemology. B u t, I doubt that Boden herself rea lly  intends such 
a strong claim , for there is no exp lic it argument to  such an effect. I sha ll not, 
therefore, consider her analysis any further.
B y  contrast, I th in k  that Lenat (1983— a work which is heavily  referenced in  
Boden ’s discussion) does have a genuine, if  im p lic it , disagreement w ith  the p rin ­
ciples of evolutionary epistemology; but, equally, I believe that Lenat is w ho lly  
m istaken in  this. Lena t’s epistemology seems, at that tim e  at least, to have been 
a naïve inductiv ism :
The necessary machinery for learning from experience is not very com­
plex: accumulate a corpus of empirical data and make simple inductive 
generalizations from it.
Lenat (1983, p.287)
Lenat was ev idently unaware that the idea of induction  presented any d iffi­
culties in principle.
I should note that Lenat was working on a system (EURISKO) which went some 
way toward meeting the arch itectural requirements I have identified for realising 
A I. Specifically, EURISKO inc luded components ( “heuristics” ) for generating new 
conjectures, and the system was reflexive in  the sense tha t these heuristics could 
operate on each other. However, the heuristics seem to have been relentlessly 
inductiv is t, and EURISKO cannot be viewed as im plem enting U V S R  in  any rea­
sonable sense. In any case, the system had very lim ited  success, and Lenat 
h im se lf subsequently abandoned th is line of research; bu t he has not, apparently, 
abandoned an essentially inductiv is t epistemology. In a recent discussion of the
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on-going Cyc project, he outlines the follow ing objective for the system  (to be
achieved by late 1994):
Demonstrate that Cyc can learn by discovery. This . . .  includes decid­
ing what data to gather, noticing patterns and regularities in the data, 
and drawing from those patterns useful new analogies, dependencies, and 
generalizations.
Lenat fc Guha (1990, p. 357)
Thus, given that Lenat has s t il l not recognised, m uch less analysed, the ph ilo ­
sophical problems underlying induction, I suggest tha t any c r it ic ism  of evolution­
ary epistemology im p lied  in  his work can be safely neglected.
To close th is review of philosophical work bearing on the re lation  between 
U V S R  and A I, I shall consider the position of John H o lland  and certa in  of his 
co-workers.
Ho lland  is an engineer and scientist who has long been concerned w ith  the 
problems of developing a rtific ia l “adaptive systems” , and was in  the vanguard of 
those advocating an evolutionary approach to such problems (e.g. H o lland  1962b; 
1962a). In particu lar, as noted earlier, Ho lland  is the inventor of the so-called 
Genetic Algorithm (Ho lland  1975), a general purpose “learn ing” or adaptive pro­
cedure insp ired in  certa in ways by the mechanisms of b io log ica l evolution. Ho lland  
has specifically attempted to apply the Genetic A lgo r ithm  in  the development of 
machine learning systems which could overcome the brittleness of conventional 
expert systems (Holland 1986). It m ight seem, therefore, that Ho lland  would 
surely support the position I have been advocating— that reflexive, heterarchical, 
U V S R  processes are essential to the efficient, open ended, growth of knowledge. 
It transpires, however, that that would be, at best, an oversim plification.
In o rig ina lly  in troducing the Genetic A lgo rithm , Ho lland  identified h im se lf 
as being concerned w ith  the growth of “adaptation” (Holland 1975, Chap­
ter 1). M ore recently, Ho lland  has w ritten  e xp lic it ly  in  terms of the growth 
of “knowledge” , p a rticu la rly  in  the volume (Ho lland et al. 1986), co-written w ith  
K .J . Holyoak, R .E . N isbett and P .R . Thagard; here they jo in t ly  identify  them ­
selves as concerned w ith  “a ll inferentia l processes that expand knowledge in  the 
face of uncerta inty” (p. 1 ).
However, the situation  is rather more com plicated than this. The philosoph­
ica l framework underly ing H o lland ’s approach is, at first sight at least, quite
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incom patib le w ith  that which I have been advocating: like  Lenat, H o lland  et al. 
seem to be self-declared inductivists— indeed, the t it le  of the ir book (Holland 
et al. 1986) is actua lly  Induction. Despite th is, I sha ll not be arguing against the 
epistemology, as such, of Ho lland  et al.-, instead, I sha ll suggest that the appear­
ance of disagreement is m istaken, a m atter of words and emphasis rather than 
substance. Bu t, in  the very process of reconciling these apparent differences, I 
shall conclude that the aspects of the growth o f knowledge which H o lland  et al. 
choose to concentrate upon are largely those which I choose to neglect, and vice 
versa.
The appearance o f disagreement between the position  o f Ho lland  et al. and 
that of Popper and Cam pbe ll is clear enough. W e find, for example, an un­
qualified rejection o f “evolutionary epistemology” (Ho lland et al. 1986, p. 79; 
they exp lic it ly  cite Cam pbe ll 1974a; 1974b); and w h ile  we (eventually) find  an 
admission, mentioning Hum e and Popper, that the very poss ib ility  o f induction  
is problematic, th is is im m ediate ly passed over w ith  the statement that “most 
[philosophers] have attem pted to solve the narrower prob lem  of determ ining un­
der what circumstances the [inductive] inference can be justified” (Ho lland et al. 
1986, p. 230).
However, I do not th in k  the situation is quite as it  m ay seem when selectively 
quoted in  th is way. W h ile  the writers apparently believe themselves to be opposed 
to Popperian epistemology, the ir genuine fam ilia r ity  w ith  Popper’s work can rea­
sonably be questioned. There is only one exp lic it c ita tion  of Popper (on p. 328, to 
the first Eng lish  ed ition  o f The Logic of Scientific Discovery— see Popper 1980). 
Th is  is followed, quite shortly, by an ascrip tion to  Popper o f the v iew  that any 
reluctance to abandon function ing (but refuted) scientific theories must represent 
“an irrationa l, egotistica l attachment” (p. 332); H o lland  et al. go on to suggest 
(apparently as a contrast to th is “Popperian” view) that, in  practice, theories can 
only be discarded “when a new, a lternative theory tha t does not require special 
assumptions arises and offers to replace the existing theory” (p. 332). B u t one 
could hard ly  find a more genuinely Popperian  statement that the latter: it  is, 
precisely, the notion of survival between competing hypotheses. Popper (1974b, 
p. 995) has had occasion to defend h im se lf against a s im ila r “crit ic ism ” , where he 
gives a more detailed rebuttal. For m y purposes it  is sufficient to note that the
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rejection of a “Popperian” epistemology by H o lland  et al. m ay be more im agined 
(on the ir part) than real.
In fact, it  seems that the “inductive” processes w ith  which Ho lland  et al. 
are concerned m ay be more or less identified w ith  the “plausible-generate-and- 
test” processes of Boden (1984). Thus, in  in troducing  the ir problem , Ho lland  
et al. quote C.S. Pe irce at length to the effect tha t the growth of knowledge 
involves something like  “special aptitudes for guessing righ t” (p. 4); and later 
(p. 79) they e xp lic it ly  refer to th is as “Pe irce ’s prob lem  of generating plausible 
new rules” , which is almost identica l to Boden ’s form ulation (though the la tte r 
is not actua lly  cited). Th is  last reference to Pe irce is the more iron ic  since it 
is im m ediate ly juxtaposed w ith  the already mentioned dism issal of (Cam pbell 
1974a)— a paper in  which (pp. 438-440) Cam pbe ll carefu lly and c r it ica lly  reviews 
Pe irce ’s profound ambivalence on the issues at hand . 24
So: m y conclusion here is essentially the same as previously outlined in  re­
view ing Boden ’s work. I hold, essentially, that the processes which H o lland  et al. 
describe as inductive are processes of unjustified variation. Notw ithstand ing m y 
use of the term  “unjustified” here, I quite accept that, in  given circumstances, 
some such processes m ay do “better” than others (in  the sense of generating con­
jectures which are “closer” to the tru th). S im ila rly , I accept that the form ulation 
and comparison of processes in  th is respect is a genuine and d ifficu lt problem. 
Bu t, crucia lly, I hold that there can be no fina l or defin itive “so lution” to th is 
problem; a ll “inductive” processes are heuristic and fallib le; there is no “log ic” of 
induction. I say th is w ithout doubting, for a moment, that even pa rtia l solutions 
to th is “problem  of induction” m ay be very interesting, and, indeed, pragm ati­
ca lly  useful. It seems to me that Ho lland  et al. do not u lt im a te ly  disagree w ith  
any of this, and that the ir analysis need not, therefore, be considered any further 
here.
24I might also add that Popper himself has made very positive remarks regarding the phi­
losophy of C.S. Peirce (e.g. Popper 1965, pp. 212-213); however, these remarks do not bear 
directly on the issues under discussion here.
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3.9 Conclusion
In th is chapter I have argued that com putational systems can be said to have 
knowledge, in  a perfectly conventional, b io logical, sense; tha t th is knowledge can 
grow only v ia  some k ind  of Darw inian, U V S R , processes; that such processes 
w ill therefore be an essential component of any system pretending to  human­
like  intelligence (as represented, for example, by Turing  Test performance); and 
that, in  any case, such processes (as opposed to pure “Knowledge Engineering” ) 
m ay well be essential to the initial construction of any system  which exh ib its, or 
aspires to exh ib it, human-like intelligence.
It follows that the realisation, in  a com putational system, of U V S R  processes 
incorporating an open-ended, reflexive, heterarchical, architecture— which is to 
say, in  effect, some form  of Artificial Darwinism— is now seen as being at least an 
essential element ( if not the essential element) of a serious A I  research program. 
The next chapter w ill be devoted to review ing some issues which arise in  p ractica l 
attempts to do this. I shall leave the fina l sum m arising word for the present 
chapter w ith  Popper:
I do not really believe that we shall succeed in creating life artificially; but 
after having reached the moon and landed a spaceship or two on Mars,
I realize that this disbelief of mine means very little. But computers are 
totally different from brains, whose function is not primarily to compute 
but to guide and balance an organism and help it to stay alive. It is for 
this reason that the first step of nature toward an intelligent mind was the 
creation of life, and I think that should we artificially create an intelligent 
mind, we would have to follow the same path.
Popper fc Eccles (1977, Chapter P5, p. 208)
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C hapter 4
Artificial Darw inism
4.1 Introduction
There is a very large lite rature already in  existence which bears on what I term  
Artificial Darwinism— i.e. the possible realisation o f D arw in ian  evolution in  ar­
tif ic ia l systems. Furthermore, work on th is top ic has recently received a new 
impetus w ith  the (re?)emergence of the fie ld now called Artificial Life:
Artificial Life is the study of man-made systems that exhibit behaviors 
characteristic of natural living systems. It complements the traditional 
biological sciences concerned with the analysis of living organisms by a t­
tempting to synthesize life-like behaviors within computers and other arti­
ficial media. By extending the empirical foundation upon which biology is 
based beyond the carbon-chain life that has evolved on Earth, Artificial Life 
can contribute to theoretical biology by locating life-as-we-know-it within 
the larger picture of life-as-it-could-bc.
Langton (1989b, p. 1, original emphasis)
The size and rap id  growth of th is lite rature precludes any attem pt at a com­
prehensive survey or critique, and I do not pretend to provide one. Instead, th is 
chapter w ill be concerned w ith  a very selective review of work carried out by a 
sm all number of researchers. The choice of which work to h ighlight in  th is way 
is a personal one, but is not arb itrary. I shall concentrate almost exclusive ly 
on von Neum ann’s sem inal investigations, which m ay be taken almost as having 
defined the field. I follow th is w ith  a discussion of what seems to me to be the 
most d irectly  relevant subsequent work.
Von Neumann carried out his work in  th is area, for the most part, in  the 
period 1948-53. He presented his ideas in  various lectures over tha t period,
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and some lim ited  discussion of the work was also fo rm a lly  published around the 
same tim e (von Neumann 1951; Kem eny 1955). Von Neum ann h im se lf started 
work, in  1952-53, on a m ajor book in  th is area, ten tative ly  en titled  The Theory of 
Automata: Construction, Reproduction, Homogeneity. However, he put th is aside 
in  late 1953 and, as a result of his untim ely death in  1957, he was never to return 
to it. W h ile  the draft manuscript circu lated fa ir ly  w idely, it  was on ly through the 
efforts of A .W . Burks that it  was fina lly  edited, completed, and posthumously 
published, together w ith  a series of related lectures (also previously unpublished), 
under the general t it le  Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata (Burks 1966d).
I say th is chapter provides a “review” but it  should perhaps be put a lit t le  
more strongly than that. Briefly, m y contention is that von Neum ann’s orig ina l 
work has been, at best, incom plete ly understood; and that (perhaps as a direct 
result) the research programme which he proposed has foundered. Thus, the 
p rim ary  purpose here is to attempt a fresh evaluation and re-interpretation of 
von Neum ann’s work. In the light of this, I then go on to comment critically on 
the subsequent development of the field.
M y  conclusion w ill be the unsurprising one that the prob lem  of realising A r ­
t if ic ia l Darw in ism , at least in  the strong sense in  which I am using that term, 
is extremely difficult; that progress in  th is d irection  has been very lim ited; and 
that any conceivable a lternative strategies to realising th is goal should be care­
fu lly  explored. One such a lternative strategy would be to abandon altogether the 
attem pt to create A r t if ic ia l L ife  (and thus A r t if ic ia l Darw in ism ); for such cre­
ation may be s im p ly  too d ifficu lt, at least for the tim e being. Instead we m ight 
try  to create an (artific ia l) system which is adm itted to be devoid of “life ” , at 
least in it ia lly , but in  which “life ” may spontaneously arise. Tha t is, we could 
redirect our attention away from  the broad sweep of evolutionary bio logy (which 
“pre-supposes” the existence of life, a lbeit of a “p rim it ive ” k ind), and concentrate 
instead on capturing the genesis of “life ” in  an a rtific ia l system. Th is  m ay (or 
may not!) be a more tractab le problem; in  any case, it  w ill subsequently become 
the specific concern of Chapter 5.
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4.2 Von N eum ann’s Theory of Automata
4.2.1 Background
You had to be a quick note-taker indeed if you were going to follow one of 
von Neumann’s lectures. During his seminars (Fuld Hall’s seminar room 
was right across the hallway from his office) he’d write dozens of equations 
on the blackboard, jamming them all into a two-foot square space oif to 
one side. As soon as he was finished with one formula he’d zip it away with 
the eraser and replace it with another one. He’d do this again and again, 
one right after the other—an equation and zzzip, another one and zzzip—  
and before you knew it he’d be putting the eraser back on the ledge and 
brushing the chalk dust from his hands. “Proof by erasure,” his listeners 
called it.
Regis (1987, p. 104)
In the late 1940’s John von Neumann began to develop what he intended as 
a tru ly  general “theory of automata” . B y  “automaton” von Neum ann meant, 
roughly, any system which could be described or understood as a more or less 
“complex” whole made up of “sim ple” parts having prescribed properties. In 
other words, an automaton is any system which is amenable to a s tr ic t ly  reduc­
tion ist analysis (or synthesis, for that m atter). Th is  is not to say that von Neu­
mann was a “reductionist” in  any general or cosmological sense (I do not know 
what, i f  any, metaphysical positions he adopted). The po int is rather that the 
scope o f his “theory of automata” was restricted, by defin ition, to just those 
systems which are reducible in  th is k ind  of operational sense.
The class of automata was, of course, to include a rtific ia l systems in  general: 
after a ll, reductionist explanation is (for the tim e being at least) the sine qua 
non of a ll successful engineering; to th is extent “the theory of autom ata” would 
almost be better called “the theory of engineering” . B u t von Neumann also 
included bio log ica l systems (organisms in  particu lar), at least tentatively; that is, 
to whatever extent bio logical phenomena m ay y ie ld  to a reductionist explanation 
(and th is is u ltim ate ly, of course, an open question), then the study of these 
phenomena would fa ll properly w ith in  h is theory of automata.
Von Neum ann’s automata theory thus involves two quite d istin ct k inds of 
question:
1. The characterisation of the “p r im it ive ” parts. In the simplest case von Neu­
mann required that these should be what would now be called finite state
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machines, of some sort. T ha t is, any given p rim it ive  part would have some 
specified set of “inputs” , some specified set of “outputs” , and its “instan­
taneous” outputs would be determ ined by its  instantaneous inputs and its 
instantaneous, internal, “state”— where inputs, outputs and in terna l states 
each adm it of on ly fin ite ly  m any d istinguishable values.
2. The organisation of the parts in to  complex wholes, having some coher­
ent properties and behaviours. In particu lar, certa in  sets o f such complex 
wholes, defined in  some way, m ay be identified as “autom ata” of some more 
or less interesting kind.
The two questions are clearly interrelated. Thus: the poten tia l or scope for 
complex organisation must, in  the fina l analysis, be constrained by the properties 
of the p rim itive  parts; but conversely, we m ay speculate tha t certa in  “interesting” 
behaviours of a whole may be largely independent of the detailed properties of 
the parts, being chiefly a reflection of the ir organisation.
Von Neumann proposed, in it ia lly  at least, to address questions of the first k ind  
(the characterisation of p rim itive  parts) by a process of un ila te ra l axiomatization:
Axiomatizing the behaviour of the elements means this: We assume that 
the elements have certain well-defined, outside, functional characteristics; 
that is, they are to be treated as “black boxes.” They are viewed as 
automatisms, the inner structure of which need not be disclosed, but which 
are assumed to react to certain unambiguously defined stimuli, by certain 
unambiguously defined responses.
This being understood, we may then investigate the larger organisms that 
can be built up from these elements, their structure, their functioning, 
the connections between the elements, and the general theoretical regular­
ities that may be detectable in the complex syntheses of the organisms in 
question.
I need not emphasize the limitations of this procedure. Investigations of 
this type may furnish evidence that the system of axioms used is convenient 
and, at least in its effects, similar to reality. They are, however, not the 
ideal method, and possibly not even a very effective method, to determine 
the validity of the axioms. Such determinations of validity belong primarily 
to the first part of the problem. Indeed they are essentially covered by the 
properly physiological (or chemical or physical-chemical) determinations of 
the nature and properties of the elements.
von Neumann (1951, pp. 289-290)
The paper from  which the above is quoted was o rig ina lly  read at the H ixon  
Sym posium  (on Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior) in  September 1948. Von Neu­
mann returned again, and in  more detail, to th is issue during the follow ing year,
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in  the course of a series of lectures delivered at the U n ive rs ity  of Illino is (fina lly  
published as von Neumann 1966a). He there concluded:
. . .  while the choice [of the “elementary parts”] is enormously important 
and absolutely basic for the application of the axiomatic method, this 
choice is neither rigorously justifiable nor humanly unambiguously justifi­
able. All one can do is to try  to submit a system which will stand up under 
common sense criteria.
von Neumann (1966a, p. 77)
I emphasise von Neum ann’s stipu la tion  of the essentia lly in form al nature of 
the axiom atization procedure, because it  underlines the contingent nature of his 
results— they are valid, and are cla im ed to be va lid , on ly  w ith in  the scope of 
certain specified axiomatisations. W e shall see, in  due course, that th is im portant 
point has been overlooked by at least one subsequent worker (Frank T ip le r—  
see section 4.2.4), who has then gone on to im pute quite unjustified cla im s to 
von Neumann.
W ith  regard to the second k ind  of question— the organisation of parts into 
complex wholes— von Neumann concentrated on one pa rticu la r problem , which 
he identified roughly as the growth of complexity. M ore specifically, he wanted to 
establish that there is nothing fundam entally paradoxica l about the notion of a 
complex automaton being able to construct another which is as complex as itse lf 
( “self-reproduction”— a prerequisite for natura l selection— being the p roto typ ica l 
example); or, more substantially, about the notion of an automaton spontaneously 
becoming, v ia  construction or otherwise, more complex. Together, these proper­
ties would perm it, though not, of course, guarantee, the spontaneous growth of 
com plexity v ia  Darw in ian  evolution. He sought to do th is by actua lly  exh ib iting  
these possib ilities— automaton self-reproduction in  a form  supporting the possi­
bility o f spontaneous, heritable, growth in  automaton com plex ity— w ith in  some 
particu lar, more or less “reasonable” , ax iom atization  of “p rim it ive  parts” and 
“automaton” .
In effect, von Neumann was interested in  showing that certain conditions, 
which seem to be necessary, though not sufficient, for the spontaneous growth 
of com plexity by Darw in ian  evolution, can be satisfied w ith in  re la tive ly  simple 
(reductionist) systems. Th is  result would, of course, open up the prospect of
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actua lly  bu ild ing  a rtific ia l systems, com putational or otherwise, which satisfy 
these m in im a l conditions.
In what follows I shall interpret von Neum ann’s in form al notion of automa­
ton complexity as being synonymous w ith  what I have, in  the previous chapter, 
called subjective knowledge, and I shall use the terms interchangably. That this 
interpretation is a reasonable one may, perhaps, be most c learly  seen from  the 
follow ing passage:
There is a concept which will be quite useful here, of which we have a 
certain intuitive idea, but which is vague, unscientific, and imperfect . . .
I know no adequate name for it, but it is best described by calling it 
“complication.” It is effectivity in complication, or the potentiality to 
do things. I am not thinking about how involved the object is, but how 
involved its purposive  operatio n s  are. In this sense, an object is of the 
highest degree of complexity if it can do very difficult and involved things.
von Neumann (1966a, p. 78, emphasis added)
I review th is notion of “com plication” (and its role in  b io log ica l Darw in ism ) 
in  more deta il in  (M cM u llin  1992b, pp. 5-7). For the present purposes, it  is 
sufficient to note that the problem  of the growth of automaton “com plex ity” (in 
von Neum ann’s sense) is thus essentially equivalent to the prob lem  of the growth 
of “knowledge” as I have discussed it  heretofore. Von  Neum ann’s work is therefore 
of very d irect relevance to the concerns of th is Thesis and deserves careful and 
detailed consideration.
Note carefu lly here that von Neum ann’s concern here was not w ith  “self- 
reproduction” per se, but w ith  the general problem  of the construction of complex 
automata by other automata in  such a way that com plex ity  need not degenerate, 
and m ay even increase; and the reason for th is concern was because of its  re lation 
to the fundamental problems of b io log ica l evolution. Th is  must be emphasised 
because “self-reproduction” is a vague concept which adm its of t r iv ia l as well as 
interesting interpretations, a fact of which von Neumann was keenly aware. He 
sought to avoid tr iv ia lity  in  two ways. F irstly , he constrained what should be 
regarded as a “reasonable” axiom atization  (specifically, constrain ing the powers 
of the p rim it ive  parts). B u t secondly, and cruc ia lly  in  m y view, he constrained 
the phenomena which should be adm itted  as proper examples (for his purposes)
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of self-reproduction. Bo th  these points were covered in  the 1949 lecture series, 
already mentioned above, delivered at the Un ive rs ity  o f Illino is:
. . .  one may define parts in such numbers, and each of them so large and 
involved, that one has defined the whole problem away. If you choose to 
define as elementary objects things which are analogous to whole living 
organisms, then you obviously have killed the problem, because you would 
have to attribute to these parts just those functions of the living organism 
which you would like to describe or to understand. So, by choosing the 
parts too large, by attributing too many and too complex functions to 
them, you lose the problem at the moment of defining it.
von Neumann (1966a, p. 76)
. . .  One of the difficulties in defining what one means by self-reproduction 
is that certain organizations, such as growing crystals, are self-reproductive 
by any naive definition of self-reproduction, yet nobody is willing to award 
them the distinction of being self-reproductive. A way around this difficulty 
is to say that self-reproduction includes the ability to undergo inheritable 
mutations as well as the ability to make another organism like the original.
von Neumann (1966a, p. 86, emphasis added)
So it  is clear that, insofar as von Neumann was interested in  some “problem ” 
of self-reproduction, it  was, v ia  the notion of inheritab le m utations, pure ly  in  its 
role in  the (Darw inian) growth of complexity.
Now, of course, these conditions, stipu lated by von Neum ann to avoid t r iv ­
ia lity , are not formal. Indeed, according to von Neumann, they are not even 
formalisable. I have already quoted h im  e xp lic it ly  to the la tte r effect in  the case 
of choosing an axiom atization. He im p lic it ly  makes the same point, though per­
haps less strongly, in  regard to the poss ib ility  of form alization  o f “inheritab le 
m utation” ; for th is c learly refers to the poss ib ility  of “m utations” which m ay 
involve increased complexity, and, again as already quoted, von Neum ann adm its 
the vague and inform al nature of h is concept of complexity.
M y  reason for drawing out th is po int is that it  seems to have been missed 
or obscured by at least some subsequent workers; in  particu la r, there has been a 
perception that von Neumann was concerned w ith  self-reproduction as a problem 
in itself. Th is  is a part of what I shall ca ll the von Neumann myth. T h is  m yth  
has had various negative effects, such as, for example, spawning an extended 
attem pt to formalise a criterion  for “non-triv ia l self-reproduction”— an attem pt 
which I believe to have been unnecessary, confusing, and u lt im a te ly  sterile (as
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von Neumann clearly anticipated in  the first place). To reiterate: m y view  is 
that von Neumann was not at a ll concerned w ith  self-reproduction as a problem  
in  itse lf (indeed, discussion on that basis can hard ly  avoid tr iv ia lity ); but rather 
w ith  self-reproduction as a facet of a much more substantive prob lem — the growth 
of automata com plexity (particu la rly  v ia  Darw in ian  evolution). I sha ll return to 
th is issue in  more deta il in  section 4.2.7 below.
Von  Neum ann’s earliest expositions, in  1948/49 (first p riva te ly  at the P rin ce­
ton Institute for Advanced Studies, and then at the H ixon  symposium , and later 
again in  the lectures, already quoted, delivered at the U n ive rs ity  of Illino is) were 
in  terms of a model which was very inform al, but which sufficed to  allow  h im  to at 
least outline his arguments. Subsequently, he set out to provide a m athem atica lly  
rigorous axiom atization, and derivation, of his results. He brought th is to a fa ir ly  
advanced stage in  a m anuscript w ritten  during 1952/53. The essential aspects 
of th is model were presented in  the Vanuxem  Lectures delivered at Princeton 
Un ivers ity  in  M arch  1953. Von Neumann h im se lf d id  not w ish to  w rite  up these 
lectures separately from  his manuscript; in  the in terim , it  was arranged that John 
Kem eny w rite  an article, based on the Vanuxem  Lectures. Th is  was published as 
(Kem eny 1955). In late 1953 von Neumann put his m anuscript aside, unfinished; 
in  the event, he was never to return  to it. John von Neum ann died in  February 
1957, after an extended illness.
Von Neum ann’s manuscript, ten tative ly  entitled The Theory of Automata: 
Construction, Reproduction, Homogeneity, was fin a lly  edited and completed by 
A .W . Burks, and published posthumously as (von Neum ann 1966b).
In the follow ing sections I shall review von Neum ann’s work on the theory 
of automata in  some detail. I adopt the follow ing procedure. F irs t, I restate, 
as c learly as possible, the pa rticu la r problem  which (I c la im ) von Neumann was 
setting out to solve (which I shall term  Pv). Next I digress tem porarily  to dis­
cuss Turing ’s work on computing automata, in  order to introduce certain ways 
in  which von Neumann planned to exp lo it or generalise th is work. Then I con­
sider von Neum ann’s proposed solution to Pv. Th is  involves in it ia lly  assuming 
than some system or axiom atization  of automata supports certa in  more or less 
p lausible phenomena; th is discussion corresponds essentia lly to von Neum ann’s
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early, informal, presentations of his ideas, and represents what I ca ll h is core ar­
gument. Th is  is followed by von Neumann’s correction of a m inor flaw in  th is 
core argument. I then review the demonstration(s) by von Neumann and others 
that the required phenomena are, in  fact, supported in  at least one particu la r 
axiom atization of automata (this is based on a ce llu la r automaton form ulation, 
and corresponds to von Neum ann’s later, unfinished, m anuscript), and discuss 
the extent to which th is successfully solves P„. H av ing  completed the presenta­
tion  of von Neum ann’s solution, I present some m ild  c r it ic ism  or clarification  of 
it , showing how it  can perhaps be strengthened in  certa in  ways. I close th is de­
ta iled discussion of von Neum ann’s work by returning, once again, to the question 
of what problem he was actua lly  try ing  to solve. I d istingu ish  sharply between 
m y own view on th is and the somewhat contrary views seem ingly expressed by 
von Neumann himself, and by a number of other commentators.
4.2.2 Von N eu m an n ’s P roblem  (Pv)
Among the many questions which our discussion of self-reproducing au­
tom ata raises are ‘Whence come the components out of which our automata 
are made?’ and ‘Given that such automata exist, how might one imagine 
them to evolve?’ It is not our purpose in this section to answer these 
questions—would that we could—but rather to suggest some interesting 
avenues towards their solution.
Arbib (1969a, p. 214)
A lthough it  seems to have been von Neum ann’s u lt im ate  objective to formu­
late a single, comprehensive, and completely general, “theory o f autom ata” , I 
take the view  that that objective has certa in ly not yet been achieved. Instead 
there exists a w ide variety of more or less d istinct “theories of automata” , which 
are related in  various ways, but which preserve the ir own unique characteristics 
also; and in  what follows it  w ill be necessary to consider at least a selection of 
these d istinct theories. I therefore introduce some new term inology to fac ilita te  
th is discussion.
I sha ll refer to some particu la r ax iom atization  of (abstract) autom ata as defin­
ing an A-system. W ith in  the context of such a pa rticu la r A-system  I shall refer to 
the entities which are to be regarded as “automata” as A-machines. The set of a ll 
A-machines (w ith respect to a particu la r A-system ) w ill be called the A-set. The
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possible “p rim itive ” (irreducible) parts of an A -m achine w ill be called A-parts. 
In general it  must be possible to analyse the behaviour of any given A-m achine in  
terms of its  being composed of a number of A -parts, wh ich are “lega lly” arranged 
or aggregated. I shall refer to an arb itra ry aggregate of A -parts as an A-structure.
Note carefully, at th is point, that “A -structure” and “A-m achine” are not, 
in  general, synonymous, though they are c learly related. In fact, certa in  A - 
structures m ay not qua lify  as A-machines at all; and certain, d istinct, A - 
structures m ay be regarded as instances of the “same” A -m achine (in  different 
“A-states” )— i.e. an A-m achine may well be defined as some k in d  of equivalence 
class of A-structures. Indeed, it  is conceivable that we could have two A-systems 
which incorporate exactly  the same A-parts, and thus have exactly  the same 
sets of A-structures, and yet which differ rad ica lly  in  the ir defin itions of what 
constitutes an A-machine.
A s well as th is term inology specifica lly re lating to automata, I sha ll also make 
occasional use below of a technical term inology regarding the abstract ideas un­
derly ing Darw in ian  evolution in  general. The la tte r term ino logy is detailed in  
(M cM u llin  1992a), and I shall provide only a b rie f sum m ary here.
Actors are ind iv idua ls which reproduce, w ith  some degree o f heritab ility . A  
S im ilarity-lineage or S-lineage is a lineage of actors which includes, at each gener­
ation, only those offspring which are “s im ila r” to the ir parent (s) in  some specified 
way. D is tin ct, heritable, “s im ila rities” (sim ilarity-classes or S-classes) thus d is­
tinguish d istinct S-lineages. In the general case, any given actor m ay be a member 
of m any d istinct S-lineages. In certain circumstances an S-lineage m ay grow con­
sistently u n til lim ited  by resource ava ilab ility; and, in  so doing, m ay exclude or 
elim inate one or more other S-lineages. Th is  is S-lineage selection. S-value is a 
parameter of an S-lineage such that differences in  S-value are pred ictive of the 
rate and u ltim ate  outcome of selection. S-value corresponds to one of the common 
interpretations of “fitness” in  evolutionary biology.
The b irth  of an actor w ith  some heritab le characteristic not possessed by any 
of its  parents is called S-creation. S-creation in itia tes new S-lineages. If S-creation 
is unjustified (in the sense of “unjustified varia tion” introduced in  Chapter 3) the 
actors are called Darw inian- or D-actors. A  lineage of D-actors, incorporating 
m u ltip le  d istinct S-lineages, whose evolution can be usefu lly described in  terms
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of selection events between those S-lineages, is called a D-lineage. A  system of 
D-actors, form ing D-lineage(s), is called a D-system.
Some further term inology w ill be introduced below as the context demands. 
In particu lar, where it  is necessary to restrict the discussion to  some particu la r A - 
system, an appropriate subscript w ill be added, thus: A^-system , A^-structure, 
A jf-pa rt etc.
Von Neumann’s ( in it ia l) problem  in  the theory of automata, which I shall 
denote Pv, is to formulate a particu la r A-system  in  such a way that the follow ing 
d istinct conditions are satisfied:
1. There should not be too m any different “k inds” of A -part, nor should these 
be ind iv idua lly  very “complex” .
2. We require that some A-machines operate (in  at least some circumstances 
or “environments” ) so as to  acquire (somehow) further A-parts, and as­
semble them  in to  new A-machines. A-machines of th is sort w ill be called 
A-constructors. In general, we do not expect that a ll A-m achines w ill be 
A-constructors, so that the set of A-constructors w ill be a proper subset of 
the A-set.
3. We require that some of the A-constructors be capable of constructing 
offspring which are “identica l” to themselves . 1 We shall ca ll these A- 
reproducers. A-reproducers may also, of course, be capable of constructing 
A-machines quite different from  themselves. In general, we do not expect 
a ll A-constructors to be A-reproducers, so that the set of A-reproducers w ill 
be a proper subset of the set of A-constructors.
4. We require that there should exist some mechanism(s) whereby an A - 
machine can “spontaneously” change into a different, d istinct, A-machine; 
these changes w ill be called A-mutations. W e require that A -m utations
1Note th a t this does not involve an infeasibly strong notion of “identity” between parent 
and offspring, bu t requires only “similarity” to  the extent of having all the “same” A -parts in 
the “same” configuration. These will be formal relationships between formal entities, which 
can be effectively tested for identity; in itself this says nothing about the capabilities of real, 
physical, systems. In the terminology of (McMullin 1992a), it can be roughly regarded as a 
formalisation of the possibility of the preservation of S-class in S-descent. Compare also the 
discussion in (McMullin 1992c, pp. 15-16).
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should not occur so often as to corrupt the “norm al” behaviour o f A - 
machines.
5. In general, the A-machines almost necessarily form  a connected set (in  the 
technical, graph-theoretical, sense) under A -m utation , but th is is not im ­
portant in  itself; the im portant point is that, in  p rinc ip le , proper subsets of 
the A-set (such as the set of a ll A-reproducers) m ay or m ay not be connected 
under A-m utation. W ith  th is understanding, we require that there must 
exist at least one set of A-machines which is connected under A -m utation , 
whose elements are a ll A-reproducers, and which includes elements having 
a “w ide” (preferably “in fin ite” ) range of A-complexity (or A-knowledge). 
Th is  notion of A -com p lex ity  or A-knowledge is necessarily informal; it  w ill 
be interpreted in  essentially the sense of “knowledge” previously introduced 
in  Chapter 3. The general idea of connectiv ity  under some k ind  o f m uta­
tiona l relationship is closely related to what Kauffm an (1990) has called 
“evo lvab ility” ; essentially the same issue has also been previously discussed 
(in a specifically b io log ica l context) by M aynard  Sm ith  (1970).
Taken together, these at least approximate to a m in im um  set of necessary 
conditions for the growth of autom ata com plexity ( if  such growth is to occur 
spontaneously, by Darw in ian  evolution). M ore specifically, we must have A - 
constructors which can at least maintain A -com p lex ity  (A-reproducers being a 
special case of this), for S-actors have th is property, and on ly S-actors can give 
rise to S-lineage selection; and we must have some mechanism, over and above 
this, corresponding to S-creation, whereby A -com p lex ity  m ay actua lly  increase 
(M cM u llin  1992a).
Th is  is, of course, precisely the rationale for form ulating  th is pa rticu la r set of 
conditions; but I reiterate that, even i f  a ll these conditions can be satisfied, they 
are not sufficient for the growth of A-com plexity. T h is  po int w il l be returned to 
subsequently. For the moment, we note that, prima facie, it  is not at a ll clear 
that the conditions already identified can be satisfied, even in  p rinc ip le— i.e. that
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any A-system  satisfying these conditions exists. Von Neum ann put the issue th is 
way:
Everyone knows that a machine tool is more complicated than the elements 
which can be made with it, and that, generally speaking, an automaton A, 
which can make an automaton B, must contain a complete description of 
B and also rules on how to behave while effecting the synthesis. So, one 
gets a very strong impression that complication, or productive potentiality 
in an organization, is degenerative, that an organization which synthesizes 
something is necessarily more complicated, of a higher order, than the 
organization it synthesizes.
von Neumann (1966a, p. 79)
If th is were rea lly  so it  would represent, at the very least, a severe d ifficu lty  
for the continued application  of reductionist, or mechanistic, theories in  biology. 
It is ev idently an issue of considerable and profound importance.
So, the question becomes: can we actua lly  exh ib it an A -system  which demon­
strab ly  does meet a ll the conditions stated above?
Von Neum ann’s crucia l insight was to recognise that there is a way whereby 
th is can be done (at least in  princip le), and done re la tive ly  easily at that. I 
shall outline his argument in  the follow ing sections; but I must stress, in  advance, 
that von Neumann does not c la im  that the b io log ica l world necessarily or exactly 
conforms to the particu la r axiomatizations, or arch itectural organisations, which 
he describes. Tha t is, von Neumann does not c la im  that h is so lution to Pv 
is, in  any sense, unique; rather, h is demonstration must be regarded on ly as 
a proof of the principle that a solution is possible at a ll, and thus as leaving 
open the poss ib ility  of some valid, s tr ic t ly  reductionist (A-system atic), theory of 
the b io log ica l world— even if  its  detailed mechanisms are found to be different, 
perhaps even rad ica lly  different, from  von Neum ann’s example.
4.2.3 A lan Turing: th e  A ^-system
Von Neum ann’s attem pted solution to Pv was heavily, and exp lic itly , influenced 
by Turing ’s form ulation and analysis of a certain formalised class o f “computing 
machines” (Turing 1936). However, the relationsh ip between these analyses of 
von Neumann and Turing can be easily m isunderstood, and w ill therefore require 
careful and extended exam ination.
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Turing ’s analysis had the follow ing general structure. H e first introduced a 
basic form alization of the notion of a computing machine. In m y terms, th is cor­
responds to the defin ition of a (more or less) specific A-system . I shall d istinguish 
references to th is w ith  a subscript T , thus: Ay-system , Ay-m ach ine etc .2
One of Turing ’s m ajor results was that, in  a perfectly  defin ite sense, certain 
particu la r Ay-m achines can be so configured that they can simulate the (compu­
tational) operations o f any Ay-m ach ine— and can thus, in  a defin ite sense, realise 
the same “com putation” as any Ay-machine.
Turing called any Ay-m ach ine having th is property a universal (computing) 
machine. Von Neumann referred to th is same property as “log ica l un ive rsa lity” 
(von Neumann 1966b, p. 92). It should be clear that th is concept (though not, of 
course, any particu la r automaton) can be generalised across any A-system  which 
supports some notion of “computing automaton” , in  the follow ing way. C a ll any 
“com putation” which can be carried out by some A-m ach ine an A-computation; 
then, a “universal log ical (computational) m achine” , which I shall term  sim p ly  
a ULM, is a single A-m achine which, when su itab ly  “configured” , can carry out 
any A-com putation.
Note carefully that (so far, at least), there is no cla im  about any re lationsh ip 
which m ight exist between A-com putations (and thus U L M s)  in  different A - 
systems. The U L M  concept is well defined on ly re lative to a pa rticu la r A-system  
(and especially the particu la r notion of A -com putation  incorporated in  that A - 
system).
We m ay restate Turing ’s c la im  then as a specific c la im  for the existence of 
at least one U L M  w ith in  the Ay-system — i.e. the existence of a U L M t -3 A n  
essential concept in  Tu ring ’s form ulation of his U L M y  is that its operations are 
“programmed” by a lis t of “instructions” and that, as long as a fa ir ly  sm all 
basis set of instructions are supported, it  is possible to com plete ly describe the 
com putational behaviour of an a rb itra ry  Ay-m ach ine in  terms of a fin ite  sequence 
of such instructions. That is, a U L M y  is made to sim ulate the computations of
2W hat I  term  an A t-m achine is, of course, what is more commonly referred to  as a Turing 
Machine (e.g. Minsky 1967; Lewis & Papadim itriou 1981).
3Again, what I call a ULMy is now m ost commonly referred to  as a Universal Turing 
Machine  (Minsky 1967; Lewis & Papadim itriou 1981).
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any arb itra ry  Ay-m ach ine sim ply by provid ing it  w ith  an appropriate ly coded 
description of that machine.
Note that, in  itself, Turing ’s c la im  for the existence of at least one U L M y  is 
entire ly neutra l as to whether U L M ’s can or do exist in  any other A-system , or, 
more generally, whether “computing machines” in  general share any interesting 
properties across different A-systems. These are im portan t issues, which were 
central to the problem  which Turing was attem pting to solve. They w ill be taken 
up again in  due course. For the moment, however, I note s im p ly  that although 
von Neumann was, in  some sense, insp ired by Tu ring ’s work on the Ay-system , 
his problem was entire ly different from  Turing ’s problem; and, as a result, these 
issues prove to be more or less irrelevant to von Neum ann ’s work.
4.2.4 On “U niversal” C onstruction
Turing form ulated the Ay-m achines specifica lly as computing machines; the 
things which they can m anipu late or operate upon are not at a ll the same kinds 
of things as they are made of. No Ay-m ach ine can m ean ingfu lly  be said to con­
struct other Ay-m achine(s)— there are no such things as Ay-constructors or, more 
particu larly , Ay-reproducers.
Von Neum ann’s basic idea was to generalise Tu ring ’s analysis by considering 
abstract machines which could operate on, or m anipulate, things of the “same 
sort” as those of which they are themselves constructed. He saw that, by gen­
eralising Turing ’s analysis in  th is way, it  would be possible to solve Pv in  a very 
definite, and rather elegant, way.
In fact, von Neumann considered a number of d istin ct A-systems, which are 
not “equivalent” in  any general way, and which were not always com plete ly for­
malised in  any case. However, a key thread runn ing throughout a ll th is work was 
to introduce something roughly analogous to the general concept of a U L M , but 
defined re lative to some notion of “construction” rather than “com putation” .
Von Neum ann’s new concept refers to a pa rticu la r k in d  of A-m achine which 
he called a universal constructor; I shall refer to th is as a “universal constructing 
machine” , or UCM.
The analogy between the U L M  and U C M  concepts is precisely as follows.
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L ike  a U L M , the behaviour of a U C M  can be “programmed” , in  a rather general 
way, v ia  a lis t of “instructions” . In particu lar, these instructions m ay provide, 
in  a su itab ly  encoded form , a description o f some A-machine; and in  tha t case, 
the effect of “programm ing” the U C M  w ith  that description w ill be to cause it  
to construct the described A-m achine (assuming some su itable “environm ental” 
conditions: I shall have more to say about th is requirement later).
Thus, just as a U L M  can “simulate the com putation o f” any A -m ach ine (when 
once furnished w ith  a description of it), so a U C M  should be able to “construct” 
any A-m achine (again, when once furnished w ith  a description of it , and, of 
course, always working w ith in  a particu la r ax iom atiza tion  of “A-m achine” , which 
is to say a particu la r A-system).
We m ay tr iv ia lly  note that since there do not exist any Ay-constructors at 
all, there certa in ly does not exist a U C M y , i.e. a U C M  w ith in  the Ay-system .
I emphasise strongly here that it  was precisely, and solely, the spanning of 
all A-machines in a particular A-system  that m andated Turing ’s o rig ina l usage 
of the word “universal” (in “universal m achine” , or U L M y  in  m y terms), and 
which therefore also mandated von Neum ann’s analogous usage (in  “universal 
constructor” , or U C M  in  m y terms). The typ ica l operations o f the two kinds 
of machine (computation and construction, respectively) are, o f course, quite 
different. Th is  is an im portant point, which I shall elaborate.
In Turing ’s orig ina l paper (Turing 1936) he argued, inter alia, that there exists 
a U L M y , in  the sense already described— a single Ay-m ach ine which can sim ulate 
(the computations of) any Ay-machine. Th is  is a technical, form al, result—  
a theorem in  short— which Turing  proved by  actua lly  exh ib iting  an example of 
a specific Ay-m ach ine having th is property. W e shall see that von Neumann 
sought to achieve an essentially analogous, perfectly formal, result for a U C M —
i.e. to prove the existence of such things, at least w ith in  some “reasonable” A - 
system, and to do so by precisely para lle ling  Turing ’s procedure, which is to 
say by actua lly  exh ib iting  one. A t  th is level, the analogy between these two 
developments is very strong and direct, and the word “universal” has a clearly 
related im p lica tion  in  both  “U C M ” and “U L M ” w ith in  the ir respective domains.
However, a problem  arises because the “universal” in  “U L M ” actua lly  adm its 
of three (or perhaps even five, depending how they are counted) quite d istinctive
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interpretations or connotations— only one o f wh ich is the one described above as 
being leg itim ate ly  preserved in  von Neum ann’s intended analogy. If one m istak­
enly supposes that any of the other connotations should be preserved (as well 
as, or instead of, the correct one) then the result can be serious confusion, if  not 
outright error.
4.2 .4.1 U niversal th e  First
The first connotation of “universal” in  U L M , the one already described, and which 
is correctly preserved in  von Neum ann’s analogy, refers s im p ly  to a re lationsh ip 
between the U L M  and all A-machines within its own A-system. In m y view  th is 
was the prim ary, i f  not the only, connotation which Turing  had in  m ind  when he 
first introduced the term  “universal machine” . In any case, I suggest that th is 
is the only connotation which von Neumann properly  intended should carry over 
to the interpretation of U C M , as already described .4
4.2.4.2 U niversal th e  Second
The second interpretation of “universal”— and the first which it  would be erro­
neous to im pute to the U C M — revolves around the idea that what makes a U L M  
“universal” is not just that there exists some re lationsh ip between it  and some 
complete set of A-machines, but that there exists a very particular re lationsh ip—  
namely that of being able, when su itab ly  programmed, to carry out the same 
A-computations. To put it  another way, the “un ive rsa lity ” of the U L M  is seen 
to be inseparably bound up w ith  the idea of “com putation” , so that it  is not so 
much a m atter of spanning a set of (A-)machines, but rather to be specifica lly 
about spanning a set of (A-)computations.
Now th is is not an en tire ly  unreasonable interpretation  of “universal”— as long 
as we restrict attention to U L M ’s; because, in  that case, it  is entire ly com patib le 
w ith  the orig inal interpretation. However, in  contrast to that orig ina l interpreta­
tion, the application  of th is second interpretation in  the case of a U  C M  is deeply
4A further, fine, distinction could be made here between the idea of a ULM spanning all A- 
machinee, and its spanning just those which can be regarded as realising some A-com putation. 
This distinction does not arise in the A i-system , because all Ay-machines are regarded as 
realising some Ay-com putation. Fortunately (!) this is not a significant issue insofar as the 
analogy w ith the UCM is concerned, so I  shall not pursue it  further.
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prob lem atic and counterintu itive. If we try  to force th is in terpretation , we come 
up w ith  something vaguely like  the following: given any (A-)com putation, a U C M  
can, when su itab ly  programmed, construct an a A-m achine which could, in  turn, 
carry out that (A-)com putation.
A t  first sight, th is is such an abstruse view of how the U L M  and U C M  m ight 
be related that one is inc lined to say that it  could not possib ly arise. A fte r 
a ll, von Neum ann’s whole po int is to ta lk  about autom ata which can construct 
automata like themselves; whereas, under the in terpretation  of the previous para­
graph, the defin ition of a U C M  would make no reference at a ll to  its a b ility  to 
construct automata “like  itse lf” (i.e. which could, in  the ir turn , also construct fur­
ther autom ata “like” themselves), but would instead ta lk  about the a b ility  of a 
U C M  to construct automata of a different (perhaps very different) k ind— namely, 
“computing” automata.
Nonetheless, precisely th is interpretation has been adopted in  some of the 
literature, as we shall see. To exp la in  how, and perhaps why, th is  arises, it  is first 
useful to d istinguish three variants on the idea, which differ in  exactly  how the 
“universal” set of “computations” , which is to be spanned by the offspring of the 
U C M , is defined:
• In the simplest case, we assume that the A-system , in  which the putative 
U C M  exists, itse lf supports some definite notion of com putation, which is 
to say it  defines some set of A-com putations. W e then require on ly that 
the offspring of the U C M  span th is set. Specifically, we place no a priori 
constraints or requirements on what k ind  of th ing should qua lify  as an A- 
computation.
• In the second case, we require that the set of A-com putations of the A - 
system be such that, in  some well defined sense, for every A j-com pu ta tion  
there must be at least one A-com putation  which is “equivalent” . I shall 
om it any consideration of how such a re lationsh ip m ight be p ractica lly  es­
tablished. G iven that it  can be established, we then require that the off­
spring of the U C M  span some set of A-com putations which is “equivalent” 
to the set of Ay-com putations (this may, or m ay not, be the complete set 
of a ll A-com putations). On th is interpretation, a U C M  is related not to the
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“general” notion of a U L M , but to the specific case of a U L M y  (i.e. a U L M  
in  the Ay-system).
• F in a lly , we m ight require that the set of A -com putations of the A-system  
be such that, in  some well defined sense, for every “com putation” of any 
sort, which can be effectively carried out at a ll, there must be some A - 
com putation which is “equivalent” . Again , I om it any consideration o f how 
th is relationship m ight be p ractica lly  established. G iven  that it  can be 
established, we then require that the offspring of the U C M  span some set 
o f A-com putations which is “equivalent” to the set of a ll effective com­
putations (and again, th is may, or m ay not, be the complete set of a ll 
A-computations).
I refer to a ll three of these (sub-)interpretations of the “universal” in  U C M  
as being “com putational” . In m y view, of course, they are a ll three equally 
erroneous.
The first two of these com putational interpretations o f U C M  could, in  p rin ­
cip le at least, be com pletely formalised in  particu la r A-systems, so that the exis­
tence of a U C M  in  these (somewhat peculiar) senses would, at least, be a m atter 
of fact, which m ight adm it of proof or disproof.
However, the th ird  com putational interpretation relies on the in form al notion 
of what constitutes an “effective com putation” , and w ill always be a m atter of 
opinion or convention rather than fact; there is no poss ib ility  of the existence (or 
otherwise) of a U C M , in  this sense, being decisively established for any A-system .
Having said that, Turing, in  his orig inal paper Turing  (1936), argued (in­
formally, of course) that the Ay-system  already captures everything that could 
“reasonably” be regarded as an effective computation. A s well as in form al ar­
guments to th is effect, Turing  showed that an equivalence could be established 
between the set of Ay-com putations and the set of (A-)com putations of an en­
tire ly  different form alism  proposed by Church. S im ila r equivalences have since 
been demonstrated w ith  respect to a number of other independent formalisations, 
and the idea that the Ay-com putations capture, in  some sense, a ll possible com­
putations, is now referred to as the Church-Turing thesis (e.g. Hofstadter 1979, 
Chapter X V II ) . Due to the necessarily in form al nature of the c la im , it  is a thesis
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not a theorem; nonetheless it  is now w idely regarded as being well founded (e.g. 
M in sky  1967, Chapter 5).
Now if the Church-Turing Thesis is accepted, then the th ird  (computational) 
interpretation of U C M  described above becomes exactly  equivalent to the second. 
Indeed, one m ay say that the on ly reasonable basis for in troducing the second 
com putational interpretation at a ll is on the understanding that the Church- 
Turing thesis holds, because th is im plies that the A r-com pu ta tions provide an 
absolute benchmark of all k inds of computation. I f th is were not the case, then 
it  would appear rather arb itra ry  to single out this set of com putations for special 
significance re lative to the notion of U C M .
M ore generally, it  seems to me that it  is only in  the context of the Church- 
Turing Thesis that a s tr ic t ly  com putational in terp retation  of the “universal” in  
U C M  suggests itse lf at all. The point is that a U L M t  is (by defin ition) capable 
of carry ing out a ll A^-computations; and therefore, under the conditions of the 
Church-Turing Thesis, a U L M 7- is, in  fact, capable of carry ing out a ll effective 
computations. We should perhaps say that a U L M t  is doubly universal: it  is 
f irs tly  universal w ith  respect to a ll A t-com puta tions (which gave it  its orig ina l 
title); but th is then turns out (at least if  the Church-Turing Thesis is accepted) 
to mean that it  is universal w ith  respect to the com putations of any effective 
computing system whatsoever, not “ju st” those of the A r-system . To make th is 
completely clear, we should perhaps refer to a U U L M , or U 2LM ; but, since there 
is apparently no conflict between these two d istinct a ttribu tions of universal (i.e. 
since the Church-Turing Thesis asserts that they are synonymous) it  has become 
conventional not to bother to d istinguish them; the single “U ” in  U L M t  (i.e. in  
“universal Turing machine” ) is, today, flex ib ly  interpreted in  either or both of 
these two senses, as the context m ay demand, w ithout any further comment. I 
suggest that it  is only because these two connotations o f “universal” in  U L M t  
are not norm ally  distinguished, that a s tr ic tly  com putational interpretation  of 
“universal construction” , or U C M ,  (i.e. any of the three such interpretations I 
have d istinguished above) is typ ica lly  entertained at all.
I stated that com putational interpretation(s) of U C M  have appeared in  the 
literature. It is not always possible to isolate exactly  which o f the three identified 
sub-cases are intended, though th is is not c r it ica l for m y purposes, since, as
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already noted, I consider them  a ll to  be m istaken. In any case, the most exp lic it
(and, to the best of m y knowledge, the earliest) advocate of a com putational view
of the U C M  concept is E .F . Codd, and his proposal is quite precise, corresponding
exactly to what I identified above as the second com putational interpretation:
The notion of construction universality which we are about to formalize 
demands of a space the existence of configurations w ith the ability to con­
struct a rich enough set of computers such that w ith this set any Turing- 
computable partial function on a Turing domain can be computed in  the 
space.
Codd (1968, p. 13)
Codd ’s interpretation of U C M  has been exp lic it ly  repeated by Herm an (1973). 
Langton (1984) does not exp lic it ly  endorse Codd ’s in terp retation  as such, but does 
equate Codd ’s concept w ith  von Neum ann’s, which I consider to be m istaken.
I should adm it that it  w ill tu rn  out that the position, typ ified  here by Codd, 
is not quite as perverse as I have painted it. Codd had special reasons for his 
particu la r approach ,5 and, even aside from  these, it  will u lt im a te ly  prove useful 
to say something about the “com putational” powers of A-constructors and/or 
the ir offspring.
However, m y cla im  is that such powers should form  no part o f the essential 
definition of the U C M  concept; in  particu lar, they seem to me to be no part of 
von Neum ann’s analogy between the U L M  and the U C M . W h ile  Codd ’s defin ition 
cannot, of course, be said to be “wrong” , it  is ce rta in ly  different, in  a substantive 
way, from  von Neum ann’s; more seriously, we shall see that adopting such an 
interpretation would fa ta lly  underm ine von Neum ann’s proposed solution to Pv. 
Since Codd does not say any of this, and since his work is otherw ise e xp lic it ly  
based on that of von Neumann (Codd 1968, Introduction), his subsequent devel­
opment is poten tia lly  m isleading. Th is  is a ll the more unfortunate as Codd did 
achieve certain significant new theoretical results.
To put th is in  a s ligh tly  different way, note tha t Turing  and, equivalently, 
Church, proposed the ir thesis for a very definite reason. They were each at­
tem pting to solve the so-called Entscheidungsproblem, the decision problem  of 
(meta-)mathematics, o rig ina lly  form ulated by H ilb e rt .6 The statement o f th is
5He was in ter alia interested in the uses of “real” cellular au tom ata as massively parallel 
computers.
6For a concise discussion see, for example, (Hodges 1983, pp. 91-94).
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problem  exp lic it ly  referred to the (informal) notion o f a “defin ite m ethod” , or an 
“effective procedure” as it  is now called; thus Turing ’s work could conceivably be 
regarded as a solution of th is problem  only i f  the Church-Turing thesis were ac­
cepted. The thesis was thus absolutely central and essential to Tu ring ’s analysis. 
Von Neum ann’s problem, on the other hand (at least in  m y form u lation  as Pv), 
makes no reference whatsoever to computation, “effective” or otherwise; so the 
Church-Turing thesis can have no essential role to  p lay  in  its solution.
4.2 .4 .3  U niversal th e  Third
I now come to the th ird  (and final) d istinct in terpretation  o f “un iversal” (in 
U C M ). Th is  again involves the Church-Turing thesis, but in  a way which is quite 
different from  the s tr ic t ly  com putational interpretations just outlined.
Roughly speaking, the Church-Turing thesis says that the computations of 
which A j-m ach ines are capable are universal w ith  respect to all com putational 
systems— regardless, for example, of the ir “m ateria l” structure. W e could there­
fore attem pt to, as it  were, carry over th is whole thesis, through von Neum ann’s 
analogy, to say something, not about computational systems in  general, but con­
structional systems in  general.
Now it  is clear that von Neum ann must indeed have had something at least 
vaguely of th is nature in  m ind; for he hoped to establish the absence of paradox in  
the growth of com plexity in  the biological world, and th is part o f his argument can 
go through on ly if, in  some sense, h is results transcend the specific form alism  or 
axiom atisation in  which they are o rig ina lly  derived. O n  the other hand, the degree 
of generality actua lly  required here is very weak. Von Neum ann ’s on ly  c la im  was 
that there is no necessary contradiction between the growth of com plex ity  in  
the b io log ica l world, and the poss ib ility  of some s tr ic t ly  reduction ist exp lanation 
of that world. Th is  c la im  can be justified  provided on ly tha t von Neumann 
can exh ib it the poss ib ility  of such growth of com plex ity  in  some form alisation of 
automata theory: it  is not required that th is form alisation be pa rticu la r ly  fa ith fu l 
or accurate as a representation of physica l or b io log ica l reality.
M ore specifically: we shall see that von Neum ann introduced the notion of 
a U C M  as an element of h is argument for the poss ib ility  of growth in  automa­
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ton complexity, but that, in  considering how his results related to  the b io log ica l 
world, von Neumann im p lic it ly  denied that U C M ’s per se p lay  a role in  b io log ica l 
organisms (von Neumann 1951, p. 318), thus leaving entire ly open the question of 
whether “b io log ica l U C M ’s” (however they m ight be defined) are even possible, 
in  princip le.
Thus, von Neumann never attempted to form ulate an exp lic it analog to the 
Church-Turing Thesis, incorporating the notion of construction (in  place of com­
putation); and insofar as he touched on the issue at a ll, i t  was in  terms very 
much weaker than the Church-Turing Thesis. I therefore take the view  that, 
although there is a strong and genuine analogy between von Neum ann’s work 
and Turing ’s, th is has not been (and perhaps cannot be) extended to inc lude any 
reasonable analog of the Church-Turing Thesis. To put it  another way, whereas 
Turing cla im ed that the set of a ll A r-m ach ines (and thus any single U T M y )  was 
“universal” w ith  regard to a ll effective computations, of any A-system , there is no 
analogous c la im  relative to the constructional powers of the set of a ll A-machines 
(or, equivalently, any single U C M )  in  any pa rticu la r A -system  (whether described 
by von Neumann or otherwise).
The point o f this discussion is that the analogy between the U T M  and U C M  
concepts is so strong that, u n til the issue is considered exp lic itly , one can be easily 
lu lled  in to  supposing that there is some obvious generalisation o f the Church- 
Turing thesis; which would im ply, in  turn, that a U C M , in  any “sufficiently 
powerful” A-system , captures something im portant about the powers o f all au­
tomata, in  all form al frameworks, and, by im p lica tion , about the powers of a ll 
“real” (physical) automata. It is im portant to emphasise tha t von Neumann h im ­
self never asserted, much less argued for, any such thesis; and that, for what it  is 
worth, it  seems un like ly  (to me) that such a thesis could be defended. Conversely, 
to assume that some such thesis holds w ill be confusing at the very least, and also 
liab le  to lead to actual error in  interpreting the im p lica tions of von Neum ann’s 
work.
Adm itted ly , as far as I am  aware, no worker has ever explicitly argued for such 
a generalisation of the Church-Turing thesis— but there are some ind ications of 
its  having been at least im p lic it ly  assumed.
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Thus, Thatcher (1970, pp. 153, 186) makes passing reference to such a pos­
s ib ility , though he does not explore it  in  any detail. M ore substantively, while 
T ip le r (1981; 1982) does not exp lic it ly  m ention the Church-Turing thesis, he 
does interpret von Neum ann’s work as having extrem ely w ide-ranging app licab il­
ity, well outside anything actua lly  mentioned by von Neum ann himself. In brief, 
T ip le r cites von Neumann as establishing that a “real” , physical, U C M , which 
can construct any physica l object or device whatsoever (given an appropriate de­
scription, sufficient raw m aterials, energy, and, presumably, tim e), can be bu ilt. 
It seems to me that such a c la im  must im p lic it ly  re ly  inter alia on something 
like  a generalised Church-Turing Thesis; it  is, in  any case, d ire c tly  contrary to 
von Neum ann’s comment, in  discussing the general nature o f h is theory, that 
“A n y  result one m ight reach in  th is manner w ill depend quite essentially on how 
one has chosen to define the elementary parts” (von Neum ann 1966a, p. 70).7
4.2.4.4 And So?
To conclude th is discussion o f “universal” construction: von Neum ann introduced 
the notion of a U C M , by analogy w ith  Turing ’s U L M r ,  as a particu la r k ind  of 
A-m achine which could, when su itab ly  programmed, construct any A-machine. 
Th is  notion only becomes precise in  the context of a pa rticu la r ax iom atization  of 
A-machines, i.e. a pa rticu la r A-system  (and A-set); but we can already state that 
the U C M  concept, as orig ina lly  formulated by von Neumann, does not inherently 
involve any comment about the “com putational” powers e ither of itse lf or of 
its  offspring, and does not involve or im p ly  any “na tu ra l” generalisation of the 
Church-Turing Thesis.
7I claim, incidentally, th a t T ipler’s interpretation of von N eum ann’s work can separately be 
severely criticised on a  variety of other grounds. Some of these should subsequently become 
apparent; bu t to  a ttem pt a  comprehensive critique of T ipler’s work a t this point would be a 
confusing distraction.
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4.2.5 von N eu m an n ’s Solution
4.2.5.1 T he K inem atic M odel
A  complete discussion of automata can be obtained only by . . .  considering 
automata which can have outputs something like themselves. Now, one has 
to be careful what one means by this. There is no question of producing 
matter out of nothing. Rather, one imagines automata which can modify 
objects similar to themselves, or effect syntheses by picking up parts and 
putting them together, or take synthesized entities apart. In order to 
discuss these things, one has to imagine a formal set-up like this. Draw 
up a list of unambiguously defined elementary parts. Imagine that there 
is a practically unlimited supply of these parts floating around in a large 
container. One can then imagine an automaton functioning in  the following 
manner: It also is floating around in this medium; its essential activity is 
to pick up parts and put them together, or, i f  aggregates of parts are found, 
to take them apart.
von Neumann (1966a, p. 75)
A s previously mentioned, Von Neum ann’s in it ia l, in form al, attem pted solu­
tion  to Pv was presented orig ina lly  in  a series of lectures given to a sm all audience 
at the Princeton  Institute for Advanced Studies, in  June 1948; no form al record of 
these lectures survives, but Burks reconstructed m uch of the detailed exposition 
from  notes and memories of his audience (Burks 1966d, p. 81). Von Neum ann 
h im se lf recounted the ideas, though in  somewhat less deta il, at the H ixon  sym ­
posium  in  September 1948 (von Neumann 1951), and during h is lectures at the 
Un ivers ity  of Illino is in  December of the follow ing year (von Neumann 1966a). 
These presentations were a ll based on what came to be called his kinematic model.
Th is  model involved something of the order of 8-15 d istinct, p rim itive , A - 
parts, v isualised as m echanical components freely floating in  a two or three 
dimensional Euclidean space. These included basic structura l elements ( “r ig id  
members” or “girders” ), effectors ( “muscles” , “fusing” and “cu tting” organs), 
and elements to realise general purpose signal processing ( “stim ulus” , “co inci­
dence” , and “inh ib ito ry ” organs). Sensors could be ind ire c tly  realised by certa in 
configurations of the signal processing elements. Rough ly  speaking, any more or 
less arb itrary, fin ite, aggregation of these p r im it ive  parts, m echan ica lly  attached 
to each other, would then qualify as an A-m achine in  th is system.
In th is basic m odel von Neum ann intended to disregard a ll the detailed prob­
lems of mechanics proper— force, acceleration, energy etc.— and restrict attention
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to essentially geometrical-kinematic questions; which is w hy Burks introduced the 
term  kinematic to identify  th is k ind  of model (Bu rks 1966d, p. 82).
The k inem atic model was never formalised in  detail; indeed, to do so would 
involve overcoming quite form idable obstacles. However, even in  a very in form al 
presentation, the model does provide an in tu it ive  p ic tu re  supporting the argu­
ments von Neumann wished to present. I shall more or less fo llow  von Neum ann 
in  this. Thus, the follow ing discussion of von Neum ann ’s so lution to Pv is a ctua lly  
phrased in  com pletely abstract terms, w ith  no exp lic it reliance on the k inem atic 
(or any other) model; but it  m ay nonetheless help the reader’s in tu it ive  under­
standing to imagine, in  the first place at least, tha t its  terms are interpreted 
re lative to the k inem atic model.
A lso  follow ing von Neumann (though perhaps rather more so than he), I adopt 
a certain amount of m athem atica l, or quasi-mathematical, notation here. Th is  
should not be taken too seriously; it  is essentially a shorthand device, intended 
on ly  to render certain elements of the argument as c learly  and concisely as pos­
sible. There is no question that I provide anyth ing which could be regarded as a 
proof, in  a formal, m athem atica l, sense— the notation  notw ithstanding.
4.2 .5 .2  Som e N otation
Denote the ( “universal” ) set of a ll A-machines in  some particu la r A-system  by 
Mu.
In general, the “com bination” or “com position” o f A-machines (p rim itive  A - 
parts, or otherwise) w ill be denoted by the sym bol ®. Tha t is, i f  m i and m 2 
are two A-machines, then (m i 0  m 2) w ill denote a single A-m achine consisting 
of m i and m 2 “attached” to each other. For the purposes of th is outline, it  
w ill be assumed that such compositions are always well-defined, in  the sense 
that, for arb itra ry  m i, m 2 , there w ill exist some unique m 3 € Mu such that 
(m i ® m 2) =  m 3. The precise nature or mechanism of such “attachments” m ight, 
in  general, be ambiguous; but I shall assume that that extra com plication  can be 
overcome in  any particu la r A-system.
Constructional processes in  the A-system  w ill be denoted by the sym bol 
that is, i f  an A-m achine m i constructs another A-m achine m 2 , separate from  
itself, then th is w ill be w ritten  m i m 2. Thus, in  particu lar, i f  some m  G Mu
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is an A-reproducer, it  must be the case that, under “su itab le” circumstances, 
m  m.
We require that the A-system  should support the existence of a certa in  special 
class of A-machine, which can function as a “data storage” devices. These w ill 
be termed A-tapes. The set of a ll A-tapes w ill be denoted T. T  w ill, of course, 
be a proper subset o f Mu. It is an essential, i f  im p lic it , property of A-tapes that 
they are, in  some sense, static; an A-tape m ay po ten tia lly  be transformed into  
another, different, A -tape (or, i f  one prefers, the “content” of a “single” A-tape 
m ay be altered to a different “value” ), but only through the action o f some other, 
attached, A-m achine (which is not, in  turn, an A-tape).
Suppose that a particu la r U C M , denoted tto, can be exh ib ited  in  th is A-system  
(i.e. uo G Mu), where “programm ing” of u0 consists in  the com position o f u0 w ith  
some A-tape. The A-tape is thus interpreted as encoding a form al description 
of some A-machine, in  some suitable manner ( “understood” by u0). A n y  A -tape
which va lid ly  encodes a description of some A-m ach ine (relative to u0) w ill be
called an A-descriptor. We require (from our assertion that « 0  is a U C M )  that 
V  m  G Mu there must exist at least one element o f T  wh ich va lid ly  describes 
m. Thus we can define a function, denoted d() (read: “the A -descrip tor o f” ) as 
follows:
d : Mu —> T
m  1—► d(m) s.t. ( « 0  © d(m)) m
That is, uo composed w ith  (any) d(m) w ill construct (an instance of) m.
We assume that the behaviour of u0 is such that, when any (u ® d(m)) com­
pletes its constructional process, it  w ill be essentially unchanged (w ill revert to 
its  orig ina l “state” ); which is to say that it  w ill then proceed to construct another 
instance of m , and so on .8
The set of A-descriptors is clearly a subset of the set of A-tapes, T ; it  may, or 
m ay not, be a proper subset.9 In fact, we do not (for the moment) require any
8I note, in passing th a t, on the contrary, von Neumann originally assumed th a t the attached 
A-descriptor would be “consumed” or destroyed when processed by a UCM. However, it turns 
out th a t this has no essential significance; it also complicates the subsequent development, and 
obscures the biological interpretation of von N eum ann’s ideas. Indeed, von Neumann himself 
subsequently adopted (in his cellular model) the convention I have adopted here from  the first.
9T hat is, it is not clear whether, in the definition given of d(), T  should be technically 
regarded as its range, or merely a sufficiently inclusive targe t
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one-to-one correspondence (for example) between the A-descriptors and A-tapes; 
which is to say that while every A-descriptor w ill be an A-tape, the converse w ill 
not necessarily hold. In particu lar, some A-tapes m ay not va lid ly  describe any 
A-machine. The composition of such an A -tape w ith  uq is s t i l l well-defined (i.e. 
is some particu la r A-machine) of course, but we say noth ing in  pa rticu la r about 
the behaviour of such a composition.
4.2 .5 .3  T he Core A rgum ent
The U C M  u0 is, of course, introduced as a too l for the so lution of Pv; but, 
to anticipate somewhat, it  w ill tu rn  out that u0 does not (d irectly) solve Pv. 
Instead, we shall see that the existence of uo “a lm ost” solves it, or, at least, it  
solves certain aspects of it. Nonetheless, th is “near” so lution is the very heart 
of von Neum ann’s argument. Its deficiencies are re la tive ly  m inor and can, as 
von Neumann demonstrated, be re la tive ly  easily corrected; but these corrections 
w ill make no sense at a ll u n til the basic underly ing argument— the “near” so lution 
of Pv— is clearly understood. It is the underly ing argument that w ill be elaborated 
in  th is section.
Reca ll that, by defin ition, uo can construct any A-machine; therefore, it  can 
construct (an instance of) uo itself, when once provided w ith  the relevant A - 
descriptor, namely d(uo). Thus, it  seems that any U C M  should more or less 
d irectly  y ie ld  an A-reproducer, s im p ly  by program m ing it  w ith  its  own descrip­
tion. I hasten to add that the logic here is actua lly  m istaken, and it  is as a 
consequence of th is that u0 w ill on ly “almost” solve Pv; but we shall ignore th is 
for the tim e being.
Now th is result (that u0 d irectly  im plies the existence of a pa rticu la r A - 
reproducer) is, in itself, almost entire ly w ithout interest: for the po int is not 
to exh ib it self-reproduction as such, but rather to exh ib it the poss ib ility  of a 
spontaneous growth in  A -com p lex ity  (by D arw in ian  means). The existence of 
at least one design for an A-reproducer is certa in ly  a necessary precond ition for 
any solution of th is problem; but what we really need is the existence of a set 
of d istinct A-reproducers, spanning a diverse (preferably “in fin ite” ) range of A - 
complexity; which set must also be connected under some reasonable defin ition
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of A -m utation . uo on its own does not y ie ld  th is . 10
However, it  turns out (and th is is one of von Neum ann ’s crucia l insights) that 
the argument for u0 g iv ing rise to a single A-reproducer could ( if  it  were valid) 
be im m ediate ly  extended, in  the follow ing manner.
Let X  be the set of a ll A-machines having the property that any x € X  can 
be composed w ith  « 0  w ithout “interfering” w ith  the basic operation o f the latter. 
That is, given any A-m achine of the form  (ito © x ), it  w ill s t ill be possible to 
compose th is w ith  any A-descriptor and the effect w ill be that the composite A - 
machine w ill s t il l be able to construct the described A-machine; more concisely, 
we assume, or require, X  to be such that:
V m G  Mu,
\ / x e x ,
((u0 © x) © d(m)) m
A ny  composite A-m achine (u0 © x ) may, of course, be capable of doing other 
things as well. In particu lar, we assume that it  can do essentia lly any o f the things 
which the “isolated” A-m achine x was able to do. T h is  is a roundabout way of 
saying that we assume that the A -com p lex ity  of any composite A-m achine o f the 
form  (u0 © z) is at least as great as either u0 or x taken separately (whichever of 
the la tte r two A-com plexities is the greater).
We make one further, critica l, assumption about the set X: we require that it 
include elements spanning a “w ide” (preferably “in fin ite” ) range of A-com plexity. 
Th is is, strictly , a new and independent assumption. However, we m ay hope that 
it  w ill not be too d ifficu lt to satisfy, assuming that the set Mu satisfied such a 
condition in  the first place— which presum ably it  w ill, provided we choose our 
axiom atisation “reasonably” . T ha t is, while we do not expect to have X  = Mu 
as such, we can reasonably suppose that if  Mu itse lf offers a very large set of 
A-machines having a very w ide variety of behaviours (A-com p lex ity) then there 
should “surely” be a subset, s t ill spanning a wide variety o f behaviours, but whose 
elements do not interfere w ith  the behaviour of u0.
10To pu t the same point conversely: if we were merely interested in self-reproduction “as 
a problem in itself” (of course, we are not!) then any A-reproducer a t all would do, and the 
introduction of uo would be unm otivated, if not positively counterproductive; it is plausible (I 
m ight even say likely) th a t there are far easier ways to design a single A-reproducer than  by 
trying to  base it on anything as powerful as a UCM!
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Now, by hypothesis, every A-m achine of the form  (uo © x) can still, by  being 
su itab ly  programmed, construct any arb itra ry  A-m achine. Tha t is to say, we have 
gone from  having a single U C M  u0, to having a whole fam ily  or set o f “related” 
U C M s  ( “related” in  the sense of having the same “basic” U C M , u0, embedded 
w ith in  them— which means, inter alia, that they a ll process the same description 
language, or are a ll com patib le w ith  the same set of A-descriptors). I shall denote 
th is set o f related U C M s  by U:
U =  {(u0 © ®)|x € X }
As a special case I stipu late that uq itse lf is also a member of U.
Now the elements of U are not themselves A-reproducers; but since every 
element is a U C M  in  its own right then, i f  the o rig ina l argument applied to u0 
were va lid  (and we shall return to this issue shortly), every element of U im plies 
or gives rise to a d istinct A-reproducer m erely by program m ing it  w ith  its own 
description.
Thus, corresponding to every x € X  there exists a (putative) A-reproducer 
which effectively contains a: as a (functional) subsystem (and is therefore, pre­
sumably, to be considered at least as A-com plex as a;). W h ich  is to im p ly  that 
the existence of u0 does not m erely y ie ld  a single (putative) A-reproducer; in ­
stead, w ith  the addition of some more or less innocuous add itiona l assumptions 
(i.e. those re lating to the existence and properties o f the A-machines m aking up 
the set X )  uo im plies the existence of a whole set o f A-reproducers, spanning the 
requisite range of A-com plexities.
W ith  th is observation we are now very close to a so lution of Pv. B u t a 
question s t il l remains as to the relationships between these A-reproducers un­
der A-m utation: that is, have we any basis for c la im ing  tha t th is set of A - 
reproducers, anchored on u0, w ill be connected under any p lausib le interpretation 
of A-m utation?
W ell, note that any of these A-reproducers can be effectively transformed into 
any other s im p ly  by appropriate change(s) to the A-tape. In more detail, i f  we 
regard A -m uta tion  as inc lud ing the poss ib ility  of a spontaneous change in  the 
A-tape, changing it  from  being an A-descriptor of any one A-reproducer (based 
on some u\ €  U) to being an A-descriptor of some other A-reproducer (based
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on some u2 é  U), then the future offspring of the affected A-reproducer w ill 
incorporate (instances of) « 2  instead of u i,  and w ill then reproduce as such. A s 
a general princip le, it  would seem that any A -m uta tion  to the A -tape which d id  
not affect the construction of the embedded (instance of) uo in  the offspring (i.e. 
any A -m uta tion  not affecting the d(u0) “section” o f the A-descriptor) would be 
at least a candidate for this. So it  seems at least “p lausib le” , that the set of 
A-reproducers, anchored on ito, m ight indeed be connected under some re la tive ly  
sim ple notion of A -m utation  applied to the A-tapes.
S trictly , it  must be carefu lly recognised that th is last c la im  does involve some 
assumption about the encoding of A-m achine descriptions which is “understood” 
by the particu la r U C M , uq (and thus by a ll the U C M s  in  U). So far, I have said 
that, for every A-machine, there exists at least one A-descrip tor which describes 
it  (relative to ito); hut I have not said how “dense” th is set of A-descriptors 
is w ith in  the set o f a ll A-tapes; nor, more particu la rly , have I said how dense 
is the subset of A-descriptors which va lid ly  describe the elements of the set of 
A-reproducers anchored on Uq. Specifically, one can im agine encodings which 
would be very “sparse” — i.e. such that “m ost” A-tapes are not A-descriptors 
o f any such A-reproducer, and, therefore, such that an A -m uta tion  o f an A - 
descriptor, defined as affecting on ly a single A -part, would be un like ly  to  y ie ld  
an A-descriptor of any other A-reproducer, but would rather y ie ld  some k ind  of 
more or less “nonsensical” A-tape. However, one can equa lly  imagine encodings 
which are dense in  th is same sense. For the tim e being at least, we are thus free 
to assume, or stipulate, that the encoding in  use is of just th is sort. L ike  a ll our 
other assumptions (pre-em inently the existence o f uo itse lf) th is can u ltim ate ly  
be defended only by showing that it  can be satisfied in  some particu la r A-system .
A t  th is point then we have, based essentially on the assumed existence o f a 
U C M  « 0 , a tentative schema for the solution of Pv. It must be emphasised that 
th is schema depends c r it ica lly  on the construction un ive rsa lity  of u q . It would not, 
for example, be possible to formulate a s im ila r schema based on any a rb itra ry  A - 
reproducer, of unspecified in terna l structure— for such an a rb itra ry  A-reproducer 
could not generalise to a set of A-reproducers of essentia lly un lim ited  (w ith in  
the scope of the A-system  itse lf) A-complexities; nor could such an a rb itra ry  A - 
reproducer offer any system atic form  of A -m uta tion  which could be expected to
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connect it  w ith  other A-reproducers . 11
It is thus clear, once again, that the problem  Pv is u tte r ly  different from  the 
(pseudo-)problem of self-reproduction “in  itse lf” ; for whereas the U C M  concept is 
seen (for the tim e being at least) as central to the so lution of Pv, its  in troduction  
would be gratuitous, i f  not un inte llig ib le , i f  one thought the prob lem  at hand 
were m erely that of self-reproduction.
Th is  completes the presentation o f von Neum ann’s core argument; we must 
now tu rn  to crit ic ism  and elaboration of it.
4.2 .5 .4  A M inor B lem ish(?)
I pause to identify  and correct a log ica l error in  the core argument thus far 
presented. I should emphasise that von Neumann h im se lf presented his theory 
on ly in  its  final, corrected, form. I have chosen to present it  first in  a (slightly) 
m istaken form  because I th in k  th is can help to c la rify  the re lative im portance 
and significance of the various elements of the argument.
I refer to the error m erely as a “m inor b lem ish” because an essentia lly m inor 
m odification  of the argument can correct it; but I do not mean by th is to im p ly  
that it  was “easy” to correct in the first instance. Even though the required 
m odification u ltim ate ly  proves to be m inor, it  arguably required a remarkable 
insight on von Neum ann’s part to see that a correction was possible at a ll, never 
m ind  actua lly  form ulating such a correction. I adm it a ll this. B u t I want to 
emphasise that, in  m y view, von Neum ann’s central achievement is a lready con­
tained in  what I have called the core argument— compared to which the technical 
correction introduced in  th is section, though s tr ic t ly  necessary of course, is a 
very m inor m atter indeed. I point th is out because at least some commentators 
seem to have supposed, on the contrary, that the mere “tr ic k ” to be introduced
u This is perhaps a more subtle point th an  can be properly done justice to  here. The critical 
thing is th a t by thinking of A -m utation as occurring in the space of A-descriptors—which 
involves an essentially arbitrary  encoding of the A-machines—we can quite reasonably require 
th a t the encoding be designed to  be ju st such th a t the images (A-descriptors) of our putative 
A-reproducers should be as close as we like to  each other in this space, thus (indirectly, via 
construction) yielding the necessary A-m utational connectivity of the A-reproducers themselves. 
But no such assumption of connectivity could be justified if we think of the A -m utations as 
affecting some essentially arbitrary  set of A-reproducers in general, for we then have no basis 
for supposing they are, or can be made to  be, “close” to  each other in any relevant space. See 
the further discussion of this point in section 4.3.2.2 below.
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here was of the essence of von Neum ann’s analysis— see, especially, Langton ’s 
discussion (Langton 1984, pp. 136-137), and, to a lesser extent, A rb ib  (1969b, 
pp. 350-351).
The logical error is this: in  the orig inal development, it  was stated, or as­
sumed, that, given an arb itra ry  U C M  u, then there w ill exist a corresponding 
A-reproducer, consisting s im p ly  of u programmed w ith  its  own A-descriptor— i.e. 
the A-m achine (u © d(u)). T h is  is sim ply false.
W hat we actua lly  have here is:
(u © d(u)) i t
whereas, what we would s tr ic t ly  require for self-reproduction would be some­
th ing like:
(u © d(u)) (u © d(u))
which is clearly not the case.
In words, the A-m achine (u © d(u)) constructs, not another instance o f itself, 
but an instance of the “naked” A-m achine u, w ith  no A -tape attached. Th is  is 
c learly not self-reproduction. Th is  flaw applies, of course, to tio itself, but equally 
to a ll the other elements of the set U. None of them  im p ly  the existence of an 
A-reproducer, in  the manner indicated; which s to say tha t none of the orig inal, 
putative, A-reproducers are actua lly  self-reproducing, and the proposed schema 
for solving Pv fa ils utterly.
Before considering the correction which von Neumann found to overcome this, 
it is worth exploring the d ifficu lty  of a “d irect” approach. Th is  w ill demonstrate 
the cla im , made earlier, that, although the correction u lt im a te ly  proves to be 
m inor, it  is by no means a tr iv ia l m atter to find  it.
Le t us denote by Co the set of A-constructors consisting of our basic U C M , 
uo, composed w ith  the A -descriptor of any A -m achine m  G Mu.
C0 =  {(u0 © d(m))|m € Mu}
O ur earlier, putative, A-reproducer corresponding to uq is one particu la r el­
ement of th is set, namely (tt0 © d(u0)). We now see that th is is, unfortunately 
not an A-reproducer after all. B u t, it  m ight suffice for our argument if  we could
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guarantee, s im ply from  the universal construction property of u0,12 tha t some­
where among the elements o f Co there must always be at least one A-reproducer. 
Th is is to say, we m ight speculate (naïvely, as it  w il l tu rn  out), that even though 
«o composed w ith  its own A-descriptor is not an A-reproducer, th is set Co will 
contain at least one A-reproducer; which is to say at least one fixed point (under 
the action of ~*). Th is  seems not altogether im p lausib le  because, after a ll, we 
regard Co as being rather large and diverse— reca ll that, for every A-m achine 
m G M u, there is some element of Co which constructs it.
So: a “d irect” approach to correcting the earlier error would then consist in  
establishing (from the property of universal construction) that every set of the 
form  Co does include at least one A-reproducer. T ha t such a d irect approach 
would be naïve, at best, is shown by the follow ing considerations . 13
In attem pting th is d irect approach, we are, in  effect, try ing  to directly over­
come the (apparent) paradox of self-reproduction, as o rig ina lly  form ulated by 
von Neumann. Specifically, we can fa ir ly  easily accept the poss ib ility  of some­
th ing like  (u ® d(u)) u, because it  does involve a degradation in  A-com plexity; 
a U C M  without any A-descriptor attached p la in ly  is less A-com plex, in  some 
reasonable sense, than a U C M  with an A-descriptor attached. So the reason that 
our orig ina l proposal for an A-reproducer fails to actua lly  self-reproduce seems 
to be precisely an instance of degenerating (A-)com plexity.
Le t me try  to make th is even more exp lic it. The problem  w ith  (u0 ® d(u0)) is 
that it  constructs just u0 instead of (ti0 ® d(u0))- Now  (u0 ® d(uo)) is itse lf some 
A-m achine in  its own righ t— say c G Co; so i f  we want to construct c, perhaps 
we should program u0 w ith  d(c) (instead of m erely d(u0))? T h is  seems like  an 
improvement; at least now the offspring does have an A -tape attached. B u t, of 
course, we have only displaced, rather than elim inated, the problem. The parent 
A-m achine is now (u0 ffi ¿(c)) instead of c itse lf (i.e. (tz0 ® d(u0)), and, in  turn, 
the second generation offspring (i.e. c ’s offspring) is not c either, but is s im p ly
12Thus ensuring th a t a similar guarantee would then apply to  every « G U, as required by 
the core argument.
13It seems clear th a t von Neumann himself did consider (and reject) this naïve approach before 
hitting  on his alternative approach (still to  be discussed) which actually works. However, the 
only explicit discussion, of which I am aware, by von Neumann on this topic (von Neumann 
1966b, p. 118) is quite cursory, and I shall try  to  fill out the argum ents in rather more detail 
here.
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Mo w ith  no A-tape again; we s t il l have just further examples of degenerating A - 
complexity. W e p la in ly  cannot identify  an A-reproducer by th is procedure; nor, 
indeed, by any further iterations of it.
W e m ay now begin to suspect that the paradox is a genuine one— at least in  
the restricted sense that even i f  self-reproduction is not paradoxica l in  general, it  
is paradoxical for a ll elements of Co, i.e. a ll A-m achines having the sim ple arch i­
tecture ( « 0  © d(m))). W h ile , i f  true, th is would be a rather negative conclusion, 
it  might s t il l represent progress (by e lim inating  th ings which w ill not work), and 
deserves some consideration for that reason.
In more detail, the argument for paradox here is roughly this: suppose firs tly  
that some c = (u0 ® d(m)) is self-reproducing. Then it  seems that some “part” of 
the A-descriptor d(m) must be taken up w ith  describ ing «o, w ith  the “rem ainder” 
(presumably) describing the A-tape to be connected to uq in  the offspring; but 
th is la tte r A -tape is supposed to be precisely d(m) again (on the assumption 
that c is indeed self-reproducing) and th is means that a proper “part” of d(m) 
must, in  some sense, code for the whole of d(m) itself. Th is  certa in ly  sounds like  
something dangerously close to paradox.
In fact, we can now perhaps see that the situation  stops just short of any 
necessary paradox. It may indeed be the case that, for any certa in  particular 
“description language” , no A-descriptor can contain a proper part which can 
serve inter alia to describe the A-descriptor as a whole— i.e. self-reproduction 
m ay actua lly  be paradoxical for a specific set Co (re lative to a specific U C M  u0—  
and thus also re lative to a ll u €  U, sharing the same form al language); but there 
appears to be no va lid  argument showing that th is must be so in general (i.e. for 
all U C M ’s, or a ll “possible” form al languages). Bu rks has made just th is point, 
saying that:
P rim a  facie it  m igh t seem  th a t  an  a u to m a to n  [A -m achine] could  n o t s to re  
a  descrip tion  o f its  own s tru c tu re  because , how ever m an y  cells [A -parts] i t  
h a d , s to rag e  o f th e  d esc rip tion  w ould requ ire  m o re  th a n  th a t  n u m b er o f 
cells . . .  T h is  ob jec tio n  is o f course n o t sound , because  we m ay  use  indices, 
su m m atio n  signs, an d  quan tifiers in  th e  descrip tion .
B urks (1960, p p . 307-308)
However it  should be clear from  th is that, wh ile self-reproduction in  some 
particu la r Co may not be actua lly  paradoxical, th is w ill be c r it ica lly  dependent
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on the peculiarities of the description language processed by «o- Indeed, it  may 
seem that, even i f  one or more elements of (some) Co are A-reproducers, then 
th is w ill be an essentially serendipitous or co incidental effect, almost certa in  to 
be d isrupted by A-m utation; i.e. that even i f  we could exh ib it some uo (and thus 
some set U) such that we could exh ib it at least one A-reproducer “corresponding” 
to each u G U (which would seem like  quite a ta ll order in  the first place), the 
constraints imposed on the description language in  order to  achieve th is m ay be 
such tha t the images o f the A-reproducers cannot be kept “close” to each other 
in  the space of A-tapes. That is to say that, prima facie at least, it  seems that 
designing an encoding which guarantees the existence of A-reproducers at a ll may 
well conflict w ith  the requirement that, under th is encoding, the images of the 
A-reproducers must be “close” enough to each other to allow that they w ill be 
connected under some reasonable form  of A -m utation .
W e are now ready to consider von Neum ann’s mechanism  for getting around 
these d ifficulties. Von  Neumann presented th is (w ith in  the k ine tic  model) es­
sentia lly  in  terms of a m odification of the U C M  u0, wh ile leaving the form al 
description language more or less unchanged. For reasons which should become 
qu ick ly  apparent, I shall refer to th is new m odified k in d  of A-m achine as a “U n i­
versal Genetic M ach ine” or UGM, though these are not terms which von Neum ann 
h im se lf ever used. I note that the U G M  is (or, at least, can be) defined not as 
something different from  a U C M , but as a special kind of U C M — a U C M  subject 
to a certain constraint, to be explained below, on the description language which 
it  supports. Th is  roughly underlies B u rks ’ (1966a, pp. 294-295) development 
(or “com pletion” ) of von Neum ann’s ideas and explains why both  Burks (1970b, 
p. x i) and A rb ib  (1969b, Chapter 10), for example, can use the term  “universal 
constructor” synonymously for the two kinds o f A-m achine I d istingu ish as U C M s  
and U G M s.
A lthough  von Neumann orig ina lly  introduced the U G M  as, lite ra lly , a m od i­
fication of a U C M , nothing crucia l hangs on th is procedure. Tha t is, it  may, or 
m ay not, be the case, in  a particu la r A-system , that i f  a U C M  exists at a ll, it  
can be “easily” m odified to y ie ld  a U G M . So, technically, rather than re ly ing  on 
any such im plication , I now s im p ly  strengthen the o rig ina l requirement tha t our 
A-system  support “some” U C M , and demand instead that it  specifica lly support
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a U G M  as such. So: we suppose that our U C M  u0, o f the previous sections, is 
now constrained to be, in  fact, a U G M .
Since uo is s t il l a U C M  we know that, given any A-m achine m  €  M u, there 
must exist an A-descriptor d(m) which would cause uq to  construct (an instance 
of) m. However, we w ill make at most in form al or heuristic use of th is property. 
The im portant property of uq is the constraint on its description language which 
is introduced by v irtue  of its  being a U G M , and th is is as follows. G iven  any 
A-m achine m  €  Mu, there must exist some A -descrip tor d'(m) wh ich would cause 
uQ to  construct (an instance of) (m © d'(m)). M ore  form ally, we are declaring the 
existence of a function, denoted d'Q (read: “the dashed A -descrip tor o f” ) w ith  
the follow ing definition:
d! : -► T
m  h-» d'(m) s.t.
(u0 © d'(m)) (m © d'(rn))
Before showing how th is property can resolve the d ifficu lty  w ith  achieving self- 
reproduction, we need to provide some argument to suggest that such a property 
might actua lly  be realisable. Informally, the idea is that each d'(rri) can contain, 
embedded w ith in  it, the A -descriptor d(m); faced w ith  d'(m), uq first identifies 
th is embedded A-descriptor d(m) and decodes it , “as usual” , to construct the 
described A-machine; but uo then goes on to construct a copy of the complete 
A-descriptor d'(m), and attach it  to the offspring A-m achine m. The d'(m) A - 
descriptors can thus s im p ly  be the orig inal d(m) descriptors w ith  some k ind  of 
qualifier or flag added to ind icate that this extra  copying step should be carried 
out.
Another way of looking at th is is that uq now, as it  were, supports two differ­
ent form al languages: the orig ina l one (which can s t i l l be freely designed to satisfy 
any particu la r requirements we like— such as ensuring that the A-descriptors of 
certain A-machines w ill be A -m uta tiona lly  “close” to each other); and a new, im ­
poverished language, which can code only for A-tapes, and which uses the simple 
coding that every A-tape is its own A-descriptor. B y  alternately interpreting an 
attached A-tape in  these two different ways (whenever the A -tape is flagged to 
ind icate that th is is desired), uq can ensure that, for every m  € Mu there w ill
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correspond an A-descriptor, d'(m), describing precise ly the composite A-m achine
( m  © d'(m)).
Now, given th is property of uo, we can d ire c tly  identify  a corresponding A- 
reproducer— not by programm ing it  w ith  its A -descrip tor d(u0), but by  program ­
m ing it  w ith  its dashed A-descriptor d'(uo). B y  defin ition, th is is the A-descriptor 
of uo © d'(u0). Tha t is:
(u0 © d'(u0)) (uo © d'(u0)) 
and, at last, we have genuine self-reproduction.
The rest o f the core argument can now be com plete ly rehabilitated; assuming 
that a ll the A-machines x €  X  s t ill have the property of not interfering w ith  the 
basic operation of uo (when composed w ith  it)  we can say tha t a ll the machines 
u £ U w ill be, not m ere ly U C M s , but U G M s. Just as w ith  « 0  then, each u 6  U 
w ill give rise to a corresponding A-reproducer by program m ing it  w ith  the A - 
descriptor d'(u). The complete core argument can then go through, y ie ld ing  a 
now va lid  solution schema for Pv.
4.2 .5 .5  Loose Ends(?)
I have deliberately termed what has so far been achieved a solution schema for 
Pv, rather than a so lution proper. It suggests, in  outline, a method whereby 
we m ight establish that an A-system  satisfies the requirements set out in  the 
statement of Pv: but it  does not, in  itself, identify  any pa rticu la r such A-system . 
There are, that is to say, some decidedly loose ends to be tid ied  up before Pv can 
properly be declared solved.
Nonetheless, before proceeding to these loose ends, I w ish to make clear that, 
in  m y view, th is is a re la tive ly  routine or m inor task. It seems to me that the core 
argument (as it  has now been presented) satisfactorily  solves a ll the substantive 
difficulties bound up w ith  Pv\ tidy ing  up loose ends is a necessary drudgery of 
course, but further, real, progress cannot now be expected before we can carry 
out a cr it ica l reform ulation of our problem  situation (in  the ligh t of having solved
Pv).
The loose ends in  question here amount essentially to the exh ib ition  of a 
particu la r A-system  which meets the requirements for the core argument to be
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applied to it. Von Neumann perhaps hoped o rig ina lly  to develop the k inem atic 
model to a point where th is would be possible. Be that as it  may, he instead 
turned his attention to what Burks (1966d, p. 94) calls his cellular model— a 
form  of ce llu lar automaton.
The questions to be answered for th is pa rticu la r A-system  m ay be conveniently 
d iv ided into  one which is pure ly formal, and a second which is large ly informal:
1. The form al question is whether there exists a basic U G M  «0 , and a set 
of related U G M ’s U, such that the A-descriptors of the corresponding A - 
reproducers are “dense” (in the sense of being connected under A -m utation) 
in  the space o f A-tapes. Once the pa rticu la r A-system  is properly for­
malised, these things become matters o f fact, accessible (in  p rin c ip le  at 
least) to form al proof. The attempt to provide such proofs constituted the 
larger part of von Neum ann’s unfinished m anuscript The Theory of Au­
tomata: Construction, Reproduction, Homogeneity (von Neumann 1966b).
2. The in form al question is whether the identified  A-reproducers span the 
requisite range of A-com plexity. Since A -com p lex ity  itse lf is an in form al 
concept here, any answer to th is w ill necessarily be informal. Von Neum ann 
h im se lf d id  not attem pt to e xp lic it ly  answer th is question for his ce llu lar 
(or, indeed, any other) model; perhaps he would have done so in  com pleting 
his manuscript; or perhaps he considered that an affirm ative answer was self 
evident. In any case, I shall give a brie f discussion of th is issue, because it  
is in  m y view  an im portant, a lbeit somewhat intractab le, question, and it 
seems that th is has not generally been appreciated.
There are, of course, m any other questions which could be taken up in  a com­
p lete ly comprehensive account. For example, we should perhaps discuss c r it ic a lly  
whether von Neum ann’s ce llu lar model does provide a “reasonable” axiom atiza- 
tion  of the notion of “automaton” at a ll ;14 or at least we should consider whether 
the model satisfies the requirements of not having “too m any” p rim it ive  A -parts, 
which are not ind iv idua lly  “too complex” etc. B u t these issues would take me too
14Thus, for example, Kampis k  Csanyi (1987) argue th a t the self-reproduction phenomena 
(SR) at least, exhibited by von Neumann, “cannot avoid a sort of triviality and in this they are 
basically different from real SR, such as th a t of living organisms” .
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far afield, and I shall therefore restrict m yself here to the two questions e xp lic it ly  
identified above, which I consider to be most im m ed ia te ly  relevant to the topics 
at hand.
The first question relates to the design of a basic U G M , and the development 
of th is to establish a diverse set of A-reproducers, wh ich is connected under A - 
m utation  of the A-descriptors.
The first part of th is question— the design of the basic U G M — has been ad­
dressed positive ly  several times over. Von Neum ann h im se lf had more or less 
completed the demonstration that a basic, m in im a l (i.e. w ith  no add itiona l func­
tiona lity ) U G M  exists in  his ce llu lar model (by exh ib iting  the design for a par­
t icu la r «0) at the tim e he put h is m anuscript aside. Bu rks (1966a) showed in  
deta il how th is demonstration could be completed, and also outlined how the 
design could be sign ificantly simplified. Thatcher (1970) has demonstrated a de­
ta iled version of th is sim plified design. Codd (1968) has exh ib ited  a basic U G M  
design in  a different ce llu lar model, having on ly 8  states per ce ll (compared to 
the orig ina l 29 states per ce ll in  von Neum ann’s model); and Berlekam p et al. 
(1982) have argued, w ithout deta iling a design, that a U G M  is possible in  a par­
t icu la r ce llu lar model having on ly 2 states per ce ll (Conway’s so-called “Game 
of L ife ” ). A lthough  a ll of these represent arguments “in  p rinc ip le”— no fu lly  
fledged UGM -based  A-reproducer has actua lly  been bu ilt  or demonstrated, to 
m y knowledge— the arguments are, overall, satisfactory and we can take it  that 
the poss ib ility  of exh ib iting  a basic U G M  (and thus a basic A-reproducer) w ith in  
a su itab ly  “sim ple” (cellular) model (von Neum ann’s or otherwise) is now well 
established.
The remain ing parts of the first question— identify ing  the set X  of A-machines 
which could be composed w ith  the given ito w ithout comprom ising its operations, 
and of establishing the connectiv ity of the corresponding A-reproducers under 
A -m utation— have, on the other hand, received lit t le  or no exp lic it attention. 
Von Neumann h im se lf seemed loosely to ta lk  in  terms of X  being essentially 
coextensive w ith  Mu— i.e. neglecting the poss ib ility  tha t there would be any in ­
terference w ith  the operation of uq (von Neumann 1966b, pp. 119, 130-131); sim ­
ila r ly  he d id  not seem to give any exp lic it argument to support the A -m utationa l 
connectiv ity of the A-reproducers. Subsequent commentators do not seem to
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have added anything further. M y  disagreement w ith  leaving m atters in  th is state 
is m inor, though not quite pedantic.
F irs tly , for the sake of precision or completeness I th in k  it  should be exp lic it ly  
recognised or adm itted  that X  w ill (almost certa in ly) not be coextensive w ith  Mu. 
Bu t, equally, I do not th in k  it  generally feasible to give any better characterisation 
of X  than sim ply to say that the elements o f U are indeed s t i l l U G M s  in  the ir 
own right (i.e. m y defin ition of X  is pure ly existentia l— it  offers no clue as to 
how, for example, one m ight system atica lly  generate the elements o f X  other 
than by sim ply testing elements of Mu in  turn). In the case o f von Neum ann’s 
ce llu lar model (or, indeed, h is k inem atic model) I am  quite w illin g  to  accept, 
w ithout any attem pt at proof, that although X  cannot be coextensive w ith  Mu, 
it  is s t i l l an in fin ite  set, spanning essentially the same range of A -com p lex ity  as 
Mu itse lf— and this is rea lly  the c r it ica l point. It is, perhaps, so obvious that 
von Neumann s im p ly  felt it  was not necessary to say it. A s to whether the range 
of A -com p lex ity  offered by Mu in  the first place is, in form ally , sufficient for a 
so lution of Pv, that relates to question 2 above, and I shall take it  up separately, 
in  due course.
The second outstanding aspect of question 1 follows on from  the status o f X: 
we w ish to establish that the set of A-reproducers anchored on U (which is to 
say, ind irectly  anchored on X )  is connected under some specified interpretation 
of A -m uta tion  (of the A-descriptors). A  form al answer to th is m ight, in  princip le, 
be possible; but would be exceedingly d ifficu lt, and has never, to m y knowledge, 
been attempted. It would require inter alia that we be able to  characterise the 
set X  much more precisely that heretofore— a task which I have just accepted as 
being very d ifficu lt, i f  not impossible, in  itself.
I th in k  the best we can reasonably do (and th is is actua lly  very good, a lbe it 
far short of a form al proof) is the following:
• W e can require that the form al description language supported by Uq in ­
corporate some degree of “com positiona lity” ; specifically, we require that 
the “portion” of the A-descriptors coding for the “core” part o f the A - 
reproducers (i.e. coding for the uq subsystem itse lf) can be, to a greater or 
lesser extent, “separated” out. I mean by th is that there w ill exist m any 
possible A -m utations (namely any affecting any other portion  of the A -
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descriptors, and thus affecting only the  x  subsystem  of the  offspring) which 
would not compromise this essential core of the  offspring. This greatly en­
hances the possibility th a t such an A -m utation will, indeed, yield another 
A-reproducer, and m ay be said to  have already been im plicit in  our earlier 
discussion of the  very possibility th a t the  A-reproducers, anchored on «0, 
m ight be connected under A -m utation.
•  Furtherm ore, we can require the language to  be such th a t the  portions of the  
A-descriptors encoding the  x  subsystem  of the  offspring should be “dense” 
at least relative to M u. T hat is, while it  is difficult, if not impossible, to  
directly guarantee th a t the  encoding will be such th a t m ost (or even any) 
A-m utations of th is portion of an A-descriptor will yield an encoding of 
another x  €  X  (which is to  say, the  A-descriptor of another A-reproducer, 
or the dashed A-descriptor of another u  G U), it is perfectly feasible to 
ensure th a t m ost (if not all) such A -m utations a t least yield another m  6  M u 
(as opposed to  simply yielding nonsense— an A -tape not validly describing 
any A-machine a t all). We can now couple th is w ith our earlier (entirely 
informal) acceptance th a t, although X  cannot be coextensive w ith M u, 
it  will be very large and diverse, to  conclude th a t, even though not all 
such A -m utations will yield a viable offspring (another A-reproducer) a 
significant “fraction” plausibly should; and this is enough to  persuade me 
(at least) th a t while the  entire set of A-reproducers anchored on uo may 
not be connected under A -m utation, some infinite, and diverse, subset of 
it will be; th a t being the  case, I suggest th a t the  requirem ent involved in 
solving Pv (namely, th a t this connected subset span a  sufficient range of 
A-complexities) can still be taken as m et (always assuming th a t M u itself 
spans such a  range in the  first place).
I should add, of course, th a t Von Neum ann did indeed ensure th a t the  en­
coding^) he used were ju s t such th a t these two conditions are satisfied (see, in
particular, von N eum ann 1966b, pp. 130-131).
I now come to  the  last outstanding loose end, m y question 2 above. Given
the  discussion of question 1, question 2 has now resolved itself into the  question
of the range of A-complexity spanned by the  entire “universal” set of A-machines
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(M„) in, say, von Neum ann’s cellular model; for it has been argued th a t the  
(A -m utationally connected) set of A-reproducers, anchored on Uo, will span es­
sentially this same range.
Despite m y calling this a  m ere “loose end” , I consider th a t it  is, in  its way, 
quite the  hardest question associated w ith Pv; and since I will not p retend  to  be 
able to  offer a  really satisfactory answer, m y trea tm en t can be m ercifully brief!
One possible answer—the only one (if any) which I th ink von N eum ann himself 
could be said to  have explicitly offered—is to  say yes, M u does span a  sufficient 
range of A-complexity, and this is self-evident. This answer has, a t least, the 
m erit of an overwhelming simplicity. However, I th ink  th a t it is possible to  do 
better—though perhaps only very slightly.
I do not, of course, propose to  formalise “A-complexity” ; b u t following 
von N eum ann’s rough descriptions of the  idea, and m y own previous discussion 
in term s of equating it (more or less) w ith the  notions of “knowledge” or “antic­
ipatory system s” (McMullin 1992b, pp. 5-7), I propose15 th a t A-complexity can 
be regarded as closely related to  w hat Burks (1960) has called the  behavior, or 
as I shall te rm  it, the  A-behaviour, of an autom aton or A-machine.
A-behaviour is an essentially form al notion, and corresponds to  the  (real­
tim e) specification of how an A-machine reacts to  its environm ent. I t is not, of 
course, a scalar quantity, and I shall not propose any m easure of the  A-complexity 
corresponding to  particular A-behaviours.
The m erit, for my purposes, of introducing the notion of A-behaviour, is th a t 
we can define a certain set of A-behaviours which, at least intuitively, captures 
our notion of w hat could, conceivably, be a “possible” A-behaviour (w ithin any 
particular A-system); it constitutes, in short, a universal set, which I shall term  
B ,  of A-behaviours for th a t A-system. W ith  this set B  a t our disposal, and 
without stipulating how A-complexity and A-behaviour m ight be related , we can 
say th a t if, for every A-behaviour b G B ,  there is a t least one m  € M u (or, 
even be tte r, one x £  X )  exhibiting this A-behaviour, then  M u (or X )  m ust, in 
some sense, span all “possible” A-complexities, and therefore “m ust” m eet the 
requirem ents of Pv (there is an essentially reductionist m etaphysical assum ption
15I shall not “argue” for this proposal; I shall merely tentatively adopt it as a basis for 
discussion.
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underlying the  in terpretation of “A-complexity” here, bu t let it pass).
The universal set B  of A-behaviours for a  particu lar A -system  m ay be roughly 
defined as follows. I assume th a t the  definition of th e  A -system  includes a  spec­
ification of everything th a t m ight be regarded an an “environm ental inpu t” (A- 
sensor) or as an environm ental ou tput (A-effector) of any A-machine. I suppose 
th a t every A-machine has a fixed configuration of A-sensors and A-effectors (this 
is somewhat restrictive, b u t will serve m y purposes here). An A-behaviour will 
then  be completely defined by specifying a (finite) set of A-sensors and A-effectors, 
and a  (hypothetical) finite s ta te  machine (see e.g. M insky 1967, P art One) con­
necting these A-sensors and A-effectors together. Again, connecting A-sensors to  
A-effectors via a  finite  s ta te  machine represents som ething of a restriction, bu t it 
will serve m y im m ediate purposes. The cartesian product of possible A-sensor/A- 
effector configurations by (com patible) finite s ta te  machines, will then  yield the  
universal set of A-behaviours B  for the  particular A-system  (and note carefully 
th a t because of the  involvement of A-sensors and A-effectors, even if for no other 
reason, this definition will be tied  to  the  particular A-system).
It should be clear th a t, if the  set M u of all possible A-machines in the  A- 
system  included elements realising the  transition  functions of arb itra ry  finite state  
machines (and assuming th a t these could be then  “connected up” w ith  arb itrary  
A-sensor/A-effector configurations), then  we would have our desired result— M u 
would span the  range of all possible A-behaviours, and thus of all possible A- 
complexities, for th a t A-system.
One can actually envisage the  possibility of formal A-systems of this sort (if, 
for example, our A-parts included the  necessary elements to  realise B urks’ (1970c) 
finite idealized automata). B ut, it is certainly not the  case th a t von N eum ann’s 
cellular model (for example) could m eet this requirem ent (com pare the  rem arks 
of Burks 1966a, p. 270).16
Let m e then  weaken the  requirem ent somewhat. Let m e require th a t, for 
every A-behaviour b G B , there m ust be a t least one m  G M u (or, be tte r, x  €  X )  
which can exhibit this A-behaviour according to some sufficiently slowed down
16More generally, it seems that no A-system which incorporates some principle of “local 
action” (i.e. the impossibility of “instantaneous” transmission of signals between arbitrarily 
“distant” A-parts) could meet such a strong requirement; but I shall not attempt to prove, or 
even to formalise, this claim.
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time scale. T ha t is, the  A-behaviour can be realised if we consider th e  tim e- 
scale defining the  A-behaviour (the clock ra te  of its finite s ta te  m achine) to  be 
scaled down to  be as slow as we like com pared to  the  actual (real-)tim e of the 
A-system.17
If th is requirem ent, or criterion, for assessing the  range of “A-complexity” 
spanned by M u is accepted, then  it can, for example, be m et if M u (or, better, 
X ), includes at least one “universal” (in the  Church-Turing thesis sense) comput­
ing machine (something w ith the  com putational power of a ULMx) together w ith 
all its arbitrarily  program m ed variants (provided th a t th is can be flexibly con­
nected up w ith arb itrary  A-sensor/A-effector configurations). This requirem ent 
can indeed be satisfied in the  von N eum ann cellular model; indeed, in B urks’ 
completion of von Neum ann’s work, he specifically established th a t a  single A- 
machine combining both  a UGM and an (arbitrarily  program m ed) ULMr (in 
effect) could be realised in this model. Burks has term ed the  la tte r  a universal 
computer-constructor (Burks 1970b, p. xi).
As I said, I do not consider th a t th is result really goes very m uch beyond 
a simple statem ent th a t the  range of A-complexity spanned by M u (or X )  in 
von N eum ann’s cellular model (say) is “self-evidently” satisfactory for the  solution 
of Pv. Indeed I feel th a t th a t (much simpler) answer has definite advantages. I 
introduce the alternative, somewhat convoluted, answer purely to  show th a t here 
is one place where the  solution of Pv might be said to  directly depend on the 
“com putational” properties of the  A-machines. I t provides a rationale—in my 
view the  only valid one—for adding into the  definition of “universal construction” 
something relating to  ( “universal” ) com putation as such. It is the  one point in 
the argum ent where it might even m ake sense to  invoke the  Church-Turing thesis 
as having some relevance. I fear I m ay be alone in this opinion, bu t th a t merely 
makes it the  m ore im portant th a t I should sta te  it as clearly as possible. In any 
case, I have now discharged the  obligation I originally accepted in section 4.2.4 
above to  show th a t it would “. . .  u ltim ately  prove useful to  say som ething about
17It is a very moot point whether, in so weakening the requirement one Í8 not, perhaps, giving 
away rather too much; but I shall accept it without further discussion, simply to show where 
this can lead.
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the ‘com putational’ powers of A-constructors and /o r their offspring” . Of course, 
in doing so, I continue to  reject entirely Codd’s explicitly com putational definition 
of “universal” construction.
4.2.6 C ritique
The previous section presented von N eum ann’s original solution to  Pv in 
some detail. I should now like to  consider some elaborations—perhaps even 
improvements—to this solution. The gist of von N eum ann’s argum ent is th a t the 
existence of a single UGM, it0> is (more or less) sufficient to  allow Pv to  be solved. 
My question is w hether, or to  w hat ex tent, we can weaken this condition— i.e. can 
we move closer toward a condition which is still sufficient, bu t also necessary. In 
doing this we shall get some glimpse of further im portan t potentialities already 
implicit in von Neum ann’s solution.
As a starting  point I take the  requirem ent th a t the  UGM  u0 should be a  UCM 
in its own right. W hile this was indeed the  case for the  particu lar UGM exhibited 
by Burks, in his completion of von N eum ann’s work (Burks 1966a), it was not (or 
at least, not clearly) the  case for von N eum ann’s own original form ulation in  the 
kinem atic model, nor for his own outline for the cellular model (von Neum ann 
1966b, p. 119). The point is th a t the  only property  of the  UGM which need 
actually be used (in solving Pv) is its ability to  correctly process the  dashed A- 
descriptors—i.e. to  construct A-machines of the form  (m ® d '(m )). Its ability 
to  construct A-machines not having this structure  (which is w hat additionally 
qualifies it as a UCM) is never actually used.
So: we can weaken the definition of the  UGM, so th a t a UGM need not be a 
UCM (although it can be).
This is, of course a very m inor improvem ent. A lthough we no longer require 
a UGM to  be able to  construct an arb itrary  isolated A-machine, we still require 
th a t it be able to  embed an arb itrary  A-machine w ith in  its offspring. There 
is therefore no sense in which a  UGM -but-not-UCM  is likely to  be significantly 
easier to  realise, for example, than  a UGM-and-also-UCM. So I introduce this 
m erely as a clarification of the  logical structure  of the  solution to  Pv, ra ther than  
as anything of deep significance.
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I now ask whether a Universal Genetic Machine, as such is tru ly  required 
at all. And the  answer, not surprisingly, will be th a t it “all depends” . Let us 
consider a  (non-universal) Genetic Machine, or GM, which I shall identify as go. 
The defining feature of <70 is th a t it works only for some proper subset of the  
A-machines in M u. T hat is, there exists some proper subset, M g C  Af„, such 
th a t for every A-machine m  G M g (and only for these) there  exists a  (dashed) 
A-descriptor d '(m ) which has the property  th a t:
(go ® d '(m )) (m  ® d '(m ))
This obviously represents a weakening of the  original requirem ent for a UGM; 
in  fact, it essentially introduces a continuum  along which th is requirem ent can be 
weakened, depending on ju s t how impoverished the  set M g becomes relative to  
M u. W hat, if anything, can we say about how this will affect the  solution schema 
for PV1 In particular, under w hat circum stances m ight the  schema now fail?
Well, it seems clearly the  case th a t we m ust have go G M g, for otherwise there 
will not even exist the basic A-reproducer (go ® d'(<7o))- So: it does not m atte r 
how extensive M g otherwise is, it m ust at least contain g0 itself.
More generally, let us in terpret X  in th e  same way relative to  go as it was 
originally in terpreted  relative to  u0 (of course, since go and «0 are different A- 
machines, th is means th a t X  is also now a m ore or less different set). T hat is, 
for every A-machine x  €  X ,  composing th is x  w ith  go will not interfere w ith the  
la tte r’s basic constructive processes. More concisely, we can still say th a t:
V m G M g,
V i G l ,
(Í9o ® x)  ® d '(m ))  (m  ® d '(m ))
Corresponding then to  the  original set U  of UGM ’s related to  u0,1  shall denote 
the  set of GM ’s related to  go by G :
G = {(00  ® x )\x  G X }
As in the  case of uq and U, we stipulate  th a t go itself is also a m em ber of G.
Now, as pointed out above, we had to  require th a t go G M g to  ensure th a t even 
a basic A-reproducer, incorporating go would exist. We can now generalise this
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as follows. Consider the  set GC\Mg. We are guaranteed th a t for every A-machine 
g G (G  fl M g) (if any), there will exist a  corresponding A-reproducer, namely:
(9 © d'(g)) (9 © d'(9))
In effect then  the  set of A-machines G f)M g com pletely characterises the  set of 
A-reproducers which will be guaranteed to  exist as a  consequence of th e  existence 
of g0 itself. So the  question of w hether any go (which is not a  fully fledged UGM) 
will suffice to  solve Pv reduces to  the  question of w hether th is set GC\Mg still spans 
the  required range of A-complexity, and whether we can still assume th a t the set 
of corresponding (dashed) A-descriptors will be connected under A -m utation. 
The la tte r  is not entirely trivial: we would expect th a t, as the  set G  D M g is 
m ade smaller or more impoverished (by weakening the  powers of go) then  the 
corresponding set of A-descriptors m ay naturally  become sparser in  the  space of 
A-tapes, and m ay therefore cease to  be connected (even “approxim ately” ) under 
A -m utation.
We can identify two extrem es here.
Suppose firstly th a t G  fl M g is essentially equal to  our original set U  (i.e. go is 
“alm ost” a  UGM). Stipulate th a t the  “original” solution to  Pv was accepted—i.e. 
we were satisfied th a t the  original set X ,  and thus U, spanned a  sufficient range 
of A-complexity, and the  (dashed) A-descriptors corresponding to  the  elements of 
U  were sufficiently close together (in A-tape space) to  form  a connected set under 
A-m utation. Then, assuming th a t the  (dashed) description languages processed 
by u0 and go were essentially similar, go would certainly suffice to  solve Pv. Of 
course, under this assum ption, the  powers of Uq have only been very slightly 
weakened to  yield go] go can do everything «o can do except (possibly) construct 
some A-machines in which are em bedded A-machines not in the  set X  (where X  
is now being in terpreted as essentially the  same set relative to  bo th  go and uo). 
So, we m ay say th a t go can indeed be something short of a fully “Universal” GM, 
and still be “equally” satisfactory in  solving Pv. B ut the  weakening represented 
by th is seems quite m inim al. Anyway, since X  itself is extrem ely difficult to 
characterise it  seems extrem ely unlikely th a t it would be any easier to  design a 
GM w ith  ju st this property th an  to  design a  full blown UGM.
The other extrem e is represented by supposing th a t G  fl M g has only a  single
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elem ent—g, say.18 This suffices to  establish the  possibility of self-reproduction, 
though by an extraordinarily convoluted path! If we wish, we can identify it 
as the  necessary and sufficient condition for w hat we m ay call “genetic” self- 
reproduction (it is not, of course, a  necessary condition for self-reproduction 
per se: von N eum ann’s (1966a, p. 86) “growing crystals” would not satisfy this 
condition, for example). B ut it is still, in von N eum ann’s sense, a  stric tly  trivial 
form of self-reproduction, despite its being called “genetic” . By definition, the  A- 
reproducer {g@d'(g) is not connected (by A -m utation) to  any other A -reproducer 
(not, a t least, any based on the  same core GM, g0), never m ind being connected, 
directly or otherwise, to  a set of A-reproducers spanning a  “large” or “infinite” 
range of A-complexities. In term s of P„, a GM go giving rise to  only th is one 
A-reproducer would be of absolutely no interest whatsoever.
I note, in passing, th a t notw ithstanding this, ju s t such an u ltim ately  impov­
erished GM19 has been reported in the  lite ra tu re  (Langton 1984; 1986). On the 
basis of m y discussion, this kind of A-machine, in  itself, can serve no purpose 
whatsoever relative to  solving P„; Langton, on the  other hand, seems to  imply 
th a t it  can, bu t I suspect this to  be another example of the  continuing, damaging, 
influence of w hat I have already labelled the  von N eum ann myth. I shall re tu rn  
to  this point in  the  next section.
Between the  two extrem es m entioned above for the  content of the  set G  f l  M g 
(and thus, implicitly, for the  power or A-complexity dem anded of the  core GM go) 
there rem ains a  continuum . We m ay speculate th a t, in  any particu lar A-system, 
it m ight be possible to  identify a go which is “significantly weaker” (in some 
sense) than  a UGM, bu t yet is still powerful enough (in term s of the  set G  fl M g 
it supports) th a t we would still regard it as providing, through von N eum ann’s 
schema, a satisfactory solution to Pv. This would u ltim ately  depend on informal 
judgem ents as to  the  range of A-complexity spanned by the  set G  fl M g, and 
as to  whether the  corresponding set of (dashed) A-descriptors is still sufficiently 
well connected (under A -m utation in A -tape space). Given th a t these judgm ents
18Note that this condition does not imply that either G  or M g are, in any sense, “small” sets; 
the underlying, or core, GM go could still be, in this sense, very “powerful” . Nonetheless, we 
could reasonably expect that it would be easier to design this GM than a full blown UGM. The 
question, of course, is whether there might be any benefit in so doing!
19Perhaps I should say penultimately impoverished: an ultim ately impoverished GM would 
have G  fl M g =  0!
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are informal, there can be no question here of providing any clearcut, definitive, 
criterion which would be both  sufficient and necessary for the  successful appli­
cation of von N eum ann’s solution schema w ithin any particular A-system. The 
most th a t we can say in general seems to  be this: if, in a particu lar A-system, 
the  existence of a UGM would indeed suffice for th e  solution of Pv (and even this 
judgm ent will always involve a  degree of informality, as we have discussed), then 
it seems th a t something less powerful than  a  UGM should still suffice; bu t th a t 
the  question “How much less powerful?” will not adm it of any sharp answer.
Insofar as this analysis yields any substantive result it is sim ply th a t there is 
nothing decisive about the  notion of “Universal” (genetic) construction as such; 
quite aside from the  fact th a t the significance of th is “Universal” will vary from 
A-system to  A-system, it does not even play a  unique or distinctive role in the 
application of the solution schema to  a particu lar A-system. In  fact, w ith  m any 
“reasonable” axiom atisations of the  notion of A-machine, “universal construc­
tion” (and thus UGM ’s) m ay be literally impossible. This follows from  Moore’s 
(Moore 1970) so-called Garden-of-Eden theorem . This theorem  applies, indeed, 
to  von N eum ann’s cellular model, although th is point is disguised by von Neu­
m ann choice of a  somewhat restrictive “universal” set of A-machines (i.e. a  set 
which excludes certain  entities which m ight intuitively be regarded as perfectly 
reasonable A-machines)— see B urks’ discussion of th is (Burks 1970d, pp. 43-45). 
In term s of Pv there  is no especially unique or distinguished, or “intuitively rea­
sonable” , notion of “universality” .20
I draw th is point out because we have seen th a t, simply by referring to  “uni­
versal” construction a t all, von N eum ann opened up a large field of potential 
confusion. G ranted, von Neum ann evidently w anted to  m ake clear an intellectual 
debt to  Turing’s original “universal (com puting) m achine” . B ut w ith  hindsight 
we can now see, perhaps, th a t the  debt is really not so great as all th a t: w hat­
ever analogy existed between the  ULM and UCM, it becam e significantly m ore 
strained or rem ote when referred to  the  UGM; and, arguably, becomes positively 
misleading when finally referred, as in  th is section, to  a merely “sufficiently pow­
erful” GM. In deference to  von N eum ann’s exam ple I have, in previous sections,
20That is: comparable to, say, the notion of “universal (effective) computation” associated 
with the Entscheidungsproblem  and the Church-Turing thesis.
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resolutely followed the  essential sequence of his original solution to  Pv, including 
all the  distracting discussion of “universality” ; bu t, having now done th a t, I ven­
tu re  to  suggest th a t the  solution could be m ade significantly m ore transparen t by 
starting  simply w ith the  notion of a ( “sufficiently powerful” ) GM, ra th e r than , 
by tortuous paths, ending there.
The discussion thus far has been conducted entirely  w ithin the  scope of 
von Neum ann’s original schema; it has consisted in  little  m ore th an  elaborat­
ing somewhat m ore precisely the  conditions under which the  schem a becomes 
applicable (though, of course, th a t is a useful enough exercise in itself). B ut I 
should now like to  point out th a t von N eum ann’s schem a can be substantially  
generalised (a t least in the  abstract, or “in principle” ), and th a t doing so can 
yield some significant benefits.
Consider again, then, a basic GM, go. This GM will give rise to  a  m ore or less 
diverse set of A-reproducers of the  form (g® d'(g)) as already discussed a t length. 
For the m om ent I m ake no assum ption as to  how large or small th is set m ay be; 
go could, in one lim it, be a full blown UCM, and the  set would accordingly be 
expected to  be very large; or, in  the other lim it, go could be a  very weak GM, 
yielding only a  handful of A-reproducers. W hatever th is set is, th a t completely 
determines w hether or not th a t go will be able to  deliver a solution to  Pv according 
to  the  von Neum ann schema; and if the  answer is “n o t” then  th a t go is essentially 
of no further interest.
Now this set of A-reproducers anchored on a  single g0 have precisely this 
in  common: they  process the  same formal language for describing A-machines. 
In biological term s we m ay say th a t this set incorporates a  fixed, or absolute 
m apping between genotype (A-descriptor) and phenotype (A-reproducer). Thus, 
in com m itting ourselves (following von Neumann) to  solving Pv purely w ithin the  
resources of a single such set, we are also com m itting ourselves to  the  equivalent of 
w hat I have elsewhere called Genetic Absolutism  (M cM ullin 1992c, Section 5.3), 
w ithin the  analysis of our form al or artificial A-system .21 I should note th a t, in 
th a t paper, I argue at length against the  idea of Genetic Absolutism; b u t not in 
the  sense th a t it is “bad” in itself—it ju s t is not a  tenable theory of biological
21Note carefully that this is strictly a limitation of the way we choose to analyse an A-system; 
it need not, and generally will not, reflect an inherent limitation of an A-system in itself.
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evolution. Now von Neum ann is not yet try ing to  capture all the  complications 
of biological evolution: he is m erely trying to  establish th a t some key features, 
at least, can be recreated in a formal, or artificial, A-system. If th is can be 
done w ithin w hat is, in  effect, a framework of Genetic Absolutism , and i f  there is 
some advantage to doing this in that particular way, then  the  fact th a t it  is still 
“unbiological” (in th is specific respect) should not be held too severely against 
it. Indeed, we shall recognise much m ore severe discrepancies th an  th is when, in 
due course, we exam ine the  new problem  situation created by the  solution of Pv.
Now, as it happens, adopting Genetic Absolutism  does have a  significant 
advantage for von Neum ann. Working w ithin such a  framework it is necessary to 
exhibit one core GM, go] and it is necessary to  establish th a t this is sufficiently 
powerful to  satisfy the  informal requirem ents of Pv] and it  is finally necessary to 
show th a t, based on the  formal language processed by g0, there is a  reasonable 
likelihood th a t m ost, if not all, of the  corresponding A-reproducers will be directly 
or indirectly connected under A -m utation. B ut if all th is can be done, then  Pv 
can, indeed be solved. W hat would be the  alternative if Genetic Absolutism  were 
not adopted?
Well, the  alternative to  Genetic Absolutism is Genetic Relativism  (McMullin 
1992c, Section 5.4), which envisages th a t the  m apping between genotype (A- 
descriptor) and phenotype (A-reproducer) is not fixed or absolute b u t m ay vary 
from one organism (A-reproducer) to  another. If we tackle Pv in a  framework of 
Genetic Relativism , we do not restrict a tten tion  to  a  single GM, giving rise to  an 
“homogenous” set of A-reproducers, all sharing th e  same description language. 
Instead we introduce the  possibility of having m any different core GMs—gl,go  
etc. Each of these will process a m ore or less different description language, 
and will thus give rise to  its own unique set of re la ted  A-reproducers. We still 
establish th a t m ost if not all A-reproducers in  each such set are connected un­
der A-m utation; bu t, in addition, we try  to  show th a t there are a t least some 
(A -)m utational connections between the  different such sets. The la tte r  is, of 
course, a m uch more difficult task, because the  A -m utations in question are now 
associated w ith changes in the  very languages used to  decode the  A-tapes. B ut, 
if such connections can be established, then, for the  purposes of solving Pv we 
are not restricted to  considering the  range of A-complexities of any single set of
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A-reproducers, b u t can include the  union of the  sets.
Now clearly, in term s simply of solving Pv, G enetic Relativism  introduces 
severe complications which are not necessary, or even strictly  useful. For now we 
have to  exhibit not one, bu t m ultiple core GMs, processing not one, b u t m ultiple 
description languages; and we have to  characterise the  range of A-complexity, 
and A -m utational connectivity, of not one bu t m ultiple sets of A-reproducers; 
and finally, we still have to  establish the existence of A -m utational links between 
these different sets of A-reproducers. The only benefit of any sort in th is approach 
seems to  be th a t maybe—just maybe—th e  d istinct GMs can be, individually, 
significantly simpler or less powerful than  the  single GM required under Genetic 
Absolutism; b u t it seems quite unlikely th a t this could outweigh the  additional 
complications.
Let me say then  th a t I actually accept all this: th a t for the  solution of Pv 
as stated , adopting the  framework of Genetic Absolutism  seems to  be quite the 
simplest and m ost efficacious approach, and I endorse it as such. Nonetheless, 
I th ink it worthwhile to  point out the  possibility of working in the  alternative 
framework of Genetic Relativism  for several d istinct reasons.
Firstly, it would be easy, otherwise, to  m istake w hat is m erely a  pragm atic 
preference for using Genetic Absolutism in solving Pv w ith  the  m inim um  of effort, 
for a claim th a t Genetic Absolutism is, in some sense, necessary for the  solution 
of Pv. I t  is not. More generally, our chosen problem , Pv, is only concerned w ith 
w hat m ay be possible, or sufficient—not w hat is necessary.
A second closely related point is this: prim a facie, our solution based on 
Genetic Absolutism m ay seem to  imply th a t a  universal GM (or, at least, some­
thing not far short of th a t)  is a pre-requisite to  any evolutionary growth of A- 
complexity. I t  is not. Indeed, we m ay say th a t, if such an im plication were 
present, we should probably have to  regard our solution as defective, for it would 
entirely beg the  question of how such a relatively A-complex en tity  as a  UGM 
(or something fairly close to  it) could arise in the  first place. Conversely, once we 
recognise the possibility of evolution w ithin the  framework of Genetic Relativism , 
we can a t least see how such prior elaboration of the  powers of the  GM(s) could 
occur “in principle” ; this insight remains valid, at least as a  coherent conjecture, 
even if we have not dem onstrated it in operation. It precisely underlies the  rem ark
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already m ade th a t the  advantage of Genetic Relativism  in  relation to  the  solution 
of Pv (insofar as there is one at all) is th a t it  m ay perm it us to  work, initially  at 
least, w ith significantly m ore prim itive GM ’s as th e  bases of our A-reproducers.
Thirdly, Genetic Absolutism views all the  A-reproducers under investigation 
as connected by a single “genetic network” of A -m utational changes. This is 
sufficient to  solve Pv, as stated , which called only for exhibiting the  possibility of 
A -m utational growth of A-complexity. In practice, however, we are in terested in 
this as a  basis for a Darwinian growth of A-complexity. Roughly speaking, th is 
can only occur, if at all, along paths in the  genetic network which lead “uphill” 
in term s of “fitness” (S-value). If the  genetic network is fixed then  th is may 
impose severe lim its on the  practical paths of Darw inian evolution (and thus on 
the  practical growth of A-complexity). Again, once we recognise the  possibility 
of evolution w ithin a framework of Genetic R elativism —which offers the  possi­
bility, in effect, of changing, or jum ping between, different genetic networks— the 
practical possibilities for the  (Darwinian) growth of A-complexity are evidently 
greatly increased.
This last point represents a quite different reason for favouring the  fram e­
work (or perhaps we m ay now say “research program m e”) of Genetic Relativism , 
and it is independent of the  “power” of GM ’s. In particular, even if we can 
exhibit a single full blown UGM, which yields an A -m utationally connected set 
of A-reproducers spanning (virtually) every possible A-behaviour supported in 
the  A-system, there could still be advantages, from the  point of view of support­
ing Darwinian evolution, in identifying alternative (U)GM ’s, defining alternative 
genetic networks (viewed now as evolutionarily accessible pathways through the  
space of possible A-behaviours).
Indeed, this need not be all th a t difficult to do: it provides another (in my 
view, m uch more compelling) reason to  consider combining a  basic (U)GM  w ith 
a  ULMt  (or something of similar com putational powers): the  la tte r is arranged 
so th a t it “pre-processes” the  A-descriptor in  some (Turing com putable) fashion. 
The program  of the  ULMy could then effectively encode a space of alternative 
description languages (subject to  the  prim itive constructional abilities of the  orig­
inal (U)GM); w ith m oderately careful design, it should be possible to  open up 
an essentially infinite set of (U)GM ’s, which are themselves connected under A-
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m utation  (of the program  for the  em bedded ULMy— another A -tape of some 
sort), thus perm itting  a  m ultitude of different genetic networks for po tentia l ex­
ploitation by a Darwinian evolutionary process. This should greatly enhance the 
possibilities for Darwinian evolution of any sort, and  thus, in  tu rn , for evolution 
involving the  growth of A-complexity.22 This idea seems to  have been anticipated 
by Codd:
A further special case of interest is tha t in which both  a  universal computer 
and a universal constructor (sic) exist and the  set of all tapes required 
by the universal constructor is included in the  Turing domain T . For 
in this case it is possible to  present in coded form the specifications of 
configurations to  be constructed and have the universal computer decode 
these specifications . . .  Then the universal constructor can implement the 
decoded specifications.
Codd (1968, pp. 13-14)
W hile Codd did not elaborate on why such flexibility in “coding” should be of 
any special interest, it seems plausible th a t he had in  m ind precisely the  possibility 
of opening up alternative genetic networks.
I close this critique w ith two final rem arks relating to  Genetic Relativism .
Firstly, von Neum ann himself seems to  have discounted even the  possibility of 
Genetic Relativism  being applicable to  his models. In his discussion of different 
kinds of (A -)m utations, he stated  explicitly th a t A -m utations affecting th a t part 
of an A-descriptor coding for the  core part of the  A -reproducer (i.e. coding for g0 
in the term s used above) would result in the  production of “sterile” offspring (von 
N eum ann 1966a, p. 86): the  im plication is th a t this would always be the  outcome 
of such A -m utations. I suggest th a t such a claim  is too strong, in general. My 
view is th a t, on von N eum ann’s model, it is probably fair to  say th a t such A- 
m utations would almost always yield sterile offspring; b u t th a t depending on the 
detailed design of the GM, and the  nature  of the  particu lar A -m utation, there 
might be exceptional cases where the  offspring would still be an A-reproducer, 
bu t containing an altered core GM.
Secondly, when tackling Pv w ithin the  framework of Genetic Absolutism , it 
was necessary to  assume a  degree of compositionality in  the  description language,
22It should be clear that this proposal is closely related to the more general suggestion already 
presented in Chapter 3, section 3.8.2, that the efficient growth of knowledge, via UVSR, will 
necessarily rely on the elaboration of a loosely hierarchical structure of variational processes.
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to  assure th a t there would exist a  range of A -m utations not affecting the  core 
GM in an A-reproducer; w ithout this assum ption it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to  argue th a t the set of A-reproducers anchored on this single core 
GM would be connected under A -m utation. This com positionality assum ption is 
more or less equivalent to  the  biological hypothesis of Genetic A tom ism , which 
holds th a t genomes m ay be system atically decomposed in to  distinct genes which, 
individually, have absolute effects on phenotypic characteristics (see McMullin 
1992c, p. 11; Dawkins 1989b, p. 271). This again represents a  divergence between 
von N eum ann’s pragm atically convenient solution schem a for Pv, and th e  realities 
of the  biological world (where any simple Genetic A tom ism  is quite untenable). 
I conjecture therefore th a t, should we wish to  move away from  a s tric t Genetic 
Absolutism in our form al or artificial systems we m ight well find it useful, if 
not essential, to  abandon simple compositionality in our descriptive language(s) 
(i.e. Genetic Atomism) also. This, in tu rn , would ultim ately  lead away from A- 
reproducer architectures in which there is any simple or neat division between 
the  core GM and the  rest of the  A-machine (though there  m ight still be  a fairly 
strict separation of the  A-descriptor— i.e. a genotype/phenotype division).
4.2 .7  T he Von N eum ann M yth
Having now presented and criticised, in some detail, w hat I have identified as 
von Neum ann’s solution to  von Neum ann’s problem , I m ust discuss, once again, 
whether this really was the  problem  John von N eum ann sought to  solve. In 
one sense, of course, this is of no im portance; provided Pv is adm itted  as an 
interesting and difficult problem , relevant to  the  interests of th is Thesis, and 
provided th a t von N eum ann did, indeed, solve it, then  it hardly  m atters whether, 
as a m atte r of historical fact, von Neum ann him self saw his work in precisely this 
way. B ut, in another sense, the  question is very im portant; my sta ted  reason 
for re-presenting von N eum ann’s work at length, and in  detail, here was the 
claim th a t its significance has not been properly recognised, and th a t this has 
m eant th a t his research program m e (which is essentially now also m y research 
program m e) has foundered. This claim needs a t least some further discussion 
and support.
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Briefly, I conjecture th a t there exists w hat I m ay call a  von N eum ann m yth : 
nam ely th a t, in his work on the Theory of A utom ata, von Neum ann was concerned 
w ith some “problem ” of self-reproduction as such, an d /o r th a t von Neum ann pro­
posed th a t universal com putational abilities could provide a criterion of dem arca­
tion between “triv ial” and “non-trivial” instances of self-reproduction. I adm it, of 
course th a t von Neum ann was concerned w ith some problem  of self-reproduction; 
bu t in m y view it was not self-reproduction as such, bu t self-reproduction as a 
route to the spontaneous growth o f complexity (particularly  via Darwinian evo­
lution) th a t interested him; and th a t even though he was also immensely in­
terested in the  theory and practice of com puting au tom ata, the  “com putational 
abilities” as such (i.e. as opposed to  the im plications of such abilities for complex 
behaviour and /or evolutionary potential) associated w ith his self-reproducing au­
tom ata  were a m atte r of almost negligible im portance.
Following on this, my task  is twofold. F irst to  back up m y assertion th a t 
something like a von Neum ann m yth actually exists. And secondly to  re itera te  
why I consider the  position(s) identified w ith the m y th  to  be untenable. I shall 
take these in reverse order because I think von N eum ann him self was largely, if 
inadvertently, responsible for the  origin of the  m yth; I shall therefore consider 
those elements of von N eum ann’s writings which m ight seem  to  give rise to  the  
m yth, and show how, in my view, they cannot be seriously upheld. Then I 
shall show how, notw ithstanding this, the  von Neum ann m yth  has indeed been 
form ulated and propagated.
Consider von N eum ann’s first published presentation of his ideas on a  gener­
alised theory of autom ata, taken from his Hixon sym posium  lecture in  1948. We 
m ay find there the following seemingly clearcut statem ent:
The problem of self-reproduction can then be stated  like this: Can one 
build an aggregate out of such [i.e. kinematic] elements in such a  manner 
th a t if it is put into a reservoir, in which there float all these elements in 
large numbers, it will then begin to  construct other aggregates, each of 
which will at the end tu rn  out to  be another autom aton exactly like the 
original?
von Neumann (1951, p. 315)
O ut of context this certainly suggests th a t von N eum ann’s problem  was self­
reproduction, pure and simple. B ut, despite the  somewhat unfortunate phrasing
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and emphasis here, there is a context, which m ust no t be ignored. Ju st two pages 
earlier von Neum ann introduced the  m otivation for his work, a t some length, as 
being the  apparent paradox presented by the  ability of biological organisms to  
m aintain their complexity in self-reproduction, and for th a t com plexity to  increase 
“over long periods of evolution” (p. 312). Furtherm ore, even in th is earliest paper, 
von Neumann went on, after explaining his scheme for how self-reproduction could 
be based on a UGM, to  point out th a t this scheme had  “some further a ttractive  
sides, into which I shall not go a t this tim e a t any length” (p. 317); while this 
further discussion was, indeed, brief, he did point out quite  explicitly th a t his 
particular scheme of self-reproduction “can exhibit certain  typical tra its  which 
appear in connection w ith m utation, lethally as a  rule, b u t w ith a possibility of 
continuing reproduction w ith a  modification of tra its ” (pp. 317-318). W hether 
von Neum ann was originally led to  his particular scheme by the  need to  support 
these things, or w hether he was merely “sleepwalking”23 is not really a t issue 
here. The point is th a t he clearly recognised th a t his scheme offered a  solution of 
a  very difficult problem , nam ely what I have designated Pv, and he did say this, 
even if, w ith hindsight, we m ight wish he had been a little  m ore explicit.
Similar rem arks can be m ade about the  Illinois lecture (von N eum ann 1966a, 
F ifth  Lecture), which I have already quoted several tim es in previous sections. 
Again, he introduced his problem  as being the  apparent paradox of the  growth of 
complexity in the  biological world. Again, a  significant p a rt of his discussion was 
then devoted to  the  “problem  of self-reproduction” , in the  sense of establishing 
th a t self-reproduction could indeed be based on a UGM. B ut again, crucially, 
he concluded by discussing how this scheme supported m utational change, while 
still retaining the  self-reproductive ability. Indeed, as previously noted, he even 
went to  far as to  explicitly cite “the ability to  undergo inheritable m utations” 
as a criterion of dem arcation between “triv ial” and “non-trivial” reproduction. 
In m y statem ent of Pv I elaborated this slightly by m aking explicit a require­
m ent th a t such inheritable (A-)m utations connect up a  set of A-reproducers of 
diverse A-complexities; bu t, taken in context, th a t was clearly already im plicit in 
von Neum ann’s treatm ent.
23This evocative term seems to have originated with Koestler (1959).
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Finally we come to  w hat was to  be von N eum ann’s magnum opus in  the  field, 
his unfinished m anuscript The Theory o f Automata: Construction, Reproduction, 
Homogeneity. Von Neum ann here concisely outlined (on w hat is now ju st the 
second page of the  published version, von N eum ann 1966b) the  com plete set of 
5 questions (labelled A -E ) which he proposed to  answer—or, in m y term s, the 
problems he proposed to  solve.
Von Neum ann’s question (A) was, adm ittedly, concerned w ith the  com puta­
tional powers of autom ata. B ut this was natu ra l since com puters were then  by 
far the  largest and m ost complex artificial au tom ata  which had yet been built; 
and, furtherm ore, von Neum ann intended to  introduce his UCM (and, subse­
quently, the UGM) by analogy w ith Turing’s “universal (com puting) m achine” , 
so th a t discussing com puting autom ata would represent an essential pream ble. 
Again adm ittedly, when it came tim e to  answer the  questions von Neum ann did 
take care to  ensure th a t w hat we m ight call “universal com putational processes” 
could be realised in his cellular model. B ut I deny th a t any of th is had any deep 
significance. Certainly, some kind of general purpose signal processing or com pu­
tational abilities would be necessary if the A-machines were to  be said to  span a 
reasonable range of A-complexities; I have drawn this point out in detail myself. 
Such abilities would also be of direct assistance in actually designing the  UGM. 
B ut, th is is all really incidental to  the central argum ent. I th ink it is m uch m ore 
significant to  note th a t none of the rem aining 4 questions, which represent the 
real substance of von N eum ann’s program m e, m ade any reference to  com putation 
as such.
Von N eum ann’s questions (B) and (C) were concerned w ith the  question of 
construction universality—specifically w hether this could be dem onstrated in 
some model system (s). In themselves, these questions were not explicitly mo­
tivated.
Question (D) introduced (at last) the  “problem ” of self-reproduction—but 
in a  very special form. Von Neum ann explicitly referred to  this question as a 
“narrowing” of his question (C) relating to  universal construction; this was, at 
the  very least, a broad hint th a t he was not in terested in self-reproduction per se 
bu t in self-reproduction which was built upon universal construction, though as 
yet there is no indication of why this should be of special interest. He im plicitly
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reinforced this in terpretation by asking for self-reproducing au tom ata  which could 
“perform further tasks” , such as constructing “other, prescribed, au tom ata” .
Finally, von N eum ann’s question (E) took up the  question of evolution, 
and asked in particular w hether au tom ata  “com plexity” and /o r “efficiency” can 
“progress” .
My own view is th a t the  only coherent or m otivated  way of viewing this 
program m e of von N eum ann’s is to  read it in reverse: starting  w ith his question 
(E) of whether or how (Darwinian) growth of com plexity can even be possible, 
and seeing all the  other questions as m erely subproblems, or in term ediate  goals, 
on the  way to  solving this fundam ental problem. This in terpretation  m akes sense 
on the  assum ption th a t von Neum ann had already worked out, in outline a t least, 
his solution schema for th is fundam ental problem; b u t of course, we know  th is to  
be the  case because von N eum ann had already presented the  outline solution in 
the Hixon and Illinois lectures.
Now I should adm it th a t there is one sense in which it seems von Neu­
m ann may have been genuinely concerned w ith w hat we m ight call a problem  
of self-reproduction “in itself” . He conjectured (w ithout elaboration) th a t self­
reproduction based on direct self-inspection m ay be impossible, since otherwise 
“one would probably get involved in logical antimonies of the  R ichard type” (von 
Neum ann 1966b, p. 122). His architecture based on the  use of A-descriptors 
does indeed “solve” (or a t least avoid) this problem . However, it now seems 
clear th a t von Neum ann had here identified an entirely spurious pseudo-problem; 
Laing (1977) exhibited an early counter-example, showing how reproduction by 
self-inspection is, in fact, perfectly possible, w ithout paradox.24 Thus, in the  
one place where it seems th a t von N eum ann could fairly be considered as tack­
ling a “problem ” of self-reproduction as such it now seems th a t he was actually 
mistaken.
T hat completes my argum ent for how von Neum ann himself might have given 
rise to  the  von Neum ann m yth—and also for how the  position(s) identified w ith 
the m yth  cannot be upheld. More particularly, I have not been able to  iden­
tify anywhere where von N eum ann discussed self-reproduction except in the  con­
240 r at least, with no more paradox that von Neumann’s own A-reproducers; cf. Rosen 
(1959).
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tex t of an evolutionary growth of complexity; nor have I found anywhere where 
von Neum ann proposed or adopted com putational ability  as criterial for “non­
trivial” self-reproduction. He did adopt heritable, viable, m utation  as criterial in 
this sense; and he did show th a t universal construction (in the  form  of a  UGM) 
provides a t least one way of achieving this (though not, of course, th a t it  is the  
only way). In short, it seems to  me highly unlikely th a t von Neum ann could have 
intended to  prom ote the  views I have identified as the  “von Neumann m y th” .
The only discrepancy of substance (of which I am  aware) between w hat I have 
called Pv and the  problem  von Neum ann described him self as being concerned 
with, is th a t von Neum ann, in  one brief note, considered how his A-reproducers 
might support Lamarckian , as opposed to  Darwinian, evolutionary change (von 
N eum ann 1966b, p. 131).25 I om itted  this from m y form ulation of Pv because 
Lamarckism is not, in  itself, a satisfactory biological theory of the  growth of 
organismic complexity (McMullin 1992b, Section 4.4). In  any case, Lam arckism  
is not an element of m y alleged von Neum ann m yth.
The rem aining task  here is to  establish th a t a von Neum ann m yth  does actu­
ally exist (and indeed persists).
I s ta rt w ith Kem eny’s article (Kemeny 1955), based on von N eum ann’s 
Vanuxem lectures delivered a t Princeton U niversity in early 1953. I th ink  we 
m ay say th a t the  seed of the  m yth  is already present here. For although Kemeny 
does refer to  the  question of realising an artificial evolutionary process, he does 
so only a t the very end of the  article, alm ost as an afterthought, and w ith no 
discussion of how von N eum ann’s specific scheme of self-reproduction addresses 
precisely this problem . There is also no discussion of the  apparent paradox of 
the  growth of complexity in the  biological world. On the  contrary, in  fact, the 
th rust of the  article seems to  be to  identify artificial self-reproduction in  itself (no 
m atte r how realised) as the  problem —and to  then  present von N eum ann’s work 
as a  solution. W hich is to  say, a form of the  m yth.
However, the  m ost telling source for the  von Neum ann m yth, it  seems to  me, 
is A.W. Burks.
I should say, in advance, th a t I have the  greatest respect for Burks; and th a t,
25Von Neumann does not use the term “Lamarckian evolution” as such, but that is effectively 
what he describes in the second paragraph of his section 1.8.
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further, I owe him  a considerable debt, for w ithout his work, von N eum ann’s 
original m anuscripts, upon which I have drawn very heavily, m ight never have 
been published; nor, perhaps, m ight the  outstanding collection of seminal works 
in this field, Essays in Cellular Autom ata  (Burks 1970a), have ever been brought 
together in one volume.
However, despite all this, I wish to  suggest th a t Burks m ade a  m istake. I con­
jecture th a t he did (perhaps still does) erroneously subscribe to  the  von Neum ann 
m yth; th a t th is contam inated his work on th e  von N eum ann’s m anuscripts which 
he (Burks) edited and completed; and th a t, as a result of the  apparent authority  
of Burks’ rem arks, the  m yth has been indefinitely propagated.
The volume of von Neum ann’s work, edited and com pleted by Burks, collected 
together the  m anuscripts associated w ith von N eum ann’s Illinois lectures and his 
unfinished m anuscript on autom ata theory, and was published as (Burks 1966d); 
a taste  of the  m yth  appears already in the  title  Burks chose for th is collection: 
Theory o f Self-reproducing Autom ata. Burks justifies this choice by referring 
repeatedly to  von N eum ann’s work as being concerned w ith the  problem  of “self- 
reproduction” , and describes the m anuscript of P a rt II (von N eum ann 1966b) 
exclusively as treating  “the logical design of a  self-reproducing cellular autom aton 
(sic)” (Burks 1966c, p. xvi). On the  same page, and w ithout qualification, Burks 
makes the  extraordinary rem ark th a t “self-reproduction requires an autom aton 
of considerable complexity” (emphasis added). I call th is extraordinary because, 
on my in terpretation, the  point of von N eum ann’s work was almost precisely 
opposite to  th is rem ark: far from showing th a t complexity was “required” for 
self-reproduction, von Neum ann sought to  establish how self-reproduction might 
still be possible despite arbitrarily high complexity.
However, I shall not a ttem pt to  identify every point a t which Burks might 
be said to  have supported, directly or indirectly, th e  von Neum ann m yth. It will 
suffice to  identify w hat seem the most decisive examples.
Burks claimed th a t the central question addressed by von N eum ann, particu­
larly in  (von Neum ann 1966b), was “W hat kind of logical organization is sufficient 
for an autom aton to  be able to  reproduce itself?” (Burks 1966b, p. 19). Even tak­
ing account of the  full context, I cannot find any way of interpreting th is claim 
other than  as a statem ent th a t von N eum ann’s problem  was some problem  of
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self-reproduction per se; which is to  say, a statem ent of th e  von Neum ann m yth.
In completing his editorial work on (von Neum ann 1966b) Burks added a 
final chapter (Burks 1966a) which included a  Sum m ary o f the present work (Sec­
tion 5.3.1). In this, Burks reviewed the  five questions (A) through (E) which 
von Neum ann originally started  out with. W ith  regard to  question (E)—which I 
have argued provided the  very essence and m otivation of the  entire m anuscript— 
Burks says only th a t “Von N eum ann m ade a  few rem arks relevant to  evolution 
. .  .b u t never re tu rned  to  the  topic” (p. 287); the  rest of B urks’ sum m ary then  
completely ignores this question. This is all the  m ore striking when we contrast it 
w ith  an earlier parenthetical rem ark by B urks’ th a t “W henever he [von Neumann] 
discussed self-reproduction, he m entioned m utations” (Burks 1966d, p. 99).
Burks went on, in his summary, to  “reform ulate” von N eum ann’s rem aining 
questions in the  context of von Neum ann’s particu lar cellular model, “a t the  
same tim e modifying them  somewhat” (Burks 1966a, p. 292). One of these m od­
ifications affects von N eum ann’s original question (D); where von Neum ann had 
asked for a self-reproducing autom aton which could do “other tasks” , such as con­
structing “other, prescribed, au tom ata” , Burks now altered this to  call instead 
for a self-reproducing autom aton which can also “perform  the com putations of a 
universal Turing m achine” . I believe this m ay be th e  first occasion on which this 
specific idea was proposed— and, as far as one can tell, it was not proposed by 
von Neumann. Burks offered no explanation of the  change a t this point, b u t we 
see here another elem ent of the  von N eum ann m yth  being born.
Moving on to  (Burks 1970b, p. xv) we find a restatem ent of the  earlier claim 
th a t von Neum ann was seeking to  answer the  question “W hat kind of logical or­
ganization is sufficient for an autom aton to  be able to  reproduce itself?” B ut now, 
a t least, Burks points out th a t the  question “adm its to  triv ial versions as well 
as interesting ones” ; he states th a t von Neum ann had  the  “fam iliar na tu ra l phe­
nomenon of self-reproduction in m ind” , w ith which I agree; bu t he then  goes on 
to  say th a t von Neum ann “wished to  abstract from  the  natu ra l self-reproduction 
problem  its logical form ” which I consider to  be obscure, a t best. Burks does not 
m ention here von N eum ann’s own form ulation th a t the  possibility of heritable, 
viable, m utation distinguishes the  non-trivial form of the  problem.
Turning finally to  (Burks 1970d), we find first (p. 3) the now fam iliar claim
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th a t von N eum ann was concerned w ith the  problem  of a sufficient “logical or­
ganization” for self-reproduction. B ut, m uch m ore im portantly , after a  detailed 
discussion of the  design of a UGM, and of an A-reproducer based upon it, in 
von Neum ann’s cellular space, comes this passage:
This result is obviously substantial, bu t to  express its real force we must 
formulate it in such a  way th a t it cannot be trivialized. Consider, for 
example, a two-state cellular system whose transition function takes a  cell 
into sta te  “one” when any of its neighbors is in sta te  “one” . Define an 
autom aton to  be any area, even a single cell. A  cell in sta te  “one” then 
“reproduces itself” trivially in its neighboring cells. Clearly what is needed 
is a requirement that the self-reproducing automaton have some minimal 
complexity. This requirement can be formulated in a  number of ways.
We will do it by requiring th a t the self-reproducing autom aton also be a 
[universal?] Turing machine.
Burks (1970d, p. 49, emphasis added)
Here we have the  von Neum ann m yth  in  its purest form. To be fair to  Burks, 
he does not explicitly ascribe this position to  von Neum ann; bu t from th e  con­
tex t, such an ascription would seem to  be implied. The irony, again, is th a t 
von N eum ann did address precisely the  issue Burks raises here, when he spoke of 
the  triviality  of reproduction in “growing crystals” (von Neum ann 1966a, p. 86); 
bu t, of course, von N eum ann’s resolution was nothing to  do w ith com putation. 
Instead, he identified heritable, viable, m utation  as the  critical criterion, which, 
in tu rn  flagged his problem  as m y Pv, and not as self-reproduction p er se  (not 
even its “logical organization” ).
It seems to  m e th a t B urks’ argum ent, on the  o ther hand, can be understood 
only by firstly assuming, or demanding we m ight say, th a t von Neum ann was 
trying to  solve some “problem ” of self-reproduction, and indeed th a t he did solve 
it; bu t then  noticing th a t th is is a pseudo-problem, adm itting  of triv ial solutions; 
and finally try ing to  find some way of immunising von N eum ann’s obvious “suc­
cess” from this criticism. There is, of course, a  germ  of tru th  in this view—my 
own analysis of von N eum ann’s work was arrived at in roughly this way. B ut, 
on m y view, the  correct resolution is not a  direct requirem ent to  em bed some 
m inim al “complexity” represented by a Universal Turing m achine (say); th is idea 
simply does not work because one can easily form ulate a  cellular space in which 
trivial (crystal-like) self-reproduction is still possible even for A-machines incor­
porating Turing machines (universal or otherwise). This is essentially the  force
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of a  la ter paper by H erm an (1973);26 Herm an concludes explicitly th a t:
W hat the result does show is th a t the existence of a self-reproducing uni­
versal computer-constructor in itself is not relevant to  the problem of bi­
ological and machine self-reproduction. Hence, there is a  need for new 
m athem atical conditions to  insure non-trivial self-reproduction.
Herman (1973, p. 62)
W hile, of course, agreeing w ith the  essence of th is, I disagree literally  w ith 
the last sentence, which I consider to illustrate only the  lingering after-effect of 
the von Neum ann m yth  (apparently inherited by H erm an, through Codd, from 
Burks). Perhaps we do need conditions to  insure non-trivial self-reproduction, 
though I personally prefer to  say th a t we need to  reorient ourselves as  to  the 
problem  we are tackling— and recognise th a t it is not helpful to  describe it as a 
problem of “self-reproduction” . B ut, in any case, we do not need “m athem atical” 
(or formal) conditions. Not yet, at least. For we are not yet ready, by any means, 
to  formalise “A-complexity” ; and that (not “self-reproduction” ) is the  point at 
issue. And, of course, as I have already repeated several tim es, von N eum ann 
himself had already provided a perfectly serviceable informal condition, in the 
form of heritable, viable, m utations, so Herm an need really have looked no further 
than  tha t.
T hat completes m y case th a t Burks, in particu lar, prom ulgated the  von Neu­
m ann m yth. If I am  correct in this, then  it seems fair to  add also th a t B urks’ 
particular adoption of the m yth  would have been decisive for its subsequent de­
velopment (given his authoritative position as the  editor of the  relevant von Neu­
m ann m anuscripts), and th a t is why I have discussed his case in such detail. 
Difficulties which then  flowed from this can be sum m arised relatively briefly.
Since von N eum ann’s original development, his results are been rederived in 
a variety of different frameworks. I include here, for example, T hatcher’s (1970) 
redesign of a  UGM w ithin von N eum ann’s original space; Codd’s (1968) work on 
a “simpler” 8-state space; Berlekamp, Conway & G uy’s (1982) outline work on 
a 2-state  space; and A rbib’s (1969b, C hapter 10) form ulation which shifted back 
somewhat toward the  kinem atic kind of model. This is probably by no means an
26Granted, Herman does work with Codd’s definition of UCM, which I consider deeply mis­
leading, as already explained; but that does not affect the application of his argument to Burks’ 
claim.
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exhaustive list. I hold th a t, whatever other m erits th is kind of work m ight have 
had, it has not offered any advance in term s of von N eum ann’s original problem. 
In particular, there has been no recognition here of the  substantially  modified 
problem situation which resulted from solving Pv. And I blam e th is, in large 
measure, on the  von Neum ann m yth: if von N eum ann’s original problem  is not 
understood, or m istaken, the  new problem situation will also be missed.
T hat the  m yth  is still alive and well is apparent from, for exam ple, Lang- 
ton  (1984). Langton, as Herm an before him , senses th a t there  m ust be some­
thing wrong w ith the  m yth. Langton’s version of the  m y th  seems a  little  more 
garbled—he cites the  embedding of a UCM as a criterion for non-triviality in 
self-reproduction, bu t he m ay m ean this in Codd’s sense (which refers, in  effect, 
to  a universal com putational power, and is thus ultim ately  related  to  B urks’ ver­
sion). In any case, Langton stipulates th a t th is criterion is not satisfactory for 
various reasons. W ith  this I agree whole-heartedly. B ut in contrast to  Herm an 
(assuming they are talking about essentially the  same thing) Langton feels th a t 
the  criterion is too strong ra ther than  too weak. He therefore goes on to  propose, 
as a replacem ent criterion, th a t we require only th a t self-reproduction involve 
separate processes of “copying” and “decoding” a description. In th is way he 
manages to  preserve the  superficial form of von N eum ann’s analysis, while cu t­
ting out its heart; for Langton describes an autom aton  which still has a  vaguely 
von Neumann-like m echanism  of self-reproduction; bu t in which the  description 
language has been so impoverished th a t there are absolutely no A -m utations 
which would yield another, different, b u t still self-reproducing, autom aton. On 
my in terpretation this m ust be seen as a cruel (though of course unintentional) 
parody of von N eum ann’s work, which could not possibly have been proposed 
if von Neum ann’s true  problem  (rather th an  the  m yth) had  been properly un­
derstood. It is all the  m ore ironic when viewed in  the  light of a subsequent 
paper (Langton 1986), when this intrinsically deficient (by Von N eum ann’s cri­
terion) self-reproducing autom aton is again described, bu t this tim e followed by 
an extended discussion of the  possibility of a  Darwinian evolution process among 
self-reproducing au tom ata—a discussion in which Langton fails entirely to  recog­
nise the deep problems which this raises, a t least some of which von N eum ann 
had long before not only recognised bu t solved!
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To conclude this discussion: I assert th a t there is a von Neum ann m yth , which 
seriously mistakes the  nature  of the  problem which von Neum ann confronted (and 
solved); th a t it is pernicious and persistent; and th a t it has seriously ham pered, if 
not completely preem pted, further progress in  the  direction of realising artificial 
Darwinism. I emphasise again th a t m y criticism  here is not at all directed at 
the  people who have subscribed to  the  m yth: it is purely of the  objective m yth  
itself. I believe th a t it has caused considerable dam age, and th a t is why I have 
felt justified in expending so m uch effort on its identification, elaboration, and 
refutation.
I hope th a t I am  correct in m y analysis; and, if so, th a t the  m yth  can now 
finally be dispelled.
4 .3  A  N e w  P r o b lem  S itu a tio n
4.3.1 Pa: T he P rob lem  o f Autonomy
Von Neum ann’s form ulation and solution of som e  of the  fundam ental problems 
underlying the  (Darwinian) growth of complexity in  form al (or artificial) systems 
was a  very substantial achievement. But it still falls far short of a  complete 
solution of the  problems I subsume under the  phrase A rtificia l Darwinism . I 
should therefore like to  sum m arise here m y view of the  new problem  situation 
which arises as a result of von N eum ann’s work, and identify, albeit ra ther crudely, 
one particular new problem , which I shall call the  problem  of autonomy, or Pa.
Von Neum ann (and various successors) established th a t a (U)GM  could be 
em bedded in his 29-state cellular A-system and, indeed, th a t the  existence of 
a  set of A-reproducers could thus be established which would be connected un­
der A -m utation (albeit no A -m utational mechanism  was explicitly built into the  
A-system), and which could fairly reasonably be described as spanning an indefi­
nitely  large range of A-complexity. This A-system therefore satisfies som e  condi­
tions which are arguably necessary for the spontaneous growth of A-complexity 
by Darwinian evolution (which is not, of course, to  say th a t von N eum ann’s 
particular means of m eeting these conditions are “necessary” ). Exhibiting this 
possibility exhausts the  scope of Pv, as I defined it.
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In this new situation one new question or problem  which im m ediately presents 
itself is this: will von N eum ann’s A-system in fa c t exhibit a  spontaneous growth in 
the  A-complexity of A-reproducers, by Darwinian evolution (when once “seeded” 
w ith an initial A-reproducer)? Indeed, will it exhibit D arwinian evolution of the 
A-reproducers a t all (w ith or w ithout a growth of A-complexity)?
The first point to  m ake in relation to  th is is th a t, as far as I am  aware, 
i t  has never been empirically tested. Indeed, not even th e  operation of a  sin­
gle A-reproducer on the  von Neum ann design has been so tested. According to  
Kemeny (1955, p. 66) Von N eum ann’s basic A-reproducer would occupy about 
200,000 cells (a size dom inated by what I have called the  A-descriptor, which 
stretches out for a linear distance of about 150,000 cells). Thus, to  im plem ent27 a 
large enough example of this A-system to  support not ju s t a  single A-reproducer, 
bu t a sufficient population of such A-reproducers th a t they  m ay in teract and form 
competing S-lineages— and thus to  potentially allow for Darwinian evolution— 
would be a very daunting task. M atters would not be dram atically  b e tte r for the 
alternative cellular A-systems of, say, Codd (1968) or Berlekamp et al. (1982); 
although the individual cells are simpler in the  la tte r systems, the  size of config­
uration required to  realise a  von Neum ann style A-reproducer would be (more or 
less) correspondingly larger.
The second point to  m ake is th a t there seems to  be little  doubt as to  the 
outcome which can be expected from such tests: unless special ad hoc measures 
are taken to  preem pt any substantive interactions between the  A-reproducer(s) 
they  will destroy each other quite quickly, and any initial population will become 
extinct. The population m ight be sustained, or m ight even grow, if interactions 
are effectively prevented, bu t th a t would defeat the  purpose by preem pting n a tu ­
ral selection,28 and thus Darwinian evolution. In  any case, there will not be any 
significant Darwinian growth in A-complexity.
It would be m ildly interesting to  see these predictions tested; but there  is good
27There is, perhaps, room for argument about the meaning of “implement” in this context— 
specifically, whether a “simulation” on, say, a conventional, serial, computer would qualify. 
However, I consider that to be a sterile essentialist argument, and will not take it up. In 
this particular case, the reader is invited to adopt whichever meaning she prefers; it will not 
materially affect the conclusions.
28I shall continue to refer to “natural” selection, even within “artificial” systems, consistent 
with the abstract interpretation discussed in (McMullin 1992a).
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reason for believing th a t such tests are unnecessary. It seems to  be quite clear 
th a t all these A-reproducers, in the various (cellular) A-systems I have m entioned, 
are extrem ely fragile. The self-reproducing behaviour relies on the  surrounding 
space being essentially quiescent, and on there  being no interference from  other, 
active, configurations. W hile simple procedures could be adopted such th a t, 
from an initial seed A-reproducer, the  offspring are all carefully located so as 
not to  interfere w ith each other, or their subsequent offspring etc., th is would 
preem pt the  kind of direct and indirect interactions which are essential to  the  
operation of natu ral selection. If, on the  contrary, more or less unrestrained 
interactions were allowed, the  A-reproducers would very quickly destroy each 
other, and m ake the  environm ent uninhabitable. T he basic von Neum ann design 
of genetic A-reproducer, and comparable designs for the  o ther cellular A-systems, 
whatever their positive m erits (and they are substantial, as we have seen), lack 
any capability to  protect or m aintain their own in tegrity  in the  face of even m inor 
perturbations. In m y view therefore, they could not possibly survive in any bu t 
the  m ost strictly  controlled environments; which is to  say th a t they  could not 
effectively dem onstrate the  operation of natural selection.
Von N eum ann him self clearly acknowledged th a t this was the  case for his cel­
lular model. An extended discussion appears in (von N eum ann 1966b, Sections 
1.7, 1.8). There he explicitly accepted th a t any substantive interaction between 
two of his A-reproducers would be likely to  cause “an unforeseeable class of m al­
functions . . .  corrupting all reproduction” (p. 129), and th a t a  sim ilar result could 
be expected if the surrounding space for an A-reproducer were not initially quies­
cent (p. 130); and he did elaborate ad hoc m ethods whereby all such interactions 
could be avoided, such th a t descendents “will be d istinct and non-interfering en­
tities” (p. 127). He did, separately and briefly, suggest th a t Darwinian evolution 
could be “considered” in the  context of his models, b u t then  adm itted  th a t “the 
conditions under which it  can be effective here m ay be quite com plicated ones” 
(p. 131); w ith the  benefit of hindsight this now appears to  have been something 
of an understatem ent.
I do not claim th a t these various A-systems cannot support genuinely robust 
or viable A-reproducers of any sort. However, I  do suspect this m ay be the 
case, simply due to  the  fragility of the underlying cell states—they can typically
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be disrupted by almost any perturbation. Again, von Neum ann suggested as 
much, commenting th a t this m ay be, in  p a rt a t least, “the  price one has to  
pay for the  sim plicity obtained by our elim ination of kinem atics” (von Neum ann 
1966b, p. 130). I m ay say th a t, in this respect, the  cells of von N eum ann’s 
original cellular A-system, though m ore com plicated th an  those of o ther cellular 
A-systems subsequently proposed, were certainly m ore robust—m uch closer, in 
this respect, to  von N eum ann’s informal kinem atic A-system. However this, on 
its own, would surely not suffice to  m ake the  basic, genetic, A-reproducer(s) even 
in  von N eum ann’s cellular A-system, as described by von N eum ann, Burks and 
Thatcher, genuinely viable; and this situation could only be worse for those A- 
systems where the  underlying cell states are individually m ore fragile.
Having said th a t, I do not wish to  lay any great stress on th is issue of the  
fragility or otherwise of the  prim itive cells (or, m ore generally, A -parts) in  an A- 
system. I fully accept the  general conclusions from, for example, Langton’s (1986) 
extensive review of th is question in  the  particu lar context of cellular A-systems. 
To paraphrase very roughly, it  will only be if there is some kind of compromise 
( “balance” is Langton’s word) between fragility and, we m ay say, rigidity, in the 
properties of the  A -parts th a t the  existence of A-machines having a wide variety 
of A-complexity will be possible at all. My point however is th a t there m ay be an 
almost literal danger here of missing the  wood for the  trees. W hile we certainly 
need some kind of suitable “trees” (A -parts of appropriate potentialities), th is by 
no means autom atically solves the problem  of building a  “wood” (viable, robust, 
A-reproducers).
Thus we m ay say th a t designing “good” A -parts seems like a  step in the  right 
direction—but it is a  step of unknown size, and it might be exceedingly small 
compared to  the  journey ahead. My own view, for w hat it is w orth (and I con­
jecture th a t this was also von N eum ann’s view) is th a t the  design of satisfactory 
A-parts is an almost triv ial problem: the  difficult th ing is to  organise these into 
complex, coherent, entities which can protect their own integrity in  m ore or less 
hostile environments. Von Neum ann solved (or, a t least, showed the  possibility 
of solving) the  problem  of how such complex A-machines could reproduce; and, 
in  particular, how they could reproduce in a  m anner which would support (the 
possibility of) a  Darwinian growth of A-complexity. He did not solve w hat is, in
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its  way, a prior problem: th a t of how such A-machines could sustain themselves 
a t all. This is w hat I am  calling the problem  of autonom y ; and I venture to  
suggest th a t it is m uch the  harder problem.
I m ay also m ention here the  VENUS system  described by Rasmussen et al. 
(1990). Technically, VENUS is the  nam e for a sim ulator of one specific exam ple of 
a m ore general class of A-system, which Rasmussen et al. refer to  as Coreworlds. 
However, for convenience in w hat follows I shall use VENUS to  refer loosely to  bo th  
the  sim ulator proper and the  Coreworld which it sim ulates.
The VENUS Coreworld consists of an array of cells or m em ory locations (the 
“Core” ) in which reside instructions taken from  a specified instruction set (Red 
Code), which is somewhat reminiscent of the  instruction  set of a  simple m odern 
com puter. Instruction pointers, or v irtual execution units, can execute these 
instructions. Instruction pointers m ay be dynam ically created and destroyed 
(subject to a fixed m axim um ). Execution of any given instruction can freely affect 
other m em ory locations w ithin some fixed radius. Execution uses up resources, 
which are replenished a t a fixed rate; if insufficient resources are available for a 
given instruction pointer to  continue execution (typically due to  the  existence of 
too m any other instruction pointers in the  same general region) then  the  pointer 
will be destroyed. Various effects in VENUS are stochastic ra ther th an  strictly  
deterministic.
In  VENUS th e re  is no sim ple no tion  of w hat con stitu te s  an  A -m achine; b u t 
roughly  speaking, one or m ore instruc tion  po in ters, to g e th er w ith  som e associated 
segm ent of core contain ing p articu la r in struc tions, m ay  be regarded  as an  A- 
m achine.
Rasmussen et al. exhibit a single A-reproducer which can be em bedded in 
VENUS. This is based on an original design by Chip W endell called MICE (Dewd- 
ney 1987). This does not have the von Neum ann self-reproducing architecture. 
Instead it uses something m ore akin to  reproduction by self-inspection. This can 
be coerced into the  von Neum ann framework by regarding an A-machine as its 
own A-descriptor. This is feasible in the  simple one-dimensional VENUS. It suffers 
by comparison to  the  m ore general von Neum ann m odel in th a t it  does not allow 
any flexibility in the  genetic network; in particular, we cannot directly introduce
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the  idea of Genetic Pluralism . Nonetheless, in the  particu lar case of VENUS, it 
seems clear th a t the  space of A-machines (which is to  say A-descriptors) will, in 
fact, include a subspace of A-reproducers, derived from  the  MICE A-reproducer, 
which are “close” to  each other under a  reasonable in terpre ta tion  of A -m utation. 
T hat is, it seems likely th a t VENUS does allow a solution to  Pv, though only weakly 
following von N eum ann’s schema.
The advantage of VENUS over the  other A-systems m entioned above is th a t, as 
a result of the  relatively greater complexity of the  individual cells, the  sim plicity 
of the  geom etry of the  cellular space, and the  relatively simplified (non-genetic) 
scheme of self-reproduction proposed, the  basic self-reproducing A-machine is 
quite small—occupying only eight cells (mem ory locations, or A -parts). Em pirical 
investigation of VENUS is thus quite feasible and it is precisely the  results of one 
such investigation which are reported in (Rasmussen et al. 1990).
For my purposes the key result is this: the  simple A-reproducer (MICE) de­
scribed above was not viable. If VENUS is seeded w ith  a  single instance of this A- 
reproducer the  population initially expands rapidly, bu t then  these offspring in ter­
fere with and corrupt each other, leading the  population to  become extinct and /o r 
sterile. In none of the  tests reported did self-reproducing behaviour survive this 
initial transient. This directly illustrates and supports m y claim  th a t, surely, 
the  same fate would befall the  vastly m ore complex and fragile A-reproducers 
proposed by von Neum ann, Burks, Thatcher, etc.
The problem  Pa m ay thus be stated  as follows: we wish to  exhibit an A-system  
which still retains the  positive features which allowed a  solution of Pv—the  restric­
tion to  a “small” set of “simple” A -parts, the  existence (in principle a t least) of a 
set of A-reproducers spanning a wide range of A-complexity, connected under A- 
m utation, etc.—but which additionally satisfies a  requirem ent th a t a t least some 
of these A-reproducers (a subset still spanning a wide range of A-complexity) 
should be able to  establish viable populations in th e  face of “reasonable” envi­
ronm ental perturbations, including, a t the very least, fairly arb itrary  interactions 
w ith other A-reproducers. T hat is, we should like to  see natu ra l selection occur­
ring (rather than  the  A-reproducers being artificially prevented from interacting 
w ith each other, or sim ply going extinct). A-reproducers satisfying these condi­
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tions could, I suggest, be reasonably term ed A-organisms.29
Pa does not have quite the  crisp and explicit m otivation which von Neum ann 
was able to  cite for Pv (the apparent paradox of evolutionary growth of biological 
complexity). Nonetheless, I  think it is clear th a t Pa is a  good and interesting 
problem, and we could learn very m uch even from  partia l solutions of it. As I 
have m entioned, I also th ink  it a very hard  problem ; b u t of course, we learn very 
little  from the  solution of easy problems.
As w ith Pv before it, Pa is not strictly  formalisable; it relies particularly  on 
an informal notion of what would represent “reasonable” environm ental p e rtu r­
bation. And of course, I m ust emphasise yet again th a t, even if Pa could be 
solved m ore or less satisfactorily, it would not, in itself, m ean th a t we could yet 
exhibit a Darwinian growth of A-complexity (or A-knowledge) in an artificial 
system: that would rely (among other things) on a  correlation between S-value 
and A-complexity. B ut a solution to  Pa would surely give us a  vehicle for the 
investigation of this deeper and more fundam ental issue: for D arwinian natu ra l 
selection is precisely our best known exam ple of a selective process having this 
characteristic—or, a t least, so we conjecture.
Pa is well known in  various forms; it m ight even be said to  subsum e all the 
problems of biological organisation, not to  m ention the  problems of cybernetics, 
robotics, or even Engineering and Technology as a  whole. More particularly, it is 
closely related to  the  problem  of w hat Packard (1989) calls intrinsic adaptation. 
Similarly, Farm er & d ’A. Belin (1992) have explicitly identified Pa (or at least 
something very m uch like it) as “probably the  central problem  in  the  study of 
Artificial Life” .
I do not, of course, pretend to  solve P0; m y intention is sim ply to  leave it 
exposed as a  kind of bedrock th a t underlies m any other things I have discussed, 
and will yet discuss. Indeed, in its way, Pa m ay be almost coextensive w ith  the 
entire problem  of Artificial Knowledge and its growth. For w hat distinguishes an 
A-organism from an A-reproducer—its autonom ous ability to  survive in  a  m ore 
or less hostile world, a  world lacking any “pre-established harm ony” (Popper fc
29I mean that this is “reasonable” only in the sense that it seems not to do too much further 
violence to the English language; but, of course, I should not be read as making any metaphysical 
claims for having finally, definitively, isolated the one true essence of life here. A word is a word 
is a word.
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Eccles 1977, p. 184)—is precisely w hat I refer to  as its A(rtificial)-knowledge; and 
what Pa demands is th a t we exhibit an A-reproducer w ith “enough” initial A- 
knowledge to  allow a t least the possibility for A-knowledge to  then  show further 
spontaneous, and open-ended, evolutionary growth.
I th ink  th a t the  von Neumann m yth  has, to  some extent inhibited work on Pa; 
but there have, nonetheless, been various experim ents and theories which m ay be 
said to  have, deliberately or otherwise, addressed P„. The following sections will 
be concerned w ith a  critical review of a selection of these. I shall suggest th a t 
there has been some progress, bu t th a t it  is still of a very lim ited kind. W ith  
this background, I shall then  finally form ulate a  suggestion for a particu lar kind 
of indirect a ttack, which will serve to  conclude the  chapter.
4.3.2 T he G enetic A lgorithm
Burks explicitly identified John Holland as continuing von N eum ann’s work re­
lating to  evolutionary (Darwinian) processes in au tom ata  systems (Burks 1970b, 
p. xxiv). We m ay suppose therefore th a t H olland’s work would be likely to  address 
Pa. In fact, Holland has developed a num ber of quite distinct lines of enquiry in 
this general field; bu t th a t w ith which he is m ost closely identified is the  idea of 
the so-called Genetic Algorithm  (Holland 1975), and this section will be devoted 
exclusively to  consideration of i t .30
“Genetic Algorithm s” now come in m any varieties, bu t I shall nonetheless 
refer simply to  “the” Genetic Algorithm, to  encompass all those variants which are 
more or less closely modelled upon, and largely derive their theoretical inspiration 
from, Holland’s original formulation.
To anticipate m y conclusion: it  seems to  m e th a t the  problem  Holland sought 
to solve w ith the  Genetic Algorithm is essentially disjoint from m y P0; it will 
follow (more or less) th a t, while the Genetic Algorithm  m ay (or m ay not) be 
successful in  solving its own problem, it can be discounted as offering any solution 
to  Pa. None of this is intended as any criticism  of Holland himself, for (as far as 
I can see) he has never claimed th a t the  Genetic A lgorithm  did solve Pa. Indeed, 
although I sta te  m y argum ent in the  specific context of the  Genetic Algorithm,
30I shall introduce quite a different suggestion of Holland’s, the so-called a-Universes, in the 
concluding section of this chapter.
the  fact th a t it is really directed a t the  underlying problem  situation ra th e r th an  
at this particular a ttem pted  solution means th a t it should be taken to  apply 
mutatis mutandis to  a variety of other work also.
Thus, I review the  Genetic Algorithm, not to  criticise it, bu t to  clarify th a t 
it is irrelevant to  my purposes. This is necessary as appearances m ight o ther­
wise be deceptive: as noted, Burks specifically identified Holland as continuing 
von N eum ann’s programme; and Holland’s work does, in some sense, involve the 
artificial realisation of processes of biological evolution. W ithout quibbling over 
words, I want to  establish th a t the  aspects of biological evolution preserved in 
the  Genetic Algorithm  are not those which are directly relevant to  Pa.
4.3.2.1 Holland’s Problem (Ph)
I have already reviewed the  underlying philosophical com m itm ents of Holland 
and his colleagues (Holland et al. 1986) in the  previous chapter (section 3.8.3). 
I concluded there th a t the  processes which Holland et al. describe as inductive 
are, precisely, processes of unjustified variation in the  sense of UVSR; bu t I quite 
accept th a t, in given circumstances, some such processes m ay do “be tte r” than  
others (in the  sense of generating conjectures which are “biased” tow ard the 
tru th ). The form ulation and comparison of processes in this respect is w hat I am  
here calling Holland’s problem  or Ph, and I recognise it as a  genuine and difficult 
problem.
The im portant point for my purposes is this: the  growth of knowledge requires 
two things—unjustified variation and selective retention (reflective of “verisimil­
itude” ). Ph concentrates almost exclusively on the  former, whereas Pa concen­
tra tes  almost equally exclusively on the  la tte r. My problem  (encapsulated in 
Pa) is not concerned at all w ith the  rival “m erits” of different heuristics or 
generators or sources of variation (though it requires th a t some such sources 
of variation m ust exist); ra ther it is concerned alm ost exclusively w ith selec­
tion mechanisms—indeed, w ith one particular selection mechanism , th a t of D ar­
winian natural selection.31 I am  not arguing here for some preeminence of either
31 There is, as always, no claim that, for example, Darwinian, natural, selection, is guaranteed 
to select for “verisimilitude” ; merely that it sometimes might, and is, moreover, the best, if not 
the only, example we know.
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problem—the growth of knowledge relies on at least p artia l solutions to  both; I 
merely hope to  have established th a t they  are d istinct.
4 .3 .2 .2  Pv A g a in . ..
I contend th a t Pv can be viewed as a  special case of Ph". it  is, precisely, Ph applied 
to  the  case of the  growth of (inate) knowledge by Darwinian processes (whether 
in na tu ra l or artificial systems).
More specifically, Pv m ight be resta ted  as follows. In  order for A-complexity 
(A-knowledge) to  grow by Darwinian m eans there  m ust be a process (A -m utation) 
whereby A-reproducers of greater A-complexity can spontaneously arise from 
parents of lesser A-complexity. Prim a facie, this is v irtually  inconceivable. It is 
difficult enough to  see how a complex A-machine can successfully reproduce a t all; 
bu t given th a t some can, we certainly expect these to  be very m uch the  exception 
ra ther th an  the rule. T hat is, if we th ink  of A-machines as being identified w ith 
points in a  space of “possible” A-machines, then  we expect the  A-reproducers to  
be extrem ely sparse in this space. Assuming th a t some such space will adequately 
represent the  relationships between A-machines under any particu lar process of 
variation, then the very low (average) density of A-reproducers in the  space seems 
to  suggest th a t the possibility of a variation in any one A-reproducer giving rise 
even to  another A-reproducer (never m ind one of greater A-complexity) m ust be 
quite negligible.
Von N eum ann’s schema solves Pv essentially by pointing out th a t, via an 
A-reproducer architecture based on the  use of a “genetic” (i.e. programmable) 
constructor, one can decouple the geom etry of a variational space of A-reproducers 
from all the  peculiarities of the  particu lar A-parts etc. in  use. Once this is done, it 
becomes almost a triv ial m a tte r to  exhibit a space (which, in  effect, characterises 
some process of spontaneous variation) w ith the property  th a t, although the  A- 
reproducers m ay still be ra ther sparse on average, they  are concentrated into a 
very small subspace so th a t the  density is locally high. W hich is a  roundabout way 
of saying th a t the  spontaneous transform ation of one A-reproducer into another 
A-reproducer (as opposed to  a transform ation into another A-machine which is 
not an A-reproducer) is quite possible— perhaps even “likely” .
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The key insight here is th a t the  von Neum ann self-reproducing architecture, 
based on reasonably “powerful” genetic machines, allows such a de-coupling; it al­
lows a “designer” space as it were, which can be so-configured th a t A-reproducers 
are “close” together. Indeed, once this self-reproducing architecture is proposed, 
it almost becomes difficult to  see how the  A-reproducers could fa il to  be close to  
each other in the relevant variational space (i.e. the  space of A-descriptors).
Granted, von Neum ann himself never quite expressed m atte rs  in  th is way. 
However, he certainly recognised th a t the  use of A-descriptors (i.e. the  use of 
a fairly sharp genotype/phenotype decomposition) in his self-reproducing archi­
tecture was very im portant; explicit comments on this appear in  (von N eum ann 
1966a, p. 84) and (von Neum ann 1966b, pp. 122-123). In  any case, regardless of 
his intentions, the  fact remains th a t his schema solves a  m ost substantive element 
of Ph (as in terpreted  in the  context of Darwinian evolution).
We m ay say th a t Ph is still not “com pletely” solved of course. Von Neum ann 
shows us firstly (and crucially) how a more or less arb itrary  variational network 
or space can be overlaid on a set of A-machines; and he shows, secondly, a partic­
ular way of doing this such th a t set(s) of A-reproducers can be identified whose 
elements are “close” to  each other. W hile this allows us to  say th a t a given A- 
reproducer can plausibly be transform ed into other, distinct, A-reproducers, it 
says nothing about the  plausibility of such transform ations resulting in  increased 
A-complexity. If we think ( very informally) of some m easure of A-complexity 
being superimposed on the genetic space we m ay expect th a t, even still, the  A- 
reproducers of “high” A-complexity m ay be very sparse in  the  space; so th a t it 
may seem th a t the  likelihood of variations yielding increased A-complexity would 
still be quite negligible.
T hat this is the  point at issue in  the  Genetic A lgorithm  is em phasised by other 
elements of the  problem  situation which underlay Holland’s work. As noted  in the 
previous chapter, the  general notion of using vaguely “Darwinian” processes to  
achieve the  growth of artificial knowledge had already received substantive prior 
investigation, bu t w ith mediocre results (e.g. Friedberg 1958; Friedberg et al. 
1959; Fogel et al. 1966). W hile Friedberg et al. were com m endably honest about 
this, Fogel et al. were, perhaps, less forthright. Lindsay’s review of the  work of 
Fogel et al. (Lindsay 1968) was harshly critical, and was arguably responsible for
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the v irtual abandonm ent of any “Darwinian” approach for several years. Lindsay 
explicitly a ttrib u ted  the failure of such approaches to  the  relative sparsity of 
entities of high complexity in  the  relevant spaces.
Now one possible way of tackling this problem  would be to  try  to  handcraft 
the  genetic space even further (beyond w hat had been explained by von Neu­
m ann), so th a t A-reproducers of “high” A-complexity would be dense, in at 
least some regions. This seems ra ther to  beg the  question however, for it ef­
fectively asks the  designer to  already know the  relative complexities of all the 
A-reproducers involved. An alternative approach is to  ask for m ore sophisticated 
procedures for negotiating th is space (which is assumed to  be given, and not to 
have A-reproducers of “high” A-complexity already conveniently packed closely 
together), th an  the  simple, purely local, transform ations im plied by the  notion 
of A -m utation as so far discussed. We shall see th a t th is is, a t least roughly, the 
idea of the  Genetic Algorithm.
However: the  crucial point, for my purposes, is th a t none of th is—neither 
von N eum ann’s solution of the  original Pv , nor Holland’s solution (if solution 
it be) of the  enhanced form of Pv represented by Ph— addresses the  core issue 
of selection fo r  verisimilitude. Indeed, it does not even identify selection as a 
problem. Conversely, selection is the  substantive new issue being raised in Pa. 
Thus, whereas Ph takes selection as relatively unproblem atic, and concentrates 
on variation, Pa takes variation as relatively unproblem atic and concentrates on 
selection (specifically, na tu ra l selection).
Still: this argum ent does not yet quite m ake Ph and Pa disjoint. In particular, 
it does not necessarily m ean th a t the  Genetic A lgorithm  is, as I  claim , irrelevant to 
Pa. The Genetic Algorithm  is inspired by certain  aspects of biological evolution; 
so, notw ithstanding the fact th a t it was not form ulated w ith Pa in m ind, it (or 
a t least its  applications) m ight still address Pa to  some extent. Therefore, I shall 
now briefly outline the  Genetic Algorithm, comment on how it can, perhaps, be 
regarded as a partia l solution to  Ph, bu t then  show how it  is hardly  relevant to 
Pa-
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4.3.2.3 W hat is the G enetic Algorithm?
Suppose th a t there exists a  population of entities, which Holland calls structures, 
but which, for m y purposes, will be equated w ith A-reproducers. Suppose th a t, 
associated w ith each such A-reproducer there is an A-descriptor, in the  sense of 
a da ta  storage subsystem  whose contents rem ain essentially sta tic  for the  lifetime 
of any single A-reproducer, and which establish (describe) th e  com plete structure 
and organisation of th a t A-reproducer. Associated w ith  each A -reproducer there 
m ust also a m easure of its “degree of adaptation” , which Holland norm ally calls 
fitness ; I shall take th is to  be equivalent to  A-knowledge in  m y term s.
The Genetic Algorithm  m ay then  be described as follows:
1. Arrange (somehow) th a t the  to ta l population size is lim ited to  some m axi­
m um  value.
2. Arrange (somehow) th a t the  A-reproducers do, indeed reproduce; bu t th a t, 
furtherm ore, the  relative reproductive success of each A-reproducer is pro­
portional to  its A-knowledge. T h a t is to  say th a t if we th ink , roughly, in 
term s of discrete generations, the  expected relative num ber of surviving off­
spring for any A-reproducer will be proportional to  its relative A-knowledge.
3. Arrange (somehow) th a t, in the  process of reproduction, the  A-descriptors 
are subject to  certain  specified kinds of transform ations, or “genetic oper­
ators” . These would include something essentially equivalent to  w hat has 
previously been term ed A -m utation, bu t would also include som ething akin 
to  recom bination in biological organisms. Holland refers to  the  la tte r as a 
crossover operator; I shall call it A-crossover. I t denotes the  construction 
of an offspring A-descriptor by splicing together segments taken from two 
distinct, parental, A-descriptors. The use of some form  of A-crossover is 
the  m ost distinctive characteristic of the  Genetic Algorithm.
4.3 .2 .4  W hat good is th e G enetic A lgorithm ?
The Genetic Algorithm  preserves (im plicitly), from the  prior solution of Pv, the 
notion of A-descriptors as passive subsystem s, which can therefore be used, via 
the  definition of the  description language, to  configure A-machines in general, and
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A-reproducers in particular, into a  m ore or less arb itra ry  genetic space, having 
the  property  th a t A-reproducers are close together in  th is space.
Indeed, applications of the  Genetic A lgorithm  are commonly arranged so th a t 
only A-reproducers inhabit the  genetic space—i.e. an a rb itrary  transform ation 
of a  point in  the  space is guaranteed to  yield another A-reproducer. This cor­
responds, in  the  von Neum ann model, to  disallowing A -m utations (or any other 
kind of genetic transform ations) affecting those parts  of th e  A-descriptors coding 
for the  core m achinery (<70): essentially, a tten tion  is restricted  to  th a t p art of 
the A-descriptor coding for th e  “ancillary” m achinery (x  e  X ) .  Von N eum ann’s 
work m andates this kind of assum ption in the  sense th a t von N eum ann showed 
(by concrete example) th a t a descriptor language could be im plem ented which 
allowed A-descriptors to  be factored or decomposed in th is way. However, it is 
w orth noting th a t to  adopt th is view is tan tam ount to  adopting Genetic Abso­
lutism ; it is therefore a  somewhat restrictive decision, as discussed in  section 4.2.6 
above.
In any case, the  key novelty which the  Genetic A lgorithm  introduces is th a t 
transform ations of the  A-descriptors are no longer lim ited to  the  k ind of local A- 
m utations envisaged in von N eum ann’s schema, b u t are now expanded to  include 
A-crossover. A-crossover allows relatively “large” transform ations to  be tried  
out in genetic space. The significant difference between A-crossover and simply 
increasing the  A -m utation ra te  (per A -part in the  A-descriptor— which would 
ultim ately  allow similarly large transform ations) is th a t the  transform ations to  
be tried  are severely constrained. Roughly speaking, only points which are a cross 
between existing points will be sam pled via A-crossover. The conjecture is th a t, 
in m any cases of practical interest, th is kind of transform ation will be “b e tte r” 
th an  any com parable kind of A -m utation, in term s of the  A-complexity of the  
transform ed A-reproducers.
Of course, th is is not the  whole story. The Genetic Algorithm  introduces w hat 
I have elsewhere (McMullin 1992a) called bimodal procreation—th e  idea th a t a  
single offspring has m ultiple parents. This, in tu rn , allows intersecting S-lineages, 
and means th a t a  num ber (possibly a  large num ber) of S-lineage selection r  
cesses can go on concurrently w ithin a single population. Holland ha*' 
considerable emphasis on this point, referring to  it as intrinsic par'
195
land 1975) an d /o r im plicit parallelism  (Holland 1986). In explaining th is Holland 
introduces the  concept of a schema , being a  set of A-descriptors which are “iden­
tical” in certain  specified respects; it is essentially identical to  Dawkins’ (1976) 
notion of a “selfish gene” , and corresponds, in  m y term s, to  a tag  identifying a 
particular S-lineage. Holland’s point is then  th a t any single A-reproducer will be 
an elem ent of m any schem ata, and thus its reproductive success (or otherwise) 
can simultaneously contribute to  m any different S-lineage selection processes.
I have previously argued, a t length, th a t, in the  presence of epistasis, the 
operation of th is kind of concurrent selection m ay become problem atic (McMullin 
1992c, esp. section 7.2.1). This is particularly  so if selection involves Sewall 
W right’s process of shifting balance (e.g. W right 1982). I t seems to  m e suggestive 
th a t a t least one application of a  form of the  Genetic Algorithm  (M uhlenbein et al. 
1988) actually involved deliberate modifications of the  population s tructu re  which 
were very reminiscent of the  conditions required for a shifting balance process to  
operate. M uhlenbein has recently m ade th is connection w ith  the  Shifting Balance 
process m ore explicit (M uhlenbein 1992).
However, be th a t as it may, it is not central to  m y concerns here. Let us accept 
th a t intrinsic parallelism  m ay be a significant and useful effect. This will be m ost 
obvious in  the  case th a t there is little  or no epistasis; and in  th a t case (a t least) 
the  operation of intrinsic parallelism  can be viewed as involving the  indepen­
dent, concurrent, selection of relatively short segments of A-descriptors (which 
are largely undisturbed by A-crossover) which, as they  come to  dom inate the 
population, are autom atically joined together (by the  operation of A-crossover). 
This is the  so-called “building block hypothesis” concerning the  operation of the 
Genetic Algorithm  (Goldberg 1989, 41-45); situations (such as m entioned in  the 
previous paragraph) in which this hypothesis m ay not hold are then  generally 
referred to  as GA-deceptive (Goldberg 1989, pp. 46-52). The point, for m y pur­
poses, is th a t, although the  idea of intrinsic parallelism  is overtly associated w ith 
selection, its force is concerned w ith its advantages (if any) for the  generation  of 
new variation.
T hat is, even allowing for the  operation of intrinsic parallelism , the  Genetic 
A lgorithm  is strictly concerned w ith the  problem  P/, (the problem  of generating  
variation) ra ther than  w ith Pa (the problem  of selecting  variation). Pa is not con­
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cerned a t all w ith the  selection “dynamics” as such; it is concerned w ith selection 
criteria ; and these are not addressed a t all by the  Genetic A lgorithm  (in itself). 
Somewhat the same point has been m ade previously by, for exam ple, M uhlenbein 
(1989). The point is manifest in m y particular form ulation of the  Genetic Algo­
rithm  in the  previous section, where it is simply stipulated  th a t reproductive 
success (and thus, eventually, selection) is conditioned by A-knowledge—without 
any comment on how this can be achieved in practice.
None of this rules out the  possibility th a t a  particu lar application  of the  Ge­
netic Algorithm  might address Pa. Since every such application m ust involve 
some selection criteria, these m ay  be the  kind of criteria  sought by Pa. As it 
happens, I am  not aware of any such applications: selection is typically per­
formed relative to  a “fitness” function, which m ay be explicit or im plicit, s tatic  
or dynam ic, b u t which ultim ately  reflects criteria established by the  researcher 
ra ther th an  criteria emerging spontaneously w ithin the  A-system  itself (i.e. they 
do not incorporate natural selection). In other words, w hatever growth of knowl­
edge occurs in these systems is parasitic upon, and constrained by, the  prior 
knowledge of the  researcher.
B ut even if some application did  address Pa in th is way, m y point is th a t 
it would not be doing so by virtue of incorporating a Genetic Algorithm; its 
relevance to  Pa would, ra ther, be an essentially independent a ttrib u te . I conclude 
th a t the  Genetic Algorithm, interesting though it m ay be in  its own dom ain, has 
nothing to  offer in the  solution of Pa.
4.3.3 C onstraining th e  Interactions
One strategy for addressing Pa is to  consider A-systems which are m ore or less 
tightly  constrained in the  kinds of interactions allowed between A-machines. In 
this way it  m ay be possible to  guarantee th a t at least some of these will be viable, 
despite allowing interactions between them . Some work has been done along these 
lines (though perhaps not consciously w ith this end in m ind) and I shall briefly 
review it here.
In the  m ost extrem e case, interactions between A-reproducers and their en­
vironm ent (or, more particularly, each other) can be effectively elim inated. This
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will certainly allow the  A-reproducers to  be “viable” . As already discussed, 
von N eum ann’s original scheme for sustained self-reproducing activ ity  was of this 
sort. Similar concepts were subsequently proposed by Laing (1975) and Lang- 
ton (1986). B ut, as already m entioned, th is simply sidesteps ra th e r th an  solves 
Pa: there  can be no selection at all in these system s, never m ind selection for 
verisimilitude. To pu t it another way, once variation is allowed at all, it is v irtu ­
ally certain  th a t the variant A-reproducers will no longer stay isolated from each 
other, and th a t all self-reproducing activity  will quickly be destroyed.
The A-system proposed by Packard (1989) represents a  m ore or less m inim al 
re trea t from this position. His set of A-reproducers ( “bugs” ) are loosely modelled 
on the gross functionality of chem otactic bacteria. They have a  fixed genetic 
structure consisting of just two genes, determ ining, respectively, their “food” 
threshold for undergoing reproduction, and the  num ber of offspring resulting from 
a single act of reproduction. O ther than  these two characteristics all bugs are 
identical. Bugs exist in a two dimensional environm ent. No  d irect interactions 
between bugs are allowed— only indirect interactions via food consum ption.
Due to  the  severely circumscribed interactions or perturbations between bugs 
and their environm ent they are generally m ore or less viable; b u t the  allowed 
interaction is, indeed, sufficient to  allow a m inim al degree of (natural) selection. 
For the  same reason, however, the  possibility for A-knowledge to  grow in this 
A-system is also severely impoverished. N atural selection can occur—but its 
effect is lim ited to, at best, selecting a com bination of the  food threshold for 
reproduction and num ber of offspring which is best m atched to  the  characteristics 
of the  available food supply. We m ay say th a t, through the  evolution of the 
system, bugs (or, at least, bug-lineages) can, indeed, grow in  the ir A-knowledge 
of their environm ent. But this is achieved a t a cost of lim iting the  scope for such 
growth to  a  point where it is barely significant. In effect, Packard introduces 
natural selection only by abandoning von N eum ann’s achievement in the  original 
solution of Pv—namely, the  availability of a set of A-reproducers spanning an 
essentially infinite range of A-complexity (A-knowledge).
Packard of course recognises th is lim itation; indeed, it  was a  deliberate de­
cision to  a ttem p t, initially, to  design a m inim al A-system which would exhibit 
na tu ra l selection. He explicitly notes the  desirability of enhancing his A-system
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to  include “a space of individuals th a t is open, in the  sense th a t, as individuals 
change, they  could have an infinite variety of possibilities” (Packard 1989, p. 154); 
if this corresponds to  m y requirem ent for an infinite range of A-complexity (or 
A-knowledge), then  it identifies Packard’s problem  w ith  Pa. In any case, the  
point is th a t, for the  m om ent at least, Packard is still stating  the  problem  ra ther 
than  offering a  solution.
Rizki & Conrad (1985) had earlier presented a m uch m ore sophisticated 
A-system (Evolve I I I ) ,  bu t in essentially the  same genre. The range of A- 
complexity or A-knowledge is substantially wider, param eterised by fifteen dis­
tinct “phenotypic tra its” . The genotype/phenotype m apping is subject to  a de­
gree of variation also. Again, “genuine” natu ra l selection can be achieved in this 
A-system, bu t the  range of A-complexity or A-knowledge is still so sharply con­
strained th a t the  scope for sustained growth of A-knowledge is unsatisfactory. 
The RAH A-system of Taylor et al. (1989) is a m ore recent, and independent 
development, bu t seems to  share essentially the  same strengths and weaknesses.
The final system  which I wish to  discuss here is the  T i e r r a  system  described 
by Ray (1992). I note th a t this work is relatively recent, and its publication 
postdates the  rest of the analysis presented in this chapter. My discussion of 
T ie r r a  is therefore lim ited to  a prelim inary review, sufficient only to  assess its 
effect on m y central conclusions.
T ie r r a  can roughly viewed as a development of the  VENUS system  discussed 
in  section 4.3.1 above—but w ith several fundam ental modifications. Most im por­
tan tly  in the  current context, T i e r r a  involves the  im position of special constraints 
on the interactions between A-machines. In  particular, a  form  of “m em ory protec­
tion” is introduced, which prevents the  m em ory segment(s) “owned” by a given 
A-machine being pertu rbed  by other A-machines. This now allows A-reproducers 
to  be viable, bu t on its own actually makes them  “too” viable— they become in­
vulnerable. Thus, a single seed A-reproducer would quickly produce a  population 
which exhausts the  available memory, bu t there would be virtually  no further ac­
tivity; all the  A-reproducers would be, in  a certain ra th e r strained sense, “alive” ; 
bu t they could not function in any meaningful way.
To offset this, Ray introduces an autom atic m echanism  for killing A-machines 
(destroying instruction pointers and deallocating m em ory) so as to  guarantee th a t
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a pool of unallocated memory is m aintained which, in tu rn , ensures the  possibility 
of continuing activity. Very roughly speaking, this is a “m ortality” mechanism, 
operating on a FIFO  basis—the “older” an A-machine is, the  m ore likely th a t it 
will be killed in this way—though there are other factors which m ay qualify this 
to  a lim ited extent.
Tierra differs from VENUS in a variety of o ther respects also. For example, 
the  process scheduling rules in  Tierra are ra th e r sim pler th an  in VENUS. More 
substantively, although Ray continues to  use a  form of self-reproduction based on 
self-inspection (rather than  a properly genetic system  in the  von Neum ann sense), 
his instruction set (Tierran) is quite different from th e  Red Code of VENUS. Ray 
argues th a t Tierran should exhibit enhanced “evolvability” com pared to  Red 
Code. In  m y term s, Ray is com pensating for the  inflexibility associated w ith 
reproduction by self-inspection by a ttem pting  to  directly handcraft the  “pheno­
type” space. This is a  perfectly reasonable strategy; bu t again, it would seem 
preferable to  allow for full blown Genetic Pluralism  instead. In  any case, al­
though Ray places significant emphasis on the  differences between Tierran and 
Red Code, it is difficult to  assess his claims in th is regard: he does not present 
any em pirical test of the  specific hypothesis th a t Tierran has improved “evolv­
ability” com pared to  Red Code (which would involve presenting a comparison of 
systems in which the instruction set is the  only difference between them ). My 
own conjecture (equally untested) is th a t the  instruction set is of relatively little  
significance; the  crucial difference between VENUS and Tierra is, in m y view, the 
use of m em ory protection and controlled m ortality.
Unlike VENUS, self-reproduction behaviour in Tierra can generally persist for 
indefinitely long periods of tim e. This is a direct consequence of the  m em ory 
protection and controlled m ortality  mechanisms. As a result, R ay’s empirical 
investigation of Tierra has dem onstrated what I regard as sustained Darwinian 
evolutionary processes, including some ra ther dram atic phenom ena. In partic­
ular, Ray has exhibited the  emergence of various kinds of parasitism. T hat is, 
A-reproducers emerge which partially  exploit code, and possibly even instruction 
pointers, owned by other A-reproducers, in order to  complete the ir own reproduc­
tion. Ray (1991) has also reported the  emergence of A-reproducers in which m ore 
or less “complex” optim izations of the  reproduction m echanism  have occurred.
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Thus, A-knowledge has indeed grown in Tierra, by Darw inian mechanisms. 
We m ay reasonably say, for example, th a t a basic parasite  “knows” (or a t least 
“expects” ) th a t certain other A-reproducers will be present in its environm ent, 
w ith which it can interact in certain  ways in order to  com plete its  reproduc­
tion. Similarly, A-reproducers exhibiting im m unity to  certain  kinds of parasitism  
m ay be said to  “know” about those kinds of parasitism . The optim ization of 
the  reproductive m echanism, m entioned above, involves “knowing” about certain 
aspects of the  underlying process scheduling m echanism  (nam ely th a t “bigger” 
A-machines get allocated m ore CPU tim e th an  “sm aller” ones).
These are all substantive results. Tierra is a  definite im provem ent on the 
other A-systems considered in th is section, in th a t the  space of A-reproducers is 
once again very large and diverse, as it was in the original von N eum ann proposal. 
Tierra is also an improvement over the  von Neum ann proposal (and its close 
relatives) in th a t a t least some A-reproducers are viable, despite interactions 
between them , and natu ra l selection can indeed be exhibited as a  result. In  my 
view, Tierra represents the  best exam ple to  date of som ething approxim ating 
Artificial Darwinism.
On the  other hand, Tierra can hardly yet be said to  confront Pa. A Tierran 
A-machine is not, by and large, responsible for its own integrity—th a t is es­
sentially guaranteed by the  m em ory protection mechanism; so the  difficulties 
represented by Pa are not directly addressed w ithin Tierra (as it stands). In 
th is sense, the  potential for the  growth of A-knowledge in Tierra would seem 
to  be strictly  lim ited. This suspicion is borne out, a t least by th e  results so far; 
while there  has certainly been some interesting, and even surprising, growth of 
A-knowledge in my term s, it still seems to  have been very lim ited, being con­
cerned almost exclusively w ith fine tuning of reproductive efficiency. I suggest 
th a t this will continue to  be the  case, as long as the substance of Pa is effectively 
bypassed. Indeed, I m ay annunciate the  following crude, bu t general, principle: 
the  stronger are the constraints on interactions by A-reproducers (which is to  say 
the weaker the  attack  on Pa) then  the  sm aller m ust be the  scope for A-knowledge 
to  be the  subject of na tu ra l selection—for it is only by m ediating interaction th a t 
A-knowledge can a tta in  a selective value. In Tierra, of course, the  constraints 
on interaction are very strong indeed.
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4.3.4 A utopoiesis: T he O rganisation o f  th e  Living?
. . .  the process by which a  unity maintains itself is fundamentally different 
from the process by which it can duplicate itself in some form or another. 
Production does not entail reproduction, but reproduction does entail some 
form of self-maintenance or identity. In the case of von Neumann, Conway, 
and Eigen, the question of the identity or self-maintenance of the unities 
they observe in the process of reproducing and evolving is left aside and 
taken for granted; it is not the question these authors are asking a t all.
Varela (1979, p. 22)
The p a th  I have presented thus far, to  the  recognition of the  problem  of auton­
omy, P„, is a  somewhat tortuous one, proceeding via the  failure of von Neum ann 
style “self-reproducing au tom ata” to  actually support a  Darwinian, evolutionary, 
growth of complexity (or knowledge). There is an alternative, arguably more 
direct, route which has been pioneered by H um berto M aturana and Francisco 
Varela (M aturana & Varela 1980; Varela 1979).
Briefly, the  difficulty w ith  the  von Neum ann A-reproducers can be sta ted  in 
this way: they  are, evidently, “unities” only by convention, relative to  us as 
observers—they do not assert or enforce their own un ity  w ithin their dom ain 
of interactions. In fact, this is true  of what we typically call “machines” or 
“au tom ata” in general, and is a  crucial difference between such system s and those 
systems which we call “living” . This is, perhaps, clear enough on an intuitive 
level, bu t it is quite another m a tte r to  elaborate exactly  w hat th is distinction 
consists in—what does it m ean for an en tity  to  “assert” its unity. This is the 
problem  which M aturana & Varela have tackled; and we can now see th a t it is 
a  problem  in its own right, which is actually logically prior to  von N eum ann’s 
problem  of the  growth of autom aton complexity (by D arwinian evolution), as it 
queries w hat we should regard as an “autom aton” in the  first place. The solution 
which M aturana &; Varela propose is this: w hat distinguishes “living” or properly 
“autonomous” systems is th a t they are autopoietic. This is defined as follows:
The authors [M aturana & Varela 1973] first of all say th a t an autopoietic 
system is a homeostat. We already know what th a t is: a  device for holding 
a  critical systemic variable within physiological limits. They go on to  the 
definitive point: in the case of autopoietic homeostasis, the critical variable 
is the s y s te m ’s ow n org a n iza tio n . It does not m atter, it seems, whether 
every measurable property of th a t organizational structure changes utterly 
in the system’s process of continuing adaptation. I t  survives.
Beer (1973, p. 66, original emphasis)
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The autopoietic organization is defined as a  unity by a network of produc­
tions of components which (i) participate recursively in the  same network 
of productions of components which produced these components, and (ii) 
realize the network of productions as a  unity in the  space in which the 
components exist. Consider for example the case of a  cell: it is a  network 
of chemical reactions which produce molecules such th a t (i) through their 
interactions generate and participate recursively in the  same network of re­
actions which produced them , and (ii) realize the  cell as a  m aterial unity.
Thus the cell as a physical unity, topographically and operationally separa­
ble from the background, remains as such only insofar as this organization 
is continuously realized under permanent turnover of m atter, regardless of 
its changes in form and specificity of its constituent chemical reactions.
Varela et al. (1974)
Accepting, at least tentatively, this vision of w hat would properly constitute 
an “autonomous” system, m y “problem of autonom y” (Pa) can now be recast in  a 
somewhat more definite form: can we exhibit an A -system  which still retains the  
positive features which allowed a  solution of Pv—the  restriction to  a  “small” set 
of “simple” A-parts, the  existence (in principle at least) of a set of A-reproducers 
spanning a wide range of A-complexity, connected under A -m utation, etc.—bu t 
which additionally satisfies a requirem ent th a t these A-reproducers should be 
autopoietic unities?
As far as I am  aware, th is problem  has not been previously explicitly formu­
lated, m uch less solved. However, a simpler problem  has been previously tackled 
and solved: this is the  problem  of exhibiting an A -system  which can support 
autopoietic (autonomous) A-machines of any kind. The original solution was 
presented by Varela, M aturana &; Uribe (1974), and fu rther developments have 
been reported by Zeleny (1977) and Zelany & Pierre (1976). This work is also 
reviewed in (Varela 1979, C hapter 3).
The A-systems described by these workers were inspired to  an extent by the  
work of von Neum ann, and bear some sim ilarity to  two dimensional cellular au­
tom ata. However, these A-systems are also very distinctive as a  result of being 
deliberately designed to  support autopoietic organisation. In any case, I shall 
not present a detailed description here. The essential point, for my purposes, is 
th a t the possibility of exhibiting artificial autopoietic unities w ithin a suitable 
A-system has been satisfactorily dem onstrated; indeed, Zeleny (1977) has indi­
cated th a t a prim itive form of self-reproduction of such autopoietic entities m ay 
be dem onstrated (though I should emphasise th a t th is bears no significant simi­
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larity  to  the genetic self-reproduction envisaged by von Neumann; th is illustrates 
yet again the shallowness of the  idea th a t von N eum ann worked on “the” problem  
of self-reproduction as such).
It thus seems th a t the two aspects of m y Pa have been separately addressed, 
successfully, w ithin the  general framework of (two dimensional) cellular autom ata. 
T hat is, von Neum ann and his successors have shown how A-reproducers can be 
organized such th a t there  will exist an A -m utational network linking low complex­
ity  A-reproducers w ith high complexity A-reproducers, using the  idea of “genetic” 
A-descriptors; and Varela, M aturana, and others, have shown how properly robust 
or autonomous A-machines (and even A-reproducers of a kind) can be organized. 
Pa calls for bo th  these things to  be exhibited a t once. The separate results cer­
tain ly  suggest th a t the  general cellular au tom ata  framework is rich enough or 
powerful enough to  allow a  solution of Pa.
As far as I am  aware, however, no one has yet explicitly a ttem pted  this 
synthesis— and the  difficulty of achieving it should not be underestim ated. In  
the  first place, the  A-systems which have yielded these separate results bear only 
very lim ited similarities. More im portantly, the  A-machines under considera­
tion, em bedded in  these distinct A-systems, are radically different kinds of entity. 
W hereas an instance of one of von N eum ann’s original A-machines can be rea­
sonably well defined simply by identifying a  fixed core set of cells (A-parts) which 
constitute it, the  autopoietic A-machines of Varela et ol. can potentially  retain  
their un ity  or identity  even through the replacem ent of all of the ir A -parts.
This last point actually suggests the possibility of a radical rein terpretation 
of some of the A-systems already discussed previously, particularly  VENUS and 
T ie r r a .  W hile it is clear th a t the  entities which are conventionally regarded as the 
A-machines in these systems (namely, the code fragm ents associated w ith a  single 
v irtual CPU) are not autopoietic, it seems possible th a t certain  aggregations of 
these m ay  be validly said to  realise a prim itive autopoietic organisation. For 
example, it seems th a t this m ay be an alternative, and potentially  fruitful, view of 
the  emergence of w hat Rasmussen et al. (1990, p. 119) actually call “organisms” 
in the  VENUS system; and, equally, this m ay be a  valid view of the  phenom ena 
which Ray (1992) describes in term s of the emergence of “sociality” in the T i e r r a  
system. B ut of course, if this alternative view is adopted, then  the  “higher-
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level” , autopoietic, A-machines now being studied are no longer typically self- 
reproducing in any sense, never m ind being self-reproducing in the von Neum ann, 
genetic, sense.
Thus, it is clear th a t, while the  work on artificial autopoiesis yields a  consid­
erable and valuable clarification of Pa, and perhaps even some progress toward 
its solution, it is not yet a  solution as such. I shall not discuss it fu rther a t this 
point, bu t I will eventually re tu rn  to  it in the  next chapter (section 5.5.8).
4 .4  C on clu sion
The m ajor purpose of this chapter has been to  reconsider and rein terpret von Neu­
m ann’s work on A utom ata Theory. The result is a  claim  th a t the  problem  which 
von Neum ann was prim arily concerned w ith was, precisely, th a t of Artificial 
Darwinism—the growth of knowledge in artificial systems by D arwinian m echa­
nisms. Conversely, and contrary to  the received wisdom, I claim  th a t von Neu­
m ann was not interested in the  “problem ” of self-reproduction as such, b u t only in 
the  connection of this problem  w ith Artificial Darwinism. Furtherm ore, von Neu­
m ann was able to  provide an im portant p art of a solution to  the  la tte r problem. 
The key element of this was to  show how, in almost any “reasonable” axiom ati- 
zation of autom ata theory (i.e. which is strong enough to  support fairly general 
notions of com putation and construction), there can exist large and diverse sets 
of A-reproducers whose elem ents are connected under some plausible idea of A- 
m utation. This is achieved by introducing the  idea of a  self-reproduction archi­
tecture based on A-descriptors, which largely decouples m utational connectivity 
from the  specific structures of the A-machines.
Arising from this result, I identified a new problem , denoted Pa. This is, 
roughly, the problem  of how A-reproducers, of von N eum ann’s general architec­
ture, can be sufficiently robust to  actually carry out their reproductive function 
in a more or less hostile environment. A lternatively, we m ay say th a t Pa is 
concerned w ith exhibiting a set of A-reproducers, spanning a wide (preferably 
infinite) range of A-complexity/A-knowledge, which can practically support the 
operation of na tu ra l selection. This is an informal, and still ra ther poorly de­
fined problem (though its form ulation can be significantly improved through the
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introduction of the concept of autopoiesis). B ut I argue th a t, even in th is crude 
form, Pa is of central im portance; and th a t little  substantive progress has yet 
been m ade toward its solution.
In conclusion, I want to  suggest a new strategy, or research program m e, for 
tackling Pa. Insofar as the  problem has been explicitly tackled up to  th is point, 
the typical approach has been to  a ttem pt to  handcraft a t least one in itial robust 
or viable A-reproducer. In practice this has been effective only if the  environm en­
ta l perturbations are m ade almost negligible (such as in  the  case of the  T i e r r a  
system). In this way a superficial “viability” can be achieved, bu t w ithout ac­
tually  realising autonomy, in the autopoietic sense, a t all; which is to  say, Pa 
is being avoided ra ther th an  solved. In  itself th is is unsurprising. We already 
know th a t even relatively simple biological organisms are m uch m ore complex 
th a t the  most complex extan t technology. The question is how to  bridge th is gap 
(assuming th a t to  be even possible!).
My suggestion is th a t we should take a fu rther lesson from the  biological 
world (i.e. in addition to, or perhaps going beyond, the  central idea of Darwinian 
evolution). We know, or a t least presume, th a t biological organisms arose by some 
kind of spontaneous process from a prior, abiotic, environment; so a  possible 
strategy for the development of artificial “organisms” (in the  sense of entities 
which satisfy the  conditions for a solution of Pa) m ay be to  see if they  m ight 
spontaneously arise in an artificial, abiotic, environm ent. T hat is to  say, instead 
of attem pting to  directly construct artificial life, we a ttem p t to  realise an artificial 
version of the  original genesis of life.
As it happens, a proposal of essentially th is sort was m ade some years ago 
(albeit for somewhat different reasons) by John Holland, in  the  form  of w hat he 
called the a-Universes (Holland 1976). Holland provided some in itial theoretical 
analysis of his proposal, bu t he then  left the idea aside. In the  next chapter there­
fore, I shall revisit this proposal of Holland’s, and report on a detailed empirical 
investigation.
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Chapter 5
Artificial Genesis
5.1 In tro d u ctio n
. . .  AI as a  field is starving for a few carefully documented failures. Any­
one can think of several theses th a t could be improved stylistically and 
substantively by being rephrased as reports on failures. I  can learn more 
by just being told why a technique won’t work than  by being made to  read 
between the lines.
M cDermott (1976, p. 159)
I have argued th a t the  central outstanding problem  in  the  realisation of a 
substantive growth of A-knowledge via a process of Artificial Darwinism is th a t 
of exhibiting A-machines which are not only self-reproducing but also robust, in 
the  face of a “hostile” environment. By “self-reproducing” I m ean, of course, 
the  von Neum ann sense of supporting “heritable m utation” ; th a t is, our A- 
reproducer should be a m em ber of a set of A-reproducers, which span an indefi­
nitely large range of A-complexity, where th is set is connected under some form 
of A -m utation. The von Neum ann schema of genetic self-reproduction shows, in 
outline a t least, how this condition can be satisfied.
This outstanding problem, which I have labelled Pa, is still very informal; 
nonetheless, I have suggested th a t, to  date, there has been little  tangible progress 
toward a solution. W ithout a ttem pting  to  prejudge the  u ltim ate prospects for 
solving Pa by the  “direct” route (i.e. by directly designing robust A-reproducers 
w ithin some “reasonable” A-system) I have pointed out th a t there m ay be an 
alternative “indirect” approach—nam ely a ttem pting  to  exhibit the  spontaneous 
emergence of (viable) A-reproducers. The la tte r approach is inspired by the
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(conjectured) spontaneous genesis of life in the  biological world.
This chapter is concerned w ith a critical investigation of a class of A-systems 
which (it has been suggested) might indeed exhibit som ething like the  sponta­
neous origin of Artificial Life.1 I should warn in advance th a t the  results to  be 
presented here are largely negative: it will tu rn  out th a t, contrary to  expectations, 
the single specific A-system which will be exam ined in  detail cannot support phe­
nomena of this sort. However, I shall argue th a t the  m echanisms of failure are 
not w ithout interest.
The A-system presented here is an example of an  a-Universe. The a-Universes 
are a class of artificial system  originally proposed by Holland (1976). Holland 
m ade this proposal in a particular context, related  to, bu t by no m eans identical 
with, m y Pa. It is therefore useful to  briefly review the  problem  situation which 
Holland intended  to  address w ith the  a-Universes.
Holland’s stated  objective was to rebut certain  criticisms of the  neo-Darwinian 
in terpretation of evolution. The situation was roughly as follows (for a more 
detailed discussion Holland cites M oorhead fc K aplan 1967):
• Darwinian evolution is predicated on the  prior existence of entities having a 
wide behavioural repertoire which includes, among other things, the  ability 
to  self-reproduce in  a m anner which supports heritable m utation. Following 
Gould, I have previously called such entities Darwinian actors, or simply 
D -actors  (Gould 1982; McMullin 1992a).
• Biological Darwinism should therefore be accompanied by some comple­
m entary  theory to  explain the advent of the  in itial D-actors in the  so-called 
“prim ordial soup” . I stress th a t the  problem  being presented here is not 
th a t of Biological Darwinism itself—i.e. w hether the  la tte r provides an ad­
equate theory of the growth of biological complexity once an initial se t o f  
biological D -actors is postulated. It is the  prior problem  of w hether D ar­
winian processes could have (spontaneously) s tarted  in the  first place: the 
problem  of the  original genesis of life.
1A preliminary version of some of the material presented in this chapter has been previously 
published (McMullin 1992d). However, the treatment given here is much more detailed and 
extensive, and includes more recent experimental results: it may be regarded as the definitive 
version.
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• This complem entary theory should not draw on any new causal principles, 
over and above those assumed by biological Darwinism in the  first place (it 
should not, for example, be theistic)—for otherwise, Biological Darwinism 
itself would evidently be underm ined.
• A first (and naïve) ten tative solution is the  conjecture th a t, prior to  the 
emergence of the initial D-actors, conventional physical effects (therm al 
and electrical agitation of the unorganised chemical soup), will result in the  
generation of a wide variety of physically feasible structures in  an “unbi­
ased” m anner (i.e. we do not suppose th a t D-actors are any m ore likely to 
be generated than  other structures of com parable “size” ). Provided suffi­
cient tim e is available, this process m ight eventually result (w ith probability 
approaching one?) in the emergence of the  required, initial, D-actors. D ar­
winian evolution then  takes over (or not, as the  case m ay be; th a t is a 
separate problem).
•  This conjecture seems, however, to  be refuted by quantita tive  calculations 
of the expected tim e to emergence of D-actors, based on such an unbiased 
search process.2 Even allowing for a substantial m argin of uncertain ty  in the 
param eters for these calculations, the  result is an emergence tim e so large 
th a t it seems entirely incom patible w ith such emergence having occurred in 
the lifetime of planet Earth.
•  The next proposed solution is to retain  the  conjecture th a t conventional 
physical effects will result in the generation of a wide variety of struc­
tures, bu t to  suppose th a t this generation process m ay be (or m ay become) 
strongly biased. In particular, in analogy w ith conventional D arwinian the­
ory, it is conjectured th a t there m ay be incremental progress toward fully 
qualified D-actors. T hat is, there m ay be structures, typically m uch sim­
pler than  the  u ltim ate D-actors (i.e. m uch simpler than  even the  simplest 
of contem porary organisms), which thus have plausible emergence tim es, 
bu t which m ight still have a long term  effect on the subsequent generation
2This is a variant of the infamous “monkeys typing Shakespeare” kind of argument (e.g.
Dawkins 1986, pp. 46-49).
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process—biasing it in  such a way th a t fully qualified D-actors can, feasi­
bly, have emerged w ithin the  available tim e. To pu t it another way, we 
abandon any notion of a strict, binary distinction between structures which 
are “D-actors” and those which are not, and accept th a t there m ay be a 
continuum. Instead of supposing th a t there was a m ore or less dram atic  or 
catastrophic change between unbiased generation of structures, and D ar­
winian evolution of structures, we suppose th a t w hat we now recognise as 
Darwinian evolution m ay have emerged gradually, reinforcing itself as it 
became established. We m ight call this a bootstrap theory of the  emergence 
of D-actors (and Darwinian evolution).
• This serves to  rescue a  m aterialist theory of th e  origin of life and thus, of 
Biological Darwinism itself; bu t a t the  cost of becoming vague, qualitative, 
and, in th is form, v irtually  untestable. In  Popperian term s, it has become, 
not so m uch a theory, as a metaphysical research program  (e.g. Popper 1976, 
Section 33, pp. 148-151). T hat is, it is a framework for the  development of 
detailed theories, which detailed theories might then  be capable of m aking 
testable predictions.
• It is extrem ely difficult to  improve on this situation. Ideally, we would 
analyse and /o r sim ulate or duplicate a quantitative model of the  dynam ­
ics of the  postulated  prim ordial “soup” and thereby form ulate a  detailed, 
quantitative, testable, theory of the  emergence of fully qualified D-actors. 
Indeed, considerable effort has been expended along these lines, w ith some 
degree of success (e.g. Oparin 1953; Eigen ¿z Schuster 1979; Dyson 1985); 
however, these efforts are seriously lim ited by th e  size and complexity of the 
system  (the prim ordial soup) being investigated. Thus: the detailed com­
position of the  system  is quite uncertain; the  basic chemical interactions 
are varied, complex, and non-linear; the  system  is extrem ely large (say the 
to ta l num ber of active chemical components on the  planet E arth , during the 
pre-biotic epoch), and the  duration potentially available for the  significant 
processes is extrem ely long.
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• Holland proposed an alternative approach (still w ithin the  same basic m eta­
physical research program ). This is to  investigate the  behaviour of very 
m uch simplified systems, in order to  provide a  “proof-of-principle” . The 
idea is this: suppose we can form ulate a relatively simple system, which is, 
nonetheless, capable of dem onstrating analogous phenom ena to  those being 
postulated for the  prim ordial soup. Specifically, the  system  should be such 
th a t some form of D-actors can be sustained in  the  system , if they  once 
emerge; th a t there  is some kind of continuum  of behaviour from th a t of 
simpler structures to  th a t of fully qualified D-actors; and th a t, in  the  ab­
sence of bias due to  the  behaviours of the  structures already present, there 
will be an unbiased generation of structures over some large set of “feasible” 
structures. We can calculate the naive emergence tim e for D-actors, in  an 
analogous m anner to  th a t for the  “real” prim ordial soup; b u t additionally, 
if the  system  is sufficiently simple, we m ay be able to  dem onstrate analy t­
ically and /o r experimentally, th a t D-actors can actually emerge in  a m uch 
shorter tim e, by virtue of the generation process becoming progressively bi­
ased. If th is could be achieved, it would constitu te  a proof of the  principle 
th a t D-actors, and Darwinian evolution, could establish themselves sponta­
neously. This would not, of itself, “prove” , or even “verify” , the  theory th a t 
some analogous process occurred in the  real prim ordial soup; bu t it would 
increase our preference for such theories, by refuting the  im plicit alternative 
(tha t such behaviours are entirely impossible).
•  To this end, Holland introduced the a-Universes as a  class of simple A- 
system  which could exhibit at least some of the  required properties; he 
went on to  identify one particular a-Universe (which I shall denote c*o) for 
which he was able to  present detailed, closed form, analytic results. On 
Holland’s analysis, «o dem onstrates precisely the  result sought: simple D- 
actors appear to  have an expected emergence tim e m uch shorter than  would 
be predicted by a naive assum ption of unbiased generation.
At first sight, Holland’s analysis (if it survives critical testing) would solve not 
ju st the  problem  he was directly addressing, b u t Pa also: for, as I have described 
the situation, Holland seems to  claim, inter alia, th a t qq can support D-actors—
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i.e. identified, robust, A-reproducers. The fact th a t such D-actors should emerge 
spontaneously would, in  th a t scenario, be an added bonus, bu t would be quite 
inessential to the  solution of Pa.
However, on closer analysis the  situation proves to  be ra ther m ore com plicated 
than  this. W hile Holland does identify putatively  robust, “self-replicating” , A- 
machines, which can be em bedded in ao, these are not properly self-reproducing in 
the  von Neum ann sense; although they  do involve a von Neum ann style genetic 
mechanism, the  complete set of related A-reproducers is essentially triv ial—it 
certainly does not span a wide range of A-complexity.3 Thus, a 0 certainly cannot 
offer an immediate solution to Pa.
The real relevance of ao to Pa is the following: if H olland’s analysis of a 0 is 
correct, then  it suggests th a t some m ore “powerful” a-Universe m ight support 
a set of D-actors (A-reproducers) spanning a satisfactory range of A-complexity, 
while still retaining the property that such D-actors would spontaneously emerge. 
If this were so, it m ight allow, as previously anticipated, an experim ental solution 
of Pa without the  need for an a priori design of any initial, robust, A-reproducers.
The question which immediately arises is w hether Holland’s analysis of ao 
is, in fact, correct. Although « 0 is extrem ely simple compared to  real chemical 
systems, its analysis is by no means trivial, and could conceivably be m istaken. 
Holland therefore noted th a t his analysis could feasibly be tested  by instantiating 
an a-Universe in a  suitable, high speed, digital com puter. However, Holland 
himself did not report on such tests, and, as far as I am aware, no such test 
program  was ever carried out (Holland, Langton, personal com m unication).4
This chapter will therefore present original results from ju st such a  program. 
I preface this w ith a more detailed and formal definition of ao than  th a t origi­
nally presented by Holland, and an account of relevant aspects of the  particular 
implementation.
As already indicated, these results will be negative: it transpires th a t Hol­
land’s analysis was indeed m istaken (through being oversimplified). In  fact, even
3In this respect, the A-reproducers in ao are essentially similar to an A-reproducer proposed 
by Langton (1984) (in a rather different A-system); see my previous discussion in Chapter 4, 
section 4.2.7.
4Indeed, I have been able to identify only two substantive discussions of any kind of (Holland 
1976). I shall return to these in section 5.5.8 below.
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the  extrem ely impoverished D-actors proposed by Holland for eta prove not to  be 
robust; the  question of their spontaneous emergence (never m ind the  emergence 
of more powerful D-actors in some alternative «-Universe) is thereby rendered 
irrelevant. This outcome will serve principally to  re iterate  again the  seemingly 
intractable nature  of Pa\ but it will nonetheless also suggest some useful new 
insights into the  problem.
5.2 T h e  U n iv erse  c*o
5.2.1 O utline
Firstly, let me note th a t ao is not strictly  a single, unique, a-U niverse bu t de­
notes instead a param eterised family of related «-Universes. I shall identify such 
param eters as they  arise, bu t otherwise it will be convenient to  continue to  refer 
to  Qf0 in the  singular.
I should emphasise th a t Holland’s original definition of a 0 was not complete; 
th a t is, m any detailed aspects of its operation were left unspecified. The im plica­
tion is th a t these details should not affect the  u ltim ate  outcome; nonetheless, in 
any realisation of ao it is still necessary to  fill in  all such details in some particular 
way. This section thus serves both  to  re-present H olland’s original definition and 
also to specify, in  detail, how this definition was extended and com pleted to  allow 
a practical realisation.
Loosely speaking, ao consists of some fixed num ber of discrete atoms.5 The 
to ta l num ber of atom s is a param eter of a 0, and is denoted R; in general, Holland 
does not stipulate a specific size in his analysis. W hile he does refer to  w hat he 
calls a “region” he gives no precise definition of “region” . The experim ental work 
described below will be based on a to ta l size of R  =  104 atom s, this being the 
size of “region” used by Holland for num erical calculations.
Atoms are classified into six distinct kinds, or elements. Of these, one has an 
especially distinguished role, and is referred to  as the  null element; the  rem aining
5Holland strictly speaks in terms of an underlying “cellular automaton” , each cell of which 
can effectively “contain” one atom. The cells then remain “fixed” while the atoms “move” 
among the cells. However, this underlying cellular automaton per se plays no role either in Hol­
land’s analysis or the implementation to be described here; further discussion of it is therefore 
omitted.
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five elements are collectively referred to as material elem ents, ao supports a 
detailed principle of “m a tte r” conservation, in th a t atom s cannot be transm uted  
from one element to  another, and thus the  num bers of atom s of each elem ent 
rem ain constant. The “densities” of each elem ent (the num ber of atom s of the 
element divided by the  to ta l num ber of atom s R) are thus fu rther param eters of
Each atom  has, associated w ith it, one bond, connecting it to  one other atom . 
A bond m ay be in either of two states: strong or weak. This s ta te  m ay be 
dynamically altered under the  action of certain  ao operators (w ith the  exception 
th a t a  bond originating w ith a null atom , or connecting to  a null atom , cannot 
become strong).
As long as a given bond is strong, it cannot be disconnected. By contrast, 
a weak bond, may, in  certain  circumstances, be disconnected and re-connected 
to  a different atom; in this way the connections between atom s m ay change in 
tim e. However, it is characteristic of ao th a t bonds m ay only be “transien tly” 
disconnected; th a t is, every operator which involves disconnecting a bond also 
involves re-connecting it (to a  different atom ) all w ithin a single tim e step. It 
follows th a t, before and after the  operation of any allowed ao operator, every 
atom  m ust be connected to  precisely one other atom , and, therefore, th a t all the 
atoms in ao m ust form  a single connected chain. Assuming th a t the  num ber of 
atoms (R ) is finite (as it m ust be for any practical realisation) this further implies 
th a t the chain of atoms m ust be closed on itself—i.e. it m ust form a single closed 
loop.
Any arb itrary  connected series or sequence of atom s in ao will be called a 
segment. In  effect, all ao operators which change the  relative ordering of the 
atoms will do so in two stages (both com pleted in a single tim e step): a segment 
(which m ay consist of a single atom) is first cut out of one p art of the  loop, 
thus transiently dividing ao into a (smaller) loop and a  separate, disconnected 
segment; this disconnected segment is then  spliced back in, a t some other point, 
reforming ao into a single closed loop of R  atom s again.
A segment consisting of a null atom , followed by one or m ore m aterial atoms, 
and then  term inating in another null atom , is called a  structure; a structure
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containing exactly one m aterial atom  will also som etim es be referred to  as a  free 
atom.
A complex is a set of interacting structures: it is (for the  tim e being a t least) 
the  kind of entity  which we shall recognise as an A-m achine  in ao. The structures 
making up a complex need not, in general, have definite connections w ith  each 
other (a complex is not a segment per se); however, for a  complex to  exhibit 
interesting properties it is generally necessary th a t all the  com ponent structures 
be more or less “close” to  each other.
The ao dynamics progress in discrete tim e steps; th a t is, the operators are all 
defined in  term s of their effect in a single such tim e step.
Holland anticipated th a t, for a com puter realisation of ao, a tim e step m ight 
be accomplished in about 1ms of real time; however, he gave no indication of the 
kind of platform  he assumed to  achieve this. In any case, in the experim ents to 
be described below, a m ore typical value actually achieved was of the  order of 
500 ms per tim e step (based on an Intel 80386 CPU  w ith 33 MHz clock)— though 
this varied very considerably w ith the  actual sta te  of the  universe.
The dynamic behaviour of ao is stochastic, and is defined in  term s of two 
groups of operators: the  prim itive  operators, and the  emergent operators. The 
prim itive operators are context insensitive—i.e. they  apply throughout ao w ith­
out regard to  its sequential configuration. They are the  abstract counterparts 
of diffusion and activation in real chemical systems. The emergent operators 
are context sensitive—i.e. their operation is sensitive to  the  sequential configura­
tion of ao. In effect, certain  structures (should they  arise) have special dynam ic 
properties. They are term ed “em ergent” operators precisely because they  are 
contingent on such structures—they “emerge” iff some m a tte r in ao “happens” 
(under the  action of the  prim itive operators or otherwise) to  adopt some such spe­
cial configuration. These are the  abstract counterparts of catalysts (particularly  
enzymes) in real (bio-)chemical systems.
In the study of real chemical systems it is of in terest to  seek an explanation 
of the properties and characteristics of catalysis in  term s of m ore fundam ental 
(atomic) interactions. However, for the particu lar uses we wish to  m ake of the 
a 0 dynamics, such a m ore fundam ental analysis would be superfluous, and is not 
attem pted . Instead, the  properties of emergent operators are simply im posed by
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fia t.6 I m ay note in passing th a t the  notions of m a tte r  conservation and coherent 
movement (of strongly bonded m aterial segments) m ake oto somewhat reminiscent 
of von Neum ann’s (1966a) kinematic A-system— though c*o is, of course, very 
much simpler.
Holland takes “self-replication” as diagnostic of “life” ; the  dynamics of ao are 
such th a t certain  complexes (should they arise) m ay exhibit prim itive (but still 
loosely genetic) self-reproducing behaviours.
5.2.2 A  L ittle  Form ality
In what follows, I shall freely use relevant term inology and notation from the  for­
m al theory of com putation, as presented, for exam ple, by Lewis & Papadim itriou 
(1981, especially Section 1.8).
Atoms in oro are form ally  defined as symbols; the  closed loop of atom s is 
defined as a string  of exactly R  such atom ic symbols, which will be referred to 
as the state string ; segments and structures are also strings (of length less than  
R) over this same atom ic symbol alphabet, norm ally occurring as substrings of 
the  state  string ;7 and the  operators are production rules specifying particular 
transform ations of the  state  string.
In m ore detail, the  alphabet of atom ic symbols is defined as  Z  = X  x  Y  (i.e. 
Z  is the  cartesian product of two “simple” alphabets X  and F ) ,  where:
X  =  {0,1 , :,N o ,N \, —}
Y  = {s,w}
=>Z = { (0 , s), ( 1 , s), (:, s), (No, s), (JVi, s ), ( - ,  s),
(0 ,  v ) ,  (1,  w), (:, v ) ,  (No,  v ) ,  (JVi, w), ( - ,  w) }
6This is, in itself, an unusual and interesting (metaphysical) position. The ao dynamics 
might be said to be irreducible, to the extent that the properties and behaviours of structures 
in ao are not reducible to properties or behaviours of their “constituent” atoms. However, it 
should be added that this is still a very weak form of irreducibility, compared to, say, Rosen’s 
(1985b) “complex” systems or Popper’s Worlds 1, 2 and 3 (e.g. Popper & Eccles 1977).
7Strictly, a segment or structure will not satisfy the technical definition of a “substring” if 
it spans the atom which is (arbitrarily) designated as the initial atom of the state string. It
should be clear that this can be overcome by a minor adjustment to the formal definition of
“substring” and this technicality will not, therefore, be discussed further.
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We see th a t each atom  (i.e. each atom ic symbol) is actually an ordered pair of 
simple symbols, the  first taken from the  X -alphabet (denoting the  elem ent) and 
the second from the  K-alphabet (denoting the  bond state). The s ta te  string is 
then a string of these atom s where each atom  is (im plicitly) bonded to  the  next 
atom  to  the  right. The state  string will, of course, be exactly R  atom s (ordered 
pairs) in  length.
For m any purposes in discussing the ao dynamics it will be necessary to  refer 
to just the elements (X-symbols) or the  bond states (y-sym bols) in a segment. 
Two functions are introduced to  facilitate this. The first, denoted x (), extracts 
the X-symbols from  a segment; the second, denoted <¿>0 , extracts the  y-sym bols 
from a segment, th a t is, reading the segment (Z -string) from  left to  right, x() 
maps each Z-sym bol onto its X -com ponent:
( x , y ) i  > x
and, similarly, </>() m aps each Z-symbol onto its ^-com ponent:
(ix , y ) t-> y
5.2.2.1 T he E lem ents
Certain of the  elem ents have similar or related  characteristics w ith respect to  the 
ao dynamics, ft will therefore prove convenient to  group the  elem ent (X ) symbols 
into several partially  overlapping families or (sub-)alphabets as follows:
N  = {N0,Ni}
A = {0,1,:}
B = {0,1}
M  = N U A
D = M  — {:}
identifies the  null element, previously m entioned, and is not a m em ber of 
any of these sub-alphabets.
The iV-alphabet serves prim arily in the  construction of m ore or less static  da ta  
storage structures (similar in concept to  the  A-tapes of the  previous chapter); 
the nam e N  indicates a crude analogy to  the  function of nucleotides in  molecular
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biology. The A-alphabet serves primarily in the realisation of active structures 
(emergent operators); the name A indicates a crude analogy to the function of 
amino acids. The 5-alphabet is a subset of the A-alphabet; this alphabet is used 
within emergent operators to code for the operator type and arguments. The 
name B  is a mnemonic for binary. The iV-alphabet is also, of course, a form 
of binary alphabet: we shall see that these two distinct binary alphabets are 
closely related, and this fact partially motivated the particular choice of symbols 
to represent them. The M-alphabet serves simply to group all the material 
elements (i.e. as a more concise name for N  U A); the name M  is a mnemonic for 
material. Finally, the D-alphabet groups the material elements other than the 
colon element ( “ :”); the name D  has no mnemonic significance whatever.
Henceforth I shall refer to atoms whose X-sym bol is from the A-alphabet as A- 
atoms, those whose X-symbol is from the iV-alphabet as TV-atoms etc. Similarly, 
a segment consisting exclusively of A-atoms will be called an A-segment etc.
The densities of the separate elements (number of atoms of that element 
divided by the total number of atoms, R) are parameters of ao, denoted p(0), /s(l) 
etc. The total density of the material elements (M -atoms) is denoted simply by 
p] we must therefore have p(—) =  (1 — p). Typical numerical values, suggested 
by Holland, which will be used in the empirical investigation are as follows:
P = p(~) =  0.5
/.(0) =  i-(l) =  />(:) =  p(N„) = p(N i) = 0.1
5 .2 .2 .2  T h e B on d  S ta tes
Every atom in a 0 is bonded to the next atom to the right. The state of the 
bond is denoted by the Y -symbol of each atom: “s ” denoting a strong bond and 
“w” denoting a weak bond. Note that a strong bond cannot connect with a null 
atom; this fact constrains the state string in two distinct ways. Firstly, a null 
atom cannot originate a strong bond, which is to say that the atom (—, s) € Z  
cannot, in fact, arise in a 0. Thus, null atoms will actually occur in ao only in the 
form (—,v); we now give this distinguished atomic symbol the special name z_. 
Secondly, a null atom cannot terminate a strong bond and thus no segment can 
arise in ao consisting of an atom with a strong bond immediately followed by a 
null atom (i.e. a segment of the form zz_  where ip(z) = s).
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5.2.3 T he P rim itive O perators
There are two primitive operators: Bond Modification (BM) and Exchange (EX). 
BM is the abstract counterpart of activation, and EX is the abstract counterpart 
of diffusion.
5.2.3.1 B ond M odification (BM)
BM was originally defined by Holland as follows: on each tim e step, every bond 
state in a 0 is (stochastically) updated: each strong bond decays (becoming weak), 
with probability r; each weak bond becomes strong with probability Ar. r and A 
are parameters of ao.
However, as it stands, this is not consistent with the proviso, already stated, 
that a strong bond cannot connect with a null atom. This does not affect the 
decay aspect, from strong to weak; but the transformation of weak bonds to 
strong must strictly be qualified as applying only to bonds connecting material 
atoms (all other bonds, namely the weak bonds connecting null atoms to each 
other or to material atoms, are thus unaffected by BM).
More formally, BM is defined in terms of two stochastic transformations, or 
production rules, affecting the state string. The first is the decay from strong to 
weak:
(x , s) i—> (a;, w), x  £  X
This is applied, with probability r, to every atom matching the left hand side 
(i.e. every atom having a strong bond). The second is the transformation from 
weak to strong:
(z 0, v)(x6, y) y-* (xa, s ) (x b, y) , x a, x b €  M , y  e Y
This is applied, with probability Ar, to every segment matching the left hand 
side, r represents bond “stability” (i.e. the probability of a bond decaying from 
strong to weak). Thus, once a strong bond forms, its lifetime is simply a geometric 
random variable with parameter r, and the expected lifetime of a strong bond is 
just 1 /r  (neglecting the possible effects of operators other than BM). The typical 
numerical value used is r =  10-4 giving an expected lifetime of a strong bond
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of 104 time steps. There is no directly analogous result for weak bonds because 
a given weak bond would most likely not be eligible for modification to strong 
(because it connects to a null atom, transiently or otherwise) throughout its 
lifetime—and therefore its lifetime could not be modeled by any simple geometric 
random variable.
A determines (roughly) the “equilibrium ratio” (fixed point of the Markov 
process implied by BM) between weak bonds and strong bonds— provided this is 
interpreted as referring only to bonds connecting material atoms (i.e. which are 
eligible to be strong). Holland argues (in his Theorem l 8) that the distribution 
of structures generated by primitive operators, in isolation, will be unbiased (in 
a precise sense, defined by Holland) iff A is specified as follows:
A * 5 ^ - 13 P2
The typical numerical value for A therefore follows from the value already 
specified for p (0.5), yielding A =  7/3. Thus, among all bonds eligible to be 
strong, approximately two thirds will be expected to be strong, and one third 
weak, at any given time (at least to the extent that this ratio is determined by 
BM).
In any case, note that the formation and decay of strong bonds are only 
stochastically related (as represented by A). The number of strong (or weak) 
bonds is not constant in a o. To give an extreme example, there is a very small 
(but still non-zero) probability that, even within a single step, all bonds could 
become weak; or all eligible bonds could become strong, for that matter.
5 .2 .3 .2  E xch an ge (EX)
The function of EX is to provide for a randomised motion or relative rearrangement 
of the atoms in ao, with the proviso that any segment consisting exclusively of 
(necessarily material) atoms which are strongly bonded together will move as a 
unit.
8I should warn that this theorem relies, in turn, on Holland’s Lemma 2, and that there are 
grounds for thinking that the latter is mistaken, both in its result and its derivation—see also 
section 5.5.2 below. However, it will ultimately be clear that nothing critical relies on this, so
I shall accept Holland’s analysis at face value just here.
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In brief, the idea is that, on each time step, some pairs of adjacent segments, 
having weak external bonds, exchange positions. The internal bonds of a segment 
being exchanged may be weak or strong. No bond states (internal or external) 
are altered by the EX operator; what is altered is the connectivity between atoms.
However, the details of the EX operator are somewhat complex, as follows.
On each time step, each atom with a weak bond serves, with probability m i, 
as the pivot for an exchange operation. An exchange operation consists of two 
steps. Firstly, two other atoms with weak bonds are identified as the left and 
right limits of the exchange. This is done by considering first the next atom with 
a weak bond, to the right of the pivot; this is selected as the right limit, with 
probability m 2 ] if it is not selected, then the next atom with a weak bond to the 
right again is similarly considered, and so on until a limit is determined. The 
left limit is then established by counting the same number of atoms with weak 
bonds, to the left of the pivot.9
In this way, two disjoint, contiguous segments are identified: the left segment 
consists of all atoms between the left limit and the pivot (excluding the limit, 
but including the pivot); the right segment consists of all atoms between the 
pivot and the right limit (excluding the pivot, but including the limit); From the 
definition, the external bonds of these segments—being those of the left limit, 
the pivot, and the right limit—  are necessarily weak.
If the entire universe is scanned without establishing valid limits (i.e. without 
identifying two disjoint segments to be exchanged) the exchange operation is 
aborted—but this should be extremely rare with the typical parameter values.
Conversely, in the normal case, valid left and right segments are identified, 
and these are then swapped (exchanged) with each other, preserving the left to 
right ordering (and bond states) within the segments. Note that the left and 
right segments contain the same number of weak bonds but are not, in general, 
of equal length.
Informally, we may think of an exchange operation as being implemented 
by “cutting” the right segment out of o?o, and then “splicing” it back into a 0
9More concisely: a geometric random variable, with parameter m2, is sampled; the right 
and left limits are then established by counting that number of weak bonds to the right and 
left of the pivot respectively.
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immediately to the left of the left segment. These cutting, exchanging, and 
splicing operations must be pictured as taking place in some space of higher 
dimensionality, in which ao is embedded.
Formally, of course, an exchange operation is a string transformation of the 
form:
Z a Z hZ cZ d Z e Z a Z d Z e Z hZ c
where:
Z*,zc, z e €  Z  
\p(za),tp(zc),ip(ze )  =  w
za, z c, ze denote, respectively, the left lim it, the pivot, and the right limit; zbzc 
is then the left segment, and ZdZe the right segment, of the exchange operation.
m i and m 2 are parameters of ao. m i is roughly analogous to “mean velocity” 
or “temperature” in chemical systems; the typical value used is 10-2 , which is 
to say that any given atom will serve as a pivot for EX about once in every 100 
time steps on which it has a weak bond. m 2 is roughly analogous to “mean free 
path”. Holland does not specify a typical or unique value for m 2 as he suggests 
that his results are relatively insensitive to it. I shall discuss this in more detail 
in section 5.5 below.
Note that the EX operator does not  emulate anything even approximating to 
Newtonian mechanics. Force, velocity, momentum or kinetic energy are not even 
meaningful concepts in ao. In particular, there is no notion of conservation of 
(kinetic) energy.
Since exchange operations with distinct pivots might interfere with each other 
(if their limits overlapped) Holland stipulated that the various exchanges should 
occur sequentially from the “leftmost” pivot to the “rightmost”.
This stipulation implicitly requires that ao be finite: otherwise a single time 
step of this (strictly sequential) EX operator could never be completed; but this 
is not a substantive issue since any practical realisation would have to be finite 
anyway. More significantly, this stipulation also implicitly requires that ao be 
bounded (and not, for example, circular as assumed up to now); otherwise “left­
most” and “rightmost” atoms would not be well defined. However, Holland gives
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no detailed discussion of the exact behaviour of do at these implied boundaries, 
neither in the specific context of EX, nor elsewhere.
Furthermore, this mechanism for the ordering of the exchange operations still 
requires one further clarification. As stated, it is not clear whether, for the 
purposes of EX, a 0 should be scanned left to right just once (deciding, at each 
atom with a weak bond, whether to carry out an exchange, and, if so, then 
immediately carrying it out) or twice (first to decide which atoms should serve as 
pivots, and then a second time to actually carry out the exchanges). The former 
approach seems more straightforward, but suffers from a subtle defect: with such 
an approach, on any single tim e step, some atoms may not be even considered 
as candidate pivots for an exchange operation, and some others may actually be 
considered several times. This would arise whenever the outer limits are more 
than one weak bond away from the pivot: for then some atom(s) with weak 
bonds, which have not yet been considered as candidate pivots, will be shifted to 
the left of the current pivot, and will therefore be passed over; and conversely, 
some atoms with weak bonds to the left of the pivot, which have (presumably) 
already been considered as possible pivots, will be shifted to the right of the 
current pivot and will be considered again. Even more convoluted scenarios can, 
of course, be imagined. This defect is avoided with the alternative approach of 
scanning the complete space twice, for then the pivots are all identified before 
any exchanges are carried out. While Holland did not discuss this issue in such 
detail, it seems that this must have been his intended ordering mechanism.
In any case, we shall subsequently see that, in the implementation of ao to 
be described, there are good reasons for ultimately adopting a somewhat differ­
ent (and simpler) approach to the EX operator. This will, of course, retain the 
required statistical characteristics, and will still involve implementing potentially 
conflicting exchange operations sequentially; but it will improve the execution 
speed, and, as an added bonus, it will transpire to be immune to the kind of 
ordering difficulties just described, so that the issue of scanning from a leftmost 
boundary to a rightmost boundary (however many times) will not arise. This 
will sidestep the requirement for special “boundary” behaviour completely, and 
allow a symmetrical (unbounded) treatment of a 0 as previously assumed. Similar 
comments apply to certain aspects of the behaviour of the emergent operators.
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5.2.4 T he E m ergent O perators
The “activation” conditions for BM and EX are such that they are bound to operate 
in arbitrary states of c*o: BM is guaranteed to establish a population of atoms 
with weak bond states, and this, in turn, guarantees that the conditions for EX 
to operate will be satisfied. In particular, this means that these operators will be 
effective even in the most “disordered” or “primitive” states of a 0— and it is for 
this reason that they are termed primitive.
In contrast to this, the remaining operators are contingent on more compli­
cated activation conditions; it seems therefore that they will have a substan­
tive effect on the ao dynamics only if such (comparatively) special states should 
occur.10 It is for this reason that these other operators are termed emergent, 
in the sense that they (or their effects) will not be manifest in arbitrary states 
of «o, but may become manifest (emerge) if pre-existing operators (the primitive 
operators, in the first instance) should happen to cause the relevant special states 
to arise.
As already mentioned, the effects of emergent operators are roughly analogous 
to the functions of catalysts and enzymes in real biochemical systems. Formally, 
we shall identify or label the emergent operators with certain relatively invari­
ant aspects of their activation conditions—specifically, with certain segments, or 
classes of segments, which remain essentially unaltered through a cycle of trans­
formations associated with a particular operator. We shall then say that these 
distinguished segments are the emergent operators, or E-OPs.
While, in principle, the set of distinct E-OPs is infinite, they are all more 
or less similar in operation. This will allow the specification of their behaviour 
to be streamlined. In particular, the E-OPs will all be classified into just two 
major groups, each characterised by a certain “typical” cycle of transformations, 
or “reaction cycle”. Loosely speaking, an E-OP can be considered as a finite state 
automaton, embedded in a 0, which will automatically transit through a certain 
typical cycle of “states”.
However, it is important to emphasise, even at this point, that these “typi­
cal” cycles are simply a device, adopted to allow a more concise and systematic
10The task of quantifying just how special, or otherwise, these conditions are is a major 
element in any attempted analysis of ao-
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description of the E-OPs: it should not be taken to imply that, in fact, E-OPs 
can only arise or emerge in some “initial” state, or that an E-OP “reaction cycle” 
will necessarily run to completion. In particular, an E-OP may be spontaneously 
created, modified, or destroyed in any arbitrary state—i.e. at any arbitrary point 
in its “cycle”—by the effects of the EX primitive operator. This fact is referred 
to only obliquely by Holland; but it will transpire that it is critical to the overall 
behaviour of a 0.
5 .2 .4 .1  T h e  Codon String F u nction  tt()
Before attempting to characterise the E-OPs proper it is necessary to define an­
other, different, kind of object, termed a codon structure.
Informally, a codon structure is the analog in a-Universe of a polynucleotide in 
molecular biology. It is loosely defined as any structure (null delimited segment) 
whose leftmost material atom (at least) is an iV-atom. More formally, we define 
the set of codon structures as a language, Lcs C 2* , as follows:
Lcs =  { zcs G Z*,
Z cs  =  Z -Z a Z b Z _ ,
X(*a) G N + ,
x(zb) G (Af* —  N M * )  }
(Note that the notation N + is a short form for N N m, which is to say the set 
of all strings over N  having at least one symbol.)
In words: a codon structure is any structure whose material segment has an 
N-segment prefix (za above). This prefix will, necessarily, be uniquely delimited 
at the right—either by the null atom (z_) terminating the structure or by an 
A-atom (i.e. some M-atom which is not an AT-atom). In the latter case, this 
A-atom, and any M-atoms following it, will be referred to as a “garbage suffix” 
to the codon structure (zb above).
It is convenient to define the function:
7r : Lcs —> N + 
zCs =  z - z azbz_ h-> x(za)
where the decomposition zcs = z - z azbz -  is as introduced in the definition of Lcs
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above. That is, tt( z c s )  yields the iV-string corresponding to the iV-segment prefix 
of the codon structure. Such an iV-string will be termed a codon string.
Examples of codon structures (members of L q s ) ,  and their corresponding co­
don strings, might be the following:
zcs x ( zcs) ir(*cs)
z-(NltB)(JV0,v)z- -NiJVo- NiNo
z .(N i ,v ) (0 ,s ) (N 1,s){N 1,v ) z .  N iO N iNt N i
z~(No, w)(:, w)(0, w)(0, w)(:, v)z_ N 0:00: N 0
z- ( N q, s )(N i , s )(N o, s ) ( l ,  s)(jVj, v)z_  N 0N iN 0
Codon structures and E-OPs are mutually exclusive—i.e. no codon structure 
is an E-OP and vice versa. Codon structures are thus more or less “static”—in 
the sense that the only dynamic behaviour they exhibit in themselves is that 
implied by the primitive operators. We shall see that codon structures (or, at 
least, the codon strings thereof) play the role of “data” objects operated upon 
by the “programs” represented by the E-OPs. As mentioned earlier, they are 
somewhat analogous to the “A-tapes” of the previous chapter.
5.2.4.2 T he Binding  Function a()
In general, if an E-OP is to operate on some codon structure, it must first identify 
a “suitable” structure, and then attach this structure (or, at least, the material 
segment of it) onto itself. I shall refer to this process as selective binding. Binding 
is selective in that there will be an embedded 5-segm ent within the E-OP (termed 
the argument of the E-OP) which will constrain the binding—the selected codon 
structure must “match” this 5-segm ent. This matching is insensitive to bond 
states either in the E-OP or the codon structure— it is based purely on the X -  
symbols in both cases. The matching condition is expressed via a mapping from 
N - strings (specifically, codon strings) to 5-strings, called the binding function ,n  
and denoted by:
a :  N* —> B*
11Holland actually describes this function as yielding an “anticode” for a given TV-string; I 
find this confusing, as it seems to imply some relationship with the “coding” function 7 0  (to 
be described in the next section), whereas there is no such relationship. a() and 7 0  are quite 
independent both in definition and application. In particular, it is not the case that a  = 7 -1 . 
Thus I prefer not to propagate the term “anticode” further.
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a() is defined as follows: reading the N -string from left to right, each N- 
symbol is mapped onto a single 5-sym bol, according to:
N q i—> 0 
Nr ^  1
Thus, we can say, for example:
a (N o N iN o N i)  =  0101
a (N o N iN iN o N o ) =  01100
It is, of course, the relationship implied by o:() which originally motivated the 
particular choice of symbols for the N -alphabet. A codon structure zcs €  Lcs 
will then be said to match a relevant 5-segm ent u iff a(7r(2cs)) contains x ( u ) 35 
a prefix. This condition will be denoted zqs m u. More concisely, we require that:
zcs tx u a(7r(zCs)) =  x ax by xa =  x(u) € 5 + , x b € 5*
I m ay note in passing th a t, since a () is bijective, its  inverse, a -1 (), is well 
defined; this proves convenient when it comes to  practical realisation of selective 
binding, as it is somewhat easier to implement the  m atching condition zcs tx  u  
by expressing it, in term s of the  segments defined above, as the  condition th a t 
7r(zcs) m ust contain a -1 (x(«)) as a prefix.
5 .2 .4 .3  T h e  Decoding F u nction  7 -1 ()
The definition of certain E-OPs (the decode type) will involve “constructing” an 
A-segment based on interpreting a given codon string as a “description” of it. 
The general idea is that codon strings may act as (more or less) quiescent de­
scriptions of certain A-segments; these A-segments themselves are, in general, not 
quiescent (i.e. they may be, or become, E-DPs). The mapping from an A-segment 
to its description (codon string) is referred to in (Holland 1976) as the “coding” 
function, and is denoted by 7 0 .  This function specifies a coding only for the 
X-symbols of the atoms in the A-segment—it is insensitive to the bond states, 
and is thus of the form:
7 : A* —^ iV*
i.e. a mapping from an A-string to an JV-string.
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The definition12 of 7 0  is that, reading the A-string from left to right, each 
A-symbol maps onto a pair of ./V-symbols according to:
0 i ♦ N qN o
1 i—+ N0N i 
: h-v N\No
Thus, we can say, for example:
7(010 :) =  NqNqNqNiNoNoNi N0
7 (0 :1 0 0 ) =  NqNoNiNoNqN iNoNoNoNo 
7 (::::) =  N tN o ^ N o ^ N o N iN o
This relationship between A-strings and iV-strings—i.e. this particular coding 
of A-strings into JV-strings— “exists” only in the sense that certain E-0P dynam­
ics reflect it; nonetheless, it is convenient to define it here, separately from the 
detailed description of the E-OPs.
Of course, the function that must be used in constructing an A-segment from 
its description is not 7 0 ,  but its inverse—i.e. the decoding function, 7 -1 (). Un­
fortunately, 7 0 ,  as so far defined (following Holland), is not bijective—there are 
many TV-strings which do not code for any A-string. This arises, for example, 
if the TV-string has an odd length, or if, when it is split into pairs from left to 
right, the pair N iN i  occurs. Thus, the “correct” definition of 7 -1 () is some­
what arbitrary. Holland explicitly specifies that 7 -1 () should map odd length 
iV-strings by ignoring the final iV-symbol in the string (thus effectively making it 
of even length). However, Holland does not specify how 7 -1 () should deal with 
the pair N iN \. For the work described here N iN i  was (arbitrarily) mapped onto 
“:”—thus, both N\No  and N \N i  effectively code for the same A-symbol. The 
definition of 7 _1() is then fully characterised by the following mappings:
N0 Nq i—> 0
N0N i 1
N iN 0 :
NiNr :
12This is not literally the definition given by Holland: the la tter evidently incorporated a 
typographical error, as it showed the same coding for bo th  0 and 1.
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At various points it will be necessary for an E-OP to search for “raw materials”, 
so that it can effect particular transformations while still respecting the matter 
conservation “laws” of a o. This will involve searching for a segment of a particu­
lar, specified, form. A standard searching procedure is used, which is somewhat 
similar to that described for establishing the limits of an exchange operation in 
section 5.2.3.2 above.
The search proceeds outward from the E-OP (concurrently to both the left 
and right); when a suitable segment is located (on the left or right), then, with 
probability m 2, this segment is selected and the search terminates; otherwise 
the search continues outward. Effectively a geometric random variable, with 
parameter m2, is sampled, yielding a count— say fc; the fc’th nearest suitable 
segment is then selected (if it exists).
This procedure is completed within a single tim e step, regardless of how far 
the search has to proceed—up to, and including, searching the complete space. 
I may note that this ability to search arbitrarily far in a constant (c*o) tim e is a 
particularly counter-intuitive feature of a 0. Holland does suggest that consider­
ation should ultimately be given to more “realistic” procedures (Holland 1976, 
Section 5), though I shall not pursue that here.
This search procedure may fa il; that is, the search may exhaust a 0 without 
having selected any segment. This would certainly occur if no suitable segment 
existed in the (finite) «o, and might occur even if one or more suitable segments 
exist but they are all passed over (which can happen with probability 1 — m2 for 
each such segment).
In any case it is stipulated that if a search fails, for whatever reason, the E-OP 
in question will have no effect on «o for that tim e step; this will typically mean 
that the search procedure will then be repeated, afresh, on the next time step.13
13Holland states this point explicitly only for one special case; bu t I have applied the same 
principle, mutatis mutandis, to  all comparable cases.
5.2.4.4 Searching for Raw Materials
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All E-OPs supported in aco are structures and are, more particularly, members of 
the language Le-op, formally defined as follows:
¿e-op =  { ze- op £  Z*,
2E—OP =  Z - U V Z - ,
u =  uaubuc,
X(ua) £  5 ,
x K )  =
x ( uc) e  B +,
x ( v ) e ( M *  - B M * )  }
Less formally, an E-OP is a structure (a null delimited segment), whose ma­
terial segment can be (uniquely) decomposed into two distinct parts, u and v. 
We shall see that u remains essentially invariant through the cycle of transforma­
tions associated with the E-OP, and represents its fixed “program” part, u can be 
further decomposed into a 5-atom  ua, called the operator type, a colon atom ub 
which is just a separator,14 and a 5 - segment uc, called the operator argument. uc 
is stipulated not to be empty (e ^ B +) but is otherwise an arbitrary 5-segm ent.15
The material segment v is called the operand; it is progressively modified 
through the cycle of transformations and may be regarded (roughly) as the “data” 
being processed by the E-OP, or as the record of the instantaneous “state” of the 
E-OP. At this point v is permitted to be an arbitrary material segment (x ( f)  £ 
M *) except that its leftmost atom (if any) must not be a 5-atom  (x (u) BM *).
In this way we are guaranteed that, whether v is empty or not, the argument 
uc (and thus u itself) will be uniquely delimited on the right, being immediately 
followed by an atom whose X-symbol is not in 5  (namely the first atom in v, if 
it exists, or, if v is empty, the right null atom delimiter of the structure). This 
ensures that the decomposition of the E-OP as z -u v z _ is unambiguous.
14In fact, this separator is not strictly required in ag, because the length of ua is fixed; 
however, Holland intended this syntax to be extensible to  more complicated a-Universes, where 
ua would be of variable length (u„ £  B + ), hence the inclusion of u j even in c*o.
15There are conceivable alternatives to  requiring simply th a t the argum ent be non-empty: 
we m ight perm it an em pty argument, or we m ight impose a m inim um  length greater th an  one. 
Holland is not entirely clear on this issue: he explicitly refers to  the possible use of an  argument 
length of two, so the m inim um  should not be more th a t this—but it could still be zero, one or 
two without contradicting anything in Holland’s original paper. I simply note the convention I 
have adopted—i.e. th a t the m inim um  valid argum ent length is one.
5.2.4.5 Outline E-OP Syntax
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In practice, the definition of the E-OP dynamics is such that only a small 
number of really distinct kinds of transformation can be effected by a given E-OP. 
Thus, even though the set of possible operands v is very large, these will be 
classified into a small number of distinct classes for the purposes of defining the 
resulting transformations. This classes will, of course, be disjoint. Operands 
which do not fall into any of these classes are considered, by default, to be 
representatives of a “halt” class—which is to say that an E-OP, in such a state, 
will not cause any transformations at all.
Examples of members of L e - o p  would be segments having the following images 
under x():
- 0 : 1 -
- l . O N o N n : -  
—0:0000010iVo:A^lA l^lO:::—
—1:100:100—
E-OPs are classified in to  types on th e  basis of th e  X -sym bol of th e  5 - a to m  u a 
in  th e  definition above; since B  =  {0 ,1 } , th is  yields ju s t tw o d is tin c t types. An 
E-0P w ith  xiua) =  0 w ill be  called a  copy ty p e  (henceforth  deno ted  CP), and  an  
E-OP w ith  x ( u a) =  1 w iH be called a  decode ty p e  (henceforth  DC). T h e  behaviour 
of E-OPs of these  tw o types will be  defined in  de ta il in  th e  following sections.
5 .2 .4 .6  T h e  CP E-OPs
In brief, the CP reaction cycle consists of locating and incorporating a codon 
structure which matches the argument; copying the iV-segment prefix part of 
this (effectively the codon string proper), by locating and incorporating free N -  
atoms in the appropriate order; and finally, dividing (incorporating null atoms) 
in such a way as to reconstitute the original codon structure and delimit the copy 
thereof; this also returns the E-0P to the initial state in the cycle. In principle, a 
given E-0P may repeat this cycle indefinitely although, of course, it will sooner or 
later be broken up through the action of the other operators (especially BM and 
EX).
Loosely then, the essential behaviour of a CP E-0P can be best understood by 
examining its image under x() j  through a complete reaction cycle. A “typical”
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sequence of this sort would be as follows:
t  - 0 : 010 -
t  + 1 -0 :0 1 0 :-
t  2 —0:010:NoNiNoNo—
t -f- 3 —0:010:NoN iN oN o:—
t  +  4 —Q'.OIONq’.NxNqNq'.Nq— 
t  -|- 5 —QiOIONqNi'.NqNq'.NqNi— 
t + 6 -0:010N oNiNq:No:NoN iN o— 
t  +  7 -O-.OIONqN^oNo-.-.NoNxNoNo-
t -|- 8 —0:010—N qN i N oN q—:—:—N qN \N qN q—
Note that, in general, a CP E-0P will require at least £ +  4 time steps to  
complete its reaction cycle, where £ is the length of the N-segment prefix in the 
codon structure which is copied (£ =  4 in the example above). The time required 
may, of course, be longer than this—for example if the search for relevant raw 
materials should fail at any point.
This outline of the “normal” reaction cycle of a CP E-0P is, in fact, all that 
Holland specified of its behavior. As already noted, however, if one is interested in 
building a practical realisation of « 0, it is necessary to consider not just this kind 
of normal reaction cycle, but also all the other possible E-0P states which might 
conceivably arise. The rest of the discussion of the CP E-OPs below is therefore 
concerned with giving a complete and formal definition of the transformations 
they effect, such that reaction cycles of the kind loosely implied above will, in 
fact, result.
From the discussion already given, all CP E-OPs must be members of the 
language Lcp C ¿ e- op defined by:
I/cp =  { zcp €  Z*,
Zqp =  z_uuz_,
I t  =  U a U b U c ,
x M  = o,
X(«b) =  
X(uc) 6 B+,
X ( u )  €  ( A f *  — BM *) }
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The particular transformations implemented by a CP E-OP are determined by 
the instantaneous state—i.e. by the operand segment v. The transformations 
associated with any given operand are completed in one tim e step. This will 
result in a new operand; this will “typically” either be a member of the next 
operand class in the reaction cycle, or will still be a member of the same operand 
class. However, I emphasise again that an E-OP can, in principle, be “initially” 
formed with an operand of arbitrary class, and the relevant transformations will, 
of course, then proceed from there; and equally, the operand may fail to be 
transformed from one class to to the next in the reaction cycle for various reasons, 
despite the cycle being described as “typical” or “normal”.
5.2.4.6.1 CP Operand Class 0
There is exactly one class 0 operand, namely the empty string:
v = e
Informally, the class 0 transformations involve locating a free colon atom and 
splicing this into the E-OP, strongly bonding it to the right end of the structure 
(i.e. between the rightmost existing M -atom, and the right null atom delimiter). 
This colon atom will be subsequently used to mark the current position in an 
iV-segment (derived from a codon structure) while it is being copied; it will be 
referred to below as the position marker.
The “location” of the free colon atom is an example of a search for “raw 
materials”, which has already been detailed in section 5.2.4.4. As noted there, 
this procedure may, in general fail; and, should that happen, then none of the 
transformations described here will be effected. In particular, the operand itself 
will remain unchanged, and typically, therefore, the procedure will be attempted 
afresh on the next tim e step (etc.). These considerations will apply in every case 
where reference is made to locating particular kinds of segment, and will not be 
repeated further.
More formally, let the decomposition of the segment u of the E-OP, into its 
constituent atoms, be denoted in the normal way by:
u =  u ( l)u (2 ) . . .  u (|u |), u(i) € Z
233
Note that |u| denotes the length of u. u(|u |) will thus denotes the rightmost 
atom of u. It is necessarily the case that (¿>(u(|u|)) =  w (i.e. this atom has a weak 
bond state) because the next atom to the right is null (=  z_).
Let z denote a free colon atom:
z =  z_(:,w)z_
The following transformations are then triggered by a class 0 operand:
Z  t—> Z _ Z _
V H-» (:, w)
¥>(u(|u|)) ■-» s
5 .2 .4 .6 .2  CP O perand C lass 1
Again, there is exactly one class 1 operand, namely a single colon atom (nec­
essarily with a weak bond):
v =  (:, v)
Informally, the class 1 transformations involve locating a codon structure 
matching the argument of the E-OP, and splicing the material segment of this 
into the E-OP, strongly bonding it to the right of the colon atom v. The inter­
nal bonding of the material segment extracted from the codon structure is not 
altered.
More formally, let zcs be a codon structure:
Zcs  =  Z - Z a Z b Z _ ,
X(*a) € N + , 
x (zb) € (M* -  NM *)
We require that Zcs match the E-OP argument, in the sense of the a() function 
as described in section 5.2.4.2; that is:
zcs xi uc
The following transformations are then triggered by a class 1 operand:
Zcs >-* Z _ z _  
v »-► (:, s )zazj
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Class 2 operands are defined by the condition:
V  =  vavbvcvd,
x(va) € (D* -  M *)
X(ufc) =  
X(vc) € N D *, 
uj =  e
(The reason for including uj here will become clear subsequently.)
It should be clear that this decomposition, and similar ones which follow in 
subsequent sections, will be unique. This point will not, therefore, be repeated.
In words, the operand is of class 2 if it has exactly one colon atom in it, and 
the atom immediately to the right of this is an iV-atom.
Note carefully that the segment denoted vc must not contain any colon atoms 
(recall that D  is the set of material elements exclusive of the colon element). Now, 
there is no constraint in the definition of codon structures which guarantees that 
their material segments (which is what vc is typically derived from) will not con­
tain colon atom(s) in the garbage suffix. Thus, the “typical” transition from a 
class 1 operand to a class 2 operand might be subverted. It would, arguably, 
be preferable to define the class 1 transformations to reduce or eliminate this 
possibility, by stipulating that only the TV-segment prefix of a codon structure 
should be incorporated into the E-OP, rather than the complete material segment 
(i.e. the garbage suffix, if any, would be discarded by the action of the class 1 
operand). This would also, incidentally, slightly simplify the definitions of later 
operand classes and their transformations. However, while Holland is not com­
pletely unambiguous on this point, there is a strong implication in his treatment 
that the garbage suffix should not be discarded in this way, so I leave the class 1 
transformations as they have already been stated.
Informally, the class 2 transformations are similar to those for the class 0 
operand: a free colon atom is located and spliced into the E-OP, strongly bond­
ing it to the right of the rightmost existing Af-atom. This colon atom will be 
subsequently used to separate the original iV-segment from the copy.
5.2.4.6.3 CP Operand Class 2
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More formally, let z  denote a free colon atom:
z  =  z_(:, v ) z _
The following transformations are then triggered by a class 2 operand:
Z  I -»  z _ z _
vd (:, v)
¥> M K I)) •-> s
(The reason for including vd = e in the prior decomposition of v now becomes 
apparent: it allows the second of these transformations to be expressed relatively 
concisely.)
5.2 .4 .6 .4  CP Operand Class 3
Class 3 operands are defined by the condition:
V  =  VaVbVcVdVeV f V g ,
x (va) € (D * -  B D '),
X(«0 =  
x(vc) e  N , 
x (v d) e  D *, 
x ( ” e) =
X(u/) € AP,
X M  = e
In words, the operand is of class 3 if it contains at least two colon atoms, and 
the atom immediately to the right of the first colon atom (the position marker) 
is an iV-atom.
Informally, the class 3 transformations involve “copying” a single JV-atom; 
that is, a free iV-atom is located, matching the TV-atom immediately to the right 
of the position marker, and this is spliced into the E-OP, strongly bonding it to the 
right of the rightmost existing M -atom. The position marker is also exchanged 
with the iV-atom which has just been copied. In general, this will produce an 
operand which is still of class 3 unless and until the position marker is moved to 
a point where the next atom is not an TV-atom (typically, it will either be the
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colon atom added by the class 2 operand, or the first atom of the garbage suffix 
of the original codon structure). In this way, the E-OP should continue to have a 
class 3 operand, and will continue copying one TV-atom per tim e step, until the 
embedded codon string is completely copied.
More formally, let z  denote the required free JV-atom:
z  = z - (x (v c) ,v )z -
The following transformations are then triggered by a class 3 operand:
Z  I—» Z - Z -  
V9 ^  (X(”c),w)
v’M M ) )  •-» 8
vc h-y Vf, 
vb vc
5 .2 .4 .6 .5  CP Operand Class 4
Class 4 operands are defined by the condition:
V = VaVbVcVjVe,
X(va) €  (.D* -  B D %
X M  =
X(vc) € (D* -  N D ') ,  
X(vd) = 
x(ve) € M*
In words, the operand is of class 4 if it contains at least two colon atoms, and 
the atom immediately to the right of the first colon atom (the position marker) 
is not an N -atom.
Informally, the class 4 transformations involve breaking up and ejecting the 
operand, typically establishing two distinct, but identical (in the sense of 7r()), 
codon structures (and possibly an additional garbage structure), separated from 
the E-OP. One of the codon structures is effectively the “original”, and the other is 
the newly constructed “copy”. By ejecting the existing operand, the transformed 
operand (namely the empty string e) will be of class 0 again, and the reaction 
cycle has been closed.
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These transformations are achieved by locating “free” null atoms and splicing 
them into the (former) E-OP in appropriate locations. Bond states will be forced to 
weak wherever necessary. The precise details vary depending on whether certain 
substrings which, by the definition above, are allowed to be empty, are, in fact, 
empty (since clearly, in such a case, there is no point in “delimiting” such empty 
strings by null atoms).
The transformations associated with the class 4 operands are the most com­
plicated of all, and involve at least two, and perhaps as many as five, distinct 
sets of related transformations. These sets must be implemented sequentially, 
and each separately involves a “location” procedure, which may potentially fail. 
It is stipulated however, that all required location procedures must be success­
fully completed before any transformations are carried out; and if any location 
procedure actually fails then no transformations will be carried out.
It is convenient to regard each distinct set of transformations as a case of a 
generic “null-insertion” set of transformations which inserts a single null atom  
immediately to the right of a specified segment, say z .  Let z  = z azb where Zf, =  e. 
A segment z c =  Z-Z- is first located. The null-insertion transformations, applied 
to z ,  are then defined as follows:
Z c 1-»
Zb ■-» Z -  
V(*a(|*«|)) »-► *
The complete set of transformations triggered by a class 4 operand then con­
sists of the sequential application of the null-insertion transformations to the 
segments u, v a (iff v a ^  e), Vb, v c (iff v c ^  e), and Vj  (iff v e ^  e), in that order.
5 .2 .4 .7  T h e DC E-OPs
The behaviours of the DC E-OPs are extremely similar to those of the CP E-OPs. 
The discussion here will therefore concentrate just on those aspects in which the 
two E-OP types differ.
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The DC reaction cycle consists of locating and incorporating a codon structure 
which matches the argument; decoding (in the sense of 7 -1 ()) the iV-segment 
prefix part of this (effectively the codon string proper), by locating and incorpo­
rating free A-atoms in the appropriate order; and finally, dividing (incorporating 
null atoms) in such a way as to reconstitute the original codon structure and de­
limit the decoded version thereof; this also returns the E-OP to the initial state in 
the cycle. In principle, a given E-OP may repeat this cycle indefinitely although, 
of course, it will sooner or later be broken up through the action of the other 
operators (especially BM and EX).
As for CP, the essential behaviour of a DC E-OP can be best understood by 
examining its image under x()>  through a complete reaction cycle. A ‘‘typical” 
sequence of this sort would be as follows:
t  - 0 : 0 1 0 -
t  + 1 -0 :0 1 0 : -
t  -f- 2 —0:010:NoN iN oN o—
t  3 —0:010:NoN i N oN q:—
t + 4 -0:010JVoJVi:JVb^b:l-
t + 5 -0:010jVoNiiVoiVo::10-
i  +  6 —0:010—AT0JViiVoiVo—:—:—10—
Thus, in general, a DC E-0P will require at least t /2  + 4 tim e steps to complete 
its reaction cycle, where I  is the length of the N-segment prefix in the codon 
structure which is decoded (£ =  4 in the example above). Again, the time actually 
required may be longer than this.
All DC E-OPs must be members of the language Ldc C ¿ e - o p  defined by:
¿DC =  { ^dc €  Z*,
ZDC =  Z-UVZ-,
U =  U 0 ti(,U c ,
x K )  =  1,
X(«fc) =
X ( u c )  €  B + , 
x ( u )  €  (M* -  B M *) }
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As with CP, the operands of the DC E-OP are grouped into classes which ef­
fect essentially similar transformations. The operand classes 0, 1 and 2, and the 
resulting transformations, are identical for both CP and DC and will not be re­
peated. The definitions of the remaining 2 classes, and their transformations, 
differ slightly, and will be discussed individually.
5.2.4 .7 .1  DC O perand Class 3
The definition of this class is identical to CP class 3, except that the codon 
string part must consist of at least two atoms, where one sufficed in the CP case. 
In terms of the decomposition defined for CP, we require that:
x W  6 N 1
The resulting transformations are somewhat similar to those of CP, but with 
several significant differences. A free A-atom (rather than iV-atom) is located 
and spliced into the E-OP. The X-symbol of this A-atom must equal the decoded 
version of the next pair of A^-atoms in the codon string part of the E-OP (in the 
sense of the 7 -1 () function). Finally, the position marker must be moved two 
positions to the right rather than just one. As with CP, the new operand will 
again typically be of (DC) class 3, and transformations of this sort will be iterated 
until the codon string part of the E-OP is exhausted (has a length less than two 
in this case).
More formally, let z  denote the required free A-atom:
z =  z _ ( 7 " 1(x(uc)),w)z_
The following transformations are then triggered by a DC class 3 operand:
Z  I—> z _ z _  
va *-+ (7 -1 (x (vc)),w)
V > M M ) )  ^  s
v c t-> v b 
Vb >-► v c
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The definition of this class is identical to CP class 4, except that the garbage 
remaining from the codon string is now allowed to include a single initial iV-atom. 
In terms of the decomposition defined for CP class 4, we require that:
X(vc) e ( D ' - N 2D *)
With this modification of the definition of vc, the resulting transformations 
are then identical to those defined for CP Class 4 operands.
5.3  “L ife” in  a 0?
Consider a complex in ao comprising 8 structures having the following images 
under x():
- 0 :001 -  - N o N o N t N o N o N o N o N o N o N i -  
- 0 :011 -  - N o N o N x N o N o N o N o N t N o N t -  
- 1:001 -  - N o N r N t N o N o N o N o N o N o N ! -  
- 1:011 -  - N o ^ N t N o N o N o N o N i N o N i -
For reasons which will become more clear subsequently, this complex will be 
referred to as FullSR.
It will be observed that the structures represented in the left column are all 
E-OPs, the first two of type CP, the second two of type DC, while the structures 
represented in the right column are all codon structures. The first CP can bind 
with the first two codon structures and is thus capable of copying them; the second 
CP can bind to, and thus copy, the remaining two codon structures. Similarly, the 
first DC can bind to, and decode, the first two codon structures, and the second 
DC can bind to, and decode, the remaining two codon structures. Finally, it can 
be easily verified that, when the four codon structures are decoded they actually 
yield precisely the four E-OPs represented in the left column.
Prima facie, then, the complex FullSR is capable of a form of “self­
reproduction”: it is an example, in ao, of a roughly von Neumann style, ge­
netically based, A-reproducer.
Admittedly, complexes in ao lack some of the coherence or unity of the A- 
machines considered in the previous chapter. That is, given a population of
5.2.4.7.2 DC Operand Class 4
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structures there is a certain arbitrariness in identifying which of these constitute 
distinct complexes. When we say that FullSR is self-reproducing, what we mean 
is that, given a single instance of it, this should result in the generation of a large 
population of structures which contains many instances of each of the component 
structures of FullSR; but it is then quite arbitrary which of these structures 
should be grouped together as “instances” of FullSR itself. There is actually a 
rather fundamental issue at stake here: to anticipate somewhat, we can roughly 
regard the recursive interaction of the structures making up FullSR as realising a 
form of genetic self-reproduction or as realising a quasi-autopoietic organisation—  
but not as doing both. I shall eventually return to examine this question again in 
section 5.5.8 below; for the present I shall continue to take the former view, which 
regards FullSR simply as realising a limited form of genetic self-reproduction. 
The crucial feature of FullSR, for my purposes (i.e. in terms of Pa), is that it 
seems to be robustly self-reproducing, and, in this respect, it might represent 
a substantive advance over the various A-reproducers previously considered in 
Chapter 4.
As it happens, the reproduction mechanism of FullSR is also genetic—i.e. 
it is of the same general kind as formulated by von Neumann in the solution 
of Pv. In particular, we can roughly interpret the set of E-OPs in FullSR as a 
basic Genetic Machine (GM) go as introduced in the previous chapter; the set of 
codon structures then collectively constitute a particular (dashed) A-descriptor, 
namely d'(g0), and self-reproduction follows. Indeed, although Holland does not 
explicitly mention von Neumann’s work, it seems likely that Holland’s particular 
definition of the E-OPs in «o was motivated precisely with this outcome in mind.
However, it should be emphasised that the similarities between oro and the 
(A-)systems introduced by von Neumann are very limited. While it is true that 
one can formulate an indefinitely large set of self-reproducing complexes, all “re­
lated” to FullSR, this has no particular significance in the context of ao. Because 
the set of E-OPs defined in ao has been (deliberately) impoverished (to facili­
tate the analysis of this “proof of principle” system), the range of A-behaviours 
spanned by this set of A-reproducers seems to be extremely limited. In particu­
lar, since ao does not support universal computation, we cannot even expect this 
set of A-reproducers to meet the weak (behaviour spanning) criterion of allowing
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the embedding of an arbitrarily programmed universal logical machine (ULM).
Thus, we may say that a 0 does indeed support a form of genetic self­
reproduction, leading to an indefinitely large set of related A-reproducers (though 
even here, the details would diverge somewhat from von Neumann’s concept), but 
this set of A-reproducers clearly does not span a significant range of complexity. 
ao would not therefore serve as a vehicle for the solution of Pv (by von Neumann’s 
schema or otherwise).
While it is well to be clear about this divergence between ao and the von Neu­
mann A-systems, it is not particularly surprising. The problem being addressed 
by Holland is (ostensibly) quite different from that tackled by von Neumann. In­
deed, to the extent that von Neumann did, indeed, solve his identified problem, 
it is neither here nor there whether ao might provide another “alternative” solu­
tion to that same problem. No, the point of ao (for Holland at least) is not to 
consider the potential for evolution from FullSR to more complex A-reproducers, 
but rather to consider how even this initial, extremely basic, A-reproducer could 
itself arise from less complex precursors. In particular, Holland estimates that 
if the complex FullSR had to spontaneously emerge solely as a result of the un­
biased generation due to the primitive operators, the expected emergence time 
would be of the order of 1043 time steps. Holland comments:
This is such a large number that, for all practical purposes, we can reject 
the possibility of spontaneous emergence, if indeed the system [FullSR] 
must emerge in one fell swoop.
Holland (1976, p. 399)
We now note that, on the face of it, FullSR itself is already of greater “com­
plexity” (or, at least, bigger) than is strictly necessary. It would seem that we 
could shorten the arguments of the E-OPs of FullSR, while still retaining self- 
reproduction. Thus, shortening the arguments by one atom yields a complex of 
the form:
—0:00— -NoNoNiNoNoNoNoNo- 
- 0 :01 -  - N o N o N x N o N o N q N o N x -  
- 1:0 0 -  - N oN xN xN qNqN oN oN o-  
- 1:01 -  - N o N x N i N q N o N q N o N i -
Or, even more dramatically, if we shorten the arguments by a further atom  
(thus reducing them to the minimum length of just a single atom in each case),
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it turns out that only one distinct argument (0) is required, and the complex can 
be reduced to just four distinct structures in total:
- 0 : 0 -  -N o N o K N o N o N o -
- 1 : 0 -  —N oN i N i N oN oN q—
These simplified complexes share with FullSR the fact that they each de­
fine a set of possible transformations which, if they all occur, will result in the 
reproduction of the original complex.
But the issue here is not just which transformations are possible, but also 
which will actually occur. It should be clear that the simplifications of FullSR, 
suggested above, may be counterproductive: by shortening the arguments of the 
E-OPs one is making it more likely that E-OPs will bind with “random” codon 
strings (i.e. not belonging to the complex). If such “mis”-binding events are too 
common, then the complex will fail to achieve self-reproduction after all. In the 
event, Holland argues that FullSR represents a minimal complex in ao which 
could effectively self-reproduce.
However Holland goes on to identify complexes, significantly simpler than 
FullSR, which are not properly capable of self-reproduction (in the manner 
of FullSR) but which could nonetheless achieve a kind of “partial” (self?)- 
reproduction; he then argues that this phenomenon might be sufficient to strongly 
bias the subsequent generation of new structures (and complexes), and might 
ultimately provide a plausible route for the emergence of FullSR proper (for 
example).
Holland introduces firstly the following complex, consisting of three structures:
-0 : 1 0 0 -  —N i N qN oN i N 0N 0N qN q—
- 1:100-
The key point here is that the single codon structure in this complex, which 
can be copied and decoded by the two given E-OPs, does not code completely for 
either E-0P, but does code partially for both:
7 -1 ( N i N oN qN i N qN oN qN o) =  :100
The arguments of the two E-OPs are still long enough (arguably) to ensure 
that they will almost certainly bind to this codon string if it is available. So, if
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this complex should arise, it should result in the generation of a high density of 
copies of the codon structure, plus a high density of E-QP fragments of the form:
- ’.1 0 0 -
Now these fragments can be transformed into one or the other of the E-OPs 
of the original complex, simply by a 5-atom  being added in front of the colon 
atom— and it seems possible, at least, that this could happen spontaneously, with 
reasonable frequency, just by the background operation of the EX operator. This 
would effectively complete the reproduction of the original complex.16
Holland suggests that, indeed, this kind of process could occur and sustain 
itself in O!o- Indeed, he goes further and suggests that, if a large density of the 
relevant codon structure could be initially established, then this kind of process 
could actually be effective even if the arguments to the E-OPs were reduced from 
three atoms to just two. Again, this would allow the codon structure itself to 
be shorter also, so we identify the following complex as also “partially” self- 
reproducing:
- 0 : 1 0 -  —N i N qN qN i N qN o—
- 1:10-
I shall refer to this complex as Part SR.
It is important to note carefully here the condition which allows the reduction 
in size of the E-OP arguments—namely that the complex (or, at least, the single 
codon structure within it) already exists in high density. More specifically, the 
claim is that if, by whatever means, instances of this codon structure, with strong 
internal bonding, should achieve high density, then a high density of the complex 
PartSR should spontaneously form and sustain itself indefinitely thereafter.
In more detail, the idea is that the initial large population of codon structures 
is expected to persist long enough that it is likely that an instance of the DC E-OP 
of PartSR will spontaneously form, even while the density of codon structures 
is still high. This will then result in the formation of a large population of the 
relevant E-OP fragments—i.e. fragments of the form:
— :10—
16It is perhaps debatable whether this should still be term ed “self” reproduction— but the 
precise terminology is not im portant here. More generally, it does not m atter for m y purposes 
which, if any, of the complexes described are actually labelled as “living” .
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After this, the E-OP fragments could get spontaneously transformed into the 
required E-OPs belonging to PartSR, with sufficient frequency that a large popu­
lation of PartSR does, indeed, form and sustain itself.
All this leaves open the question of how a high density of instances of the 
PartSR codon structure (with strong internal bonding) could be formed in the 
first place. To this end, Holland finally directs attention to the following complex 
with just two structures:
-0 : 1 0 0 -  -N iN oN oN iN oN o-
Holland argues that if even a single instance of this complex should sponta­
neously form (with both structures having strong internal bonding) then this will 
result precisely in the formation of a high density of the PartSR codon struc­
ture, as required. Note the CP E-OP in this final complex is not the CP E-OP of 
the PartSR complex as such: it has an extra atom in the argument to ensure 
that it will preferentially bind, with “sufficient” probability, to the PartSR codon 
structure, even while the latter is present only at low density.
This final complex will be referred to as the Seed complex: it apparently 
has the property that, if a single instance should (spontaneously) form, then 
(with high probability) a population of PartSR complexes should arise, and sub­
sequently sustain itself indefinitely (unless and until it is displaced by some other 
complex—perhaps even FullSR— which is more efficient in its reproduction).
Holland’s “proof-of-principle” can then be stated as follows. A naive view of 
the origin of “life” (in a 0) would assume that FullSR (or something of comparable 
complexity) must spontaneously form purely from the “unbiased” generation of 
“random” structures by the primitive operators. But, in fact, the complex Seed 
would spontaneously form at a much earlier stage (since it is so much simpler 
than FullSR). Holland specifically estimates the expected emergence tim e for 
Seed as only about 4 x 108 time steps, which would make such emergence quite 
feasible. Once this occurs, the subsequent generation of structures would be 
strongly biased, in a way which could dramatically accelerate the emergence of 
FullSR. Indeed, as indicated above, the process subsequent to the spontaneous 
formation of Seed would already take on at least some of the flavour of Darwinian 
evolution.
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It may be noted that there is no claim that the complexes Seed, PartSR, or 
even FullSR, are unique in the roles they play here. There may well be other 
complexes which, if they should spontaneously form, would strongly bias the 
subsequent generation of structures in a manner similar to that of Seed and 
PartSR, such that FullSR, or some other similarly complex A-reproducer, could 
then quite plausibly emerge. Holland’s point is to give a wproof-of-principle”: 
for this it is sufficient to exhibit one family of complexes (namely Seed, PartSR 
and FullSR) having the required properties. To whatever extent (if any) other 
alternative complexes could have an equivalent effect, Holland’s argument could 
only be strengthened.
In this section I have been concerned solely with outlining the conclusions 
of Holland’s analysis of ao. This is necessarily qualitative— and entirely uncon­
vincing in itself. Holland, of course, accompanies this discussion with a detailed 
quantitative analysis to support his conclusions. I shall not consider this analysis 
at this point. Rather, I shall turn to the more direct approach: simply testing 
whether the phenomena which have been qualitatively described here do, in fact, 
occur in a particular implementation of ao*
5 .4  AVO: A  R ea lisa tio n  o f  ao
This section describes a package called AVO, which is, in effect, a computer based 
realisation of ao.
AVO has been written entirely in the C language (ANSI X3J11). Original 
development was carried out on an IBM PC compatible platform, running MS- 
DOS, and Turbo-C V2.0. However, the empirical results reported below were 
recorded with an alternative version, still running on an IBM PC compatible 
platform, but compiled under GNU cc, and executed in 80386 protected mode, 
to allow access to a large, linear, 32-bit address space; the latter was required 
to allow universes of size greater than about 2 x 103 atoms to be realised. As 
far as possible, the package has been written to be “easily” portable (machine 
dependencies are encapsulated by conditional compilation). The source code 
comprises about 5000 lines, in roughly 60 files. This source code has been placed
247
in the public domain, and is available to interested researchers.17
The primary documentation for AVO is the source code itself. This section is 
intended only to provide background information which might significantly ease 
the understanding of the source code.
5.4.1 T he Program s
AVO is organised into four executable programs.
avOrun realises the ao dynamics proper. It offers facilities for loading and 
saving disk file images of a 0 universes and for executing the ao dynamic operators 
over any specified number of time steps, including dynamic display of a window 
onto the state string. There is also support for the extraction and logging of 
various statistical measures evaluated on the state string.
The other three programs are utilities for generating state strings with par­
ticular characteristics, as follows:
• randmat: This yields a completely “randomised” state string.
• p artsr: This divides all material atoms more or less equally between in­
stances of the three structures making up the PartSR complex, and free 
atoms.
•  f u l l s r :  This divides all material atoms more or less equally between in­
stances of the eight structures making up the FullSR complex, and free 
atoms.
5.4.2 T he D isk Im ages
A disk image of a particular ao minimally comprises three files, grouped by having 
the same name (up to 8 characters). The three files are distinguished by their 
extensions as follows:
•  .mat: This contains an image of the state string.
•  .prm: This contains all parameters not implicit in the state string—namely 
r, A, mi and m2. It also contains a set of flags which allow each of the
17Requests should be directed to  the author, in the first instance.
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operator types (BM, EX, CP, DC) to be selectively enabled or disabled. Finally, 
this file contains parameters specifying the interval (in time steps) at which 
log records should be emitted, and (separately) the interval at which the 
console display should be updated.
•  . s t t :  This contains three “state” variables not contained in the state string: 
the current “time” (in ao, not wall clock tim e), the current “seed” for the 
pseudo-random number generator, and a “count” of the number of pseudo­
random number evaluations so far carried out (the latter is maintained as 
a check against possible cycling of the generator).
When avOrun is executing it maintains a log file with the extension .lo g .  
Each log record contains a summary of certain statistics on the state string at 
a particular time step. When an image is loaded by avOrun a log file will be 
created if one does not already exist; otherwise the new log records will be simply 
appended to the existing log file.
All disk files associated with the image of a particular ao are simple ASCII 
encoded text, so that they can be examined (and modified, if necessary) using 
normal text editing tools.
5.4.3 T he S tate String
The primary data structure required is the state string. A closed doubly linked list 
is used. The size is dynamically determined whenever a new image is loaded, but 
remains static otherwise. This corresponds to a finite, but unbounded (circular) 
organisation, where the size is set at “initialisation”. Essentially, the size is 
determined by an argument to whichever program is used to generate a .mat file; 
thereafter it is a constant of the ao. The linked list is effectively superimposed 
on a simple, static, array of atoms.
A closed organisation was chosen primarily to avoid having to introduce spe­
cial code to deal with behaviour at boundaries. Note that this means that the 
state string lacks any “absolute” position reference.
The linked list arrangement was chosen so that the locations in memory of 
each atom would not change (the relative locations in the state string do, of 
course, change). This makes the implementation of “movement” (which arises
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both from the EX operator, and the E-OPs) reasonably efficient: a segment can 
be arbitrarily relocated just by rearranging pointers, rather than actually moving 
atomic symbols around in memory.
The underlying, static, array organisation makes it possible to efficiently main­
tain indices of specified kinds of atoms, which, in turn, can significantly speed up 
the execution of certain operators. However, many aspects of the ao dynamics 
still require segments to be scanned, generally in either direction. The double 
linking of the list makes this reasonably efficient.
5.4.4 Pseudo-random  N um ber G enerator
The AVO package involves a number of “stochastic” processes. A pseudo-random 
number generator is used to support these. A variety of pseudo-random num­
ber generators are available— there is generally one included with the standard 
C library. However, as reported by Park fc Miller (1988), the quality of these 
generators is highly variable—where “quality” reflects some statistical measure(s) 
on the generated numbers. Furthermore, these statistical properties are not gen­
erally documented for the generators supplied as standard in a C library.
It was therefore decided to implement the “minimal standard generator”, 
identified in (Park & Miller 1988), whose characteristics would, at least, be known, 
and would also meet certain minimal quality criteria.
5.4.5 P rim itive O perators
Prima facie, the BM and EX operators both involve sampling a “large” number 
of independent Bernoulli random variables at each time step. This would be 
computationally expensive, and an alternative, statistically equivalent, algorithm 
was developed.
The key point is that, in each case, the probability of success for each Bernoulli 
random variable is quite small (typically 10-4 in the case of BM, and 10-2 in the 
case of EX). That is, “most” of the Bernoulli trials would usually come up with 
failure. The approach adopted was to first decide how many successes there 
should be on each time step, and then select which members of the population 
(of trials) will actually be the successes.
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More formally, let X  be an n-dimensional random variable, consisting of n 
identical, independent, Bernoulli random variables.18 Interpreting a component 
value of 1 as indicating that the corresponding object should be operated on, 
and 0 as indicating that it should not, then the selection processes associated 
with the BM and EX operators are equivalent to making trials of a suitable X .
Let x  denote a trial of X . Let M  denote the number of l ’s in X . M , being a 
function of the random variable X , is, formally, another random variable, which is 
jointly distributed with X . Let m  denote the number of l ’s in x — i.e. m  denotes 
the result of the trial of M  (note that, by the definitions of X  and M , M  is 
binomially distributed, with parameters n and p; this will prove significant later).
Let q = 1 — p. Given that the components of X  are identical, independent, 
Bernoulli random variables with parameter p, the (marginal) probability function 
for any component is simply:
P(X,  =  1) =  p 
P ( X i = 0 )  =  q
Given that the components of X  are independent, the probability function of 
X  (i.e. the joint probability function of the components) is given simply by the 
product of the marginals. The event x  denotes the situation that, of n indepen­
dent Bernoulli random variables, m resulted in the value 1 (with probability p in 
each case) and n — m  resulted in the value 0 (with probability q in each case). The 
probability of this event is the product of the separate probabilities. Concisely, 
the probability function for X  is, therefore:
P x(x) =  pmqn~m
This, then, is the objective: we wish to formulate an alternative procedure 
for evaluating X , such that the probability function still matches this expression 
but which will be computationally more efficient (at least in the cases of interest 
in the or-Universe) than evaluating n independent Bernoulli random variables.
Now consider a new random variable, X'. As with X , X ' is an n-dimensional 
random variable, where the sample space for each component is {0 ,1}. X' is 
evaluated as follows. Let M ' be a binomial random variable with parameters n
18The notation introduced here follows th a t of Larson (1974).
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and p. Make a trial of M '\ let m  be the result. Randomly select m distinct 
numbers from the set {0..(n — 1)} (with all possible such selections being equally 
likely). For all i in this set assign the value 1 to the corresponding components, 
X-, of X'; assign the value 0 to all other components of X \
Note carefully the distinction between M  and M '. Though they both have the 
same probability function, M  is defined (and therefore evaluated) indirectly— as 
a function of X; whereas M ' is directly defined (and evaluated) in its own right. 
The precise mechanism for directly evaluating M ' will be discussed subsequently; 
for the moment, the important point is that a binomial random variable can be 
directly generated—we do not have to resort to the indirect method of generating 
n independent trials of a Bernoulli random variable.
I claim that, with this new procedure, X ' will have precisely the same prob­
ability function as X  (and may therefore be evaluated in place of it), but is 
computationally much more efficient (the quantitative improvement in efficiency 
will depend on p: the smaller p is, the greater the improvement). Informally, the 
idea is this: with the original procedure, we always had to evaluate n indepen­
dent random variables—even though, “on average”, only np of them resulted in a 
“success”. W ith the new procedure, the number of random variable evaluations 
is, on average, 1 + np (M ' is always evaluated, and then, on average, a further np 
evaluations are necessary to randomly select the “lucky” components).
We now prove that this new procedure does indeed produce the same proba­
bility function as the original procedure.
M 1 is defined to be binomial, with parameters n and p] its probability function 
is therefore:
TO n-TO
m
Now consider the event X ' =  x , where x  contains exactly m l ’s. This can 
occur only if, firstly, the result of evaluating M ' is m (probability PM'(m) per 
the expression above), and the “correct” m elements of the set {0..(n — 1)} are
( Aselected. For the latter event, there are possible distinct outcomes, all
equally likely—so the probability of the particular outcome specified is just the 
reciprocal of this. Since the two experiments (sampling M ' , and selecting the m
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components) are defined to be independent, we can multiply the probabilities of 
the two events to get the probability of x:
= p x (x )  Q E D
Assuming that the computational cost of evaluating a single (scalar) random 
variable is (approximately) independent of its probability function (and this as­
sumption may have to be justified), then, clearly, it is computationally cheaper 
to evaluate only 1 + np random variables, instead of n. To quantify this, the new 
procedure will be, on average, computationally cheaper by a factor n /(  1 +  np). 
In the case of AVO, we typically have p < 10-2 , and the computational advantage 
is substantial—say >  102.
In implementing this procedure in AVO, there are two distinct steps: evaluating 
M ' (yielding m, the number of components to be selected) and then actually 
choosing the particular m components.
To sample a random variable of given probability function, a (pseudo-)random 
number is generated (with a uniform probability function over a given range) 
and this is then passed through an inverse, cumulative, version of the desired 
probability function. This distorts the uniform probability function of the original 
(pseudo-)random variable into just the shape of the desired probability function. 
Thus, the assumption that the cost of evaluating a random variable is independent 
of its probability function reduces to an assumption that the cost of evaluating 
the inverse, cumulative, probability function is negligible (at least compared to 
the cost of generating the pseudo-random number itself).
In the particular case of interest (evaluating M '—binomially distributed with 
parameters n and p) the computation of the inverse, cumulative function is quite
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demanding, but this is overcome by using look up tables which are computed 
once-off per run of avOrun, and imposes no on-going computational costs per 
time step. There is one lingering difficulty which is that the n values relevant 
to the various ao operators vary dynamically—they correspond essentially to 
the number of atoms having bonds of an appropriate sort (only atoms with weak 
bonds qualify as potential pivots for EX etc.). In practice this is overcome by fixing 
n = R  in all cases; then, m  atoms are “provisionally” selected, but the operator 
is applied only to those for which it is allowed. This means that somewhat more 
atoms are “provisionally” considered for the application of the operator than is 
strictly necessary; but the net gain in computational efficiency is still judged to 
be worthwhile. The probability functions for selection of the “eligible” atoms are 
not altered by this procedure.19
The final issue here is, having generated a trial m of M , how to pick the 
appropriate m  atoms. This is done in practice by repeatedly picking a random 
value in the range 0..(i2 — 1) and using this as an index into the state string 
(viewed now as an array rather than a linked list). In itself, this runs the risk 
that a single atom could be selected more than once for a given operation within 
a single time step (it represents selection with replacement, rather than without 
replacement as required). This problem is overcome by tagging each atom which 
has been selected (for the given operation, on this tim e step); if such an atom is, 
by chance, reselected, that reselection is discarded, and another attempt made etc. 
Obviously, this process could become very inefficient if m  could be comparable 
to R—but this does not arise in the cases of interest in AVO. The tagging process 
is made efficient by using a time stamp rather than a simple binary tag: this 
obviates the need to clear the tags on each time step.
19There is one minor qualification of this. The two distinct phases of BM (strong-to-weak and 
weak-to-strong) are executed sequentially. To keep the respective probability functions precisely 
as described by Holland it is technically necessary to  ensure th a t a bond m ade weak in  the first 
phase is not m ade strong again in  the second phase of the same tim e step (albeit, w ith the 
typical param eter values, such an event would be extremely rare anyway). This is achieved 
by tagging each bond which is actually modified during the strong-to-weak phase; this tag  can 
then be checked during the weak-to-strong phase. This tag  is qualified by a (strong-to-weak) 
tim e stam p, so th a t it need not be explicitly cleared on each tim e step.
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The simplest approach to the implementation of the emergent operators is to 
scan the entire state string, identifying (and processing) any emergent operators 
encountered. This is, indeed, the basic approach adopted in AVO. However, this 
scheme is modified in two ways, in order to improve the execution speed.
First note that, from the definition of the E-OPs, they all necessarily incor­
porate at least one colon atom. Now, typically, only one in 10 atoms in AVO are 
colon atoms. Thus, instead of scanning the entire state string on each time step it 
is significantly more efficient to selectively target the scan onto the colon atoms. 
This is achieved by creating an index of all colon atoms; this need only be done 
once per run, at initialisation, as the “positions” of these atoms, in the array 
view of the state string, will not change thereafter. Then, on each time step, it is 
sufficient to inspect the immediate neighbourhood of each colon atom, in turn, to 
establish whether it is part of an E-OP. Again, a tim e stamp mechanism is used 
to ensure that a given E-OP (which may contain more than one colon atom) is 
not processed multiple times on any single time step.
The second, and ultimately more significant, optimisation is concerned with 
the location procedure for raw materials, which is an essential part of the execu­
tion of all E-OPs. Recall that there is no limit on how far this search may extend, 
possibly spanning the entire state string. The lower the density of the required 
raw materials, the more extended these searches will become. It turns out, for 
reasons to be explained later, that the densities of free atoms, particularly colon 
atoms, tend to quickly become quite small, and can be zero for a significant frac­
tion of the time. Clearly, if there are no free atoms of a particular kind present in 
the state string at all, then the location procedure (for such a free atom) is guar­
anteed to fail; and should not even be initiated. This is arranged by establishing 
and maintaining counts of the free atoms of each element currently present in 
the state string. These must be correctly updated by the EX operator, and all 
E-OPs. For experiments in which the density of E-OPs is high, this optimisation 
has been found to yield approximately a five-fold increase in execution speed; in 
other cases the improvement is less dramatic, but is still worthwhile.
5.4.6 Em ergent O perators
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In the experiments to be described it is essential to track the densities, in the 
state string, of specified complexes (specifically of PartSR and FullSR). In fact, 
it turns out to be sufficient to track an upper bound on these densities, which 
proves somewhat simpler to implement.
A first point to note is that, instead of literally attempting to assess the density 
of a complete complex, we track only the density of some one structure in the 
complex; clearly this does establish an upper bound on the density of the entire 
complex.
Secondly, note that we must decide which structure to track for any given 
complex. For both complexes of interest here, codon structures have been (ar­
bitrarily) selected for tracking. In the case of PartSR the complex only includes 
a single codon structure (-iViN 0N0N iN qN q-)  so no further choice is necessary; 
in the case of FullSR the particular codon tracked was arbitrarily selected as 
-NoNoNtNoNoNoNoNoNoNr-.
However, some care must still be taken in identifying instances of these codon 
structures. Since codon structures are dynamically incorporated into the E-OPs 
and are punctuated by colon atoms (used as position markers), the tracking 
algorithm is designed to recognise the codon strings regardless of surrounding 
context, and regardless of the presence of a (single) embedded colon atom. Again, 
while this is not a completely reliable procedure, it will clearly yield a satisfactory 
upper bound for the density of the codon strings, and thus of the complexes, of 
interest.
5.4.7 Tracking C om plexes
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5.5 P la y in g  G od
5.5.1 T he P redictions
To recap, there are three substantive elements to Holland’s predictions:
1. The Seed complex will spontaneously appear within a relatively short time 
(of the order of 109 time steps).
2. Once the Seed complex does appear, a population of PartSR complexes will 
be established, and will maintain themselves.
3. Conventional Darwinian evolution can then optimise the reproducing ability 
of the complexes quite quickly, up to and including the possible emergence 
of the FullSR complex (or something comparable).
Of these, the first potentially requires a substantial amount of (real) time 
to test; the second can be easily tested (by “playing God”— directly inserting 
an instance of the Seed complex); and the third can be tested only when (or if) 
testing of the second has been successful (i.e. after prediction 2 has been verified). 
Therefore, testing concentrated, in the first instance, on prediction 2—whether 
the Seed complex can establish a viable population of PartSR complexes.
5.5.2 Param eter Values
As already discussed in the detailed definition of <*o, Holland (1976) stipulated 
particular values for the c*o parameters, which he then used in his numerical 
calculations. In summary, these values are as follows:
R  = 104
p =  0.5 (=$-p(—) =  0.5) 
p(0) =  p(l)  =p(:)  = p(No) =  p(Nx) =  0.1
r =  10-4 
A =  7/3
m i =  10-2
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With minor exceptions, which will be noted below, these values were consis­
tently adhered to in all the experiments to be described.
Holland did not specify any numerical value for the parameter m 2; in his 
Lemma 2 he suggests that his results will be insensitive to its exact value pro­
vided only that m2 <  1/6 where 6 is the number of weak internal bonds in the 
structure(s) of interest. The longest structures to which Holland subsequently 
even loosely applies this analysis are the codons of the FullSR complex, which 
are each 10 atoms long, and thus have no more than 9 weak internal bonds. The 
condition m2 <  1/6 is thus guaranteed to be satisfied, in all relevant cases, if we 
have m 2 < 1 / 9 .  It is desirable not to make m 2 much smaller than necessary, as 
this progressively slows the execution of the EX operator, and of E-OPs in general. 
Bearing this in mind, a value of m 2 =  0.1 in used in all the experiments described 
below.
I should note here that, in any case, I have been unable to follow the derivation 
of Holland’s Lemma 2; and that I have carried out both theoretical and empirical 
analyses which suggest that it may be mistaken in detail. However, this seems to 
be a relatively minor issue, which would not critically affect Holland’s predictions; 
therefore it will not be pursued further.
Four distinct experiments will be described. In each case, results are presented 
for two distinct runs of avOrun; these runs are distinguished only in that the 
pseudo-random number generator was seeded with a different value, both in the 
randomisation of the initial configuration and the actual execution of avOrun. The 
distinct seeds were chosen such that there was no overlap in the sections of the 
pseudo-random number cycle traversed within each pair of corresponding runs; 
that is, the runs used completely distinct sequences of pseudo-random numbers. 
The only purpose of this procedure is to demonstrate that, in each case, the 
essential pattern of the results does not rely on any artefact of the particular 
pattern of pseudo-random numbers encountered.
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Figure 5.1: The Seed Complex: In this case, a randomised configuration is ini­
tially generated, and a single instance of the Seed complex is artificially inserted. 
The graph shows a superimposition of results from two runs, with disjoint ini­
tialisation of the pseudo-random number generator. Contrary to the original 
prediction, a large population of PartSR is not established.
5.5.3 E xperim ent 1: T he Seed C om plex
An ao of 104 cells was generated with a random initial configuration. A single 
instance of Seed was then inserted (this increases R  slightly, and also slightly 
alters the element densities; but the effect is negligible). 104 steps were executed. 
This was repeated with the alternative seeding of the pseudo-random number 
generator.
The results of the two runs are shown (superimposed) in Figure 5.1. It shows 
the number of PartSR complexes present over time (as tracked by the number of 
PartSR codon structures). It is seen that, contrary to expectations, a significant 
population of PartSR was not generated. Indeed, the greatest PartSR codon 
string population achieved (itself an overestimate of the density of the complex 
proper) was only 4 instances.
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5.5.4 E xperim ent 2: T he Modified Seed C om plex
On examining the detailed behaviour of the Seed complex it was found that, 
quite typically, the CP E-OP was failing to bind the PartSR codon, but was, 
rather, binding other “garbage” codons. But, reviewing Holland’s analysis of 
Seed, we find a claim that the 3-atom argument of the CP E-OP should be sufficient 
“to assure that it will preferentially attach to the single copy of 'y(:a(NiNo))” 
(Holland 1976, p. 399).
In fact, it seems that Holland’s analysis here is mistaken. Following the logic 
of Holland’s own Lemma 1 (though not the precise result) the expected density 
of structures having the prefix 100 is 0.5 x 0.13 =  5 x 10-4 . Thus, in a “region” 
of 104 atoms we would expect there to be approximately 5 distinct, garbage, 
codon structures which can be potentially bound by the Seed CP E-OP. Thus 
Seed could well fail to reliably reproduce the correct (PartSR) codon structure, 
and this indeed seems to be what is happening. Note that this effect is not offset 
by initially placing the two structures of the Seed complex immediately beside 
each other: with the relatively small value of m 2 in use (0.1), proximity has only 
a very limited effect on the binding probability.
To investigate this further, the previous experiment was repeated, but with 
the Seed complex modified by adding a further atom to the argument of the E-OP 
(the argument now becoming 1001). The expected number of garbage codon 
structures, matching this argument, in a universe of 104 atoms, now falls to 
0.5, so the desired specificity should be achieved. It should be noted that this 
modification will also increase the expected emergence time of the modified Seed 
complex (though that is not, of course, at issue for these particular experiments); 
and that the expected lifetime of the modified Seed complex will be somewhat 
reduced thus reducing the maximum density of the PartSR complex which could 
be generated. But, for the moment, the important requirement is to establish a 
significant density even of the PartSR codon structure.
Figure 5.2 is a plot of the outcome of this experiment. While there is now a 
significant generation of PartSR complexes (or, at least, of its codon structure), 
it is clear that this effect is still very limited. The greatest PartSR codon string 
population achieved was 18 instances, whereas this particular universe has a
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Figure 5.2: The Modified Seed Complex: In this case, a randomised configuration 
is initially generated, and a single instance of the modified Seed complex (see text) 
is artificially inserted. Again, the graph shows a superimposition of results from 
two runs, with disjoint initialisation of the pseudo-random number generator. 
While a population of the PartSR complex (or, at least, its codon string) is now 
initially built up, it subsequently dies out again relatively quickly.
theoretical capacity for 250 instances. It is clear that the modified Seed complex 
does not come close to saturating the universe in this sense. Furthermore, after 
the initial transient, the population rapidly dies out.
5.5.5 E xperim ent 3: T he PartSR C om plex
At this point it was clear that the Seed complex was not capable of carrying 
out the function anticipated by Holland—i.e. to establish a viable population of 
PartSR complexes. However, it was not clear whether this was merely a problem 
of the relatively limited size of PartSR population which the initial instance of 
Seed was managing to generate, or whether the PartSR complex would not be 
viable even in an established population.
To test this, an a 0 was generated (via the p a r tsr  program) with a highly 
artificial initial configuration—essentially (80%) saturated with instances of the
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Figure 5.3: The PartSR Complex: In this case, an initial configuration is gener­
ated by the program p artsr; this consists solely of instances of the structures 
making up the PartSR complex and of free atoms. Again, the graph shows a su­
perimposition of results from two runs, with disjoint initialisation of the pseudo­
random number generator. Contrary to the original prediction, the population 
of PartSR is not sustained, but dies out rapidly.
PartSR complex. This was again executed for 104 steps. Figure 5.3 shows the 
outcome. It is seen that, even with this “most favourable” configuration, the 
population still rapidly goes extinct.
5.5.6 E xperim ent 4: T he FullSR C om plex
It will be recalled that the PartSR complex has the property of not being “fully” 
self-reproducing: it relies on the primitive operators to complete its cycle of re­
production. A final experiment was carried out to test whether this was a critical 
factor in the failure of PartSR to be viable. In this case, an ao was generated 
(via the f  u l l s r  program) which was saturated with instances of the FullSR com­
plex (the maximum capacity is 35 instances).20 This was again executed for 104
20The size of this universe was m ade m arginally larger than  104. A basic complex consisting 
of a single instance of FullSR  plus sufficient free atoms to  correctly set the relative element
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Figure 5.4: The FullSR Complex: In this case, an initial configuration is gen­
erated by the program f u l l s r ;  this consists solely of instances of the struc­
tures making up the FullSR complex and of free atoms. Again, the graph shows 
a superimposition of results from two runs, with disjoint initialisation of the 
pseudo-random number generator. As with the PartSR complex, and contrary to  
the original prediction, the population of FullSR is not sustained, but dies out 
rapidly.
steps. Figure 5.4 shows the outcome. It is seen that, even with this “fully” 
self-reproducing complex, the population still rapidly goes extinct; indeed, the 
extinction is, if anything, somewhat more rapid for this complex.
5.5.7 W h a t’s going wrong?
From the experiments described above, it was clear that ao was simply not capable 
of supporting the “life-like” behaviour postulated by Holland. There was thus no 
point in pursuing the question of spontaneous emergence. But these experiments 
do not, in themselves, give any indication of how deep rooted (or otherwise) the 
deficiencies of a 0 may be.
densities turns out to  require 290 atoms. The size of the universe m ust then  be m ade an integral 
multiple of this (10,150) to  correctly retain  these densities.
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A series of informal studies were then carried out, which involved simply 
monitoring a dynamic display of a window onto the at0 state string, over many 
different variations in the configuration and parameters of the universe. Based on 
this exercise it was possible to identify at least some specific, proximate, causes 
of failure (there can, of course, be no guarantee that all relevant factors were 
identified by this process).
Note that Holland’s analysis of the PartSR dynamics relies on its being com­
posed of structures which are, internally, “strongly bonded”—which is to say long 
lived. He then estimates the average “productivity” over this lifetime, to come up 
with a net positive rate of change for the density of the complex (once a threshold 
is reached). However, in practice, there are (at least) three factors which severely 
disturb the behaviour of the complex, and which are not allowed for in Holland’s 
analysis:
• Raw materials (free atoms, in particular) quickly become scarce (due to 
usage by random, garbage, emergent operators). The effect is to drastically 
reduce the rate at which all emergent operators function in practice, thus 
reducing the fecundity of any putatively self-reproducing complexes.
• Even when a structure is strongly bonded internally, there is nothing to  
stop random garbage moving into a position immediately adjacent to it. 
At the very least this interrupts or suspends the progress of an emergent 
operator. Thus, it turns out that complexes can only be active for a limited 
portion of their total lifetimes (regardless of the availability of free atoms); 
again this severely limits fecundity.
•  But, at worst, this random arrival of a garbage structure beside an emergent 
operator can have much more severe effects. If it arrives on the right hand 
side it can corrupt the output of the operator (introducing a high “muta­
tion” rate, and further reducing fecundity). If it arrives on the left hand 
side it can result in the formation of a different, garbage, emergent operator 
which forcibly, and prematurely, breaks up the original operator. This has 
actually been observed to occur on a number of occasions. Thus, as well as 
reduced fecundity, complexes also have higher mortality than expected.
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So: compared to Holland’s analysis, the lifetimes of the structures are shorter 
than expected, they are only active for a fraction of this tim e, and their products 
are quite frequently corrupted. The net effect is that mortality exceeds fecundity 
(by a significant margin), the putatively reproducing complexes cannot make up 
for their own natural decay rate, and thus become extinct quickly. These effects 
are directly related to the time required to complete a reproduction cycle, and 
thus to the size of the complexes. This explains the even worse performance of 
the FullSR complex compared to PartSR.
Note that I have not presented any experimental investigation of the sensitiv­
ity of my quantitative results (experiments 1-4 above) to the parameters of ao, 
even though this would be a straightforward (if tedious) exercise. The reason for 
this omission should now be clear: Holland’s analysis has been demonstrated to 
be greatly oversimplified, and defective as a result. The failure of the predictions 
is not dependent on the particular parameter values used, but is, rather, repre­
sentative of the fact that several significant factors have been entirely neglected 
in the analysis. This effectively destroys the assumed theoretical basis for the 
empirical investigation; in this situation a random search through the ao param­
eter space for a system which would show some “interesting” behaviour seems to 
me quite futile, and I do not pursue it.
Thus, even though the original objective was to design an artificial system  
which would be simple enough to allow closed form analysis, it turns out that a 0 
is just not that simple. At this point it seems doubtful to me that a system which 
was genuinely simple enough to allow the kind of analysis envisaged by Holland, 
would actually support any of the phenomena of relevance—though this remains 
an open question. I should note that Holland’s own diagnosis of the situation is 
not quite as pessimistic as mine; commenting on the preliminary results of the 
current work (McMullin 1992d) he stated:
When I wrote my original version I didn’t make any allowance for diver­
sionary “precipitates” (and the like) that would sequester needed interme­
diates . . .  several of my colleagues in various places have said in one way 
or another that this is a central problem in the origin of life. I think some 
revisions in the model would “fix this up” but it takes some thought (and 
I would make no guarantees).
John Holland (personal communication)
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In any case, leaving aside the question of closed form analysis, a naive attempt 
at solution of the particular problems observed in a 0 might be to simply reduce 
the “temperature” of the universe (reduce the rate at which bonds decay, and 
structures get randomly moved around). It seems likely that the FullSR complex 
could be made “viable” in this way (in the lim it, if the primitive operators are 
disabled entirely, FullSR should be able to expand to the capacity set by whatever 
free atoms are initially available; thereafter, of course, all dynamic activity would 
cease); however, this is not at all the case for PartSR, which relies on the primitive 
operators to complete its reproduction. It is quite possible (though no proof 
is currently available) that PartSR would not be viable at any “temperature”. 
However, in any case, from the point of view of the problem originally posed 
by Holland (i.e. that of spontaneous emergence) any reduction in “temperature” 
would be accompanied by an increase in the expected emergence tim e for any 
particular structure or complex, and thus may be completely counterproductive.
But there is a more general point here: my purpose in studying ao was not 
concern for the problem of spontaneous emergence per se, but as an avenue to the 
solution of Pa—the demonstration of A-reproducers which are robust in the face 
of environmental perturbations (including interactions with each other). Thus, 
while one might well be able to improve the viability of certain complexes in oro 
by ad hoc measures which “protect” them from interference, this would be to 
undermine completely the purpose for which I turned to the a-Universes in the 
first place. The specific perturbations identified above, which arise in a 0, are 
precisely the kinds of things we want to allow. Again, as noted at the end of the 
previous chapter, we already know that we can achieve “viable” A-reproducers 
if we rule out, or rigidly constrain, their interactions with each other and their 
common environment, so modifications of ao which move in that direction are 
fundamentally of limited interest.
In summary, oro does not yet provide any substantive advance toward a solu­
tion of P„. The A-reproducers in oro? such as they are, are just as fragile as in 
any of the A-systems considered in the previous chapter; contrary to Holland’s 
analysis, ao does not provide any prospect for the spontaneous emergence of ro­
bust A-reproducers, and does not, therefore, provide a basis for the realisation of 
Artificial Darwinism.
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5.5.8 Can W e F ix  it?
I should note here that the original paper (Holland 1976) seems to have been 
largely ignored since its publication. I have been able to identify only two sub­
stantive discussions of it: by Martinez (1979) and Kampis (1991, Section 5.1.2). 
In both these cases the correctness of Holland’s analysis was assumed, and fur­
ther discussion was then predicated on that. Given the results which have been 
presented here, this assumption was not justified; I shall not, therefore, comment 
further on these works.
I do not, of course, know how one might best proceed in the light of the results 
which have been presented here; but there are two distinct avenues which seem  
to me worth considering further.
Firstly, it seems that at least one part of the deficiency of oto hinges on the fact 
that von Neumann style reproduction involves copying and decoding an informa­
tion carrier, where the decoding must be such as to generate (at least) a copy of 
the required copying and decoding “machinery”. a 0 fails to sustain this kind of 
behaviour because ( inter alia) the maximum information capacity of its carriers 
(in the face of the various sources of disruption) seems to be of the order of per­
haps 10 bits, which is insufficient to code for any worthwhile machinery—even 
the relatively simple copying and decoding machinery constructible in a o.
A more plausible model for the spontaneous emergence of properly genetic 
A-reproducers might therefore involve a universe in which certain information 
carriers, of capacity (say) an order of magnitude larger than that required to 
code for minimal decoding machinery (in the particular universe), can be copied 
without any specialised machinery at all. In such a system there may be poten­
tial for a Darwinian evolutionary process to begin more or less immediately, in 
which more sophisticated phenotypic properties might, incrementally, become as­
sociated with the information carriers—possibly then culminating in a full blown 
“decoding” (or embryology).
This is, of course, rather speculative; but, as it happens, it is closely related 
to a general model for the origin of terrestrial life which has been championed 
by Cairns-Smith (1982). This is based on inorganic information carriers, which 
could conceivably be replicated without the relatively complex apparatus required
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for RNA or DNA replication. It seems to me, in the light of the experimental 
results presented here, that it would now be a promising research program to 
adopt Holland’s original strategy (which is to design relatively simplified model 
chemistries, loosely based on cellular automata, in which to examine the origin 
of “life”), but to replace his detailed models (the a-Universes) with models based 
on different theoretical considerations—such as those of Cairns-Smith.
The second avenue I can envisage for challenging the limitations of «o turns 
on a point which is both subtle and fundamental. I had already raised, or at least 
anticipated, this issue in general terms in the previous chapter (section 4.3.4), and 
I referred to it again, albeit obliquely, earlier in the present chapter (section 5.3). 
In the specific context of ao it may be expressed in the form of a question: should 
complexes, such as FullSR, be properly regarded as realising self-reproduction (as 
I have done up to this) or, instead, as realising a primitive form of autopoiesis?
Briefly, the situation is this. As long as we consider an instance of an A- 
machine in ao as corresponding to a particular, fixed, set of structures, then it 
makes sense to regard the mutually recursive relations of production between 
these structures as realising a form of self-reproduction— such a set of structures 
is (in principle at least) capable of bringing new and separate instances of such 
sets into existence. But this is not the only possible way of looking at things. We 
could, instead, regard an A-machine in ao as corresponding to the set of recursive 
relations of production rather than a particular set of structures which happen 
to realise these relations. In effect, an A-machine is then identified with what 
I have previously regarded as a population of structures (or complexes) in a 0. 
These relations of production are then recognised as being autopoietic: such a 
population is (or, at least, should be) capable of sustaining itself, by virtue of 
this autopoietic organisation, despite turnover of some or all of its constituent 
structures.
From this perspective, the phenomena studied in a 0 can now be recognised 
as fundamentally related to phenomena occurring in, say, the VENUS (Rasmussen 
et al. 1990) or T ierra  (Ray 1992) systems, discussed in the previous chapter 
(see sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.3). In the present chapter I have very loosely talked 
in terms of the putative A-reproducers in ao as being potentially “robust” or 
“viable”; but the fact is that, as long as by “A-reproducer” I meant a single fixed
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set of structures, there was never any possibility of their being “autonomous” 
in the strong sense of being autopoietic. As it happens, the putative <*0 A- 
reproducers turned out not be “viable” anyway (just like the A-machine MICE 
in VENUS); but, even if they had been “viable”, it seems that it could only have 
been, at best, the cosseted “viability” of the A-reproducers in T ierra  with their 
inviolable memory allocations. By definition, no static set of structures in «o can 
realise the dynamic homeostasis of its own identity, which would be characteristic 
of properly autopoietic viability or autonomy.
By contrast, if we turn our attention to “populations” of structures in c*o—  
the equivalent of considering “organisms” in VENUS or “sociality” in T ierra  (see 
Chapter 4, section 4.3.4)—we can encounter the possibility of properly autopoi­
etic organisation. Granted, in a 0 as it stands, the autopoiesis is not effective—  
such populations actually die out—but (with the example of T ierra  before us) 
we may anticipate that some modified a-Universe could overcome this. The 
point is that the kinds of entities which we might properly regard as autonomous 
are not the kinds of entities which could be regarded as self-reproducing; and, 
moreover, the “higher level”, properly autonomous entities, are not, in general, 
self-reproducing in any sense, and are certainly not genetically self-reproducing 
in the von Neumann sense of permitting an open-ended growth in complexity.
Can we envisage a path toward making the properly autonomous entities 
( “organisms” in VENUS, “social systems” of T ierra , “populations” in c*o) self- 
reproducing, in the von Neumann sense?
Well, the first point is that to have any kind of self-reproduction, we would 
probably need some mechanism for the formation and maintenance of boundaries 
by the autopoietic entities. Some kind of boundary formation is actually part 
of the definition of fully fledged autopoiesis. Furthermore, a boundary seems 
to be logically necessary if we wish to talk about self-reproduction: unless the 
entities establish well defined boundaries then it is entirely unclear what could 
possibly qualify as self-reproduction. In VENUS, T ierra , or c*o, its they stand, 
there are no such mechanisms for boundary formation (capable of bounding the 
relevant entities). Boundary formation has, of course, been exhibited in the A- 
systems pioneered by Varela et al. (1974). These systems, by contrast to VENUS, 
T ierra  and ao, are two dimensional rather than linear. On the other hand, the
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introduction of a kind of boundary mechanism has been previously outlined by 
Martinez (1979), in a modification of ao which would still be one-dimensional. 
Thus, while two-dimensionality is probably not essential here, it certainly provides 
conceptual simplification, and makes visualisation much easier.
Incidentally, it seems plausible that the introduction of an appropriate bound­
ary mechanism could positively help in overcoming the primary deficiency of ao 
identified by the empirical tests described above, that even the putatively au- 
topoietic populations cannot actually sustain themselves.
In any case, assuming the introduction of mechanisms allowing for the con­
struction and maintenance of such boundaries, it is clear that self-reproducing 
autopoietic entities can be established, in the manner already described by Ze- 
leny (1977). Briefly, once one has a bounded autopoietic entity of any sort then, 
since it already incorporates processes capable of reestablishing all its component 
relationships, it should be a relatively trivial matter to arrange for it to progres­
sively grow larger. Once this is possible, then one need only add a mechanism  
for the boundary to rupture in such a way that it can be reformed into two 
closed parts, and a primitive form of self-reproduction is achieved. There seems 
no reason, in principle, why this general kind of process cannot be achieved in 
A-systems derived from the VENUS, T ierra  or ao models.
Doing this based on the VENUS or T ierra  models would yield a form of self- 
reproduction which might still be said to be impoverished in the sense that, 
insofar as “information carriers” are being reproduced, this is occurring by self­
inspection, without any overt genotype/phenotype distinction, or von Neumann 
style decoding. Still, although I have arrived at this from a completely distinct 
direction, this idea actually corresponds rather closely to the first suggestion 
which I outlined in this section, following Cairns-Smith (1982), of arranging for 
the possible existence of reasonably high capacity “information carriers” which 
could be “reproduced” without the aid of any special or elaborate machinery. It 
may thus be a useful, and perhaps even essential, step toward more sophisticated 
self-reproduction techniques.
Conversely, if we used ao as our starting point, and succeeded in modifying it 
to support reproduction of bounded, autopoietic, “populations”, then we would 
have entities which do exhibit a “von Neumann style decoding”; but, of course,
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they would be impoverished in a different manner, namely that the functionality 
available in ao is extremely impoverished anyway and there certainly could not 
exist a space of such autopoietic A-reproducers which would span a wide range 
of A-complexity (see the previous discussion of this point in section 5.3 above).
This is all rather vague and informal, and I do not pretend that it has more 
than heuristic value. Nonetheless, it seems that there may be some limited 
grounds for optimism here. If the various phenomena which have been sepa­
rately exhibited in this diverse range of A-systems can be consolidated into a 
single system, then it seems that some significant progress may then be possible 
in the solution of Pa.
5.6  C on clu sion
The popular view that scientists proceed inexorably from well-established 
fact to well-established fact, never being influenced by any unproved con­
jecture, is quite mistaken. Provided it is made clear which are proved facts 
and which are conjectures no harm can result. Conjectures are of great 
importance since they suggest useful lines of research.
Turing (1950, p. 442)
I should like to emphasise the debt which the work reported here owes to 
John Holland’s original formulation and analysis of the problem of spontaneous 
emergence of self-reproducing behaviour. While it has been possible to point to 
defects in that analysis, this was with the benefit of hindsight, and prompted 
by experimental evidence not available to Holland. It does not detract in any 
way from Holland’s creative achievement in formulating the possibility of such an 
investigation in the first place.
In conclusion, this chapter is a report on failure—but, I suggest, in the very 
best and most productive sense of that word. As enunciated by McDermott in 
the quotation with which I opened the chapter—and, indeed, as encapsulated in 
the Popperian theory of the evolutionary growth of knowledge—failure, or ex­
perimental refutation of predictions, is the very stuff of the so-called “scientific 
method”. Although the model universe ao fails to demonstrate the phenomena 
originally hoped for, its particular mechanisms of failure are interesting in their 
own right. These show that Pa continues to be a deep and intractable prob­
lem even in a universe which is extremely simplified, and where the dynamics
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have been deliberately tailored to make von Neumann style genetic reproduction 
“easy” to realise.
However: all human works are finite, the end of the rainbow steadily recedes, 
and we have finally reached that otherwise arbitrary point where a halt must 
be called to this cycle of conjecture and refutation. It only remains, in our 
concluding chapter, to briefly look back and consider a final, distinctive, view, 
which can be made available now that we have arrived at the end point of this 
particular journey.
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Chapter 6
Rainbow’s End?
The way in which knowledge progresses, and especially our scientific knowl­
edge, is by unjustified (and unjustifiable) anticipations, by guesses, by ten­
tative solutions to our problems, by conjectures. These conjectures are 
controlled by criticism; that is, by attempted refutations, which include 
severely critical tests. They may survive these tests; but they can never be 
positively justified: they can be established neither as certainly true nor 
even as ‘probable’ (in the sense of the probability calculus). Criticism of 
our conjectures is of decisive importance: by bringing out our mistakes it 
makes us understand the difficulties of the problem which we are trying to 
solve. This is how we become better acquainted with our problem and able 
to propose more mature solutions: the very refutation of a theory—that is, 
of any serious tentative solution to our problem—is always a step forward 
that takes us nearer to the truth. And this is how we can learn from our 
mistakes.
As we learn from our mistakes our knowledge grows, even though we may 
never know—that is, know for certain. Since our knowledge can grow, 
there can be no reason here for dispair of reason. And since we can never 
know for certain, there can be no authority here for any claim to authority, 
for conceit over our knowledge, or for smugness.
Popper (1989, Preface to the First Edition, p. vii)
This quotation from Popper captures, perhaps, the single most important 
idea in all of Popperian philosophy. It certainly identifies the central, unifying, 
theme of this Thesis: in brief, I have tried to take this Popperian philosophy and 
methodology seriously, and to apply it in the context of Artificial Intelligence.
However, there have been some diversions and digressions along the way, so it 
may be as well to finally distil out the central ideas again. These may be loosely 
represented as a series of interrelated conjectures. I shall identify each in turn, 
and comment briefly on how I have dealt with them.
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•  Conjecture: Mentality is computational.
This conjecture underlies and motivates much of AI; but it is deeply coun­
terintuitive and even repugnant. I considered two separate substantive at­
tempts to refute this conjecture—by Searle and by Popper—but concluded 
that they were flawed; this leaves the status of the conjecture open, and I 
tentatively adopted it.
•  Conjecture: Knowledge is computational.
This conjecture characterises AI in the “weak” sense, where we ask only 
that a computer system display “intelligent behaviour”, without commit­
ting ourselves as to its “genuine mentality”. In considering this conjecture, 
my primary concern was to clarify the interpretation of “knowledge”; I con­
cluded that provided we mean something like “effective anticipation” then 
knowledge is, or at least can be, computational.
•  Conjecture: Computational Knowledge can grow.
In my view this conjecture epitomises the most difficult and fundamental 
challenge within AI. Having analysed it, my conclusion was that compu­
tational knowledge can indeed grow—but only by a process of unjustified 
variation and selective retention; so the challenge becomes to design com­
putational systems which can realise such processes.
•  Conjecture: Artificial Darwinism is possible.
The point at issue here is whether artificial, computational, “knowledge” or 
“complexity” can grow by a process of Darwinian evolution. Von Neumann 
pointed out that there is a prima facie refutation of this: it seems para­
doxical that any automaton could construct another of greater complexity 
than itself. Von Neumann went on to show how this argument is, in fact 
mistaken, and such growth of complexity can be supported by a form of 
genetically based self-reproduction. This, however, leaves the question of 
autonomy—which is also required for Darwinian evolution— open.
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• Conjecture: Artificial Genesis is possible.
One plausible route to achieving artificial Darwinism is to realise some 
form of artificial genesis of Darwinian actors. I examined one very specific 
elaboration of this conjecture, in the form of Holland’s a-Universes; and 
concluded that the conjecture was refuted in that particular case, but the 
refutation was productive in suggesting some alternative reformulations.
Rather than review these various points in greater detail again, I shall try to 
finally conclude in a different way. The genesis of an idea is, of course, a different 
thing from its validity. In laying out this Thesis I have naturally tried to organise 
the material, with the considerable benefit of hindsight, into its most “logical” 
order; but this is certainly not the order in which it originated. In closing then, I 
should like to offer, briefly, that alternative perspective on the Thesis, which tries 
to show where the ideas actually came from and how they grew. I shall present it 
almost as an autobiographical record—but of course, the significance lies not in 
the World 2 of my personal subjective experiences as such, but in the additional 
insight which this narrative may yield into the World 3 problems which I have 
been concerned with.
I must start with the years from 1983 to 1987, which I spent working with 
Hyster Automated Handling Limited (HAHL), as an engineer and a manager, on 
the design of “Automatic Guided Vehicles” (AGVs)—in effect, a form of mobile 
robot— and systems thereof. I was privileged to work with an extraordinarily 
talented and enthusiastic team in HAHL over those four years; we started with 
the proverbial blank drawing board, and despite extreme youth and inexperience, 
we designed, built, and installed several successful AGV systems in Europe and 
North America.
Traditionally, AGVs had been designed to be “dumb”: for the most part, their 
functionality was controlled by some kind of off-board controller, typically a large 
central computer. In HAHL we set out to design “intelligent” AGVs; later, we 
even went so far as to call them “autonomous”. They were intended to operate, 
as far as possible, without relying on direction from any off-board, or central, 
controller. Our success in this was, of course, only partial, but it established an 
approach or objective which has since become standard in the industry.
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I arrived in Dublin City University (then the National Institute for Higher Ed­
ucation, Dublin) in June 1987. In making this move I was specifically motivated 
by a desire to investigate some of the deeper, fundamental, problems of building 
genuinely “autonomous” systems. I was conscious of the fact that, despite our 
successes in HAHL, these vehicles were still, in truth, very stupid, if they were 
compared with even the simplest of biological organisms. While, from a practi­
cal, technological, point of view, the brute force method of trying to “engineer” 
smarter machines still seemed like the correct way forward, I was convinced that, 
in the longer term, more fundamental advances would be required.
Given this background, it was a small step to the idea of mechanising some 
kind of Darwinian process— after all, that was how biological organisms were 
“designed”. I was not yet aware of the complexities underlying this idea!
My earliest investigations were concerned with the work by Holland (1986) 
on Classifier Systems, and Reeke & Edelman (1988) on Neural Darwinism; I felt 
that there were significant underlying parallels between these apparently separate 
developments (McMullin 1988). I gradually expanded outward to identify other 
workers who had formulated what appeared to be related approaches (McMullin
1989). I recognised a common core here, concerning the growth of computational 
knowledge through some kind of essentially recursive or self-referencing process. I 
dubbed this rather vague idea the reflexive hypothesis; I was conscious that there 
was a danger of paradox or infinite regress here, which I characterised by the 
question Who Teaches the Teacher? (McMullin 1990). I had stumbled— though 
I surely did not yet recognise it—on the problem of induction.
I am not sure when I first read Popper’s Objective Knowledge: An Evolu­
tionary Approach (Popper 1979); but I know that I returned to this marvellous 
collection of essays many times, and it provided immeasurable clarification for 
the whole enterprise.1 More specifically, Popper provided me with a coherent 
account of how the regress implicit in the evolutionary growth of knowledge can 
be made benign rather than vicious, and this allowed me to examine the prob­
lem situation in Artificial Intelligence, and machine learning, with a quite new
xIt is, of course, for this reason th a t I chose to  play on Popper’s title  in nam ing th is Thesis.
276
perspective. This ultimately produced the detailed discussion presented here in 
Chapter 3.
However, I was also conscious that Popper rejected physicalism in general, 
and computationalism in particular (Popper & Eccles 1977). If I was to continue 
with the methodology of computationalism, I needed to at least understand these 
views of Popper. Coincidentally, John Searle’s rather different criticisms of com­
putationalism were also receiving something of a revival at about this tim e (Searle
1990). I found that I was sympathetic with the intuitions being expressed by both 
Popper and Searle—computationalism is certainly not an attractive idea—but I 
could not accept that their arguments were remotely decisive. This critique of 
Searle and Popper became, in effect, Chapter 2 of the present work.
Somewhat in parallel with these developments, I was still working on the 
problem of realising a “satisfactory” form of Artificial Darwinism. I was not sure 
what I meant by “satisfactory”, but I was sure that the things I had found in 
the literature (such as the “Genetic Algorithm” in particular) were not it. At 
this point it seemed to me that, if I wanted to achieve a spontaneous growth of 
knowledge or complexity, I might just as well ask for the spontaneous emergence 
or genesis of complexity. Informally, I wanted to reduce, or eliminate, the pos­
sibility that I, as the developer or programmer, would be directly or indirectly 
“injecting” complexity into the system; and it seemed that this constraint would 
surely be satisfied if the system were started in a totally “random” or “chaotic” 
state.
I then came upon Holland’s description of the a-Universes, and, in particular, 
the system which I have called ao, and which Holland analysed in detail (Holland 
1976). While the functionality or “potential” for organisation that would be 
possible in a 0 was clearly extremely limited, it did seem like this could provide 
a good starting point for the kinds of system I wanted to investigate. Moreover, 
by this stage I wanted to tackle something more concrete. I found Holland’s 
theoretical analysis extremely difficult to follow, and I therefore resolved to carry 
out an empirical investigation. That is, I would build ao, and play with it. On 
the one hand, this would help me understand and probe Holland’s theoretical 
results, and I would also then be in a position to decide how to enhance ao in an 
effort to achieve more substantive spontaneous organisation.
277
In the event of course, I discovered that a 0 was significantly more complicated 
in its behaviour than Holland had anticipated, and the predictions of his analysis 
did not hold up in practice. This rather stymied the idea of “simply” enhancing 
a 0. First indications of the negative results regarding ao were informally commu­
nicated at the AICS ’89 conference, held in DCU in September 1989; following 
much more extensive testing, a concise published account eventually appeared 
as (McMullin 1992d). The fully detailed description of this work, including a 
complete formal specification of ao (which was neither required nor provided by 
Holland), now comprises, of course, the substantial part of Chapter 5 of this 
Thesis.
I was extremely dissatisfied with the outcome of the experiments on a 0, but 
was very unclear on how to possibly move beyond them. While Holland did not 
say so explicitly, it was clear that the kind of “genetic” self-reproduction which 
he had envisaged would emerge in a 0 had been inspired by John von Neumann’s 
work on “self-reproducing automata” (Burks 1966d). I therefore resolved to study 
this original work by von Neumann carefully. This turned into a very prolonged 
exercise. Adopting a Popperian approach I tried to ask what problem(s) von Neu­
mann had been trying to solve; and I found that the answers which seemed to 
be offered by Burks, and by various subsequent commentators, did not stand up 
to critical examination. In particular, it seemed to me that the idea of “uni­
versal construction” which von Neumann had formulated had been subsequently 
interpreted in a variety of different, and mutually contradictory, ways. Evidently 
something was amiss, but I was not at all sure just what.
What was clear to me was that von Neumann was concerned with the growth 
of “complexity” by essentially Darwinian means—and that he was only interested 
in self-reproduction as a means to this end. I conjectured that a von Neumann 
style “genetic” self-reproduction might be some kind of necessary condition for 
such Darwinian evolution, and that this was von Neumann’s “result”. I was 
strongly influenced in this view by the various writings of the evolutionary biolo­
gist Richard Dawkins, especially The Selfish Gene (Dawkins 1989b) and Universal 
Darwinism  (Dawkins 1983). Dawkins seemed to have arrived at a similar con­
clusion in regard to the necessity of “genetic” self-reproduction, though by an 
entirely independent route.
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There followed an interlude, during which I attempted an intensive study 
of at least a selected fragment of the literature of evolutionary biology, in an 
attempt to make sure that I properly understood Darwinian theory in its orig­
inal setting. As a result I attempted to reformulate the theory in an entirely 
abstract form (McMullin 1992a), and then reviewed biological (or shall we say 
“organismic”) Darwinism from this perspective (McMullin 1992b). Finally, and 
most importantly, I used this as a basis for an extensive and detailed critique of 
Dawkins’ “genic selectionism”, showing first of all that the presentations of it have 
sometimes been less than consistent, and secondly trying to separate out those 
elements which can be successfully defended (McMullin 1992c). I had originally 
intended that all this biological material would be integrated into the Thesis; but, 
in the event, it expanded to far too great a length, and was not essential to the 
understanding of the other material in any case; it was therefore separated out 
into the several technical reports just cited.
While this biological review no longer appears overtly in the text of the Thesis, 
it had a very important and necessary effect, nonetheless. It was only after com­
pleting this exercise that I was able to properly formulate the detailed analysis 
and re-interpretation of von Neumann’s work which now appears as Chapter 4. 
Specifically, as long as I tentatively accepted Dawkins’ doctrine of genic selec­
tionism, I was not able to clearly envisage what problem von Neumann might 
have been attempting to solve. Contrariwise, once I had satisfied myself that 
genic selectionism, in Dawkins’ terms, could be validly rejected (or, at least, rad­
ically diluted), I was free to recognise von Neumann’s true achievement: this was 
to show, not that genetic self-reproduction is a necessary aspect of Darwinian 
evolution, but that it is one possible means of allowing such evolution. That is, 
von Neumann’s problem was to show how a spontaneous growth of complexity 
could be possible at all in a mechanistic world.
With this resolution of my doubts about von Neumann’s work, it was time to 
return again to the o-Universes, and the question of spontaneous emergence of 
von Neumann style self-reproducing automata. Having once established what 
problem von Neumann had solved, it became clear, by omission, what was 
outstanding—and, indeed, what should be sought from any revised or enhanced 
version of a 0- I initially expressed this in terms of words like “robustness” and
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“viability”, and the connection between these things and the possibility of nat­
ural selection. It was with the benefit of this idea that I criticised the more 
recently published attempts at artificial Darwinism, such as VENUS (Rasmussen 
et al. 1990) and T ie rra  (Ray 1992). But it was only when I discovered the notion 
of autonomy in the technical sense of autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela 1980), that 
the final element fell into place. It was this that gave me the concepts and vo­
cabulary which allowed me to properly complete the discussion of a 0, VENUS and 
T ie rra , and to draw out the fundamental similarities between these superficially 
diverse systems, and to identify the prospects for a future synthesis.
With this very late addition, the Thesis was finally completed; or at least as 
complete as any such work ever can be.
And as to the end of the rainbow? I do not know now whether, as a child, 
I really believed that I could get there; or if, having arrived, I would find the 
unfortunate Leprechaun’s crock of gold, and quickly, quietly, steal it away. But 
though I chased many rainbows then, and since, I did gradually realise that the 
fun was in the chase, and in the beauty of the rainbow itself.
This has been a particularly long and exhausting chase; and there is no crock 
of gold awaiting us this time either. But, finally looking back now at this paper 
rainbow, I still love it, for it is my rainbow, and I painted it myself.
To conclude, I think that there is only one way to science—or to philosophy, 
for that matter: to meet a problem, to see its beauty and fall in love with 
it; to get married to it, and to live with it happily, till death do ye part— 
unless you should meet another and even more fascinating problem, or 
unless, indeed, you should obtain a solution. But even if you do obtain a 
solution, you may then discover, to your delight, the existence of a whole 
family of enchanting though perhaps difficult problem children for whose 
welfare you may work, with a purpose, to the end of your days.
Popper (1983, Preface 1956, p. 8)
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Epilogue
“Are you going to listen to what I  am telling you about the Lepre- 
caun?” said the Thin Woman.
“I am not,” said the Philosopher. “It has been suggested that we 
go to sleep at night because it is then too dark to do anything else; but 
owls, who are a venerably sagacious folk, do not sleep in the nighttime. 
Bats, also, are a very clear-minded race; they sleep in the broadest 
day, and they do it in a charming manner. They clutch the branch of 
a tree with their toes and hang head downwards—a position which I  
consider singularly happy, for the rush of blood to the head consequent 
on this inverted position should engender a drowsiness and a certain 
imbicility of mind which must either sleep or explode.”
“Will you never be done talking?” shouted the Thin Woman pas­
sionately.
“I will not,” said the Philosopher. “In certain ways sleep is use­
ful. It is an excellent way of listening to an opera or seeing pictures 
on a bioscope. As a medium for day-dreams I  know of nothing that 
can equal it. As an accomplishment it is graceful, but as a means of 
spending a night it is intolerably ridiculous. I f  you were going to say 
anything, my love, please say it now, but you should always remem­
ber to think before you speak. A woman should be seen seldom but 
never heard. Quietness is the beginning of virtue. To be silent is to 
be beautiful. Stars do not make a noise. Children should always be in 
bed. These are serious truths, which cannot be controverted; therefore, 
silence is fitting as regards them .”
“Your stirabout is on the hob, ” said the Thin Woman. “You can 
get it for yourself. I would not move the breadth of my nail if  you were 
dying of hunger. I hope there’s lumps in it. A Leprecaun from Gort 
na Cloca Mora was here to-day. They’ll give it to you for robbing their 
pot of gold. You old thief, you! you lob-eared, crock-kneed fat-eye!”
The Thin Woman whizzed suddenly from where she stood and 
leaped into bed. From beneath the blanket she turned a vivid, furi­
ous eye on her husband. She was trying to give him rheumatism and 
toothache and lockjaw all at once. If she had been satisfied to concen­
trate all her attention on one only of these torments she might have 
succeeded in afflicting her husband according to her wish, but she was 
not able to do that.
uFinality is death. Perfection is finality. Nothing is perfect. There 
are lumps in i t ,” said the Philosopher.
James Stephens 
The Crock of Gold
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